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 Introduction
Julian Hanich/Daniel Fairfax
Fifty years ago, a young Belgian psychologist wrote a short book for a small 
publisher in the Belgian town of Leuven, a book that had little resonance in 
the French-speaking world and was almost completely overlooked elsewhere. 
The psychologist, 27 years old at the time, was Jean-Pierre Meunier, and his 
study bore the title Les Structures de l’expérience filmique: L’identification 
filmique.1 Meunier, born in 1941 in Namur (Wallonia), had studied psychology 
at the Catholic University in Leuven from 1960 to 1964, and subsequently 
became a chercheur at the Centre des techniques de diffusion under the 
auspices of Victor Bachy, one of the f irst professors to teach f ilm courses at a 
Belgian university. Later promoted to research assistant, Meunier joined an 
interdisciplinary team consisting of philosophers, psychologists, specialists 
in law, and sociologists to study the effects of media. It was at that time that 
he developed a phenomenological approach to the study of f ilm and set out 
to write The Structures of the Film Experience.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is diff icult to overlook that the year 1969, 
when the book appeared in a simple green and white cover, was hardly 
fertile terrain for a rigorous phenomenological study – one that was heavily 
influenced by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Husserl, but also by psychological 
research on perception (Albert Michotte van den Berck, Henri Wallon) and 
psychoanalytic conceptions of identif ication (Angelo Hesnard). Needless 
to say, on intellectual highways crowded by powerfully motored semiotic, 
psychoanalytic, and Marxist trucks that were headed in a decidedly political 
direction, Meunier’s little vehicle did not gain much headway. Trying to 
retain the value of describing the subjective experience of viewers from 
the f irst person, it seemed outdated theoretically and outmoded politically.
And yet, some people did read the book and were impressed by it. Dudley 
Andrew, who discovered the book in a Parisian bookshop, was one of its 
f irst champions. In his influential article “The Neglected Tradition of Phe-
nomenology in Film Theory” from 1978, Andrew was struck by how Meunier 
“describe[s], and account[s] for the peculiar fascination and momentum 
belonging to various types of f ilm, from home movies through narrative 
features.”2 In 1983, Jacques Aumont, Alain Bergala, Michel Marie, and Marc 
Vernet included Meunier in a list of recommended readings at the end of a 
chapter on the spectator in their L’Esthétique du film.3 Later, in Du Visage 
au cinéma (1992), Aumont described Meunier’s book as an “authentically 
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Sartrean attempt” to theorize the f ilmic spectator, an attempt that was so 
far removed in time for him, however, that it already seemed dated at the 
time of its appearance.4 At the end of the 1990s, Vivian Sobchack sat down 
with an English-French dictionary and slowly worked her way through the 
book to fully grasp Meunier’s important contribution to understanding the 
viewer’s relation not only to the fiction film, but also to the documentary film 
and the home movie (or film-souvenir, as the more specif ic term in French 
would have it). In her article “Towards a Phenomenology of Nonfictional Film 
Experience” (1999), Sobchack describes The Structures of the Film Experience 
as “an undeservedly neglected book” that “offers the premises and potential 
for an enriched understanding of how dynamic and fluid our engagement 
with the cinema really is.”5 Meunier’s text also found resonances in other 
Fig. 1: Jean-Pierre Meunier’s private copy of his book.
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ways: for instance, it left a profound impression on the young Marie-Aude 
Baronian, who, as she recalls in her contribution to this volume, found 
the book in her father’s private collection on cinema and philosophy, an 
encounter that resulted in a moment of epiphany for the future scholar.
Meunier’s attention to home movies, highly unusual as it was for its 
time, is a good example of one of the most astonishing facets of his book: in 
some respects, The Structures of the Film Experience predates later research 
by decades. For instance, as Robert Sinnerbrink shows, Meunier came up 
with very similar categories of character identif ication to those devised 
by Murray Smith more than 25 years later in his influential book Engaging 
Characters (1995).6 Long before Hans Jürgen Wulff rejected the notion that 
viewers empathize with single characters and instead suggested the idea 
of an “empathic f ield,”7 Meunier had described characters in the cinema as 
“relational nodal points” or “characters-for-other-characters”: “They define 
themselves with respect to other characters and the objective elements 
(or rather ‘objectif iable’ elements), which characterize them, only have 
meaning in the social context specif ic to the f ilm” (p. 137). Moreover, much 
like Noël Carroll many years after him, Meunier rejects overblown ideas 
of a total fusion with characters in identif ication (even while insisting on 
a certain loss of the self):
I must act ‘as if ’ I were in the place of the characters, ‘as if ’ I possessed 
their bodies and possibilities. And yet, this ‘as if,’ imposed by the insur-
mountable distance between that behavior which remains inexorably 
before my own self, remains implicit for consciousness, and renders the 
realization of the relationship impossible. This is because ‘acting’ at being 
like another person implies that, at the same time, I deny that I simply 
am this other person (p. 134).8
Similarly, his brief but incisive remarks on f ilm stars, although following 
in the footsteps of Edgar Morin’s Les stars (The Stars, 1957), a book Meunier 
knew, predate Richard Dyer’s more extensive work on that topic from the 
late 1970s and 1980s.9 This alone would justify devoting closer attention to 
Meunier’s study.
Here, we publish The Structures of the Film Experience for the f irst time 
in English translation, and complement the text with a collection of essays 
that historically locate it, critically discuss its merits, and extend it into 
territory far beyond its original habitat. This is more than a philological 
favor to those interested in the history of f ilm theory (particularly in f ilm 
phenomenology, but also in cognitivism, f ilmology, and psychoanalytic f ilm 
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theory). For various reasons, Meunier’s book remains a fascinating read, a 
quality that has to do with its assured tone and reasoned argumentation, 
an argumentation refuting contemporaneous positions as convincingly as 
it smoothly incorporates scholarly f indings. While the book, except for a 
few references to f ilmologists like Michotte van den Berck, Jean-Jacques 
Rinieri, or François Ricci, contains hardly any footnotes referencing the 
f ilm theory of its time, the young author shows a profound familiarity with 
the phenomenological literature of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.
Meunier’s book, and this is not the least of its qualities, demonstrates f ilm 
phenomenology from its most intriguing and convincing side. The work does 
not limit itself to a subjectivist account of an idiosyncratic viewer response, 
but provides a description of the recurring structures of the f ilm-viewing 
experience. As Meunier unmistakably def ines his own phenomenological 
description of identif ication: “It is not a matter, of course, of elucidating 
particular forms of behavior – for example, a given identif ication of a given 
subject with a given person – through the concrete modalities of their realiza-
tion, but, rather, of unveiling the invariable aspect in these particular forms 
of behavior” (p. 34, emphasis added). Implicitly distancing himself from the 
subjectivism of what today often goes by the name of ‘f ilm phenomenology,’ 
Meunier sets out to describe from a generalized f irst-person perspective the 
invariable differences between three modes of spectatorial engagement: the 
home-movie attitude, the documentary attitude, and the f iction attitude. As 
the contributions to this volume show, these distinctions are as stimulating 
for further phenomenological explorations as they are in need of amendment 
and further differentiation.
If not every detail of the book survives equally well after 50 years, this 
was entirely expected, even hoped for by the author. At the end of his 
introduction, Meunier writes modestly but with an unabashed belief in 
the progress of scholarly insight:
Inevitably, the views expressed here will be criticized, corrected and 
even refuted with scientif ic progress in the f ield. Unavoidably, too, some 
(possibly important) aspects of the problems occupying us will escape 
us or will not be given the space they deserve. But what we do hope will 
come out of this work is that, beyond its imperfections, it shows some 
contours of the truth, some new insights, some interesting perspectives 
and that, above all, it provides a source of inspiration for new hypotheses 
conducive to advancing the cause of f ilmology” (p. 36/37).10
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 “Every Theory Needs a Reference to 
Lived Experience” : An Interview with 
Jean-Pierre Meunier
Julian Hanich/Daniel Fairfax
Your book came out in 1969 when you were still a very young scholar. Can you 
tell us a bit about the years leading up to your writing of The Structures of 
the Film Experience? 1
Jean-Pierre Meunier: From 1960 to 1964, I did a degree in psychology at 
the Catholic University of Leuven/Louvain. At that time, the teaching of 
psychology was very diverse. It naturally included many courses of so-called 
scientif ic psychology, like experimental psychology and psychometrics. But, 
on the other hand, often in opposition to the pure and hard experimentalist 
tendency, many teachings gave a relatively important place to psychoanalysis 
and phenomenology. These currents of thought that emphasized the lived 
experience and existential problems interested many students. The “spirit of 
the time,” to use an expression that served as the title of a beautiful book by 
Edgar Morin, was still strongly marked by existentialism and very little by 
Marxism.2 In this context, individual existence gains more attention than 
the systems and structures of which it is a part. Hence, the interest in the 
relations with others and the relation with oneself, and also the interest of 
many – and, in any case, me – in the notion of identif ication. I remember 
our interest in Freud’s concept of narcissism, and toward the end of my 
studies in 1964, in a text by Jacques Lacan, still little known at the time, 
about the mirror stage.
This is something today’s psychology students might be very astonished to 
hear: that in your psychology lectures and seminars you were reading Freud, 
Lacan, and phenomenology.
JPM: Belgians are very eclectic. During my studies, there were courses on 
experimental psychology, but also courses that presented Jean-Paul Sartre 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. And, at this time, they also began to give some 
attention to Lacan. There is a good Belgian author, Alphonse de Waelhens, 
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who wrote an interesting book, La philosophie et les expériences naturelles, 
in which he merged phenomenology and the theory of Lacan.3
After your studies and before writing The Structures of the Film Experience, 
you worked on a study of a single film: La Vie conjugale (Anatomy of a Mar-
riage, 1964) by André Cayatte.4
JPM: Yes, this was an empirical research project about the reception of the 
f ilm, and I was employed as assistant to Professor Victor Bachy from the 
institute of political and social sciences in my university, who had set up a 
media research center, the Centre des techniques de diffusion. Its intention 
was to bring together researchers from different backgrounds to develop an 
interdisciplinary approach to media. I arrived in 1964, at the right moment, to 
occupy one of the positions he reserved to psychologists to f inish empirical 
research dealing with the reception of Cayatte’s f ilm. It would be too long to 
talk about this study in detail, but suffice it to say that it allowed me to point 
out in the responses of the f ilm’s spectators obvious traces of identif ication 
with the characters, because the responses given by men and women were 
noticeably different. And it also helped me to convince Professor Bachy of 
the interest of the notion of identif ication.
Fig. 2: Meunier during the first part of the interview on 23 november 2017 in Frankfurt am Main.
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Where did the importance of phenomenology in your work come from?
JPM: What I learned from phenomenology during my studies convinced 
me that the phenomenological approach to the lived experience of the 
spectator constituted the best approach to the f ilm experience. When I 
was a student, I read Sartre’s The Imaginary, and when I was employed by 
the Centre des techniques de diffusion, Professor Victor Bachy invited me to 
work on my ideas in one of his courses on f ilm. It is within the framework of 
this course that I developed a phenomenological approach to the cinematic 
imaginary: I remembered the importance of the distinctions Sartre made 
between different ways of paying attention to reality, as existent or non-
existent. In fact, I had three frames of reference to orient my reflection. 
First: the description of image consciousness proposed by Sartre in The 
Imaginary, whose different forms of image consciousness seemed to me to 
correspond to the main types of cinematic representation: home movies 
( films-souvenir), documentary f ilms, f iction f ilms. Second: the concept of 
identif ication proposed by psychoanalyst Angelo Hesnard, who wrote on 
the phenomenological conception of intersubjectivity. Third: a number 
of articles from the Revue internationale de filmologie, which I had just 
discovered in the faculty library – mainly articles by psychologists like Henri 
Wallon and Albert Michotte van den Berck as well as Gilbert Cohen-Séat.
That’s the beauty of serendipity: you go to the library, you browse, and you 
find something you have never looked for. How did you come across Angelo 
Hesnard, a psychoanalyst who is lesser known today?
JPM: Also by accident, when I was walking through the library. I knew that 
Hesnard tried to compose a phenomenology focusing on human relations, 
intersubjectivity, and psychoanalysis.
Did you also read the texts of André Bazin back then?
JPM: No. I was mostly unfamiliar with Bazin. I only knew a little of his work.
But filmology was important for your work?
JPM: Yes, I was really inspired by Cohen-Séat, Morin, Michotte van den Berck, 
and some of Jean Mitry’s writings. Certainly by Michotte and Cohen-Séat, 
because they highlighted the role of mimesis in spectatorial participation: 
there is a correspondence between the body of the character and the mimetic 
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body of the spectator. For Cohen-Séat, this implies that the spectator no 
longer truly has awareness of himself. As for Michotte van den Berck, he said 
that, at bottom, the spectator no longer has his own sensations – he forgets 
them. For the spectator, the character has become his external aspect. So 
there are two complementary aspects: the spectator forgets himself, and, 
for him, the character has become akin to his external aspect. This is what 
impressed me the most, because here we f ind the entire problem of f ilmic 
identif ication, as I tried to explain in The Structures of the Film Experience 
and, a fortiori, in my second book Essai sur l’image et la communication. In 
The Structures of the Film Experience, the home-movie attitude was not really 
important for me. It was just a way to f ind my bearings: to show that, in the 
f iction attitude, protention and retention are so strong that the spectator 
effectively forgets himself, whereas in documentaries and home movies 
there is still some relationship with the real.
You mentioned the three main influences of your work that structured The 
Structures of the Film Experience. You also have the triple structure in your 
distinction between fiction attitude, documentary attitude, and home-movie 
attitude. Is there an importance of the number three for you?
JPM: For me, at the time, the triptych f iction attitude/documentary at-
titude/home-movie attitude was especially interesting for highlighting 
the experience of the viewer of f iction. My interest was in the f iction-f ilm, 
and only in the f iction-f ilm. But Sartre’s distinctions allowed me to show 
that, in the home movie, we are looking for people in general, for the 
style of the person, but we still stay within reality. When you look at a 
photograph of somebody you know, you are situated in a certain time 
and place; when you follow a f iction f ilm, you are not in the real world. It 
seems to me that it is the home-movie attitude that has come to the fore 
now. Perhaps it is due to technological change, which has allowed for an 
unprecedented multiplication of image-memories and representations 
of oneself.
What were the fiction films that you were predominantly interested in at the 
time?
JPM: Fellini, Godard, Truffaut, of course. The nouvelle vague. But also com-
edies like Georges Lautner’s Les Tontons-flingueurs (Monsieur Gangster, 1963). 
I went to the cinema very often and I saw a lot of movies at that time. The 
period was rich in outstanding f ilms: À bout de souffle (Breathless, 1960) by 
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Godard, L’Avventura (1960) by Antonioni, La Dolce Vita (1960) by Fellini – all 
f ilms which testify to the phenomena of empathy and identif ication that 
the cinema arouses, and that interested me in The Structures of the Film 
Experience.
What was the cinema scene in Louvain like?
JPM: Louvain is a city with a big university. At the time, there were cinemas, 
whose programs were like in other big cities, but there were also ciné-clubs 
for the students, with a special choice of experimental f ilms, etc.
Did you also frequent the famous Cinémathèque belge in Brussels?
JPM: At this time, never. I was a student in psychology, not cinema. I simply 
had the chance to be employed by a communications department as a 
psychologist.
In the late 1960s, you then wrote The Structures of the Film Experience as a 
research assistant for Victor Bachy.
JPM: Yes. The book came out as part of a new collection launched by Profes-
sor Bachy to publicize the work of our research center. It was put out by 
a modest Louvain publisher called Vander. But the collection was too 
discreet to be known beyond a very narrow cycle of researchers, especially 
because, since 1969, attention had already shifted signif icantly towards 
structuralism in its various forms. In this new intellectual context, the 
image in general became a sign and the cinema became a special kind of 
language. Suspected of subjectivism and even of idealism, phenomenology 
as a method disappeared, to give way to the formalism of semiology. I 
believe that without the attention that Vivian Sobchack and a few others 
gave to The Structures of Film Experience, the book would likely have fallen 
into oblivion. It seems that it is now enjoying a new life f ifty years after 
its release.
What was your first reaction when you heard that your book was coming out 
in English translation?
JPM: I was indeed very surprised, because for me it was a text that had 
been buried by several layers of structuralism, pragmatism, etc. It was 
something that I did not think would have been interesting to return to. But 
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on the other hand, I feel like there is a broader groundswell of interest in 
the phenomenological approach. This aspect did not surprise me so much. 
I was quite happy, in the end, to see this newfound interest in an old work 
that had been rarely cited in the French academic literature.
Did you know Vivian Sobchack’s essay “Toward a Phenomenology of Nonfic-
tional Film Experience” from 1999, in which she introduces the ideas of The 
Structures of the Film Experience to non-French speakers?
JPM: Not at all.
There was no dialogue between you and Sobchack?
JPM: None whatsoever. It was only later that I encountered her work, in the 
special issue of Studia Phaenomenologica on “Film and Phenomenology” 
that Christian Ferencz-Flatz and Julian Hanich published, for which we 
both wrote an article.5 Before that, I didn’t know her at all.
Were you aware of other resonances your text had in the English-speaking 
world?
JPM: No. It’s astonishing, but perhaps it was because this all took place in 
f ilm theory, and I have mostly abandoned this terrain. For me, it turned 
into a marginal area. I became a professor of general semiology and the 
general theory of communication, so problems relating to the image were 
no longer specif ic for me. I understood them in a more general framework, 
relating to audio-scripto-visual communication. So I was focused on the 
image only within complex messages, and I was no longer occupied with 
the specif ic literature on the cinema.
Before you became a professor in general semiology, you had to write a 
dissertation. It was entitled Image et perception: essai de description phé-
noménologique de l’expérience f ilmique and was later published as your 
second book under a different title: the still untranslated Essai sur l’image et 
la communication.6
JPM: Indeed. I wrote it in the early 1970s, and in the 1970s nobody in my 
department was interested in phenomenology anymore. It was the time for 
semiology, for narratology, for Lacan and Althusser. I wrote my thesis because 
I was obliged to have a thesis to continue my career at the university, and of 
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course I continued with what I knew: phenomenology. I was also interested 
in semiology, but it was easier for me to go on with what I knew. In The 
Structures of the Film Experience, I had taken Sartre as the framework, but 
the second book was based on Merleau-Ponty: namely, his books Structure of 
Behavior (La Structure du comportement) and Phenomenology of Perception 
(La Phénoménologie de la perception), two works which I studied deeply at 
that time. It seemed to me that what Merleau-Ponty said about perception, 
which is inspired by Husserl, what is called the perspectivism of perception, 
was a very interesting way to comprehend the f iction-attitude. In my book, 
I compared the real and the unreal.
The thesis was finished in 1972, but the book only came out in 1980. Why did 
it take so long?
JPM: There were no more publishers ready to publish a book of phenomenol-
ogy at that time. It was very diff icult. In France, it was not possible, nor in 
Belgium. I myself was rather uncertain about the value of phenomenology 
at that time. So I delayed the publication for a few years, until the day that 
my thesis supervisor told me that I must publish my thesis. So I found a 
very little publisher in Louvain, whose name was Cabay, which has since 
become a big publisher (but not thanks to me…).
Fig. 3: Meunier in 1972 during a public lecture that was part of the requirements to acquire the 
doctoral degree in his faculty.
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Even more than The Structures of the Film Experience, the second book was 
overshadowed by new intellectual currents.
JPM: Yes, indeed. Let me briefly go through the history of this: interest in 
phenomenology had completely died out as a result of the waves of struc-
turalism, Marxism, materialism, which served to rediscover the materiality 
of language. For these studies (semiology, narratology, and other types of 
formalism), there was nothing but codes. Nonetheless, there was also the 
famous special issue of Communications on psychoanalysis and cinema, 
with articles by Christian Metz, Jean-Louis Baudry, and others, who were 
inspired by Lacanian psychoanalysis.7 Here, you can indeed f ind an interest 
for the lived experience. They weren’t doing phenomenology in a Husserlian, 
Sartrean, or Merleau-Pontian vein, but they did pay heed to lived experience. 
And when, for example, Metz in The Imaginary Signifier described the 
f ilm-viewer as an all-perceiving subject, it goes without saying that I saw the 
relationship with what I had written in Essai sur l’image et la communication. 
We were both concerned with perspectivism.
As I said, in The Structures of the Film Experience, my point of departure 
was Sartre and his different imaginary attitudes. Essai sur l’image et la 
communication was based more on Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and on 
their description of the perspectivism that characterizes perception. This 
notion, fundamental for phenomenology, takes account of the fact that, in 
our experience of the real, what we perceive is mediated by its perspectival 
aspect, and that, therefore, it always exceeds our vision. This is true both for 
the perception of objects and for the perception of other people. Perceiving 
a cube (to take the classical example) involves perceiving a volume through 
a prof ile that can only show us three sides – the other sides are merely 
anticipated. As Merleau-Ponty put it: “The ‘things’ in naïve experience are 
evident as perspectival beings: it is essential to them, both to offer themselves 
without interposed milieu and to reveal themselves only gradually and 
never completely […]; I grasp in a perspectival appearance, which I know 
is only one of its possible aspects, the thing itself which transcends it.”8 It is 
the same for other people. I can only perceive certain forms of behavior, but 
understanding them is akin to slipping into a life grasped as a totality (as a 
general manner of being or as a style of behavior) since the perceived gestures 
become meaningful for us from a mass of other possible gestures – possible 
but not immediately accessible, and which thus remain hypothetical. As 
with objects, the other person always transcends our vision.
On this basis, I tried to show that unreal objects and people do not have 
this transcendental character. They do appear to us in perspective, as in 
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reality, but we know that the perceived prof iles (the perceived aspects of 
objects, or the behavior of the character) only have an imaginary existence, 
that they do not really imply other possible prof iles, and that the totalities 
that we aim for through them are entirely constituted by us, by our gaze. By 
slipping into the gestures of a f ictional character, we bestow them with a life 
and an imaginary interiority which is wholly the result of our projections.
Here you show some similarities to other film theorists from this period.
JPM: Yes, indeed. From this derive some of the major characteristics of the 
f ilmic experience described by f ilm theorists: the sentiment of being an 
“all-perceiving subject” (to adopt Metz’s expression), as well as the forgetting 
of the self (the “absence of reflexive duplication” noted by Cohen-Séat) and 
identif ication such as described by Michotte (in the cinema, the character 
“becomes, so to speak the external aspect of the person of the spectator”). 
In the end, it is the extent to which what is perceived no longer has any real 
(transcendental) alterity that we lose a sense of difference and of our own 
identity. I can’t delve any further, here, into the details of this explanation, 
nor into the nuances that arise from it. I will simply add that, as opposed 
to Metz, who was inspired by Lacan, I do not conceive of the cinema as 
an ideological apparatus, but as a dispositif that allows for many different 
forms of identif ication, empathy, comprehension, projection, etc. In Metz, 
the idea of the all-perceiving subject is based on an identif ication with the 
camera; I based it on the perceptive characteristics of the image. So Metz 
and I had similar ideas about an all-perceiving subject. But in contrast to 
Metz I didn’t conceive of the cinema as an ideological apparatus. Metz 
used this idea to condemn the cinema. For Baudry, too, and especially for 
him, the cinema is an ideological apparatus, as he wrote in his famous 1970 
article for Cinéthique.9
Did you have any contact with Roger Odin, who later developed a semio-
pragmatic approach in which, in a somewhat similar way to your triptych, 
he distinguishes modes of reading a fiction film, a documentary film, and a 
home movie?
JPM: I have never met Odin. I noted with interest that he made distinctions 
similar to those that I proposed (between the f iction f ilm, the documentary, 
and the ‘family f ilm’), but his semio-pragmatic approach (founded on the 
notions of the institution and the corresponding reading) is noticeably 
different from mine, which is more psychological in nature.
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You had done this already ten to fifteen years earlier.
JPM: In a way, yes. But I’m not saying he got it from me! He took a different 
path.
After you became a professor of general semiology, you gradually lost interest 
in phenomenology and film?
JPM: When I was writing Essai sur l’image et la communication, I was still 
using phenomenology, and we could still speak in those terms, because 
structuralism was not yet dominant. Then people lost interest entirely, and 
took to speaking of structures, codes, etc. And I followed this movement. 
Also, f ilm courses in the strict sense practically disappeared from my 
department after Professor Bachy left. I had a f ilmology course that was 
canceled, because the department oriented itself more towards journal-
ism and public relations. I was in this department and I became more 
interested in semiology, pragmatics, and educative messages. At bottom, I 
followed two orientations: the general theory of communication, and more 
specif ically, educational communication, that is, documentary, pedagogical 
communication, museology, and the like. So the cinema disappeared from 
my f ield of interests. But I have always kept a phenomenological thread, 
because in my courses on semio-pragmatics, I have taught the pragmatics 
of Austin, Searle, Grice, and others, but also certain works relating to 
messages combining images, writing, speech, etc.
It’s interesting that you mention that phenomenology remained important for 
you. Already in The Structures of the Film Experience, you voiced a strong 
critique of positivism in filmology, from a phenomenological point of view. You 
argued that there are things that quantification cannot take account of – such 
as subjective experience.
JPM: To tell the truth, I am not aware of that many positivist attempts 
at quantif ication in the cinema. For Michotte, phenomenology was very 
important, and I wanted to take this even further. Phenomenology was 
important even for anthropologists like Morin. They were a little outside of 
Husserlian phenomenology and philosophical questions in the strict sense, 
but they made reference, in some way or another, to lived experience. Semiol-
ogy evacuated this entirely and saw everything in terms of language, while 
forgetting that, even in Saussure, there are references to lived experience. 
Lived experience was eliminated, except in psychoanalysis, where there 
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is a recourse to lived experience through the concept of the Imaginary as 
conceived by Lacan.
I don’t know if you know Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s book Rel-
evance.10 The writers wanted to show that when you understand someone, 
it’s like a proposition, you place what they say in a propositional logic, in 
order to discover what they meant to say. Sperber and Wilson understand 
the mind as a simple machine, a computer. But how can they say that if they 
did not have the feeling of actually having to reason, at a given moment, in 
order to understand what someone has said? There is always a reference 
to lived experience in order to elaborate any theory whatsoever – even in 
theories that deny lived experience. For a major part of cognitivism, the 
mind functions in a non-conscious way, like a robot. But in order to say 
this you have to have feelings… By this I mean that, even in the cognitivist 
current, which has said very interesting things, personally, I have always 
maintained that theoretical elements rest on an implicit lived experience 
being made explicit, and that we should not make implicit lived experience 
a purely unconscious, automatic thing, which is what Sperber and Wilson 
do.
Resorting to a computational model of the mind does not seem adequate 
anymore, even in cognitive science where ideas of the embodied mind have 
long replaced the so-called first-generation cognitivism. Does your critique 
also hold for contemporary neuroscience?
JPM: Yes, just take the problem of mirror neurons. This is an important 
problem for identif ication. It was discovered that, when a macaque watches 
another macaque doing something, the activated neurons of the one who 
watches correspond to those of the one who acts. So scholars like Giacomo 
Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia, who are perfectly respectable f igures, say: 
we are now f inally understanding the comprehension of other people. But 
phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty (and Hesnard, who took inspiration 
from Merleau-Ponty) have long understood that, in order to comprehend 
someone else, there is a mimesis which makes one’s own body capable of 
resonances with a perceived body, which allows me to understand someone 
else. It is not reasoning that allows us to understand someone else, it is the 
resonance of bodies. The neuroscientists have only been able to give this 
explanation because they themselves, in their lived experience, feel that 
we are capable of resonating with the bodies or actions of other people. 
Without this lived experience, it is impossible to understand the functioning 
of mirror neurons.
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There’s a primacy of experience – only then can we go on to formulate scientific 
explanations?
JPM: Exactly. The neuroscientists think that they have found an explanation. 
But they only show electric charges, and that’s it. They don’t know how to 
give meaning to them, they don’t get any closer to lived experience. You 
can’t ascribe any meaning to the activation of neurons if you do not relate 
it to lived experience.
If we move away from a critique of other methods and look at phenomenol-
ogy itself: what would you say are criteria for good phenomenology?
JPM: There must be an intersubjective accord, the only confirmation can 
be an intersubjective recognition! This is an old philosophical problem 
that goes back to Husserl, the problem of the transcendental subject, the 
transcendental ego. Why did you ask this question?
Because it is extremely vital for the whole film-phenomenology movement: there 
are certain strands that have a different understanding of phenomenology 
than others, and it would be helpful to know from someone who has practiced 
film-phenomenology what one could say to people how you can discover that 
this is good phenomenology – and that is not. What are your criteria?
JPM: It’s a question I’ve also asked myself. There are f irst-person approaches, 
of course, but there is also a second-person approach, which relies on ques-
tionnaires, etc., and whose goal is to revive lived experience. The problem 
of all phenomenology is to let lived experience come to the surface in order 
to explain it, to render the implicit explicit. But it is true that we never did 
this in an entirely satisfactory manner.
In France, Claire Petitmengin has done interesting studies on second-person 
phenomenology.11
JPM: Also Natalie Depraz, who is a Husserl specialist, wrote an article with 
Francisco Varela and Pierre Vermersch which I found very interesting, “La 
réduction à l’épreuve de l’expérience” (“Reduction to the Feeling of Experi-
ence”), in a journal called Études phénoménologiques.12 Methodologically, 
it’s interesting, because the writers try to explain how to let the implicit 
surface and make it explicit. I think that this is still a problem. Merleau-Ponty 
went beyond the dogmatism that you f ind in Husserl and Sartre. But the 
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language you use to make the implicit explicit remains marked by layers 
of culture. In the end, I think that rendering lived experience explicit is 
an inf inite work, which has numerous intersections with intersubjective 
experience. Second-person phenomenology can be useful, but it still doesn’t 
exhaust the problem.
Many feminist film phenomenologists take as a point of departure the differ-
ence of the female experience. For you, this was not so crucial in The Structures 
of the Film Experience.
JPM: In our empirical investigation of Cayatte’s La Vie conjugale, it was quite 
obvious that male and female viewers did not have the same projection on 
the characters: what they resonated with in the character’s bodies was not 
exactly the same. Here we have a difference. But the common point is that 
both project something, and the f ictional character of f iction lends itself to 
putting oneself into the other much more than a real being. Here we have 
a point in common.
Hence you are saying the structure of identification is the same?
JPM: Yes, the common point is that we all constitute – by projection and 
identif ication – the experience of a character via our own experience. The 
difference is that we do not project the same thing, because, depending on 
whether we are a man or a woman, we do not have the same background.
Just like Merleau-Ponty and Sobchack, you are saying that phenomenology 
is never complete. If you go back to The Structures of the Film Experience, 
what would you say is incomplete about it?
JPM: There’s something I’d like to do, but I’m not sure if I will end up doing 
it. In the article that I wrote for Julian Hanich and Christian Ferencz-Flatz’s 
Studia Phaenomenologica issue, I began a kind of synthesis between the 
earlier and the later book. I would try to begin, very simply, with the 
phenomenology of the unreal. I would not begin with Sartre’s different 
attitudes or ways of positing existence. I would say: how does the unreal 
appear? And I would try to graft onto that the problems of the home movie 
and the documentary, the reference to the real. I would invert my procedure 
somewhat. Instead of beginning with the three attitudes, or ways of positing 
existence, I would start with the phenomenology of the unreal. I would try 
to better understand what happens when, instead of simply letting myself 
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believe in the unreal, I target someone who exists. What does generalization, 
in the sense in which Sartre spoke about it, mean? What is a generalizing 
gaze, as compared to a gaze that remains in the singular? This is a question 
that has stayed with me, and that I would like to develop.
Likewise, what I would like to develop much more is the question 
of f ictional emotions. If a character is f ictional, what is the emotion 
that is projected? In Essai sur l’image et la communication, I said that we 
project all the schemas of existence of the f ictional person we see. But 
as Merleau-Ponty said, in reality the rage of my friend is not really my 
own rage, I just feel it. Whereas in the cinema it is my rage that I project. 
What, then, does a rage that is unreal, played at, mean? What is an unreal 
rage, an unreal fear, etc.? This is a problem that I think it is necessary 
to go deeper into. We should not simply limit ourselves to saying ‘play 
at.’ What does ‘play at’ mean? A phenomenology of emotion seems very 
important to me.
So when you have the feeling of rage or fear as a film-viewer, it is not a real 
sentiment, but it is a sentiment that is played at by the spectator?
JPM: It is played at. It is projected by the spectator.
You are claiming that we don’t really have these feelings? We do not leave the 
cinema in terror, for example?
JPM: Right. It’s all play. There is a gap in phenomenological descriptions of 
viewer emotions.
There is already this importance of play in The Structures of the Film Experi-
ence when you speak of child’s play, role-play. When children play ‘cowboys 
and Indians,’ for instance, they don’t totally believe in the game. They are 
also in reality. They are not totally subjugated to the illusion that they truly 
are ‘cowboys and Indians.’ There is a kind of double existence at this moment, 
which is comparable to watching a film.
JPM: This is something I wish to describe better. What does it mean to be 
afraid through a character? It means being double, as you said. It’s the “I know 
very well… but all the same…,” as another psychoanalyst, Octave Mannoni, 
said. But there is a powerful sense of forgetting, otherwise it would have no 
interest. If you were simply double, there would not be much interest. You 
are double because you know that you play, but all the same, you get lost in 
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the game. Sartre called it fascination. I read a novel, and I am fascinated by 
it. I can’t let go of it. But at the same time you know that you are fascinated.
Does the fact that we are faced with images make this phenomenon more 
powerful in the cinema than when reading a novel, where the images are 
purely fictional or imagined? In the cinema, the images are real.
JPM: Yes, when you read a novel you have to construct images. But Metz 
said interesting things on this topic. For instance, he critiqued the notion 
of f ilm grammar: There is no grammar in the cinema. Nouns, verbs, the 
subjunctive, etc. − there is no need for them. It is language that needs nouns 
and verbs and so on, in order to construct an image, but not the cinema. 
There is certainly a much stronger level of participation. This is what makes 
the cinema interesting. But to say it is stronger is not saying much. How is 
it stronger? How can we distinguish belief in literary characters from belief 
in the characters of a f iction f ilm or a graphic novel? My grandchildren get 
lost in comic books. They really get inside them, but at the same time they 
know they are reading.
There is a remarkable passage in your book when you say that there are mo-
ments in films where the emotion produced by a scene – such as the scene 
from Mikhail Kalatozov’s The Cranes Are Flying (Letyat zhuravli, 1957) − is 
so strong and intense that it produces a refusal in the spectator, who has a 
kind of defense mechanism against the emotional intensity of the on-screen 
world. The spectator doesn’t withdraw from the film because the emotions are 
unreal and therefore weak, but because they are too strong.
JPM: When this happens, the viewer refers to a possible reality.
So you refer to your own experiences of having a similar emotion to that which 
you see on the screen?
JPM: Look at news images. When we saw the little Syrian boy dead on 
the beach, it was atrocious, because we experience this boy as a real kid. 
We knew that he really played with toys, that he really had parents, and 
this is what was unbearable. If you see the same thing and you know 
that it’s a f iction, it’s the same thing but there is less intensity. But if, at 
the moment that you see the f iction, you think that it is possible, then 
it can be just as intense. When I saw the image of the Syrian boy, I was 
completely overwhelmed, and when I see f iction f ilms, in which horrif ic 
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things happen, then this can evoke real images, and then it too becomes 
unbearable. But it is not the f ictional image as such, it is because it refers 
to the real, because we know that somewhere in the real it is possible. Or 
take another example: not long ago I saw a f ilm on the round-up at the 
Vel d’Hiv in 1942, La Rafle (The Round Up, 2010) by Roselyne Bosch, and 
in one of the scenes you can see a French cop separating a child from its 
mother. This is f iction, but for me it was very disturbing, because I said 
to myself that it must have been possible in reality. If you only see the 
f ictional side, it’s much less intense. But if you think that it is possible, that 
there really were children separated from their parents, then the emotion 
becomes much more intense. It’s a problem of interference between the 
unreal and the real.
In fiction, you need to have a certain verisimilitude.
JPM: There is a great American f ilm, Jeremiah Johnson (Sydney Pollack, 
1972), where you see Robert Redford living with an Indian woman and child. 
He had profaned a sacred Indian site, and he returns home to his cabin, 
where he f inds that his Indian wife and child have been killed. This is pure 
f iction, but when I saw it, it really touched me, because the dead wife and 
child made me think that things of this nature really do happen. It almost 
became a documentary, a quasi-documentary, and the emotion became 
much stronger. These f iction f ilms are so evocative of real dramas that our 
emotions become charged. And there is yet another problem of emotion 
in the cinema: the problem of collective emotions. Even if it is played at, it 
becomes strong from the fact that many people are constructing it together. 
There are mimetic resonances.
This brings us to one thing missing in your book: You accept that the film 
spectator is a spectator in a cinema, whereas even in 1969 films were seen 
on television. Today, we can say that the majority of films seen by people are 
watched on screens that are not cinema screens. Does this change the nature 
of the film experience for you if we no longer have this collective experience?
JPM: The question is: are there fundamental differences in structure or 
meaning or is it more a matter of degree? If I am sitting at home with my 
wife and we watch TV, it’s not the same thing as if I were watching the 
f ilm in a theater with others on a big screen. But in the end, I think that 
this is a question of intensity, a question of degree. It’s the same thing 
but lessened.
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 Introduction
Jean-Pierre Meunier
The Structures of the Film Experience: Filmic Identification 
Today, insisting on the importance of the cinematic fact has become a 
banality. Certainly, if we had to list the various technologies that have, to 
varying degrees, transformed our contemporary lives, the cinema would 
occupy a privileged place. The breadth of cinematic production and the 
large audiences it attracts among the mass public make cinema a veritable 
‘institution’ of our era.
Film, as has been amply stated, exerts a considerable hold over both the 
individual and the crowd. The literature on this matter is abundant, yield-
ing various results with an uneven success rate, which usually stigmatize 
rather than analyze this phenomenon. For the most part, this discussion 
has focused on the phenomena of ‘fascination,’ the ‘outsized control of the 
image,’ spectatorial enchantment, and even the ‘magic of the movies.’
Theoretical analysis, whose role has been to provide an explanation for 
these phenomena, has for its part had recourse to the Freudian mechanism 
of identif ication. This is a convenient concept, which furnishes a descrip-
tive, explicatory principle that is particularly well adapted to the f ilmic 
situation. It has inspired numerous analyses and endowed scholarship 
with a precious guiding thread. We only have to f lick through specialized 
academic journals to notice the already considerable volume of studies 
dedicated to deepening our understanding of the nature of f ilmic identif ica-
tion – which, depending on the subjacent theoretical conceptions or the 
nuanced considerations of the process, also goes by the names of ‘emotional 
participation,’ ‘projection’ or ‘empathy’ – as well as its repercussions for 
individuals and the masses.
And yet, this book proposes to once more take the process of f ilmic 
identif ication for its object, despite the fact that it has been studied so 
often. What are the reasons motivating this new approach? First, it seems 
essential to us to constantly rework and perfect the general principles of 
a discipline, in this case f ilmology, whose most legitimate aspiration is to 
become a genuine science.
But to this theoretical reason we can add another, more profound reason, 
whose delineation may permit us to recognize the perspective in which the 
present study is situated.
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In their rush to apply the process of identif ication to the f ilmic situation, 
the majority of studies dedicated to the problem have, it seems, abusively 
simplif ied the data. Often, the original form of the Freudian mechanism 
has been ‘transplanted’ into the f ilmic situation without any changes. But 
this neglects the fact that the mechanism in question, in the framework 
of developments in psychoanalysis and other theoretical tendencies, had 
itself undergone various retouches, and nourished numerous controversies, 
and that it was thus rather hasty to utilize the notion of identif ication 
without subjecting it to a prior critical examination. In order to bear fruit, 
the notion must be envisaged in the framework of more recent currents of 
thought that have developed either as an extension of psychoanalysis, or 
in disagreement with it.
Furthermore, it also seems that f ilmological research has sinned through 
an excess of positivism. It was too quick to adopt the approach of a certain 
scientif ic attitude, an approach that consisted of objectivizing, or, better, 
externalizing, in the domain of objective realities observable from the 
outside, phenomena whose reality is to be found internally, in the experience 
of the subject.
Thus, f ilmic identif ication came to be considered in its objective form, 
that is, as a psychic mechanism (a mechanism of projection and introjection) 
or as a function (an empathic function) destined to comprehend or explain 
the functioning of the objective models of the personality constructed by 
scientif ic theory.
It is easy to see the reasons for this position to be adopted. Aside from 
the fact that it could be expressed in terms that were seductive by dint of 
their scientif ic allure, it seemingly justif ied submitting these phenomena to 
observation and quantif ication. It is, after all, generally admitted that the 
psyche can be regarded as an object, a slice of the perceptual world, or even 
an externally observable apparatus, if not in and of itself (the psyche has 
never been observable as an object), then at least by means of its manifesta-
tions, or through the objective representations that we construct of it.
But, in adopting this point of view, which it often did, f ilmology exposed 
itself to the same reproach that, in the last few years, phenomenological 
thinking has addressed to the scientif ic attitude in general, and which has 
done much to weaken it.
By transposing psychic phenomena to an external objectivized form, that 
is, by reducing them to the state of simple functions or mechanisms, their 
very nature was altered, and their meaning or signification was thereby lost. 
This meaning or signif ication can only be perceived if we place ourselves 
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on the terrain from which these phenomena have been extracted – namely, 
lived, f irst-person experience.
It is therefore appropriate to study what the scientif ic attitude generally 
starts out by ignoring: the experience of the subject. We must explore, 
describe, and explain phenomena such as they are immediately lived, and 
not such as they are conceived by virtue of some pre-established objective 
schema. In other words, we must make the effort to discover the meaning of 
phenomena as they present themselves to the subject who experiences them.
It is also appropriate, however, to clarify what we mean by ‘description 
of lived experience.’ It is not a matter, of course, of elucidating particular 
forms of behavior – for example, a given identif ication of a given subject 
with a given person – through the concrete modalities of their realization, 
but, rather, of unveiling the invariable aspect in these particular forms of 
behavior. In other words, we must abstract real forms of behavior and the 
structures that we can locate in all forms of the same kind of behavior, 
which themselves are their specif ic, concrete realizations.
Could it be said that, by effectuating this kind of abstraction, we slip 
back into the impasses of the scientif ic attitude?
In effect, elucidating the invariable structure of a psychic phenomenon 
supposes that we consider this phenomenon, that we take a distance 
with respect to it, and that we have an experience of the experience in a 
consciousness of consciousness, which, we might justly say, constitutes a 
certain form of objectivation.
But at least by operating this kind of objectivation, we do not escape the 
experience of the subject – that is, the reality of the phenomena studied. The 
scientif ic attitude, in contrast, proceeds from a double objectivation. It also 
starts out from the formal structure of experience and, in doing so, it must 
accomplish an initial objectivation similar to what we have just spoken about. 
But it does not remain on that level. Instead, it accomplishes a second objec-
tivation by placing in the external world what it has internally abstracted, by 
situating it in an objective, externally observable model, and thus, as we said 
above, by losing its meaning for the subject and real nature. This is why, we 
may say in passing, scientists always speak of intuition, because for them, the 
data of primary abstraction – bearing on their experience as a subject – are 
only ever presumptions or hypotheses that can serve to comprehend the 
objective model of psychism which they have constructed, and which, while 
it is supposed to represent it (they are themselves psychisms), are nonetheless 
exterior to it, and indeed rather alien to it.
As for the right to treat phenomena scientif ically, to submit them to 
evaluation and quantif ication, we think that it will not be contested if, 
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rather than beginning with objective representations of phenomena, we 
start with the description that an internal reading can deliver. Simply 
put, instead of drawing its hypothetical intuitions from objective models, 
which sometimes do violence to the most evident data of experience, such 
a description would formulate them on the basis of this very experience, 
explained in descriptive terms.
Thus, the basis for research must not be any kind of conception of man 
as an object of observation, but an explanation of man as a subject of 
experience.
The problem touched on here is evidently vaster and more complex than 
what we have just allowed it to seem. Unfortunately, the developments that 
it calls for cannot f it into the framework of this short introduction. Here, we 
can only aff irm our conviction that, in matters of human science, reflection 
on the experience of phenomena is primordial, and normally precedes that 
which it must inspire and towards which it must orient itself – to wit, a 
scientif ic approach to these phenomena.
Thus, it seems to us that the point of departure for f ilmological reflec-
tion, as is the case for all reflection on human phenomena, consists of the 
description and explanation of this new and undoubtedly original experience 
that is the f ilm experience.
The present study constitutes an attempt in this direction.
For us, it will not be a question of objectively representing to ourselves 
the experience of the spectator-subject, but, of placing ourselves within this 
experience, of attempting to describe and reveal its meaning, and specify 
its fundamental structures.
Here, sketched rapidly, are the major stages of this research. First, we will 
locate, using the texts of important f ilmmakers, what the notions of percep-
tion and identif ication relate to, notions which are evidently fundamental 
for the study of the problems occupying us. Let us note that, apart from a 
few rare personal considerations, this f irst part will not convey anything 
particularly novel. Indeed, it may even be seen as a rather pointless reminder 
of notions that are already familiar in philosophy and psychology. However, 
if we consider the particular status of f ilmology, we may understand the 
reasons for this long overview.
In fact, in the current state of things, f ilmology is not an autonomous 
science, but more a site of reflection situated at the intersection of the major 
human sciences. It can be of interest to the philosopher, the psychologist, 
the pedagogue, the sociologist, and even the philologist and the linguist.
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This is why any reflection on its object necessitates that those who embark 
on this reflection must clarify their perspective and recall the notions of 
the disciplines from which they draw.
The first part of our work has been conceived as a response to this demand.
Its essential goal is to present certain specif ically psychological notions 
and problems to the reader unversed in the f ield. Let us note that, upon 
rereading our work, some of the chapters in this f irst part strike us as not 
a little superfluous (this is the case, notably, for Chapters V, VI, and VII), 
with respect to the whole. We have nonetheless retained them, with the 
thought that they could help some of our readers to be more familiar with 
the language and, above all, the problems specif ic to psychology. Those for 
whom psychology is a foreign domain will perhaps f ind the means to better 
recognize the perspective in which this work is globally situated.
The second part consists of the more original component of this study. 
We will try, with this modest contribution, to sketch out a description of the 
essential structures of the f ilm experience, conceived as a specif ic mode 
of relating to the world and to other people. We will also try to def ine and 
explain the fundamental attitudes that this experience solicits on the part 
of the subject-spectator. Subsequently, in the same descriptive spirit, we will 
try to clarify the modalities of comportment (identif ication) that support 
the various attitudes described.
Finally, in the third part, we will endeavor to open certain perspectives 
in the study of the extensions of the f ilm experience in the existence and 
the comportment of the spectator.
As is customary, it is appropriate to conclude this brief introduction by 
formulating the usual reservations that stand in for any possible rectif ica-
tions and underscore the incomplete character of the proposed study.
But we would like to do so in more convincing terms than those generally 
deployed. In our case, these reservations are dictated much more by reality 
than by a conventional sentiment of modesty.
Thus, to preserve the valuable, or ever so slightly original, aspect of this 
research, we feel the necessity to highlight its relative, incomplete character.
This limit is tied to two things: on the one hand, there is our own lack of 
experience in the subject, and on the other hand, there is f ilmology’s own 
relative lack of experience. Filmology is, indeed, a new discipline, and every 
reflection concerning it is exercised on a terrain that has still received too 
little recognition to not be uncertain and effectively partial.
We should not, therefore, expect def initive conclusions from this study. 
Inevitably, the views expressed here will be criticized, corrected, and even 
refuted with scientif ic progress in the f ield. Unavoidably, too, some (possibly 
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important) aspects of the problems occupying us will escape us or will not 
be given the space they deserve.
But what we do hope will come out of this work is that, beyond its 
imperfections, it shows some contours of the truth, some new insights, 
some interesting perspectives, and that, above all, it provides a source 
of inspiration for new hypotheses conducive to advancing the cause of 
f ilmology.
 Part One: Introduction to the General 
Structures of Experience
Chapter I: Perception
The study of perception constitutes one of psychology’s major preoccupa-
tions, and it is easy to see why: perception is indeed a primordial faculty 
that underpins our insertion in the world and all of our relations with other 
people. No attempt to understand any phenomenon of relations between 
humans and the world (and the f ilm experience is precisely such a relation) 
can do without a general theory of perception. Whence the primary position 
reserved to the present chapter.
We will f irst see how the faculty of perception was conceived by the 
psychological tradition. More precisely, we will try to clarify the principles 
or, rather, the prejudices which have presided over the elaboration of certain 
classical theories.
This preamble will then help us to better recognize the phenomenological 
perspective, a perspective in which this study in its entirety is situated, and 
which, we suggest, will allow us to discover the true meaning of perception.
I. The Point of View of Traditional Psychology
Traditional thought unreservedly acknowledged the distinction between the 
world and the individual. It placed the individual between parentheses and be-
stowed it with the necessary functions for its integration into an environment. 
In this perspective, the world was always presented first, as an existing reality 
external to the individual, and whose truth the individual had to conquer.
As a victim of this prejudice, psychology posited the notion of sensa-
tion – an impression corresponding to a sensory excitation issued from a 
fragment of external reality – and made of perception a cognitive operation 
destined to procure for us, on the basis of a mosaic of sensations, the most 
adequate representation of this world in itself, present before anything else.
Perception, as Piéron’s dictionary of psychology indicates, had become a 
“moment of sensory awareness of external objects and events which have 
given birth to sensations of varying number and complexity.”1
As for the perception of other people, traditional psychology was also 
incapable of conceiving it without the support of a cognitive operation. For 
this psychology, totally impregnated by the classical distinctions between 
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mind and body, individual and world, the ‘psychic fact’ appeared as an 
internal reality accessible only to the subject who feels it, thanks to a process 
of introspection. Consequently, in order to apprehend this same ‘psychic 
fact’ in other people, we had to establish, by means of a totally intellectual 
operation, a relation between the ‘psychic fact’ and its external manifesta-
tions, manifestations which we have also experienced ourselves, and which 
constitute the only reality accessible to other people.
Finally, when this same psychology had to take stock of the communica-
tions existing between people, it had to have recourse to some motivation, 
function, or even instinct of sociability. The individual, conceived of as an 
individualized entity, an interiority closed in on itself, could not logically 
communicate with its kin without the intervention of these hypothetical 
internal forces. Thus, understanding other people involved intelligently 
reading the objective signs of their comportment, and communicating 
with them involved responding to a motivation strong enough to break the 
solitude of an otherwise quite self-suff icient being.
We can see that the conceptions that we have just briefly recalled are 
so many theoretical constructions built on what the phenomenologists 
have called the ‘prejudice of the world.’ There was still, at the origin of all 
reasoning, the individual and the objective world, the closed consciousness 
of the subject and the others. All the efforts of psychology consisted, then, 
of linking the terms thus def ined, and explaining the de facto relations 
existing between individuals and the world, as well as among individuals 
themselves.
And yet, we should ask ourselves whether it was arbitrary to thus dissociate 
the terms. Was there not a way of relating to the world, and to other people, 
that was more fundamental than what traditional thought could define?
Is the human being, conceived of as an individualized entity, not a pure 
abstraction, an invention of the scientif ic attitude with no bearing on lived 
experience?
In the past, psychologists ignored these questions, but they have since 
been revealed to be of major interest in modern psychology, which has been 
considerably revitalized by the contributions of phenomenological reflection.
A quick analysis of the positions of phenomenology will enable us to 
understand the most important facets of perceptive phenomena.
II. The Findings of Phenomenology
Born in Germany with Edmund Husserl and disseminated in France by 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology is above all 
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a method aimed at describing our immediate experience. Renouncing, at 
least provisionally, the theoretical explanations that reason or scientif ic 
intelligence have been able to construct, it represents a return to the lived 
experience of phenomena, an effort to recover a direct contact with the 
world such as it is, before any analysis that we can make of it, and any 
explanation that we can give of it.
As Merleau-Ponty has noted:
It is the attempt to provide a direct description of our experience such 
as it is, and without any consideration of its psychological genesis or of 
the causal explanations that the scientist, historian, or sociologist might 
offer of that experience…2
To return to the things themselves is to return to this world prior to 
knowledge, this world of which knowledge always speaks, and this world 
with regard to which every scientif ic determination is abstract, signitive 
and dependent, just like geography with regard to the landscape where 
we f irst learned what a forest, a meadow, or a river is.3
The lessons gained by the phenomenological method are so important that 
they have profoundly renewed our understanding of what it means to be 
human. Psychology and psychoanalysis, such as they are presently conceived 
by numerous practitioners (Angelo Hesnard, Jacques Lacan, etc.), have been 
considerably enriched by this new mode of thinking.
From the point of view that occupies us here, it is the contribution of the 
method concerning perception – perception in general and, more specif i-
cally, the perception of other people – that is of primary interest to us. In 
this regard, how does phenomenological reflection proceed when it comes 
to perception?
Rather than postulating, as premises for analysis, the individual and the 
world as separate entities, and trying to explain how one can represent the 
other to itself, we are concerned here, before anything else, with locating 
the experience of the perceiving subject in order to describe it and make 
it explicit.
In this perspective, the perception of the world is revealed as something 
totally different from the mental organization of a sum of sensations. The 
very notion of sensation seems unjustif iable in the face of experiential data.
Gestalt psychologists had already shown that what we perceive in a 
concrete and immediate manner is not the accumulation of sensations, 
but forms and structures of the whole, which are organized without the 
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involvement of our intelligence. Let us quote, here, some particularly 
enlightening lines from Merleau-Ponty:
Broadly speaking, we should think of it [perception] not as a mosaic but 
as a system of configurations. Groups rather than juxtaposed elements 
are principal and primary in our perception. We group the stars into the 
same constellations as the ancients, yet it is a priori possible to draw the 
heavenly map many other ways. Given the series:
a b c d e f g h i j
. . . . . . . . . .
we will always pair the dots according to the formula a-b, c-d, e-f, etc., 
although the grouping b-c, d-e, f-g, etc. is equally probable in principle. […]
The same type of analysis can be applied to hearing: it will simply be a 
matter of temporal forms rather than spatial ones. A melody, for example, 
is a f igure of sound and does not mingle with the background noises 
(such as the siren one hears in the distance during a concert) which may 
accompany it. The melody is not a sum of notes, since each note only 
counts by virtue of the function it serves in the whole, which is why the 
melody does not perceptibly change when transposed, that is, when all 
its notes are changed while their interrelationships and the structure of 
the whole remain the same. On the other hand, just one single change 
in these interrelationships will be enough to modify the entire make-up 
of the melody. Such a perception of the whole is more natural and more 
primary than the perception of isolated elements. […]
Therefore analytical perception, through which we arrive at absolute 
value of the separate elements, is a belated and rare attitude – that of the 
scientist who observes or the philosopher who reflects. The perception of 
forms, understood very broadly as structure, grouping or configuration 
should be considered our spontaneous way of seeing.4
We can see, with the collapse of the notion of sensation, that there is also 
an abandonment of the idea of the intervention of the intelligence in 
the perceptive act. To perceive is not to think, reason, or judge. Far from 
being the sketch-outline of a knowledge that is elaborated on the basis of 
a sum of elementary data, perception attests, on the contrary, to a form 
of relating to the world that is more immediate and more primitive than 
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that described by analytic thought, basing itself on supposedly objective 
elements.
As Merleau-Ponty, once more, writes:
I do not think the world in the act of perception: it organizes itself in 
front of me. When I perceive a cube, it is not because my reason sets the 
perspectival appearances straight and thinks the geometrical def inition 
of a cube with respect to them. I do not even notice the distortions of 
perspective, much less correct them; I am at the cube itself in its manifest-
ness through what I see. […]
Perception is not a sort of beginning science, an elementary exercise of 
the intelligence; we must rediscover a commerce with the world and a 
presence to the world which is older than intelligence.5
At the end of the day, perceptive consciousness can no longer be conceived 
of as a closed entity that reasons in order to give itself a reality that is exter-
nal to itself. When we return to f irst-person lived experience, perceptual 
consciousness f irst appeared as a relationship with the world, and the world 
perceived as that which is primordial in our existence, as a datum, given 
no thought, which is always ‘already there,’ and from which all knowledge 
is drawn. The primary element, however, is not the outside world, on the 
one hand, and the individual, on the other hand; it is perception itself as a 
primordial relationship with the world.
What we have just said about perception in general reveals itself to be 
just as correct when we look at the particular problem of the perception 
of other people.
Indeed, a return to lived experience evidently shows us that, no more 
than perception in general, the perception of other people is neither an 
operation nor a function of our intelligence, but an immediate datum. It is 
because the old psychology had conceived of the psychic fact as an internal 
reality only accessible by introspection that it had been obliged to carry 
out an intelligent reading of the external signs of the perception of other 
people, referring to a signif ied that is in itself inaccessible.
And yet, what does the introspection on these claimed internal psychic 
realities teach us, given that they are buried deep within the individual 
consciousness?
At the very most, there are some indications of a physiological nature, or 
certain qualitative nuances relating to a psychological state. We can say, for 
example, that emotion is an affective reaction of a certain intensity normally 
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accompanied by vegetative manifestations. We could equally distinguish 
different types of emotion and nuance them by qualifying them according 
to their intensity or their quality. Thus, we speak of joy or sorrow, love or 
disgust, rage or fear (intense fear or quiet fear). But once we have said all 
this, we have still not understood the signif icance of emotion, for nothing, 
in these objective descriptions, gives us its meaning.
On the contrary, emotion becomes clearly intelligible when we envisage it 
as a form of behavior or comportment, a modif ication of our relations with 
other people. Rage, for example, as Jean-Paul Sartre has shown, is nothing 
but symbolic behavior destined to accomplish in the imaginary what we 
are incapable of accomplishing in reality.6
We can see that, to grasp the meaning of emotion, we must think of it as a 
form of comportment. In other words, we must think of it in the same manner 
as the emotion of another person whom we can observe. This signif ies that 
the emotion is immediately perceptible in our bodily attitude, and thus 
that other people, and their comportment, are always clearly shown to us.
The psychic fact as a fundamental internal reality whose bodily manifesta-
tions would only be epiphenomena does not exist. Once again, consciousness 
is not an entity withdrawn from the world, one of whose possibilities would 
be to secrete psychic facts, which only have an external appearance through 
a collection of signs to be intelligently decoded. What is primordial is the 
beings who are in the world from the start, and who have this quality in 
common with each other, beings who are always placed on the same terrain 
of activities, and whose comportment is given with all their signif ication 
as f igures detaching themselves from the background.
These considerations concerning the perception of other people are of 
fundamental importance for the comprehension of the problems posed 
by the relations between individuals and, on this basis, the problem of 
identif ication.
Indeed, if the perception of other people is an immediate given, if it has 
no need for any involvement of the faculties of knowledge to be realized, 
and if it is the primordial datum for a consciousness thrown into the world 
and no longer withdrawn from it, we can see that there is no longer any 
need for having recourse to a hypothetical function or motivation to explain 
the interactions between individuals. The link to other people no longer 
poses a problem because it now appears as a primary datum, as one of the 
dimensions of our existence. Once again, it is because it had conceived of 
man as a consciousness isolated from the world that the old psychology had 
been obliged to make the link with other people the result of an internal 
drive and thus make social relations a secondary formation.
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In reality, as Merleau-Ponty states, “our relation to the social, like our 
relation to the world, is deeper than every explicit perception and deeper 
than every judgment. […] We return to the social world with which we are 
in contact through the simple fact of our existence, and that we inseparably 
bear along with us prior to every objectif ication.”7
Man is above all a social being, a node of relations, a being ineluctably 
linked with other people, and the nature of this link, in its original form, is 
what we call intersubjectivity.
Let us make some comments on this last notion.
The perception of other people, we said, is an immediate given. That is 
to say, in any encounter with another person, I directly grasp the signif ica-
tion of their behavior, not through a cognitive operation, but through an 
immediate apprehension of their comportment. I grasp their intentions 
and, in a way, they become my own. Correlatively, in this same encounter, 
I appear to the other person in the same way that they appear to me. The 
other person reads my behavior. My intentions become, in some way, lived 
by another consciousness and cease to belong only to me. This kind of 
conscious coexistence of several subjectivities is f irst sketched out in every 
encounter. This is what we call intersubjectivity, the primordial link by 
means of which I am to other people as they are to me.
Regarding the philosophical problem posed by the dialectic of “the Alter 
and the Ego,” Hesnard wrote the following lines, which have much to teach 
us about the nature of intersubjectivity:
In order for the dialectic of the Ego and the Alter Ego to be possible, they 
both must be defined by their situation. Discovering not only my presence 
for-myself, I must also discover the possibility of an alien actor “through 
a kind of internal weakness that prevents me from being absolutely 
individual and exposes me to the gaze of others” (Merleau-Ponty). It is 
only when the Cartesian cogito is thus clarif ied, that is to say, revealed 
to be in a situation, that, as Husserl puts it, “transcendental subjectivity 
could be an intersubjectivity.” It is then that the Ego and the Alter Ego 
appear to each other, because both he and I have the primordial world 
in common. On the same level, there is my own vision of myself, just as 
there is the vision of the other person on himself, at the same time as 
there is my vision of the other person and his vision of me. My body of 
natural knowledge – my perceived body – f inds in the body of the other 
person a kind of extension of its own intentions: our two bodies are 
inhabited by the same anonymous existence. Furthermore, our two bodies 
realize, or at least give a hint of, expressive and signif icative movements, 
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and form a single system by completing each other, since they are both 
forms of comportment, or (as Freud said before the phenomenologists) 
forms of existence or psychic life that signal themselves to each other… 
I watch the other act: the objects that surround him thereby receive 
new signif ications; my world is modif ied by it, and, as if attracted by it, 
it ceases to be uniquely mine, present to me. It becomes present to the 
other, to this other behavior which is destined for my eyes. Its own body 
is no longer an object, or some kind of fragment of the world, but the site 
of a certain vision of the world: it is reciprocally engaged with me and 
becomes, to a certain extent, another me.8
As revealed by phenomenological ref lection, intersubjectivity appears 
self-evident. But it is important to note that it responds to a factual truth 
confirmed to a large degree by a good number of observations realized in the 
domain of child psychology. Indeed, Henri Wallon and other psychologists 
have frequently described that stage of infant development in which the 
child, not yet possessing an awareness of itself or of other people as singular 
beings, lives in a kind of syncretic sociability, in a perfect lack of distinction 
between the self and other people. This syncretism of primary relations that 
intersubjectivity illustrates in a concrete manner as a primordial link to 
other people is defined by Wallon as “an exclusive and global consciousness 
that the child has of every situation at the moment when he experiences 
and imagines it.”
Let us also cite Hesnard:
Syncretism is not a nascent personal psychism, but a confused intersub-
jectivity, that is to say, one’s very relationship with the human world, such 
as it preexists any differentiation, within oneself, of the progressively 
structured attitude that will clarify one’s link to other people.
It is on the basis of this indistinct, intersubjective syncretism that self-
awareness, and the awareness of others, is structured in the child. Moreover, 
it is remarkable that the recognition of other people always precedes the 
awareness of oneself as a singular being.
This removes any credibility we may give to the formulation of the 
problem of the relations with other people in the language of traditional 
psychology. Human relations cannot be thought of in terms of cognitive 
functions, drives of attraction or repulsion, residing deep within the in-
dividual. The link to other people is provided with existence in the form 
of a co-existence of consciousnesses. As such, it precedes the formation 
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of people as private subjectivities and is even the precondition for this 
process. There is also the question as to how to conceive a differentiation of 
people – of the ‘I,’ the ‘you,’ the ‘he’ – other than on the basis of an originally 
global structure in which the terms can be differentiated from each other. 
To suppose the pre-formed person as a distinct being before any dealings 
with other people, as traditional thinking had postulated, is just as absurd 
as abstractly conceiving the right-hand side without any reference to the 
left-hand side.
The terms of a system – such as, for instance, the system ‘me, you, him…’ 
– have never had any sense other than as members of this system that 
necessarily pre-exists them.
At the end of the day, it appears that intersubjectivity constitutes the 
terrain in which the multiple forms of relations between individuals are 
rooted.
We will see further how identif ication is founded on primordial intersub-
jectivity in order for it to be structured in relation to private intersubjectivity. 
We will also see the extreme importance of the notion of intersubjectivity 
for the comprehension of the specif ic problem of f ilmic identif ication.
This is, in any case, the reason for which we have tarried at such length 
with a description of it.
Chapter II: Identification
I. The Origins of the Concept
Freud, of course, had the merit of having emphasized the importance of the 
process of identif ication in the psychic development of the child. He saw 
this as the f irst manifestation of an affective attachment to another person, 
and assigned it an important role in the formation of the Oedipus complex.
But although Freud assigned the principal role to identifications interven-
ing into the Oedipal conflict, he never excluded the idea of other forms 
of identif ication. Certain of his writings prove that he had glimpsed the 
essential role that identif ication plays in the totality of our social life, and 
more particularly in the domain of the awareness of other people.
Let us cite a short extract that serves well to illustrate Freud’s point of 
view on this subject:
What we have learned […] may be summarized as follows. First, iden-
tif ication is the original form of emotional tie with an object; secondly, 
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in a regressive way it becomes a substitute for a libidinal object-tie, as 
it were by means of introjection of the object into the ego; and thirdly, 
it may arise with any new perception of a common quality shared with 
some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct. The more 
important this common quality is, the more successful may this partial 
identif ication become, and it may thus represent the beginning of a new 
tie. We already begin to divine that the mutual tie between members of 
a group is in the nature of an identif ication of this kind, based upon an 
important emotional common quality; and we may suspect that this 
common quality lies in the nature of the tie with the leader. Another 
suspicion may tell us that we are far from having exhausted the problem 
of identif ication, and that we are faced by the process which psychology 
calls ‘empathy’ [Einfühlung] and which plays a major role thanks to the 
possibilities that it opens up in penetrating the soul of people foreign to 
our ego.9
These few lines are of fundamental importance, since they allow us to 
glimpse the richness and signif icance of the concept of identif ication. But 
they equally appear interesting because they contain, at least implicitly, the 
traditional prejudices which we discussed earlier, and which constitute, we 
think, an obstacle to the comprehension of these phenomena.
The words “penetrating the soul of people foreign to our ego” effectively 
show that the idea underpinning Freud’s theoretical formulations is that 
of an ego closed onto itself. Identif ication with other people should then 
be conceived on the basis of the perception of common traits, the only 
means for penetrating and attaching oneself to a psychic reality that is, in 
principle, foreign to ourselves.
Such a conception, however, engenders a certain number of diff iculties.
In effect, if the term ‘identif ication’ signif ies ‘affective attachment,’ 
then the number of common traits is doubtless, if not the precondition 
for identif ication, then at least a factor favorable to its development. But 
if, as Freud indicates immediately afterwards, it also constitutes a means 
of penetrating other people, we cannot conceive of it on the basis of the 
perception of common traits. We can see, indeed, that the perception of 
a common trait, that is, the apprehension of a ‘like me,’ necessitates, at 
the very least, the sketch-outline of an identif ication, without which this 
trait would not be perceived as common. In order to recognize, in other 
people, a trait that is common to me, I must have perceived its meaning. We 
should not say that identif ication is founded on the recognition of a certain 
number of common traits – the term ‘trait,’ incidentally, only corresponds 
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to an abstraction without relating to an experience. Rather, through a 
sketch-outline of identif ication, which the meaning of the ‘ways of acting’ 
of another person already gives me, I can recognize the characteristics 
that we share.
The diff iculties contained in Freud’s text drop away if we take the iden-
tif icatory relation as our starting point – not isolated egos but subjects 
who are, from the very start, open to the world and to other people. We 
will then see that it is not traits, variable in number and quality, which 
are shared between individuals, but the intersubjective link. We will also 
observe that identif ication is a mode of behavior that is structured on the 
basis of this primordial intersubjectivity, and, f inally, we will recognize that 
comprehension and the affective attachment towards others are rooted in 
identif ication itself.
Here we return to the theories of Hesnard, who, by rethinking the concept 
in the framework of a psychology enriched by the gains of phenomenological 
thinking, has unveiled its true meaning.
Thus, we will now make principal reference to Hesnard, with the goal of 
optimally pinpointing the signif ication of identif icatory behavior.
II. Identification as the Behavior of Private Intersubjectivity
Phenomenological reflection on the one hand, and child psychology on the 
other hand, have revealed to us the nature of the interhuman link such as it 
is presented in its origins: an intersubjectivity, a kind of generic co-existence 
of multiple consciousnesses.
At the beginning of any encounter, this primordial intersubjectivity may 
be qualif ied as anonymous because it is elementary, unstructured, and 
simply inherent to the human condition. As Hesnard points out:
We must insist on the fact that this generic and universal coexistence is 
anonymous, that is to say that it precedes all forms of identity, personaliza-
tion, individuation and any other psychic function. With respect to this 
analysis, let us retain the idea that, given that the world, the primordial 
world before human knowledge, is not an object for man and that it is 
in this world that man knows himself. We must be wary of objective 
psychology and psychoanalysis when they study what they call object-ties.
An object-tie, def ined as objectality in the Freudian sense, is already 
poorly def ined. If it is def ined by intersubjectivity then it is incomplete, 
since intersubjectivity is given to the anonymous human being. We must 
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therefore endeavor to consider every link between def ined, singular, or 
individual subjectivities as hatching from a soil common to everyone 
within an intersubjectivity, but structured, that is to say endowed with 
meaning and value, at the same time as relating to a particular, identif ied 
or personalized subjectivity.10
In this perspective, identif ication appears when, against the backdrop 
of anonymous intersubjectivity, more singular relations are developed 
and structured – in other words, when anonymous intersubjectivity is 
transformed into private intersubjectivity. As Hesnard writes:
Here there is a psychic structure, an appearance in the f ield of inter-
subjectivity of a posture, or, more generally, a behavior that fashions in 
each individual, or group of individuals, a disposition towards know-
ing, and then understanding, other individuals. This often complex or 
subtle postural disposition presents itself in two often distinct forms: 
an identif ication of a given individual with another (or several others), 
with a we, or a somewhat more anonymous one, and a collective or com-
munal identif ication, whose sociability largely predominates over its 
individuality or duality.11
Let us make some comments on these lines by following, in the course of 
our lived experience, the manner in which identif icatory behavior is formed 
in its simplest case – that is, the relationship between two people.
A given individual appearing in my visual f ield is perfectly unknown to me 
as a person (that is, as a singular being), but, because this being is structurally 
similar to me, because they appear to me in a given situation, their behavior 
already has meaning for me, for the simple fact that I perceive it.
At the same time, they have seen me, and due to this, my behavior no 
longer belongs to me, strictly speaking, by dint of the fact that it no longer 
has meaning for me alone. Instead, it also has meaning for this other person, 
who can read my intentions just as I can read theirs.
First of all, there is the intersubjective link. But, at this stage of the 
encounter, this link is still impersonal. The individual who I see is still 
not given to me as a person, but simply as a human being, similar, in this 
quality, to all other human beings.
It is only when my perception, becoming more active, is structured into 
an active behavior of apprehending other people that the relation becomes 
personal. Having been anonymous, the intersubjective link becomes private.
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This active behavior of apprehending another person as a singular being 
is realized by me through a kind of incorporation of the behavior of the 
other. In other terms, I identify myself by sketching out the movements of 
other people in order to comprehend them and grasp them from within. If 
they speak, I sketch out, while listening to them, the vocal gestures through 
which they express their thoughts. In extreme cases, it can even happen 
that, unconsciously, my lips exactly reproduce the movements traced out by 
the lips of my interlocutor. This quasi-muscular behavior of apprehending 
other people constitutes the principal aspect of identif ication. If we are to 
give an even more striking example, it suff ices to think of the movements 
executed by the spectators when following the twists and turns of an acrobat 
or the motion of the participants in a sporting contest.
Identif ication, as a link of private intersubjectivity, is thus that postural 
behavior by means of which I surpass the simple apprehension of the be-
havior of other people to actively revive it, through incorporating it or, as 
psychoanalysts put it, through introjecting it. It is an active fusion of two 
or several subjectivities entering into a relationship with one another.
We can equally describe it as a complex of projection (or putting oneself 
in the place of the other) and introjection (putting the other in one’s own 
place), on the condition that we consider this ‘other’ and the ‘self ’ thus 
def ined, not as already personalized entities but as subjectivities that, at 
the beginning, are still anonymous and simply opened to each other. It is 
precisely through the identif icatory relation that the ‘self’ and the ‘other,’ 
by fusing, mutually appear to each other as personal, singular beings.
At the same time, the relationship thus initiated takes on signif ication 
in the domain of affectivity, and is structured according to the multiple 
nuances of sympathy and antipathy. It is, in fact, on the basis of identification 
that the feelings of sympathy and antipathy towards other people emerge.
We must not say, as certain theorists think, that it is sympathy that 
gives rise to identif ication, or, at least, that sympathy is one of the essential 
preconditions for its realization. Sympathy, indeed, is nothing other than the 
affective dimension of the comprehension of other people, and this, as we 
have seen, is realized in and through identif ication. Sympathy would thus 
be unable to exist independently, outside of the behavior of identif ication 
of which it is one of the essential aspects.
It might be objected that many instances of sympathy have been born, 
or at least traced out, spontaneously, as the result of a momentary glance or 
even upon listening to a mere description, and that it is this initial and sudden 
sentiment that engenders a disposition that is favorable to comprehension 
and identif ication. But, upon taking a closer look, we can see that, if such 
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spontaneous feelings exist, then this is because, through this momentary glance 
that initially gives me a sense for the behavior of others, or through this mere 
description that informs me of certain ways of acting, I have already been able to 
apprehend, by means of a barely sketched out identification, a certain manner 
of being or a certain style of existence. Subsequently, following the signification 
that this style of existence provides to me, feelings of sympathy or antipathy 
will be born in an apparently spontaneous fashion. It is very possible, then, 
that, having been solicited by these initial feelings, identification is extended 
and structured in a narrower relation. But, in any case, it is certainly because 
it f inds itself traced out that the initial affective reactions have poured forth.
At the end of the day, it does appear that the multiple nuances of sym-
pathy and antipathy are both the affective reflection and one of the factors 
structuring identif icatory behavior.
We would like to illustrate here this f inal proposition through the exami-
nation of a very particular form of nascent sympathy or antipathy: that which 
emerges from the simple observation of a photograph. This phenomenon 
indeed arises very frequently, and it might be asked what, in a mere static 
image of another person, can engender a reaction of an affective nature. In 
order to understand, we should shift focus to the experience of the observer. 
When I look at a photograph, the face of the person who is represented to 
me appears to me with a certain gaze, a certain allure, in a certain position 
and with a whole series of other elements which I am able to analyze after 
the fact, but which, the instant that I see them, together form a structure, a 
structure which immediately gives me the sense of a certain comportment. 
Thus, I can immediately say of people who are photographed that they are 
smiling, or speaking, or that they are afraid or serious, etc.
But my knowledge of photographed comportment can go further still. 
As little as I observe it, a sketch-outline of identif ication is fashioned in my 
behavior, a barely traced out postural attitude by means of which I incorporate 
the behavior observed by reproducing it in a mimetic manner. Thus, I can 
grasp from within, a little as if it were mine, the attitude taken by the person 
photographed. I apprehend its meaning as a particular social behavior that 
is nonetheless revelatory of a more general style of carrying oneself.
Let us note, by the way, that this sketch-outline of the mimetic attitude 
through which I grasp the meaning of the behavior photographed sometimes 
f inds a more manifest expression. For example, I may instinctively mime 
the position of the body that I observe, or the severe pout of a person with a 
particularly austere physiognomy. These are rather rare but highly revelatory 
manifestations of this incipient identif ication born from the observation 
of a mere photograph.
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We can now glimpse the depth with which it is possible for me to com-
prehend a person of whom I only possess the image. Through this incipient 
identif ication that impregnates me with the sense of someone’s behavior, a 
whole style of existence is conveyed to me, a structure or a certain particular 
manner of being in the world. I may thus say of the person photographed 
that he appears kind, pretentious, likable, or foolish. Many other qualif iers 
may nuance my judgment, and they are so many attempts at explaining the 
form of social existence that it is possible for me to perceive.
At the same time, and in an entirely natural manner, sentiments of 
sympathy or antipathy spontaneously gush forth. A given countenance, 
on which I may read amiability, spontaneity, etc., will inspire sympathy in 
me, while another countenance on which transpires a social attitude that 
I f ind unpleasant will arouse antipathy in me.
All these considerations allow us to glimpse the subtlety and astonishing 
complexity of the process of identif ication, when we envisage it on the level 
of lived experience.
Structured on the basis of intersubjectivity, it is above all a postural behav-
ior with multiple, complex, and structural affective repercussions. Its role in 
the comprehension of other people is essential, and we can thus understand 
that it is both the origin and the fermentation of multiple relations between 
individuals and groups, and, subsequently, that it plays a fundamental role 
in the great and small dramas in the daily life of every individual and every 
social grouping. Among other things, it allows sympathies to be forged, 
antipathy and aggression to be formed, social groupings to be constructed, 
and alliances to be sealed or dissolved. Here, we touch on what Hesnard 
called the ‘dramatic aspect’ of identif ication, and which is, in sum, simply 
its social dimension.
To ref ine these notions and clarify these ideas, it is now appropriate to 
specify the three aspects of identif ication that we have just evoked: its motor 
or postural aspect, its affective aspect, and its dramatic aspect. With this 
goal in mind, we will permit ourselves to cite Hesnard at length. Since this 
writer has furnished very precise descriptions of these three aspects, we 
can do no better than simply convey them to the reader.
III. The Principal Aspects of Identification
a) The Motor Aspect
We have seen that identif ication is elaborated on the terrain of private 
intersubjectivity, in which the motor or postural aspect appears essential.
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As Hesnard explains:
It [identif ication] is above all a form of motoricity or, if it is observed in a 
specific situation, a segment of comportment or behavior. But this motoric-
ity is very particular: it is postural. We have here a tonic and durable 
muscular contraction which affects the muscular systems destined by 
their functional structure to plastically imitate or copy, in a more or less 
silent manner, the attitude or the action of another person; to reproduce it 
in its own way by personally reacting to it, rather than servilely imitating 
it. This is because the apparent immobility of the subject that visually 
identif ies itself with another person is an immobility full of muscular 
tension. This tension is felt by the subject by approximatively localizing it, 
and it can be objectively observed in the form of weak, undulatory expres-
sive movements (in the physiognomy, attitudes, gesticulations) made by 
the observer. We can say that the observer who identif ies interprets the 
movements of the person with whom they identify while sketching them 
or tracing them out.12
We should clarify that the motor aspect of identif ication is not a process of 
simple imitation. On the contrary, it is an interpretative mode of behavior 
correcting, in a way, the attitude incorporated. The attitude of the spectator 
whose gaze follows the movements of the acrobat and, while ‘miming’ them, 
also corrects them, in a way, is a good example of the interpretation and 
rectif ication of the behavior apprehended.
Another example: think of the fleeing gesture we spontaneously make 
when, at a distance, we see someone who is not reacting to an evident 
menace.
These examples allow us to glimpse the role that motoricity plays in 
behavior associated with spectacular identification and filmic identification. 
But we will return later to these problems which are of particular interest 
to us.
b) The Affective Aspect
Hesnard writes:
In a normal state, identif ication is initially – as much in the history of the 
individual as in the restricted cycle of these durable relations – affectively 
ambivalent. It is so in the sense that it can orient towards sympathy or 
love, or it can evolve in the direction of antipathy or aggression.13
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As we have already tried to explain, it is precisely in and through the 
process of identif ication, which gives us the ‘social mode of being’ of other 
people, that an ambivalent relation f inds its initial affective coloring, and 
is structured according to the multiple nuances of sympathy and antipathy.
c) The Dramatic Aspect
Man, we said at the beginning of this work, is an essentially relational 
being. His existence is naturally linked to that of other people by love, 
friendship, sympathy, aggression, etc., which form a whole spectrum of 
relations amounting to a vast number of variations of identif ication.
From the gossip about romantic affairs to the tragedies of hateful, de-
spairing co-existence, from a tiff between friends or joking banter about 
one’s love life to divorce, all-consuming hatred, unexpected suicides 
and unexplained crimes, all these dramatic events, with their often 
spectacular outcomes, belong to the dialectic of the couple, that of the 
master and the slave, the accuser and the accused, that is to say, the 
intensif ications, variations and failures of the links with other people, of 
identif ication. Thus is the dramatic nature of identif ication revealed.14
These three aspects of identif ication, so well described by Hesnard, are 
far from exhausting the complexity of the phenomenon. There are many 
others, undoubtedly less important, but whose utility for the comprehension 
of certain forms of behavior warrants our attention. Such is the case, we 
would hazard, with the phenomenon of the valorization or devalorization 
of other people, a phenomenon whose signif icance can be perceived when 
we tackle the particular case of f ilmic identif ication. It is this aspect that 
we would like to discuss in greater detail.
d) Identification as the Basis for the Valorization (or Devalorization) 
of Other People
As is the case with the affective aspect, nascent identif ication is, we think, 
ambivalent on the level of the value attached to a person. It is subsequently 
oriented either towards a valorization of the people with whom we identify, 
or towards their devalorization. We can illustrate this aspect by considering 
the nature of friendly relations.
Friendship doubtless constitutes a stable and profound identif ication, 
structured in the course of a durable, recurrent relationship. At the same 
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time that it sustains a mutual, highly elaborated comprehension, it f inds 
itself supported by strong feelings of sympathy. Between the members of 
such a relationship, a common system of thoughts and interests is often 
established, a similar manner of envisaging people and objects, in short a 
largely shared mode of existence. At the same time, there is, on the part 
of each of the members of the amicable relationship, a valorization of the 
other that advances insofar as the relationship is well-structured. Each 
friend, to the extent to which they see themselves in their counterpart, 
forming a community of ideas and feelings with them, attributes to them 
an unconditional value, a value that they will want to defend in the eyes of 
others, and which they will not hesitate to exaggerate if necessary.
Alternatively, if this relationship deteriorates, or rather, if the identif ica-
tion that links the friends is destructured, the inverse phenomenon often 
arises. This mutual devalorization is all the more aggressive when each 
friend is diminished in the eyes of the other.
This manner of valorizing or devalorizing other people, patent in amicable 
or amorous relations, exists on the least structured levels of the identificatory 
relationship, but in a more discreet manner. Identifying with someone, even 
if this is in a fleeting or barely traced out manner, signif ies apprehending a 
manner of existing which initially appears endowed (or not endowed) with 
a certain value. Little contact is needed in order to tell whether people are 
interesting or not, whether they are valuable or not, or whether they possess 
a remarkable or mediocre personality. In such contact, no matter how brief it 
may be, there is time for understanding other people, apprehending a certain 
social manner of comporting themselves, and thus for a confrontation, on the 
level of lived experience, of the structure of their comportment with one’s 
own. This confrontation of two modes of existence leads to a valorization, 
or a devalorization, of the people we come across.
It could be thought, upon reading the preceding lines, that this confronta-
tion consists of rational mechanisms of comparison and judgment. In our 
opinion, however, this is not at all the case. It is quite possible that these 
mechanisms act on the level of verbal thought, when, for one reason or 
another, we have been led to explain, even if just to ourselves, our attitude 
of appreciation or depreciation towards other people. But this is a second-
ary rationalization. The appreciation of people, their valorization or their 
devalorization, initially acts on the level of lived experience, before rational 
thought. Nor should we understand by ‘confrontation’ a simple process of 
f iltration, through which that which, in the other, is similar to ourselves 
would be valorized, and that which is not similar would be devalorized. This 
would abusively simplify the phenomenon. More generally, it is better to 
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consider that the sense and the behavioral style of other people, to which I 
have access via identif ication, are affectivized, in the f ield of my own mode 
of existence, in the sense of a valorization or a devalorization. In other words, 
the behavior of other people, to whom I have access via identif ication, 
endows me with a certain affective signif ication, which is given a certain 
affective value.
We are aware that we are touching here on an extremely complex and 
subtle phenomenon, one which warrants deeper attention and closer 
description.
We could study, for example, the phenomenon of valorization-devaloriza-
tion in its relations with affectivity and sympathy, or even rational thought. 
We could also attempt a classif ication of different kinds of valorization, and 
study their effect on human personalities.
Unfortunately, we can only point to these problems, whose analysis would 
take us too far away from the subject at hand. However, we would still like 
to evoke, here, certain types of pronounced valorization, whose role in the 
structure of the personality reveals itself to be particularly effective. Let 
us think, for example, of the value that parents assume in the eyes of their 
young children, or the value of particularly brilliant teachers in the eyes 
of their pupils.
In a general manner, it can be considered that, in these cases, there is, 
within the identif ication that links the child to the parent or the disciple 
to the master, an apprehension of a privileged mode of being of the lived 
world. This mode of existing will then be valorized to such an extent that 
it will often become a behavioral model, and thus a factor in the formation 
of the personality.
We will return to such phenomena of extreme valorization when we 
envisage different aspects of f ilmic identif ication. It will then become 
evident that this particular type of identification can engender a valorization 
of the f ilm character that goes as far as excessive idealization and even 
‘divinization.’
The few aspects of identif ication that we have just summarily sketched 
out are far from exhausting its complexity. We can perceive how useful it 
would be to pursue its analysis at length. We should hope, however, that 
this exposition is suff icient to glimpse the importance of identif ication in 
our psychic lives.
Identification, as we know, is of interest to the totality of the human being. 
It is the fundamental wellspring of the apprehension and comprehension of 
other people. It is both the fermentation and the structuring factor of our 
social relations. It appears in the f irst hours of our existence and continues 
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to act on a permanent basis, sometimes in a patent manner easily observable 
from the outside, but most often in a discreet, interiorized manner.
It is even present when, withdrawn into isolation, we give free reign to 
our imagination. Often, the dream is merely the identif ication of the self 
with a dreamed ego, projected in a more or less chimerical universe which 
reorganizes reality in the sense of our projects and desires.
Let us note that, in the reality of our daily relations, identif ication, as 
the behavioral form of comprehending other people, is most frequently 
structured in a relation of reciprocity, a relation through which each of 
the subjectivities in interaction, while impregnating their counterparts, 
conserves their own autonomy and self-consciousness. In such a relation 
of reciprocity, other people are present in my consciousness, as well as my 
view of them and their view of me, which constantly refers to my behavior, 
and which has the result that I am incapable of forgetting myself.
But when, outside of any reciprocity, we are only the remote spectator of the 
actions of other people, identification can become absorbing to such a point that 
it abolishes almost all self-awareness. As we will see, this phenomenon attains 
its highest degree of realization in the identif ication with a spectacle, and 
above all, in filmic identification, a kind of fusion of the actor and the spectator 
in the same behavior, represented in an effective manner by the former and 
posturally experienced by the latter. We will return to this problem later.
As we can see, identif ication subtends the most diverse types of interhu-
man relationships. Whether this is in the spectacle, in direct contact with 
other people, or even in our imagination, identif ication is what allows us 
to psychically live with other people.
As Hesnard writes:
Identif ication with another person, which can be complicated by identif i-
cation with oneself, and which extends within itself the concrete, external 
drama of existence, results in there being nothing of any importance in 
the thought or action of each of us that is not what we take from other 
people, what we give them, and what we believe to be the judgment of 
others on us. Obscure and without any effect when it comes to other 
people with whom we are only linked by generic intersubjectivity, this 
presence of the other person in us is formulated or appears reflexively 
to us with respect to all those who we have loved or desired: parents, 
friends, teachers, those who inspire our intellectual or social activity. […] If 
nothing of what is human is foreign to us, this is because, as subjectivities 
who are separate but in communication with each other, we identify 
ourselves with all the actors in the drama of our existence, up to the 
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testimonies that they leave on events. We could almost say that man is 
an anthropomorphic animal – an anthropomorphosis, if you will – and 
is born from the projective element of natural identif ication. This can 
be understood if we admit that identif ication, as a generalized style of 
comportment, is only the private aspect of anonymous intersubjectivity 
that the primary behavior of man expresses. And it is also what conditions 
in each human being their comprehension of those who are akin to them.15
IV. Fleeting and Structuring Identifications
The forms of social relations are too numerous for us to attempt, within 
the limits of this work, a systematic exposition of the multiple variations 
of identif ication. Such an attempt would doubtless lead to an abusive and 
rather artif icial schematization of reality.
However, in light of the goal of furnishing this book with the means for 
studying identif ication as a form of influence, we can distinguish, from 
among the different types of identif icatory behavior, those which are 
f leeting and most frequently without any effect on the personality from 
those which are stable and structuring. The former are sketched out in the 
multiple contacts of our daily life. The latter are realized through shared 
life and recurrent encounters with other people. Among them, we can 
cite identif ication with one’s parents, which contributes in a determinant 
manner to the formation of the personality, and the assimilation of moral 
and cultural norms. We could also cite the identif ication of pupils with 
teachers and the more prevalent identif ication of adolescents in search of 
privileged models of behaviour.
In short, in a general manner, we can qualify as ‘structuring’ those 
identif ications which, in one way or another, exercise an inf luence on 
the personality. We could also note that stable identif ication can still be 
variously qualif ied according to the modalities of its realization. It can be 
alienating or liberating, successful or failed, or even healing. But here it is 
a question of nuances introduced by psychoanalysis, and which are only of 
distant interest to the preoccupations of the present study.
V. Identification, Projection, Introjection
The terms identif ication, projection, and introjection have often been 
employed in a confused way, or in different senses by different authors.
In order to avoid any confusion, we would now like to precisely clarify 
the meaning of each of the terms in the framework we have adopted.
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Our point of view on this subject does not question the aptness of the 
concepts in the framework of psychoanalysis, or the def initions that they 
have received in this same framework. It does not enter into our competence 
to judge either this aptness or these def initions.
But, with the goal of avoiding the equivocations that may arise in the 
rest of this work, we believe it is useful to define our opinion, and to clarify 
the exact meaning that we will give to the terms under examination here.
In a very general manner, it could be said that projection and introjection 
are two aspects of a single phenomenon: identif ication as a form of private 
intersubjectivity. In our view, we should not see in these terms two distinct 
phenomena that together form identif ication by succeeding or completing 
each other in a simple synthesis.
If we have used, with respect to a single phenomenon, the apparently 
opposed concepts of projection and introjection, then this is because, for 
those who experience it, identif ication, as the behavior of actively appre-
hending other people, can also be qualif ied as a placing of the self in the 
other (projection) or a placing of the other in the self (introjection). The two 
terms refer to this same behavior of apprehending other people. They are 
simply two ways of expressing one and the same behavior.
Identif ication is a form of intersubjectivity, that is, a coexistence of 
consciousnesses, or a fusion of subjectivities, in a behavior of mutual ap-
prehension. Thus, to speak of the self and the other, of a projection of the self 
or of an introjection of the other, no longer has any significant meaning. In our 
view, they only amount to two different ways of shedding light on one and the 
same phenomenon, the subject who, having been liberated, and having been 
able to recuperate its identity, is forced to express itself by making reference to 
the two terms in the relationship – the self and the other person – and must 
therefore make its choice between the two possible combinations: ‘placing 
of the self in the other’ and ‘placing of the other in the self.’
We could, however, oppose to this point of view the observed existence of 
certain phenomena whose explanation seems to necessitate the distinction 
between the two components: projection and introjection.
Thus, the existence of different appreciations of the subject of a single 
person or a single form of behavior seems to be able to justify a conception 
of identif ication, conceived of as a composite of two processes – projection 
and introjection – with projection being the cause of the multiple distortions 
that the appreciation of other people can suffer.
How to respond to this objection? If we initially reflect on the different 
ways of appreciating a person, we can observe that the explanation advanced 
neglects to think that the personality is not a stable object, identical with 
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itself, and that a good part of the differences between the perceptions and 
interpretations of the different ways that people have of behaving comes 
from the fact that these people take on variable attitudes and structure 
their comportment differently depending on the interlocutors they meet 
and the types of relations that they establish.
Subsequently, having abstractly considered the malleability of other 
people, we should still consider that the behavior apprehended by identifica-
tion is interpreted in different ways according to our personalities, or, rather, 
the specif ic mode of being of each individual.
To explain this, it is not necessary to have recourse to the complex inter-
play of the mechanisms of projection and introjection, whose respective parts 
in the behavior of identif ication would condition the value or the objectivity 
of the comprehension of other people. Simply put, the comportment with 
which we identify in order to understand it is given a specif ic perspective, 
which depends on our own manner of structuring our existence, and thus, 
on our system of values. Hence, a given behavior, which I apprehend, and 
which appears to me, against the backdrop of my own system of values, 
as intelligent, or valid, or nonsensical, might appear to other people as 
ill-adapted or without value, etc. And yet neither this other person nor 
myself are mistaken on the meaning of this behavior.
It is only because we each categorize the real according to a system that 
is specif ic to us, that this behavior receives, for each one of us, a particular 
signif ication.
Alternatively, we can consider by attribution, occasionally observable in 
certain particular situations, very different meanings in the same behavior. 
A good example of this phenomenon is provided to us by the examination 
of responses given to projective tests (the Thematic Apperception Test, 
Rorschach tests, etc.). The same image arouses responses that perceptibly 
vary according to the subjects tested. For example, we sometimes say of 
people who have an ambiguous attitude that they are dreaming, crying, or 
sleeping, etc. Is identif ication, in these cases, reduced to its mere projective 
component? This would, evidently, confirm the idea of identif ication as a 
composition.
In order to understand these supposed pure ‘projections,’ we must take 
into account the fact that, in these cases of identif ication, reciprocity and 
exchange are lacking. There is, on the one hand, a neutral behavior (simply 
visualized in the case of projective tests) and, on the other hand, a subject 
who identif ies in an active behavior of apprehension encountering no 
reciprocity or exchange. Thus, when we demand that the subject express 
what they have perceived in the other, it is self-evident that aspects of their 
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own subjectivity appear. Is this to say that there has been a projection of 
subjectivity in the other, and thus that we have managed to isolate the 
‘projection’ component of identif ication? It seems to us that this is not the 
case, since nothing, in the experience of the subject who identifies, allows us 
to conclusively determine the autonomous existence of this kind of transferal 
of the self into the other. On the level of lived experience, identif ication is a 
form of intersubjectivity (that is, the fusion of subjectivities). But, precisely, 
because one of the elements of the relationship is neutral, and identif ication 
is unilateral, this fusion of subjectivities is a one-way process and only lets one 
of the subjectivities transpire, that of the subject who is actively apprehend-
ing. We can then speak of projective identif ication, signifying by this that it 
is conducive to revealing the personality of the subject who identifies. But we 
can in no way speak of ‘projection’ and ‘transferal’ as autonomous processes. 
These terms may well designate the result of ‘projective identif ication,’ but 
they do not imply anything about nature, or its composition.
In the same manner, we can designate with the term ‘introjection,’ not 
a process, but the result of what we may call introjective identif ication. In 
order to illustrate this last type of identif ication, let us recall the situation 
of the psychological interview. In this situation, the interviewer, whose goal 
is to understand the interviewee, effaces himself in order to better enable 
the subjectivity of the other to transpire. There is introjective identif ication, 
with a one-way intersubjectivity brought about, in which only one of the 
subjectivities in the relationship, that of the interviewee, expresses itself.
We will conclude by saying that identif ication can be projective or 
introjective to the extent that the intersubjectivity that characterizes it is 
f ixed on only one of the subjectivities in the relation.
From the point of view of the subject who identif ies, we can speak of 
projective identif ication when intersubjectivity is crystallized around one’s 
own subjectivity, and introjective identif ication when intersubjectivity is 
f ixed on the subjectivity of the other.
Thus, when we speak later of f ilmic identif ication, it should not be con-
sidered as a mechanism of the projection of the spectator, or introjection of 
the character, but only as a relation of intersubjectivity linking the spectator 
and the character.
VI. Identification, Mimicry, and Imitation
The concepts of mimicry and imitation can also give rise to diverse inter-
pretations. In order to eliminate any confusion, it is important to clarify 
what they refer to in the perspective that governs this study.
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By ‘mimicry,’ we understand the posturo-motoric behavior that consti-
tutes the principal aspect of identification. We have already had the occasion 
to clarify the nature of this aspect. Let us simply recall that mimicry is the 
active behavior through which the subject who identif ies tends to posturally 
reproduce the comportment of the person with whom they identify. This is 
a motoric behavior, sometimes patent but usually discreet, and occurring 
in an unthinking way.
We have given several examples of rather manifest mimetic behavior. In 
order to illustrate the phenomenon one last time, let us recall the example 
of spectators who trace out and reproduce the gyrations of acrobats whose 
movements they follow when identifying with them.
Contrary to mimicry, which is an apprehensive comportment, imitation 
can be characterized as reproductive comportment.
We could def ine it as follows: a comportment seeking to consciously 
reproduce, with various goals, the behavior that is apprehended through 
identif ication. Following the goals sought after, we can distinguish several 
forms of imitation.
Some forms of imitation take place within spectacles: their objective is 
to caricature a character. Others simply strive to reproduce the behavior of 
an individual or a group of individuals, to better explain or depict it. Still 
others aim to reproduce in reality modes of comportment with which we 
can identify, and which are highly valorized. These more important forms 
of imitation warrant our focus for a while.
Anticipating the second part of this study, we can illustrate this type of 
imitation with the numerous examples that are offered to us by what we can 
call the extensions of the cinematic spectacle in our individual and social life.
We know all the phenomena provoked by the cult of the movie star. An 
actor or an actress encounters the favor of the mass public, and the manner, 
the bearing, the facial expressions, and even the clothing of this actor or 
actress are immediately copied by a signif icant section of their admirers.
How can these facts be explained?
Brief ly put, we can sketch out this genesis as follows: on the screen, 
the star presents a comportment, or rather, a privileged mode of social 
existence. The spectators who identify with the star during the screening 
valorize this exceptional mode of existence, whose advantages on the social 
level appear self-evident. Thus, in order to valorize themselves, they tend 
to appropriate the characteristics of the star, to reproduce their mode of 
existence, to embody the same signif ication. In other words, they will try 
to present themselves in the eyes of other people an image of themselves 
similar to that of the valorized actor or actress.
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This intentional appropriation of the behavior of other people can also 
be called imitation.
The question remains open to know if there exists, alongside such fleeting 
imitations, more structural imitations. We can ask ourselves if, in extreme 
cases, structural imitations are not equated with what we called structural 
identif ications.
Probably, at a certain level, the vocabulary becomes uncertain and the 
distinctions become rather artif icial. Whatever the case may be, in a general 
manner, we will reserve the term ‘identif ication’ for the active behavior of 
apprehending other people, the term ‘imitation’ for the intentional behavior 
of reproducing the comportment of other people, and the term ‘mimicry’ 
for the posturo-motoric aspect of identif ication.
VII. Identification and Personality
We have tried to study some of the major principles concerning the very 
nature of the phenomena of perception, intersubjectivity and identif ication. 
We have also spoken of ‘personality’ in terms of the ‘mode of existence,’ the 
‘manner of being in the world’ or the ‘manner of structuring one’s social 
relations.’
It has thus become easier to sketch out a more systematic definition of 
the personality. This will be the object of the present section. We will try to 
present a certain conception of the nature of the personality, a conception 
which, we think, could be useful to f ilmological reflection, and to show the 
preponderant role played by identification in the formation of the personality.
What, then, is the personality? The concept of the personality evokes a 
whole series of other concepts, with a rather widespread usage in psychology, 
as in everyday language: ‘temperament,’ ‘character,’ ‘Ego,’ ‘characteristics’ or 
‘personality traits,’ etc., so many terms which all, aside from a few nuances, 
refer to a reality situated within the individual.
Often, indeed, the personality (or the temperament, etc.), is considered as one 
of the internal entities or psychic objects, and we can then ask ourselves what, 
in these objective realities, can be attributed to heredity or to the environment.
Since the problem cannot be solved scientif ically, a compromise is often 
established. Heredity is ascribed to the original nucleus, and the environment 
to the modif ication and reorganization of this nucleus. In this perspective, 
we often call ‘temperament’ that which is innate, and ‘character’ what this 
temperament becomes in the environment that has modeled it.
In any case, reference is always made to a kind of internal entity, an 
objective reality inscribed in the psychism as a biological trait.
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It may well be true that the depiction that we have provided here of a 
certain classical conception of the personality is rather caricatured. But, in 
spite of the nuances that we have neglected to expose, there remains the 
fact that, in everyday thinking as well as in the great majority of theoreti-
cal conceptions, the term of the personality almost always designates an 
internal, objective, and therefore relatively stable entity.
And yet, as with the old conception of perception evoked at the beginning 
of this study, such a mode of thinking derives from what the phenomenolo-
gists have called the ‘prejudice of the world.’
To posit, as the starting point for this reflection, the world as a reality 
external to the individual, and the latter as an individualized entity closed in 
on itself, leads us to think of the personality as an internal, objective reality, 
one that is given from the very beginning, whose function it is to give form 
to comportment in general and, more particularly, to social comportment.
And yet, what does this lived experience teach us about these supposed 
internal realities?
First of all, the personality appears much less stable than we would 
often like to imagine. ‘Comportment,’ such as it is experienced, is a f luid, 
changing reality. In order to take stock of it, it suffices to think of the changes 
in attitude and comportment of an individual according to the milieus in 
which they are successively inserted, and the different people with whom 
they associate. Of course, there is a constancy to comportment, a general 
manner of conducting oneself, which constitutes, precisely, what we call the 
personality. But the suppleness of this general manner of conducting oneself 
already underlines the relational signif ication of the personality. Behavior 
is always, in fact, formed on the basis of specif ic relational situations.
The relational character of the personality will be even more apparent 
if we interrogate the nature of the constant aspects of the personality. Let 
us take as an example the well-known phenomenon of paranoia. In order 
to understand the paranoid, or paranoiac, individual, it is necessary to 
refer to the insertion of the individual in the interhuman world. Paranoia, 
even in its attenuated forms, is essentially a social mode of comportment. 
Its signif ication can only be understood in and through the network of 
interpersonal relations of the individual.
We could doubtless say that paranoia, as a mode of social comportment, 
did not develop by chance, and that something needed to exist within the 
temperament in order to provoke it. It is quite possible that this something 
exists, that there is a biological structure favorable to the onset of paranoia. 
But, in any case, this structure cannot be considered as the sketch-outline of 
paranoia: it cannot even constitute its cause. It is only one of the numerous 
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elements that, in the f ield of the social relations of the individual, have 
contributed to the structuring of paranoiac or paranoid behavior.
Another example would allow us to better understand this idea.
Biometric and typological studies have established a correlation between 
the mental structure and the anatomic structure. Thus, it has appeared 
that malingering individuals are usually schizothymic, closed off, and 
introverted. Does this mean that asthenics (as they are called) bear, inscribed 
within themselves, at the same time as their bodily structure, the germs of 
schizothymia and introversion? This would amount to saying that, prior to 
any social insertion of the individual, the form of one’s social comportment 
is already structured. It appears more reasonable to think that, having 
taken account of a certain anatomo-physiological substrate, the manner 
in which individuals structure their comportment within the multiple 
social interactions will normally be oriented towards schizothymia and 
introversion, or towards cyclothymia and extroversion. Thus, to focus on 
anatomic structure alone, it is evident that physical asthenia, which is 
experienced by the asthenic individual as a certain mode of being in the 
world and a certain way of appearing to other people, contributes, in the 
f ields of interpersonal relations, to the formation of a certain behavioral 
structure oriented towards timidity and introversion.
In short, all this shows us that we should consider the personality not on 
the basis of the isolated individual, but rather on the basis of the insertion 
of individuals in their interhuman milieu. What is primary in man is the 
need for relationships. We thus come back, here, to what perception and 
intersubjectivity have taught us.
Perception, indeed, has shown that man is, from the start, a ‘being-in-
the-world’ and a ‘being-with-other-people.’
Intersubjectivity, as a generic co-existence of consciousnesses, has 
revealed to us that the nature of man is to be a relational being, that 
the individual can only be understood as a node of relations. We thus 
understand that the personality is none other than a certain singular 
mode of being in the world and with other people. It is the manner in 
which each individual structures their interpersonal behavior. Born 
within primordial intersubjectivity as a generic link to other people, it 
is the manner in which each subjectivity is constructed in and through 
the complex interplay of multiple identif ications that link the individual 
with others: identif ication with one’s parents, identif ication with one’s 
mentors, identif ication with cultural or moral models, group models, 
etc., as well as identif ication with oneself and the image one offers to 
other people.
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In short, the personality is a singular manner of social existence, which is 
structured within the multiple interpersonal relations in which identif ica-
tion plays a preponderant role.
Having admitted this, we can now clarify what we mean by the notion 
of the interpretative system of the personality.
In this optic, any system of interpretation or evaluation of the personality 
essentially consists of a systematic set of categories and notions serving to 
specify the modalities of being in the world.
We can also better clarify the role of research when it has the goal of 
studying the modifications of the personality when subject to the influence 
of various factors.
Hence, to ask ourselves whether a given factor can modify or influence 
one’s personality or comportment, f irst means seeking the lived signification 
of this factor, and then seeing how the apprehension of this signif ication 
can modify the social manner of being, or the social mode of existence of 
the individual.
Thus, asking whether f ilmic identif ication can influence a personality 
initially involves attempting a description of the lived meaning of the phenom-
enon of filmic identification, and then seeing if this phenomenon, whose lived 
repercussions and affective resonances we know well, can contribute to the 
structuring of the personality, or rather, to the structuring (or restructuring) 
of social modes of comportment. We will return to this problem later.
VIII. Identification, Communication, and Information
Specialists in the social sciences have often characterized communica-
tion as the simple transmission of a message from a sender to a receiver. 
The stages of the process presented in this fashion are: formulation of the 
message, its encoding or translation in a system of signs, and the emission, 
transmission, reception, and f inally decoding which provides the receiver 
with the meaning of the message.
Such a schema offers, of course, a convenient tool for thinking of com-
munication in scientif ic terms. But this apparent scientif ic objectivity can 
only, unfortunately, be obtained by neglecting an important element. It is 
indeed often forgotten that communication is just as much an affective as 
a cognitive phenomenon.
Let us cite Lagache:
If communication is that through which an individual influences another 
individual, and is influenced by another individual, then it is not only the 
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cognitive content that constitutes the essence of the message, but also 
the affective halo that accompanies it.
And yet, in the particular case of verbal transmission, what exactly does 
this affective aspect of communication consist of? It essentially relates to 
the identif ication in the relation that links individuals through communica-
tion – that links, that is, the listener (or listeners) to the speaker.
We all know by experience that an adequate understanding of the dis-
course of an interlocutor or lecturer can only be attained by mobilizing a 
certain degree of identif ication. We ‘put ourselves in the shoes’ of the person 
speaking in order to adopt their comportment and better understand the 
lived experience of the words they utter. If there is any need to convince 
ourselves of this point, it suff ices to recall the example (cited earlier) of the 
listener who, in certain pronounced cases of identif ication, unconsciously 
repeats the vocal gestures of the interlocutor.
It thus appears that communication, far from being reduced to a cognitive 
operation, is only realized to a high degree of perfection in a climate of 
intersubjectivity.
Pushing this analysis further, we can even perceive that the relations 
between identification and verbal communication, and even communication 
in the more general sense, are much more profound that we might think.
Is it not, in fact, in the primordial and generic intersubjectivity which 
initially links people to each other, that we should seek the f irst form of 
communication and the terrain on the basis of which the most structured 
modes of communication (like language, for example) are elaborated?
Hesnard answers this question in the aff irmative. Speaking of primordial 
intersubjectivity and of primary identif ication, he writes:
Expression through language is the culmination of the concrete gestural 
expression, born of a primary mimetic identif ication and expressed 
through the muscles, then becoming structured in thought, which is 
incarnated in the laryngo-vocal gesture.16
In this perspective, not only does identif ication appear necessary to the 
realization of verbal communication, but also, reversing the terms, we can 
even say that language itself, through the immense possibilities it offers to 
expression, is a tool at the service of the interhuman link of identif icatory 
behavior.
What we have already said concerning the role of identif ication in 
verbal communication can also be applied to all forms of communication, 
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beginning with writing. To understand, to discover the signif ications in 
written words, is not simply a process of decoding, but involves appre-
hending, through writing, the signif ications experienced by a particular 
subjectivity. It involves, that is, identifying with the author. Hence, any lack 
of understanding of a text, unless it is written in an unknown language, 
is not linked to the shortcomings of a decoding grid, but is usually due 
to an incapacity for identifying with the author of the text, of ‘putting 
oneself in their shoes,’ and thus grasping the living signif ications of the 
words employed. We are thus confronted with an incoherent assemblage of 
phrases that are incomprehensible because they are lacking in any affective 
resonance.
In the end, identif ication equally has a word to say about what could be 
termed ‘artistic communication.’ Understanding a work of art, a painting 
or a musical work, involves apprehending, through colors, forms, or musical 
movements, an affective structure specif ic to a certain subjectivity.
Here again we identify with and relive the experience of the author, 
and this is what permits the spectator to then aff irm, of a painter or a 
musician who has never been met, that they are passionate, sad, tender, 
or sentimental, etc.
As for the cinema, we will soon see that it is indisputably the art form 
which permits the highest degree of identif ication and that, by dint of 
this fact, its possibilities in the order of the comprehension of humans are 
considerable.
To conclude this section, let us cite some lines from Merleau-Ponty, con-
ducive to giving us a presentiment of the virtualities of f ilmic identif ication:
This is why the movies can be so gripping in their presentation of man: 
they do not give us his thoughts, as novels have done for so long, but his 
conduct or behavior. They directly present to us that special way of being 
in the world, of dealing with things and other people, which we can see 
in the sign language of gesture and gaze and which clearly def ines each 
person we know. If a movie wants to show us someone who is dizzy, it 
should not attempt to portray the interior landscape of dizziness, as 
Daquin in Premier de cordée and Malraux in Sierra de Terruel wished 
to do. We will get a much better sense of dizziness if we see it from the 
outside, if we contemplate that unbalanced body contorted on a rock or 
that unsteady step trying to adapt itself to who knows what upheaval of 
space. For the movies as for modern psychology dizziness, pleasure, grief, 
love, and hate are ways of behaving.17
 Part Two: The Film Experience
Chapter I: Filmic Consciousness Faced with Its Object
We have tried to explain the major principles that should guide our under-
standing of the general phenomena of perception and identif ication. It has 
thus become easier to broach the problems relating to the particular case 
of the f ilm experience.
We should rapidly recognize the path we are going to take. Film presents 
itself above all as an object of perception and, as such, it is a structure, a 
perceptual ‘gestalt.’ It is thus as a form, or a ‘gestalt’ that we will initially 
envisage f ilm. But we will not linger very long on this point because we 
will soon perceive that f ilm solicits a different attitude in our conscious-
ness than the pure perceptual attitude. We will see that, in order to clarify 
this particular attitude, certain writers have made of the f ilm experience 
something situating itself midway between the real and the unreal. These 
considerations, and others, will lead us to see f ilmic consciousness as a vari-
ation of the major category of consciousness that constitutes the imaginary 
consciousness. This idea will constitute the guiding thread of our whole work.
We will attempt a description of the major aspects of the f ilmic attitude 
conceived of as an imaginary attitude and, pushing this analysis further, we 
will then try to explain the particular variations or modalities of this attitude.
In the end, on the basis of what this description will have taught us, 
we will broach the problem of spectatorial behavior, or in other words, of 
f ilmic identif ication.
I. The Film as an Object of Perception
Film is f irst presented as an object to be perceived. Thus, we can already 
apply to the perception of f ilm what we have said of perception in general.
In perception, as we have said, the object always presents itself as a 
structure, a form, or a ‘gestalt.’ The same goes for f ilm, which, as an object 
to be perceived, presents itself f irst as a temporal form.
Film is not, in fact, merely a sum of elementary images placed in a tem-
poral contiguity. If we envisaged each image in particular, independently 
of its context, we would perceive that these isolated images do not have the 
same signif ication as when they are perceived inside a f ilm. This is because 
the meaning of an image always depends on those that precede it and those 
that follow it – in a word, on its surroundings.
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The succession of images thus creates a new reality, irreducible to the 
sum of the elements employed. This means that the construction of each 
shot and the organization of shots into scenes, and of scenes into sequences, 
creates a complex visual form.
A f ilm, as Merleau-Ponty writes:
seems to be an extremely complex form inside of which a very great 
number of actions and reactions are taking place at every moment. 
The laws of this form, moreover, are yet to be discovered, having until 
now only been sensed by the f lair or tact of the director, who handles 
cinematographic language as a man manipulates syntax…18
What is valid for images is equally valid for sound. The sounds and voices 
that accompany a f ilm are evidently not presented as a sum of elements more 
or less independent of one another, but form a sonic ‘gestalt,’ a sonic totality 
in which the elements draw their signif ication from their assemblage. In 
the end, it is still necessary to consider that, inside a f ilm, the visual form 
and the sonic form are not simply juxtaposed but are composed to form an 
even more complex ensemble.
Merleau-Ponty continues:
A sound film movie is not a silent f ilm embellished with words and sounds 
whose only function is to complete the cinematographic illusion. The bond 
between sound and image is much closer, and the image is transformed 
by the proximity of sound. This is readily apparent in the case of dubbed 
f ilms, where thin people are made to speak with the voices of fat people. 
[…] And the union of sound and image occurs not only in each character 
but in the f ilm as a whole.19
The f ilm, as an object to be perceived, thus appears as a structure, a complex 
organization of visual and sonic elements which draw their signif ication 
from the ensemble that they compose.
Hence, the deeds and the gestures perceived on the screen assume mean-
ing or signif ication through the contexture of the f ilm. Each event, each 
gesture or comportment, appears with a signif ication that comes to it, in 
addition to its own signif ication, from the relations that it entertains with 
everything that precedes and follows it.
But we should also point out that these significations are grasped from the 
start. Here, we come back to one of the major characteristics of perception: 
its immediacy. Perceiving, we noted at the beginning of this work, does 
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not involve intelligently interpreting the world in order to reconstitute its 
meaning. Rather, it has a presence alongside the objects of the world.
And yet, by giving us events and gestures, the cinema is essentially 
addressed to this capacity for co-existing with things that is proper to 
perception in general.
It may be that the cinema is equally addressed to reflection, but this can 
only be a secondary aspect. As is the case with perception in general, the 
reflection that necessitates taking one’s distance from the object can only 
be carried out after this immediate apprehension of the meaning of things, 
deeds, and gestures, which characterizes our f irst dealing with the f ilmic 
world and with the world tout court.
Let us summarize what we have said. The f ilm, as a perceptual object, 
constitutes a ‘gestalt’ or a complex spatio-temporal structure in which 
the elements draw their meaning from their internal organization. These 
signif ications, which are signif ications of deeds and gestures, are initially 
grasped without the aid of the intelligence.
Now, we must say that if f ilmic comprehension – or, rather, f ilmic 
consciousness – borrows from perceptual consciousness its capacity 
for co-existing with things, it is nonetheless differentiated from it by 
many aspects. This is because the cinema is only a representation of the 
world. It does not give us the world, but only images of the world. And 
yet, if images of the real, like the real itself, offer themselves to us in the 
same manner as our unmediated sensations, they nonetheless solicit a 
different attitude.
Let us explain ourselves. Perceiving real behavior or perceiving repre-
sented behavior is, in both cases, grasping the meaning of this behavior. But 
what changes from one case to another is our manner of considering this 
behavior, of relating to it. In the case of visual representation, we know that 
the behavior under consideration, despite presenting all the characteristics 
of perception, is not physically present. Whence what we could provisionally 
call a vague sentiment of mingling two different registers: the real and the 
unreal. Whence also this behavioral difference when faced with an image or 
with reality. Many writers have tried to describe this intermediary position, 
specif ic to the cinema, between the real and the unreal.
Let us cite the titles of some very important articles in this respect: “Le 
cinéma entre l’imagination et la réalité” (François Ricci),20 “L’impression 
de réalité au cinéma” (Jean-Jacques Rinieri),21 “Le caractère de réalité des 
projections cinématographiques” (Albert Michotte van den Berck).22
Some writers believed that they were able to specify the nature of the 
real-unreal mixture on the basis of the objective characteristics of the 
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image. The last article cited constitutes without doubt the most interesting 
attempt in this direction.
In order to orient this analysis, we can take this article as a point of 
departure.
II. Film, Real, and Unreal
Michotte begins with the following observation: the cinema gives a very 
vivid impression of reality, and yet, the reactions of spectators are very 
different from those of everyday life. They barely exceed the emotional 
stage. Does this mean that there are two different types of reality? This 
obliges us to distinguish between a belief in the reality of an object and 
the intuitive character of reality.
He states that “the movement perceived is real, and yet we know that noth-
ing takes place on the screen apart from the rapid succession of immobile 
images.” The conflict thus expressed is resolved, according to Michotte, 
by the introduction of the concept of ‘illusion,’ which is dedicated to the 
divorce between what we believe to be reality in itself and what merely 
seems to be real.
As Michotte writes:
This is an important distinction for the psychologist because in general, the 
reality of our beliefs rather than our intuition of the situation determines 
how we act. The cinema is again characteristic here, since our general 
attitude to f ilm is that of a belief in unreality, despite the apparent reality 
of represented events, and this probably goes some way to explaining the 
difference in behavior just mentioned. But it would be wrong to imagine 
that this explanation completely resolves the issue. On the contrary, the 
psychological relation between belief and the impression of reality sets 
up for the cinema, and indeed for the theater, extremely tricky problems 
about which we know very little. For example, we must realize that the 
attitude of belief in the non-reality of perceived objects, permanent though 
it may potentially be, is neither constantly in operation nor ever able to 
be suppressed entirely by the impression of reality. Audience reactions 
to 3D cinema prove this when they are presented with a ball that looks as 
if it has been thrown into the auditorium. Even in conventional cinema, 
apparent reality cannot but impose itself in an absolute manner at certain 
moments. There are probably numerous oscillations of this kind over the 
course of a screening and what determines them should be investigated.23
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This way of posing the problem is doubtless remarkable in many respects, 
even if, in our opinion, it is a little absurd to have apparent reality and a 
conviction of unreality co-exist in our consciousness. We will soon see that 
this mode of thinking likely derives from an effort to explain psychic realities 
on the basis of objective realities external to the spectator. Whatever the case 
may be, we will retain the following fundamental remarks for our reflection:
1. In real perception, there is a belief in the reality of the object, whereas 
in f ilmic perception, there is the appearance of reality and, at least 
potentially, the conviction of unreality;
2. Depending on whether there is belief or the impression of reality, our 
comportment takes on a different allure.
We now see how Michotte explains what he calls the “psychological relation 
between belief and the impression of reality.” In his view, the method consists 
of “examining to what extent the laws known to govern perception allow 
us to theorize an impression of reality, and how such an impression differs 
from the one we assign to real things and events.”
We can see that Michotte places his investigation on the terrain of objec-
tive realities. These are relations between the systems of excitation specif ic 
to everyday life and those governing f ilmic perception, which, according 
to him, impose on consciousness the impressions of reality and unreality.
He begins by examining the divergences between the systems of ex-
citation envisaged. Let us briefly summarize them. Firstly, there are the 
changes in the setting that intervene in the cinema and remove from the 
perceived world the continuous character and phenomenal permanence 
that it possesses in real perception. Subsequently, there is the difference in 
the visual f ield: while the limits of the visual f ield in everyday life do not 
belong to the objects perceived (we always have the impression that space 
extends beyond what we can actually see), in the cinema, the visual f ield 
f inds itself considerably reduced: the portion of space it encloses appears 
closed and strictly limited.
Analyzing the image in itself, we can observe that, as opposed to what 
happens in the real perceptual f ield, where the objects that we see are 
constituted by shadows, the realities that we project on the screen are 
patches of light, with the darker parts considered from the physical point 
of view as a sort of negative corresponding to the regions of the object that 
do not excite the retina.
Finally, one last divergence is the fact that the perception of shapes and 
sizes f inds itself perceptibly altered in the cinema. The fact is that, due to 
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its inability to reproduce the third dimension, the cinema does not entirely 
respect the principle of size consistency.
All these perceptual anomalies are, for Michotte, so many determinations 
of the impression of unreality. If it was necessary to focus on them alone, 
the cinema would be nothing but a set of a data imposing themselves on 
consciousness as unreal. But the f ilm possesses other properties which, 
according to Michotte, perceptibly bring f ilmic data close to real data.
First of all, cinematic projection ordinarily allows us to see perspectival 
images. As Michotte explains:
The opposition between the moving f igure and the still screen acts to 
segregate and liberate the object from the plane it had been in. The object 
somehow ‘substantializes’ itself and takes on an autonomous existence, 
becoming a ‘physical thing.’
A second, powerful factor of reality is constituted by movement as such.
Finally, a third and f inal factor of reality would be the fact that the f ilm, 
almost always, induces emotional reactions. For Michotte:
One f inal aspect of the question should be considered. Watching a f ilm 
usually brings about numerous powerful emotional reactions in the 
audience and these obviously possess an immanent character of reality. 
[…] These emotions are intimately tied to what we see and above all to 
its apparent reality because it is not generally the image of the character 
which evokes our sympathy or admiration but rather what makes up their 
real personality, as constructed from their physiognomy and behaviour. 
Furthermore, there is empathy, that projection of our own emotions into 
the characters on the stage or screen which is well known to psychologists 
and aestheticians. Wouldn’t all of this bring about a kind of return shock, 
a ‘circular’ process of reciprocal interaction, stronger than we might at 
f irst imagine, one which would confer a veritable resurgence of reality 
on people and the things they move around?
This last argument is differentiated from the others by the fact that it no 
longer exactly concerns objective realities. The views that it expresses are 
of a greater interest – this is, incidentally the reason for which we have 
reproduced this passage in its entirety – but we do not understand why 
Michotte introduced it into his reasoning. Emotion, in his view, is a tributary 
of the impression of reality, itself determined by objective properties. It could 
well be supposed that a circular process of emotion-empathy engenders 
ParT T wo: THE FilM ExPEriEncE 75
a recrudescence of reality. But, in any case, in the f inal analysis, they are 
the only objective properties which, in Michotte’s logic give the cinema its 
attribute of reality.
In any case, this is what transpires in his conclusions: “Now,” he writes, 
“cinematic experience appears to be a peculiar conjunction of the ‘real’ 
and the ‘artif icial.’”
And what, for him, creates this ‘peculiar conjunction’ is none other than 
the conflict between a determined perceptual organization and our acquired 
experience, a conflict that is resolved through the impression of distance. 
As he points out:
We think, in short, that the cinematic situation may be described as one 
which makes us feel we are actually perceiving real beings and events, 
but that this reality is more or less distorted, since it belongs to a world 
which is psychologically speaking not exactly ours and from which we 
feel, in spite of everything, rather distant.
Michotte’s analysis, as rich as it is in descriptive elements, nonetheless 
strikes us as rather dissatisfying in the explanations he gives.
His argumentation contains certain weaknesses that are necessary to 
analyze if we want to grasp the fundamentals of the f ilm experience. First 
of all, if, as Michotte thinks, the impression of reality is a direct tributary of 
the relation between habitual perceptual elements and unusual perceptual 
elements, then we need to take into account the fact that, as a general rule, 
this relationship is rather constant. How can we thus explain these consider-
able variations of belief in reality which Michotte himself speaks about at the 
beginning of his article, of which a striking example is given to us by certain 
spectacular reactions during the very f irst f ilm screenings? Indeed, if we are 
to believe film historians, these first representations sometimes engendered, 
among the spectators, manifest behavioral acts such as fleeing in terror.
Such behavior would be unthinkable today, and yet, the objective condi-
tions of the representation of the real have been considerably ameliorated.
We can understand these facts if we admit that there is, in f ilmic con-
sciousness, a certain knowledge: the spectators know that the reality unfold-
ing on the screen is merely represented to them. And yet, this knowledge, 
well-structured today, was without doubt still ambiguous during the f irst 
f ilm screenings. For the f irst fans of the cinématographe, who still had little 
familiarity with the screen, this knowledge was still too uncertain of itself 
to be effectively maintained in the unreal images whose apparent reality 
remained disarming for our minds.
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It could be objected that the knowledge of which we speak nonethe-
less stems from the objective conditions of representation, that it is the 
perceptual anomalies that engender the awareness of a certain unreality 
of the projected images. The schema proposed by Michotte would then 
remain entirely valid.
We should f irst note, however, that Michotte never refers to knowledge. 
He only mentions a conflict, and we are quite justif ied in thinking that this 
conflict is only exercised on the simple level of impressions. Consequently, 
is it certain that perceptual anomalies are the cause of the sentiment of 
unreality? If this were the case, many things would appear unreal to us. 
Let us take an example. Let us suppose a subject who is suddenly placed 
before an unpolished, misshapen pane of glass, behind which people move 
about. It is certain that the people perceived would appear to our subject as 
bizarre, because they would be particularly misshapen. But it would be no 
less true that they would remain just as real as they would be if they were 
seen in normal conditions.
Of course, our subject could, if they so desired, posit that these strange 
forms had come from some outlandish world. But this would necessitate an 
attitude of consciousness, an intention to interpret the shapes in question, 
since, in any case, the observing subject knows that they are real individuals 
actually existing in the real world.
Let us take another example, borrowed, this time, from the world of 
cinema. It happens that, during a f ilm, in the middle of a succession of events 
unfolding in an apparently real world, a sequence appears to be thoroughly 
unreal. This is the case with sequences intended to represent the dreams 
(or daydreams) of characters in the f ilm. It is also the case with animation 
f ilms and f ilms with fantastic settings.
How can we account for the two examples mentioned in the framework 
of Michotte’s theory?
On the one hand, we have a very deformed vision, but posited as real 
without any equivocation, and on the other hand, we have a vision of an 
unreal world detaching itself from a world that is, in theory, midway between 
the real and unreal.
Can we still, after examining these two examples, aff irm that what 
has been f ilmically perceived draws a certain unreal character from the 
objective deformations to which the representation of reality subjects it?
Such diff iculties posed by Michotte’s theory are surmounted if we make a 
distinction between unreality and absence. Unreality is what consciousness 
poses as being incapable of existence. Hence, the f ilm experience, when 
the f ilm limits itself to representing lifelike events, would not be capable 
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of inducing an impression of unreality. By contrast, when the content of the 
f ilm has, as its object, dreams or unrealistic events, the f ilmic consciousness 
evidently becomes an awareness of something unreal.
We can see that the qualities of the real and the unreal essentially depend 
on the manner in which we are given the content of the f ilmic representa-
tions, and bear no relation to the objective conditions of perception. There 
are some kinds of f ilmic content that solicit our consciousness to take them 
for reality, and others to take them for unreality, and the deformations of 
the perceived world are not responsible for any impression of unreality.
Let us now envisage the notions of absence and presence, and resurrect 
the example of perception through an unpolished, misshapen plane of 
glass. What radically distinguishes this example from the f ilm experience 
is the fact that, although it is considerably deformed, the reality observed 
through the glass remains actually present.
The cinema, by contrast, only gives a reality that we know to be absent, 
or existing elsewhere, or not existing at all.
We touch, here, on a fundamental phenomenon. We can now see to 
what the knowledge we have just discussed refers. It is not, in the end, the 
knowledge of a certain unreality of the perceived world that is in question, 
but the knowledge possessed by the f ilmic consciousness that the reality 
it perceives, even though it has all the appearances of actual reality, is not 
present in its bodily physicality.
We can also see from where this impression of ‘psychic distance’ spoken of 
by Michotte stems. It cannot only be the consequence of a supposed mixture of 
the real and the artificial, since it is included in the filmic consciousness. The 
filmic consciousness indeed gives its object as not being there. So what would 
be so astonishing about the spectator feeling distant from the f ilmic world?
In fact, it now appears that Michotte has committed a double error. 
Firstly, by bringing together the impression of unreality and objective 
data, he ignores the fact that, in the f inal analysis, reality and unreality, 
absence and presence, essentially derive from knowledge, from a position 
of consciousness. Subsequently, he makes no distinction between unreality 
and absence.
Until now, we have been able to keep separate an essential aspect of f ilmic 
consciousness: it is a relationship with the world, but a world that is not 
present. Furthermore, this absence emerges from a position of consciousness.
And yet, the absence of the perceived world constitutes one of the essential 
characteristics of the imaging consciousness, such as it is described by 
Jean-Paul Sartre in The Imaginary.24 Thus, in order to discover more about 
the f ilmic consciousness, we must now try to situate our problematic in 
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the general framework of the theory of the imaginary, such as it has been 
developed by the French philosopher.
III. The Imaginary Consciousness
Let us begin by offering a brief summary of Sartre’s thinking. A quick 
overview of his reflections will help us to better pose our problems.
Reflecting on the imaginary consciousness, Sartre observes this supremely 
important fact: in all cases in which the imaging function of consciousness 
is active, it renders present an object that we know is not there. He writes:
The image is an act that aims in its corporeality at an absent or nonexistent 
object, through a physical or psychic content that is given not as itself 
but in the capacity of ‘analogical representative’ of the object aimed at.25
This phrase undoubtedly calls for some commentary.
With regard to the object targeted by the imaging consciousness, we can 
cite this interesting passage from The Imaginary:
To produce in me the image consciousness of Pierre is to make an inten-
tional synthesis that gathers in itself a host of past moments, which assert 
the identity of Pierre across these diverse appearances and which give this 
same object under a certain aspect (in profile, in three-quarters, full size, 
head and shoulders, etc.) This aspect is necessarily an intuitive aspect: 
what my present intention aims at is Pierre in his corporeality, the Pierre 
that I can see, touch, hear, were I to see him, touch him, hear him. It is a 
body that is necessarily at a certain distance from mine, necessarily in 
a certain position in relation to me. Only, the Pierre that I could touch I 
posit at present as not being touched by me. My image of him is a certain 
manner of not touching him, not seeing him, a way he has of not being 
at such a distance, in such a position. The belief, in the image, posits 
the intuition, but does not posit Pierre. The characteristic of Pierre is 
not to be non-intuitive, as one might be tempted to believe, but to be 
‘intuitive-absent,’ given as absent to intuition. In this sense, one can say 
that the image has wrapped within it a certain nothingness. Its object 
is not a simple portrait, it asserts itself: but in asserting itself it destroys 
itself. However lively, appealing, strong the image, it gives its object as 
not being. This does not preclude our then reacting to this image as if its 
object were present, before us: we will see that it can happen that we try, 
with all our being, to react to an image as if it were a perception. But the 
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ambiguous and false state at which we thus arrive only throws into relief 
what has just been said: in vain we seek by our conduct towards the object 
to give rise to the belief that it really exists; we can ignore for a second, 
but cannot destroy the immediate consciousness of its nothingness.26
In any case, the imaging consciousness posits its object as not being present 
in its bodily physicality. But this ‘positional act’ of consciousness, as Sartre 
calls it, can take, in his view, four different forms.
The act can take four and only four forms: it can posit the object as 
nonexistent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere; it can also ‘neutralize’ 
itself, which is to say not posit its object as existent. Two of these acts are 
negations; the fourth corresponds to a suspension or neutralization of the 
thesis. The third, which is positive, assumes an implicit negation of the 
natural and present existence of the object. These positional acts – this 
remark is crucial – are not superimposed on the image after it is consti-
tuted: the positional act is constitutive of the image consciousness…27
That is to say, the imaging consciousness includes, within its constitutive 
targeting of the imaginary object, the modality of existence according to 
which it is given as an object. This also implies that this modality of existence 
only depends on the imaging intention and not on the object imagined. 
We could, for example, neutralize the thesis – that is, not posit anything 
concerning the existence of the object – with respect to the image of a dragon 
or even view this dragon as being existent. Childhood consciousness, for 
example, views as existent beings (such as Father Christmas) which adult 
consciousness normally considers to be nonexistent.
But, if the imaging consciousness has as its essential and constant 
characteristic a positing of its object as not being present, there are other 
characteristics that can be modif ied and even disappear according to the 
objective matter on the basis of which the imaging function is exercised. In 
the case of the pure mental image – that is to say, when there is no material 
basis, beyond the fact that consciousness gives its object as non-present – it 
also appears as a creative spontaneity.
Let us return to Sartre:
A perceptual consciousness appears to itself as passive. On the other hand, 
an imaging consciousness gives itself to itself as an imaging consciousness, 
which is to say as a spontaneity that produces and conserves the object 
as imaged.28
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Finally, we must still consider that, contrary to what takes place in percep-
tion, where we can observe and apprehend the object, in the mental image, 
the object is given en bloc, it is entirely determined, and nothing can let us 
know more about its nature.
Indeed, there is no sense in trying to enumerate the elements of an 
imaginary image. An image of this kind is what it is. We do not apprehend 
it – we constitute it.
As Sartre writes:
In a word, the object of perception constantly overflows consciousness; 
the object of an image is never anything more than the consciousness 
one has of it; it is defined by that consciousness: one can never learn from 
an image what one does not know already.29
In the intention produced by the absent or nonexistent object, there is a 
certain knowledge that is indissolubly linked with it, and which focuses on 
the determinations of the object.
In the case of the image that has a material existence, we can none-
theless note certain variations concerning the knowledge of the imaging 
consciousness.
Between the pure mental image and the portrait, the objective matter 
of the image is far richer and, correlatively, the knowledge about the object 
targeted evidently plays a less and less important role. Indeed, while in the 
case of the pure mental image, or in the case of the image created through a 
schematic drawing, or even more so in the case of the image created through 
an imitation, there is nothing in the image above and beyond what we put 
into it (the image is entirely penetrated with the knowledge we have of it), in 
the case of the portrait, for example, or the photograph, the rich, even perfect 
nature of the material basis of the image, its quasi-perfect resemblance 
with the intended object, does not solicit the intervention of knowledge to 
the same degree. Furthermore, we must also note that the portrait or the 
photograph can equally be an object of perceptual consciousness or of an 
imaginary consciousness.
The matter of a portrait is a quasi-face. No doubt it is f irst of all a neutral 
element that could just as well function as support for a perceptual 
consciousness as for an imaging consciousness. But this indifference is 
mainly theoretical. In fact, the spontaneity of consciousness is strongly 
solicited: these forms, these colors, strongly organized, almost impose 
themselves as an image of Pierre. If it takes my fancy to perceive them, 
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they resist. A picture spontaneously offers itself in relief to the imag-
ing consciousness, and the perceptual consciousness would have great 
diff iculty seeing it as f lat. This quasi-face, moreover, is accessible to 
observation: of course, I do not refer the new qualities that I see there to 
the object that I have before my eyes, to this painted canvas. I project them 
far beyond the picture, to the real Pierre. As a result, each judgment that 
I make is given as probable (whereas in genuine observation judgments 
are certain). When I say “Pierre has blue eyes,” I imply: “At least, if the 
picture represents him faithfully.”
The matter of my image is a strictly individual object: this painting is 
unique in time and space. It should be added to this that the features of the 
quasi-face also have this inalienable individuality: that quasi-smile is the 
same as no other. However, this individuality appears only to perceptual 
consciousness. In passing from perception to image, the matter acquires 
a certain generality. We say: “Yes, it is just as he smiles,” implying that the 
smile represents a mass of Pierre’s individual smiles. We apprehend the 
different qualities of the matter as representatives that are valid for each 
of a mass of qualities that appear and disappear on Pierre: this pink color 
becomes the pink of his cheeks; this green gleam is the green of his eyes. 
What we seek through the picture is not Pierre such as he could have 
appeared to us the day before yesterday or on such-and-such a day of 
last year: it is Pierre in general, a prototype that acts as a thematic unity 
of all the individual appearances of Pierre.30
Let us summarize. In the pure mental image where objective matter is 
lacking, the knowledge that we have of the intended object is alone respon-
sible for the determinations of the object. Here, we have what Sartre calls 
the phenomenon of quasi-observation: we observe the mental image, but 
this observation teaches us nothing. In the case of the portrait, wherein 
the objective matter possesses an almost perfect resemblance with the 
intended object, such knowledge barely intervenes at all. Furthermore, the 
matter of the portrait can, at least theoretically, be the object of a perceptual 
consciousness or an imaging consciousness. In the end, the portrait is offered 
as a quasi-person accessible to observation.
It goes without saying that the elements that we have just recalled 
will be extremely useful for our own analysis. There is, however, one 
point that we would like to deepen, a point that has little importance in 
Sartre’s theory, but which will have great signif icance on the problems 
occupying us.
82 JEan-PiErrE MEuniEr 
Regarding the portrait, Sartre’s examples almost always related to an 
image representing an absent object, or an object existing elsewhere, but 
still having been the object of a pre-existing perception. The ‘Pierre’ of the 
portrait constitutes a concrete, known being for Sartre. With this in mind, 
Sartre passes quite rapidly over the phase preceding the appearance of the 
intention that constitutes matter into an image. He even seems to indicate 
that the observation of the quasi-face is still on the side of the perception 
(‘seems,’ that is, because at other moments the observation of the face 
constitutes an imaging consciousness for Sartre.)
Let us read these lines:
The matter of our image, when we look at a portrait, is not only that tangle 
of lines and colors that I just called it in the interest of simplicity. It is, 
actually, a quasi-person, with a quasi-face, etc. At the museum in Rouen, 
suddenly entering an unfamiliar room, I happened to take the people in 
a large picture for actual men. The illusion was of very short duration – a 
quarter of a second, perhaps – it remains nonetheless that I did not have, 
during this negligible lapse of time, an imaged consciousness, but on 
the contrary, a perceptual consciousness. […] It is the case that, in the 
picture, there is the appearance of a man. If I approach it, the illusion 
disappears, but the cause of the illusion persists: the picture, made to 
resemble a human being, acts on me as would a man, whatever attitude 
of consciousness I took towards it in other respects. […] The composure 
of this f igure moves me directly whatever interpretation I may give it. 
In brief, these elements in themselves are neutral; they can enter into a 
synthesis of imagination or of perception. But although they are neutral, 
they are expressive. […] The person in the painting solicits me gently to 
take him for a man. […]
The portrait acts upon us – almost – like Pierre in person and, because 
of this fact, it solicits us to make the perceptual synthesis: Pierre of f lesh 
and blood.
Presently my intention appears; I say: “This is the portrait of Pierre” or, 
more briefly: “This is Pierre.” Then the portrait ceases to be an object, it 
functions as matter for an image. This invitation to perceive Pierre has 
not disappeared, but has entered into the imagined synthesis.31
We can see the diff iculty that these lines contain. On the one hand, Sartre 
underscores the manifest difference between the appearance of a present 
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object and the appearance of a quasi-face (the illusion was shortly lived…) 
and seems to indicate that this difference is that between perception 
and the imaginary (“I did not have, during this minute lapse of time, an 
imaged consciousness, but on the contrary, perceptual consciousness”). 
On the other hand, he suggests, at least implicitly, that the observation 
of the quasi-face remains on the side of normal perception by waiting for 
an intention to appear and be directed towards something other than 
the quasi-face, towards, that is, the real person. “Presently my intention 
appears… Then the portrait ceases to be an object, it functions as matter 
for an image.”
Let us note here that criticizing Sartre’s theory does not enter into our 
project. Doubtless, the diff iculty that we raise is only a minor diff iculty. 
But, by noting it and by trying to resolve it, we simply hope to be able to 
extract certain elements conducive to advancing our comprehension of 
our own problems.
How can we resolve this diff iculty? Let us f irst interrogate its cause. It 
does seem that the ambiguity on which rests the perception of the quasi-
face derives from the fact that the example introduced by Sartre concerns 
the case in which the intention targets an already perceived object. The 
Pierre of the portrait is known elsewhere, and from the moment when 
the intention appears, it is brought towards someone whose existence is 
situated elsewhere. The matter of the portrait and the quasi-face then totally 
disappear from the background of the object targeted, of the true Pierre 
existing elsewhere, and are shifted, so to speak, to the side of perception.
And yet, if it is correct that the objective matter (forms, colors, etc.) 
of the portrait is indisputably situated on the specif ic terrain of normal 
perception, the apprehension of the quasi-face contains an element that 
radically differentiates it from perception, and which leads us to place it 
on the side of the imaginary, of non-presence.
Let us take an example. I have before me a photograph of a person I do 
not know, who I have never seen and, thus, who has never been the object of 
my perception. The person represented thus appears to me as a quasi-person 
with a quasi-face; he solicits me to take him for a real person, and I can 
observe him at leisure, as I would do of a true person, but the fact remains 
that I cannot see him, at any moment, as being present. There is, in the 
apprehension of the quasi-face of a photograph or a portrait, a positing of 
absence. The portrait or the photograph may well be lifelike and expressive, 
but I know that the person is merely represented, and I posit him as being 
non-present. It is simply that there is no positing of his existence, or, rather, 
there is a neutralization of the thesis as to his existence.
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Let us cite a passage from The Imaginary illustrating a case in which 
there is no positing of an existence:
If I look at the photos in a magazine, they can very well ‘say nothing 
to me,’ which is to say I look at them without positing their existence. 
Thus, the people whose photographs I see are indeed reached through 
these photographs, but without my positing their existence, just as the 
Knight and Death are reached through Dürer’s engraving, but without 
my positing them.32
We could also cite these lines from Husserl:
Let us suppose that we are observing Dürer’s engraving, “The Knight, 
Death and the Devil.”
We distinguish here in the f irst place the normal perception of which 
the correlate is the ‘engraved print ’ as a thing, this print in the portfolio.
We distinguish in the second place the perceptive consciousness within 
which in the black lines of the picture there appear to us the small colorless 
f igures, ‘knight on horseback,’ ‘death,’ and ‘devil.’ In aesthetic observation 
we do not consider these as the objects [Objekten]; we have our attention 
f ixed on what is portrayed ‘in the picture,’ more precisely, on the ‘depicted’ 
realities, the knight of f lesh and blood, and so forth. […] This depicting 
picture-object stands before us neither as being nor as non-being, nor in 
any other positional modality; rather, we are aware of it as having its being, 
though only a quasi-being, in the neutrality-modif ication of Being.33
In short, to ‘have’ a quasi-person or a quasi-face indeed amounts to having an 
imagined consciousness, but one in which there is no positing of existence, 
and thus one in which the existential thesis is neutralized.
Now, it also seems that it is not enough to say that the observation of 
the quasi-face does not bear a positing of existence in order to exhaust its 
characteristics.
Rather, it must also be added that, in the case of the consciousness of the 
portrait, the neutralization of the thesis (that is, the absence of a positing of 
existence) is often conducted by an undecided consciousness, which has still 
not clearly established the existence of its object – or, in other words, of an 
imaging consciousness which has just emerged and still remains unfinished. 
The correlative of such a consciousness can only be a quasi-being.
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Or, to take another example: at the very moment in which a portrait ap-
pears to me (let us suppose it is life-sized in order to facilitate understanding), 
the person represented still f inds himself at the edge of perception. He is 
almost a present person, and solicits our consciousness to make a perceptual 
synthesis. However, this absence is already included in the consciousness of 
the portrait and prevents it from being realized in the domain of perception. 
In short, we are in the presence of a form of consciousness that is still uncer-
tain, an undecided attitude of consciousness floating between perception 
and the imaginary. On the one hand, although the quasi-face f irst appears 
absent, its resemblance with a face is such that I have a tendency to take it 
for a real, present face, presenting itself in a singular and unique attitude.
On the other hand, through its very absence, I have a tendency to take it 
as the matter of the image – that is, to target, through the portrait, a being 
existing elsewhere (or not existing at all), but which, due to this positing 
of its existence, would gain in generality, since each trait observed in the 
quasi-face is no longer valid for what it is in itself, but refers to a quantity of 
the traits of the person depicted in the portrait or the photograph.
We can now return to and clarify the genesis of the consciousness of 
the portrait.
In the f irst place, the portrait can be the object of a perceptual conscious-
ness as much as of an imaging consciousness. We can, indeed, observe the 
colors and forms by themselves.
But the portrait, through its resemblance with a human face, barely 
permits the perceptual consciousness to be realized. In fact, we are im-
mediately solicited to consider the person and the face, rather than the 
portrait as an object. At this stage, we have before us a quasi-person with 
a quasi-face. Resemblance can be such that we have a tendency to take the 
portrait for a real person.
The gaze of a portrait can sometimes be so lively that it happens that, 
at least for a brief instant, we have the sensation of being seen by a person 
in f lesh and blood. And yet, in spite of the apparent reality of the object, 
there has already been a negation of the presence of the person. There is a 
quasi-person, that is, a quasi-presence, but we already vaguely know that 
this quasi-person is not there. At this point, the attitude of consciousness 
is still rather undecided. On the one hand, consciousness is already in the 
imaginary, in that it posits the non-presence of the object, and on the other 
hand, it remains on the side of perception through the tendency it has to take 
the portrait for a real person, quasi-present and f ixed in a singular attitude.
But this relative instability of consciousness does not last for long. The 
awareness of the portrait as a portrait is soon made more explicit. The 
86 JEan-PiErrE MEuniEr 
imaging intention appears more clearly and we tell ourselves: “that is a 
portrait.” Thus, the portrait ceases to be ambiguous. Consciousness resolutely 
slides into the imaginary, and clearly poses its object as not being there. 
This does not mean, however, that there is already a positing of existence.
We know that a person existing beyond the painting is depicted, but we 
cannot posit anything about his existence.
In other words, the person is indeed targeted by the portrait, but without 
any positing of his existence from our part. It even happens that we let 
ourselves fall into the trap of resemblance, that we almost enjoy believing 
in the presence of the person. In any case, we still aim at nothing other than 
the singular aspect or the unique attitude that the person in the portrait 
presents. In short, at this moment, what we see in the portrait is not a 
person-in-general, but a f ixed person with a particular attitude.
Now, should someone tell us that it is a portrait of such-and-such a person 
(a parent, perhaps), then there is a positing of existence. We posit the person 
as existing, or having existed, elsewhere.
Thus, consciousness ceases to adhere to the object in its singularity. The 
qualities perceived are projected beyond the painting, onto the real person 
of whose existence we are assured. We target a person-in-general, since 
each quality perceived in the portrait is valid for a quantity of others that we 
presume have appeared on the face of the person. We then say that the person 
has a friendly smile, or that he possesses a severe gaze, wishing to designate 
by this a smile in general or a gaze in general. But we must remark here that 
everything that we can say of the person-in-general, consists of presumptions 
on our part. Each individual trait of the portrait refers to a trait in general by the 
intervention of a sort of hypothesis on our part. It is actually given to us to see a 
unique attitude of the person in the portrait, and if the imaging consciousness 
is generalizing, it nonetheless remains connected only to the characteristics 
of the portrait, which remains in the foreground of our attention.
If, on the contrary, we f ind ourselves faced with the portrait of a person 
we know, then there is no presumption of a person-in-general, but rather 
recognition.
Our attention extends well beyond the portrait, to the multiple charac-
teristics perceived in the real person.
Everything that we have known about the person flows from the face of 
the portrait whose singularity fades in favor of the generalities that become 
the center of our attention.
This f inal analysis of the consciousness of the portrait appears of interest 
due to the fact that the portrait, and the photograph, doubtless constitutes 
the matter of the image closest to the cinematic image.
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It is on this cinematic image that our attention will now be focused. It 
is now for us to ask how the imaging function is exercised in the specif ic 
case of the cinematic image. In other words, we must extract the specif ic 
structure of the f ilmic consciousness, with respect to all the other types of 
the imaging consciousness.
IV. The Attitudes of Filmic Consciousness Faced with Its Object
In the f irst place, we can already aff irm, recalling what we said about 
Michotte’s descriptions, that f ilmic consciousness possesses at least one 
characteristic shared with all the other forms of the imaging consciousness: 
it posits its object as not being there. In other words, we know that f ilmic 
reality is not physically present and we posit it as such.
Once this point has been ascertained, we need to interrogate the different 
functions of the cinematic image, or, alternatively, the internal modifications 
of f ilmic consciousness.
Let us note that, for reasons which will come to light in the rest of this 
study, we will follow a procedure that is the inverse of that followed for the 
analysis of the consciousness of the portrait. We will begin with a case in 
which the object is existent and known (the home movie [ film-souvenir])34 
in order to head towards the study of a case in which the object is unknown 
and non-existent (a f iction f ilm) by passing through the intermediary case, 
in which the object is existent but unknown (a documentary f ilm).
a) The Home Movie
It can happen that the cinema, like the portrait, offers to my vision images 
relating to a person who is known but absent or existing elsewhere. We can 
immediately see that this particular case of cinematic projection supposes 
a conscious attitude very different to that which engenders the f iction f ilm.
Let us take an example: I want to recall the face or the whole physiognomy 
of a person I know. In order to do this, I can produce a mental image of this 
person, but I will only ever reach an imperfect representation. I can also 
take a photograph or a portrait of this person, and then I will f ind all the 
face’s details. Photography, as we have seen, functions as an analogical 
representation of the absent person. But it lacks life. It gives all the charac-
teristics of the face, but remains incapable of rendering expressions, looks, 
and familiar gestures which have been seen countless times on the person 
in question. If I desire to rediscover these known gestures, I can then, if 
I am an amateur f ilmmaker, project a f ilm that represents the person in 
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question, if they have been f ilmed on a certain occasion. The cinematic 
image, more than the portrait or the photograph, restores life. This time, I 
really do f ind the person.
In the three cases that we have evoked, the intention remains identical: 
every time, I render present to myself a person I know who is not there. In 
all three cases, there is a positing of existence. The person who I seek to 
render present to myself is posited as existing, or having existed, elsewhere. 
In all three cases, too, the goal is to f ind a person-in-general.
Thus, the matter of the home movie, like that of the portrait, acquires a 
certain generality. As for each of the gestures that I see on the screen, I do not 
apprehend them in their own individuality, but as representations of multiple 
gestures in reality. It matters little whether the person represented carries 
out a given particular activity. The activity in itself is of no interest. What 
interests me is to f ind, through the manner in which this particular activity 
is accomplished, a more general mode of behavior, repeatedly perceived in 
the absent person.
In short, what I seek to render present to myself is the person-in-general, 
such as I knew him in the multiple real perceptions that I have had of him. 
Thus, as in the case where I gave myself a known person through a portrait, 
our attention carries well beyond the cinematic image. The person-in-
general, who is known in real perception, is the center of our attention. We 
can also say that, in the case of the home movie, the cinematic image truly 
plays the role of medium. It serves as an intermediary between the reality 
perceived and my current consciousness of this reality.
With the characteristics that we have just enumerated, we must still add 
that the consciousness of the home movie appears as a constitutive activity: 
it looks beyond the image, to the person-in-general that it depicts, in order 
to produce and maintain his existence even during the screening.
If this activity ceases, the person sought after gives way to an anonymous 
character on the screen carrying out equally anonymous and singular 
gestures, since they no longer refer to any general comportment.
Let us summarize. In the case of the home movie, there is, on the part 
of consciousness, a positing of existence, a generalization of the matter of 
the image that refers to a person-in-general, who constitutes the locus of 
our attention, and, f inally, the creative activity.
b) The Documentary Film
We can now envisage the case of the documentary f ilm, a case similar to the 
home movie in that it seeks to render present objects and people existing 
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or having existed elsewhere, but which is nonetheless differentiated from 
the home movie due to the fact that (at least theoretically) the objects and 
people represented are not the object of any real perception.
Included in this category of f ilms are biographical f ilms – that is, 
documentaries on people. But f ictionalized representations of the lives of 
historical celebrities (for instance, most f ilms treating the Napoleonic era) 
are eliminated. These are hybrid productions halfway between f iction and 
reality, between myth and historical truth.
In order to facilitate our analysis, we will begin with a rather pure case 
of modest f ilms – generally short or mid-length f ilms – seeking to render, 
as faithfully as possible, individuals who are relatively little known to the 
public, or even completely unknown.
Cinéma-verité offers us some specimens of this type of f ilm. We will 
f ind others still in certain works of new Canadian cinema (Lonely Boy, for 
example).35
What takes place in these specif ic cases? As with the home movie, there 
is, of course, a positing of existence. We know that the person proposed by 
the f ilm exists, or has existed, elsewhere, and we posit him as such.
As with the home movie, there is a certain generalization of the matter 
of the image. In other words, through the specif ic attitudes and comport-
ments of the individual presented by the f ilm, it is the general attitudes 
and comportments that the spectator considers, with the goal of rendering 
present the person-in-general who is the object of the f ilm, and whom we 
know to exist elsewhere.
In the film Lonely Boy, for example, a f ilm which seeks to give an overview 
of the life of the young Canadian singer Paul Anka, the behavior of the 
singer in question is not generally apprehended in its individuality, but 
as representative of a quantity of other types of behavior referring to the 
general comportment of the singer-in-general.
We should also note that in this type of f ilm, the director usually chooses 
the most typical fragments of behavior, which are supposed to be the most 
representative of the mode of behavior of the f ilmed person.
Until now, the biographical f ilm has not appeared any different from the 
home movie. In both cases, there is a positing of existence and the targeting 
of an object-in-general. For this reason, in both cases, there is a constitutive 
activity on the part of consciousness.
But we should also note that in this type of document, contrary to what 
occurs in the home movie, the knowledge about the person-in-general is 
contemporary to the viewing of the f ilm. In the home movie, the image 
functions as a representative of a sum of real perceptions, which, in each of 
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the specif ic appearances, flowed out of the person depicted. Thus, we have 
been able to say that our attention was focused on these real perceptions. 
The image, in other words, slid to the background of our attention and lost 
all singularity. Here, the process is quite different. We have not had any 
real perception of the character represented. We only have a vague idea of 
the character or no idea at all. Thus, if the perceived comportments gain in 
generality, or better, if they essentially serve as a representative for a general 
comportment, then it must be said that this generality is only acquired 
through a hypothesis or a series of presumptions whose point of departure 
can only be the particular behavior relayed by the f ilm. No prior perception 
can precede the current filmic image, and this remains the center of attention.
We can illustrate this last aff irmation by a new example.
With the goal of rendering present to myself a person who is a friend 
of mine, I have projected a home movie onto the screen. The f irst images 
present this person to me taking a cigarette and lighting it up. I perceive 
this unique gesture, but soon I also see something else: a familiar gesture 
that has really been perceived on the multiple occasions on which I have 
seen this friend light a cigarette. Or rather, the gesture in itself loses all 
signif ication, and I only retain fragments of particularly representative 
gestures of a general behavioral style that I have had the opportunity to 
perceive when faced with the multiple and diverse actions made by my 
friend. The cinematic image is f illed with earlier perceptions. Its effective 
content ceases to be apprehended for itself. It is dissolved, so to speak, in 
the multiple real perceptions which it calls to my mind, and which f low 
into the structural elements of the behavior presently perceived. It is not 
my friend lighting a cigarette that I see, but my friend-in-general, such 
as he appeared to me through the multiple gestures of his which I have 
perceived, and which constitute the focus of my current attention. Now, 
let us suppose that another person watches this home movie at the same 
time as me. As he does not know my friend, this person f inds himself in the 
same condition as the spectators of a documentary or biographical f ilm. I 
tell him that the person on the screen is one of my friends. At this point, for 
this casual viewer, the individual on the screen is posited as existent. What 
is more, there is a search, by both him and by myself, for a being-in-general, 
and the matter of the image acquires a certain generality. But, for the other 
viewer, the cinematic image constitutes the only point of reference for this 
search for the person-in-general. Through the representation of my friend 
lighting his cigarette, this viewer aims for a structure of the entirety of his 
comportment, but this structure is simply presumed, and his attention 
continues to adhere to the cinematic image in its singularity. Whereas for 
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me, there is a certain knowledge about my friend, which constitutes the 
pole of attention, and which f lows into the image, for the casual viewer, 
there is the trace outline of a general knowledge about the f ilm character 
on the basis of the particular characteristics of the images, which remain 
at the center of attention.
We can see, by passing from the home movie to the biographical f ilm, 
that the cinematic image gains in autonomy with respect to the level of 
real perception. It further polarizes our attention, but nonetheless remains 
situated (as an intermediary) with respect to an unknown reality, posited 
as existing elsewhere.
Let it be noted that what we have just said applies to the documentary in 
general. It suff ices to replace the f ilm character by a group of individuals. 
The majority of documentaries indeed seek to take stock of the activities 
or the history of a def ined social group (a working group, a sports group, 
etc.), or of a collectivity. In these cases, as in the biographical f ilm depicting 
a single individual, there is a positing of existence (we pose the group as 
existing, or having existed, elsewhere), a generalization of the matter of 
the image (the group-in-general, its general style of activity, is targeted), a 
constitutive activity and a f ixing of the attention on the image as a point 
of departure for the trace outline of a general knowledge.
We can now move on to a study of f iction f ilm. As we will see, this last 
category of f ilm (the largest) solicits, on the part of consciousness, a different 
attitude, in many aspects, from that which it adopts with respect to the 
home movie or the biographical f ilm.
c) The Fiction Film
Let us envisage the case of the film relating an invented story – this case is all 
the more important in that it concerns the majority of f ilm production – and 
refer once again to the same experiment.
This time, the images do not refer to anything existing. The characters 
who perform the action are indeed attained – it is perfectly evident that 
it is not the image in its objective reality that I see – but I do not posit that 
they exist (or have existed) elsewhere, and, moreover, I do not posit their 
non-existence, at least in the majority of cases. Rather, I am faced with a 
world of quasi-people, totally independent of the world known through 
real perception. We can thus say that, in the f iction f ilm, the imaginary 
closes in on itself in some way: the characters seen are indeed posited as 
being absent, or rather, as not being there in their concrete bodily existence, 
but their physical appearance and actions do not refer to anything really 
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existent, the f ilmic world is cut off from the world existing in perception 
in order to erect itself in an autonomous reality.
It follows that our attention is entirely centered on the screen. It also 
follows that the matter of the image no longer acquires any generality, but on 
the contrary, it is apprehended in all its singularity. In other words, the image 
no longer serves as a medium between a perception and a person-in-general 
or a group-in-general, it ceases to be valid as a representative sign of a larger 
signif ied, and solicits our consciousness to take it in its individuality.
This last remark already anticipates a modif ication in the form of con-
sciousness’s activity. In the home movie and the documentary f ilm, we have 
been able to extract a certain constitutive activity that seeks and maintains 
the existence of the object-in-general that it targets.
This is not entirely the case in the fiction film. Here, the consciousness of the 
fiction film appears more passive, in the sense that it submits more to the object 
that it targets in its individuality, and that it follows in its particular evolutions. 
If there is activity, it is doubtless situated more at the level of retention, which 
integrates past events into present action (and of protention, which prolongs 
present action into the future), than at the level of the constitution of the object.
But we will have the opportunity to deepen this point when we study 
the function of movement more particularly. Before this, there remain 
several important remarks to make. First of all, if the f iction f ilm no longer 
has any relation with existing reality, what is its status for consciousness? 
In other words, if the f ictional world is purely imaginary, how should we 
characterize the degree of consciousness’s belief in this imaginary world?
Let us examine our attitude when faced with the fiction film, and compare 
it with what we adopt in normal perception, and then, when faced with the 
documentary f ilm.
In perception, we do not have to believe what we see. The perceived world 
initially gives itself as real. Sartre explained this well in the following lines:
When I perceive a table, I do not believe in the existence of that table. 
I have no need of belief, since the table is there in person. There is no 
supplementary act by which, in addition to perceiving that table, I confer 
a believed or believable existence on it. In the very act of perception, the 
table is discovered, disclosed, given to me. […] The evidence peculiar to 
perception is therefore in no way a subjective impression that would be 
assimilable to a specif ication of belief: evidence is the presence for the 
consciousness of the object in person; it is the ‘fulf illment’ of the intention. 
[…] An evidence is a presence. Where evidence is given, belief is neither 
useful nor even possible.36
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In perception, therefore, the objects are not ‘believed,’ but are immediately 
apprehended as existent.
In the documentary, or, more generally, in the case in which an existent 
object is targeted through an analogical representation (photography, f ilm, 
etc.), the object is evidently not present to our intuition, but we know that 
it exists, and it is, in any case, its concrete existence that we try to attain 
through the image. Regardless of whether or not we have actually felt this 
existence, we posit it. In other terms, the awareness of the documentary 
is not disconnected from the real. It is simply their relationship that has 
changed. From now on, no more than for perception, we cannot say that 
the objects are ‘believed.’ They do not depart from the category of the real, 
and we apprehend them as real objects.
On the contrary, the objects, characters, and events of the f iction are not 
posited as existing in reality. They form part of an unreal world, the closed 
world of the f ilm, which has no more relation with reality. It can, of course, 
be objected that a given object that appears in a f ilm (an item of furniture, 
for example) really does exist, and that the spectator can, if they so wish, 
set their sights on this existence. But we must then note that the object, 
while recovering its place in the category of the real, ceases to belong to 
the world of the f ilm. It is entirely one or the other. Either we think of the 
object in its reality, and consider it to be a studio prop, or we think of it in 
relation to the events of the f ilm, and it appears as an unreal object in an 
unreal world. The same, obviously, applies to the characters of the f ilm. 
Either we consider the actor and we are in the category of the real, or we 
consider the character and we are in the category of the unreal.
But if the objects, characters, and events of the f iction film are not posited 
as existing – that is, if they are not immediately apprehended as being 
real – we must still admit that they are ‘believed.’ The spectator believes 
in the unreal, and is fascinated by it. This phenomenon of belief that we 
f ind each time we let ourselves be ‘taken away’ by a f ictional story has 
been characterized by Sartre, with respect to a problem close to our own: 
reading. Take this passage:
Reading is a kind of fascination, and when I read a detective story I believe 
in what I read. But this does not signify in the least that I cease to hold the 
detective’s adventures to be imaginary. Simply, an entire world appears 
to me as imaged through the lines of the book […] and this world encloses 
my consciousness, I cannot disengage, I am fascinated by it. This is the 
kind of fascination without positing existence that I call belief.37
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What is true for reading is even more so for the cinema, since the latter, 
rather than offering us signs on the basis of which we ‘imagine’ an unreal 
world, directly gives us this unreal world in images, with an appearance of 
reality which, even though we are never deceived (when reading and when 
watching f ilms, we never cease regarding the adventures as imaginary), 
solicits belief and fascination to a very high degree. We can better understand 
the phenomenon of fascination if we take note of the cases wherein the 
spectators, by themselves, break their belief in the adventure and the heroes 
of the f ilm.
These breaks sometimes happen when the events presented by the f ilm 
become unbearable, or when the hero f inds himself in an excessively awful 
situation. In order to escape the unpleasant feeling instilled by a belief in 
the f ilm, the spectator says, “It’s just a f ilm,” thereby refusing to believe in 
the story unfolding on the screen.
To be more precise, let us examine a concrete example of this break. In 
doing so, we can shed more light on the nature of the phenomenon of belief.
On the screen, the young hero of Letyat zhuravli (The Cranes Are Fly-
ing, 1957) by Mikhail Kalatozov is mortally wounded, and his tragic end is 
described with such dramatic intensity that the scene becomes too awful 
Fig. 4: The unexpected death of Boris (aleksey Batalov) in Mikhail Kalatozov’s The Cranes Are Flying.
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for me to continue consenting to it. I tear myself away from my fascination 
and say: “It’s just a f ilm.”
From this point, I leave behind the ‘believed’ world of the screen and 
return to my real situation as a spectator among other spectators, following 
an imaginary adventure. In other terms, I re-enter the category of the real, 
which I had momentarily evaded in order to consent to the unreal. The 
f ilmic world loses its density, it annihilates itself: for a moment, I have 
ceased to believe in it. This is not an act of denial. We do not deny that 
which is imaginary. We either consent to it or we do not. In order to deny 
an object or an event, the object or event must impose itself as such, as 
occurs in perception.
In the example given, I do not deny that the hero has died – this act of 
denial can take place, in a real situation, before a real death that I do not want 
to accept – but rather, I cease to consent to the imaginary world, I withdraw 
from it, as it were, in order to recuperate my function of the real and to 
enable me to consider the death of the hero as an unreal event. I acquire a 
certain distance with respect to this fact, which now merely appears to me 
as a product of the imagination, a shadow without any substance. In short, 
I stop believing in the imaginary world.
We can now see more precisely what belief is. It implies that we depart 
from the category of the real, in order to be fascinated by an unreal world, 
a world that we posit as neither existent nor nonexistent, that we never 
cease to regard as imaginary, but to which we consent, or rather, which we 
let ourselves believe in. Belief, in the cinema, is rather comparable to belief 
when playing. The child who plays ‘cowboys and Indians’ never ceases to 
regard his behavior as imaginary, but this does not negate the fact that during 
the game – that is, until the moment when he decides to stop playing – the 
child ‘believes’ that he is a ‘cowboy’ and ‘believes’ that his fellow players are 
‘Indians.’ He is fascinated by the unreal world created by the game, just as 
the spectator is fascinated by the unreal world of the screen. Both act ‘as 
if ’ the unreal were real. In other terms, they confer a ‘believed’ existence 
on objects that they never cease to regard as imaginary.
Such is the status of objects in a f iction f ilm.
A second important remark concerns those cases in which, contrary 
to what we said above, certain characters are apprehended, not in their 
singularity, but as representatives of people-in-general, or, rather, characters-
in-general. The popularity of certain actors is often the cause of such 
phenomena, above all when these actors remain conf ined to playing a 
specif ic type of character. James Dean, Jean Gabin, Sean Connery (as James 
Bond), and Fernandel are just a few examples of actors who generally restrict 
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themselves to certain roles. Let us suppose a f iction film in which the central 
character is played by a popular actor who generally appears as the same kind 
of character: for example, Jean Gabin. It then happens that our attention is 
diverted from the meaning of the specific action of the character, and focuses 
instead on the image of the actor’s broader personality. We then say “that’s 
Jean Gabin all right” or “that sure is how he acts,” and we thus consider, via 
the present character he is playing, a certain general personality that we 
have seen in numerous other f ilms. When such phenomena arise, we can 
see that the f iction f ilm distinctly plays the same role as the home movie.
But it is important to note two things. Firstly, these phenomena are 
generally short-lived. The f iction soon takes over again and we forget Jean 
Gabin, in favor of the police detective or the businessman he is incarnating. 
Secondly, if such generalizations about the perceived being occur, and even 
present themselves frequently, it is essential that the character-in-general 
that we perceive does not leave the f ilmic world. Thus, in our example, we 
obviously do not seek Jean Gabin such as he is presented in real perception, 
but a certain f ilm personality recognized in multiple f ilms. Or rather, if it 
is true that our attention has been detached for a short moment from the 
specif ic character incarnated by Jean Gabin in order to focus on Jean Gabin 
in general, then this process in our consciousness paradoxically leads to 
Fig. 5: Jean Gabin as the lieutenant Maréchal in Jean renoir’s Grand Illusion.
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a growing focus on the particular action of the character played by Jean 
Gabin. Indeed, at the same time as we think of Jean Gabin’s specif ic f ilm 
personality, there often forms within us a disposition to f ind and follow this 
same personality in his actions, once again incarnated in a singular character 
and action. The difference with the home movie is easy to discern. In the 
latter, the image essentially served as a medium, and its particularities fused 
into the ensemble of the characteristics of the person-in-general regarded 
by us, whose reality is located elsewhere. Here, the reality that we regard 
is not the Jean Gabin of real perception – there is no attempt to render Jean 
Gabin present as such – but a f ilm personality, a manner of being known 
only in the f ilmic world, of which we expect a new manifestation in this 
same f ilmic world.
Another important remark concerns the modif ications internal to the 
attitude taken when faced with a f iction f ilm, modif ications which derive 
from certain relations that the f iction has with the real.
We have said that, in the case of the f iction f ilm, the image does not 
refer to anything that exists or has existed elsewhere. And yet, there 
is a nuance to add to this proposition, a nuance that may be suggested 
to us by the expressions of certain spectators frequently heard when 
they leave the cinema, the object of which is to underscore the ‘truthful’ 
character of certain f ilms. We say, for example, “that sure is how things 
happen,” etc. The reason for this is that the f iction often maintains closer 
relations with the real than might seem to be the case at f irst sight. If 
we wish to be complete, it would be apt to study the changes in attitude 
that this implies.
Let us f irst distinguish between the purely f ictional f ilm, such as we f ind 
in heroic and fantasy genres, and this other category of f ilms closer to the 
real, whose action unfolds, as Cohen-Séat has explained, at the level of the 
‘resembling-ego’ [semble-moi].
In the heroic f ilm or the fantasy f ilm, there is, of course, no search for a 
reality existing elsewhere. The f ilmic world is perfectly autonomous since 
it is totally independent of all perceived reality. Sometimes, even, the lack 
of any verisimilitude in the story is such that it clearly solicits a positing of 
its non-existence. The characters we see are indeed perceived through the 
image, and we do indeed continue to follow them in their actions, but we 
do not think that they exist, or rather, we do not think that they can exist, 
which further seals the divorce between the f ilmic world and the real world.
In the second category of f ilms, wherein the action unfolds at the level 
of the ‘resembling-ego,’ the story told – while often banal or representing 
familiar events from daily life – has the particular quality that it is lifelike, 
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or at least possible. The action it recounts often refers to slices of lived 
experience, and the human conf licts and problems it illustrates can, 
to varying degrees and in various forms, be found in the common lot of 
mortals. This type of f ilm is perceptibly close to the documentary genre 
– think of Italian neorealist cinema, for example – but is distinguished 
by the fact that it does not convey, beyond the image, a specif ic, existent, 
concrete reality. We can choose an example of a realist f ilm that approaches 
the limits of the documentary: Vittorio de Sica’s Ladri di biciclette (Bicycle 
Thieves, 1948). This f ilm is presented almost as a social observation; beyond 
the characters it depicts, it invites us to consider a certain social reality. 
The f ilm, therefore, refers to something other than itself, a specif ic reality 
existing elsewhere. But, contrary to what takes place in the documentary, 
this reality remains indistinct, vague, and undifferentiated. Thus, the 
bicycle thief is not posited as existing in his specif ic reality, that is as a 
personal being, but he is valid as a representative of a number of anonymous 
beings existing in a certain period and sharing the same problems with 
him.
What should we make of this?
As in the pure f iction, our attention remains f ixed on the particular 
behavior of the character in particular, since this behavior is valid for itself. 
Indeed, we do not search for a certain general personality of the bicycle 
thief in the image, in the same way that we searched for a being-in-general 
beyond the behavior of Paul Anka in Lonely Boy, which, in any case, we 
posited as existent. Here, the behavior is not generalized, and is followed 
for itself. But, from the fact that it is inspired by existing events, it is, in a 
certain manner, impregnated with reality. The bicycle thief as such does 
not exist, but the existing reality that it illustrates confers on it a power of 
existence that gives it a certain substance of reality.
We should shed more light on this ‘substance of reality.’ We have seen 
that, in the f iction f ilm, we confer on the objects and characters a ‘believed’ 
and ‘credible’ existence. The bicycle thief, as a f ictional character, receives 
this ‘believed’ existence, and I may, if I wish to (or if I feel too uncomfortable 
with the situation he experiences), break my belief in him just as easily as 
I can break my belief in James Bond, or the hero in L’Homme de Rio (That 
Man from Rio, Philippe de Broca, 1964).
But if I do this, contrary to what takes place with James Bond or the ‘Man 
from Rio,’ there remains a residue of authenticity in the character that I 
cannot eliminate: the real man, or, rather, the possible real man, who is 
hidden behind the bicycle thief, and who I know exists in the anonymity 
of a certain social layer in postwar Italy. All of a sudden, at the same time 
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as I break my belief in the bicycle thief as a f ictional character, I must 
also, in order for this act to be complete, deny a certain social reality that 
this f ictional character illustrates, and whose major characteristics he 
reproduces.
We can now see better what is meant by ‘substance of reality’. It derives 
from the fact that a character, because he is the ref lection of a certain 
category of real people, acquires this potential existence that the authentic 
quality confers on him.
V. From the Home Movie to the Fiction Film
There still remains for us to apprehend the f ilm experience, but, before 
going further, it will be useful to briefly summarize the few conclusions 
that our thinking has provided us with.
In all the cases we have examined, we have been able to recognize this 
characteristic common to all types of f ilmic attitude: it is still a matter of 
being presented with an object that is not there, or that is not present in its 
corporal physicality. But if this characteristic has not changed, there are 
others which have been modif ied as a function of the knowledge that we 
have of what is represented, and correlatively, of the positing of existence 
that derives from it. Let us quickly refer to the different cases studied. 
From the home movie to the f iction f ilm, via the documentary, we have 
seen that the existence of the intended object, posited and known in the 
f irst case, posited but unknown in the documentary, ceased to be posited 
in the f iction.
From one end to the other of this spectrum of possibilities, we have been 
able to note a progressive, increasingly structured adhesion of our attention 
to the reality on the screen, which was gradually constituted as a reality 
autonomous from the reality existing in perception.
At the same time, and corresponding with the increased attention given 
to the f ilmic object, the matter of this object ceases to be generalized. It 
even progressively ceases to be regarded as a more general object, and is 
instead increasingly considered for itself, in its individuality.
On the other hand, passing from the home movie and the documentary 
to the f iction f ilm, we have also been able to discern a change in the mode 
of activity of the f ilmic consciousness. Beginning as a constitutive activity 
seeking a general, existing object, it then slides into a kind of submission 
when it is more attached to the particularities of the individual object that 
it targets and follows in the f ictional world.
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Furthermore, we have also seen that, when passing to the category of 
the f iction f ilm, the objects change their status for our consciousness: they 
are provided with a ‘believed’ existence, correlating with the act of belief 
that the f iction postulates.
Finally, even within the f iction, we have been able to highlight an 
important variation. In the pure f iction, above all the heroic f ilm and the 
fantasy f ilm, the f ilmic world is perfectly autonomous because it is totally 
independent of any perceived reality. In the realist f iction – whose content 
is inspired by existing reality or slices of lived experience – the behavior 
of the characters, even if they are f ictional and thus individualized, also 
acquires a real substance through the power of existence that a certain 
existing, but general and undifferentiated, reality confers on them.
In conclusion, we should also note that the positing of existence does not 
essentially depend on the type of f ilm. In the end, it is consciousness alone 
which is responsible for this positing of existence. It is quite evident that 
a home movie generally solicits a home-movie attitude, and that a f iction 
f ilm demands that we comprehend it as a f iction, but this is not necessarily 
always the case. We can indeed posit a purely f ictional character as existing, 
and we can also posit the Paul Anka of Lonely Boy as not existing.
In any case, it is probable that such phenomena take place and that the 
consciousness of the child can teach us a lot on this subject. But this is not 
our concern. We have only sought to determine certain general attitudes 
of f ilmic consciousness, particularly with respect to the evident manner 
in which each type of f ilm solicits consciousness to comprehend it, outside 
of any deviation.
It is now important to shift our focus to an essential characteristic of the 
objective matter of the f ilm: movement.
VI. Movement
Up until now, everything that we have said about f ilmic consciousness 
has been said with respect to the different attitudes that consciousness 
can take towards the portrait or the photograph. The analogies are strik-
ing. We have above all highlighted the resemblances, on the one hand, 
between the portrait of a familiar person and the home movie, and, on 
the other hand, between the portrait of an unknown person and the 
documentary f ilm.
We can even add another analogy, which we will not analyze, but which 
appears quite evident: that between the f iction f ilm and the photo-novel 
or the comic book, which also show us invented stories.
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And yet, none of the types of photography envisaged possess this char-
acteristic that is specif ic only to the cinema: movement. Moreover, none 
possess this power so often recognized in the cinema. It is this properly 
cinematic aspect that we are now going to look at. But if we do not wish to 
engage in empty discussion and lose ourselves in useless commentary on 
movement’s power of attraction, we must f irst attempt a description of the 
perceptual experience of movement in order to highlight all the implications 
on the level of the attitudes of the f ilmic consciousness.
1. The Experience of Movement
The effectiveness of movement has often been underlined by numerous 
writers. The theories and descriptions of this are abundant, and we may, 
as a point of departure for our study, take a remarkable analysis by Wallon, 
which appeared in an article entitled “L’acte perceptif et le cinéma.”38
Wallon highlights two essential aspects of movement: its power of at-
traction and its power of life.
Let us cite the most signif icant passages:
From the point of view of perception, movement is also what happens 
f irst; we detach moving objects from their background, and detach from 
that the ‘environment’ in which this action occurs. The movement in 
itself has a power of effectivity.
Illustrating this ‘power of effectivity,’ Wallon evokes the example of onlookers 
whose gaze is attracted by the rapidly flashing letters of neon street signs.
Then, passing to the analysis of f ilm movement, he adds:
In cinema there is something similar: we cannot take our eyes off the 
f ilm whose images f lash past one after another, because we would lose 
the thread of the story and would no longer understand what is going to 
follow, but also because as the images follow one another, there is a sort 
of attraction, a sort of induction working on us, on our attention, our 
senses, and our sight, to ensure that we retain everything. The movement 
is therefore something attractive and captivating in itself. I was telling 
you just now about the details in a f ilm that attract our attention more 
by moving: that is the proof of this law of perception. You know that in 
order to discern extremely subtle things which wouldn’t be visible if they 
were immobile, you give them some movement: in this way you manage 
to distinguish very slight tendencies, simply because of their movements. 
102 JEan-PiErrE MEuniEr 
All these examples demonstrate something in movement that induces 
greater subtlety of perception and which stimulates the desire to perceive.
Finally, in addition to this power of attraction, and correlating with it, f ilm 
movement, according to Wallon, possesses a veritable power of life:
But beyond this, movement possesses the power of life, a power of attrac-
tion which makes f ilm subjugate our senses’ ability to keep and attract 
this power, whereas in fact we are in an atmosphere completely foreign 
to the series of images passing before our eyes.
The power of attraction and the power of life: these are the two essential 
elements which, in Wallon’s view, characterize f ilm movement.
We will further see that these two ‘powers’ of movement function very 
differently according to the cases envisaged in the preceding section (the 
home movie, the documentary f ilm, the f iction f ilm). But f irst it would be 
best to analyze, in a deeper manner, the properties of movement such as 
they have been described by Wallon.
We should f irst try to illuminate the characteristics of movement in its 
most elementary nature – that is, the movement of a point.
Imagine an immobile point on a screen. This point, endowed with a 
certain luminosity, is clearly detached from the darker background. As 
such, it already has the power to solicit my attention. I can then f ix my 
gaze on it and it will appear to me as a f igure detached from a background, 
and one that maintains a series of f ixed relations with the elements of 
the background, which entirely determine the position that it occupies. 
Imagine, for example, that the point is placed to the right, a little bit above 
the middle of the screen. But as such, and unless I willingly adopt an attitude 
of concerted observation, this inert and entirely determined point will 
be incapable of retaining my attention for any signif icant period of time. 
Now let us suppose that this point begins to move on a background that 
otherwise remains immobile. In this case, there is, in my visual f ield, the 
appearance of an overturning of the structure, in the sense that, losing its 
stability, the point constantly changes its relations with its surroundings. 
There is an indeterminacy of the object with respect to the background, 
which poses the problem of its destination, and orients in the observer an 
attitude of expectation. In principle, this attitude will only be relaxed when 
the object attains a new stable position.
Let us explain this matter in greater detail. When the object was im-
mobile – that is, when it constituted, along with the background, a stable 
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structure def ined by a series of f ixed relations – the act of perception was 
in a certain fashion completed once this ensemble of relations is perceived. 
I would naturally turn away from the object, and if, exceptionally, I had 
maintained my observational attitude, this could only be as an effect of 
my will, since nothing (or not much) in the object solicited my attention to 
further explore it. In other words, the immobile point, or, more generally, 
the immobile object, if it can momentarily attract our attention through 
its luminosity or some other characteristic, can only mobilize our gaze in 
a more prolonged manner through the intervention of our will deciding 
to further explore the structure of the perceived object. We should also 
note that this exploration is itself accomplished through a series of ocular 
movements (our gaze wanders around the object in order to deepen its 
relation with its surroundings), which are themselves accomplished in all 
directions, but following the manner in which I have decided to explore 
the object (from left to right, from top to bottom, etc.).
But when the object begins to move, when the stable relations it main-
tains with its surroundings are broken up, a new spatio-temporal structure 
appears. This is a structure that unfolds in time, whose starting point is 
well-known, but whose endpoint remains problematic.
And yet, it is the question of the becoming of the structure that solicits 
our consciousness and mobilizes our attention. There is an incomplete 
aspect in the perceived object, which induces an attitude of expectation 
based on the def ined position of the observed point.
It is important to note that what consciousness focuses on is not the 
object as such, nor the different positions that this object can take when 
moving, but the whole structure that unfolds, the trajectory.
In this case, not only does movement mobilize the gaze through the ques-
tion of its becoming, but it also implies that our attention is only detached from 
the object once the movement has been completed. Indeed, since conscious-
ness focuses on the totality of the movement in progress, it must adhere to 
each particular position of the point as the only trace of its becoming. If it 
momentarily distances itself from the moving object, it loses the structure 
of the whole. Hence, consciousness must not be distracted. It attaches itself 
to each particular position of the point as the culmination of the movement 
that flows out of it, and that it retains, and also as the starting point of the 
future movement that it anticipates. With each position, there is an act of 
‘retention’ and ‘protention.’ This absorptive, exclusive activity has no other goal 
than prefiguring what consciousness is focused on: the totality of movement.
With respect to a different problem than the one we are concerned with, 
Sartre, taking inspiration from Husserl, gave a very illuminating description 
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of these acts of ‘retention’ and ‘protention,’ which constitute one of the 
essential aspects of the perception of movement.
He writes:
Husserl has given a remarkable description of these particular intentions 
which, starting from a living and concrete ‘now,’ are directed towards the 
immediate past to retain it and towards the future to grasp it. He calls 
these ‘retentions’ and ‘protentions.’ This retention, which itself alone 
constitutes the continuity, is not itself an image. It is an empty intention 
which is directed towards the phase of the movement that has just been 
annihilated; we say, in psychological language, that it is knowledge cen-
tered on the present visual sensation, and which makes appear that now 
as also being an after of a certain quality, an after that does not follow any 
sensation except precisely the one that has just vanished. The protention, 
on its part, is an expectation and this expectation gives the same sensation 
as also being a before. Naturally, this latter is not as strictly determined 
as a ‘before’ as it is as an ‘after,’ since […] the sensation that will follow 
is not entirely known [connue]; but this sensation is already pretraced 
by a very precise expectation. […] Retention and protention constitute, 
in every way, the sense of the present visual impression: without these 
synthetic acts, one could hardly speak of an impression at all; this before 
and this after that are correlates of these acts are not given as empty forms, 
as homogeneous and indifferent structures: they are the concrete and 
individual relations that the current sensations sustains with the concrete 
and individual impressions that have preceded it and that will follow it.39
A focus on the structure of the whole unfolding in time, an attention to-
wards the indefinite becoming of the moving object, acts of ‘retention’ and 
‘protention’ – these are the characteristics of the perception of movement, 
and we can now see what produces the ‘power of attraction’ of movement 
discussed by Wallon.
Whereas the observation of a static form (a form entirely determined in 
space and time) usually relates to a voluntary decision which is maintained 
for the duration of the observation, and which can be suspended at any 
moment without losing anything of the object (I can always come back to it), 
the observation of the temporal structure is solicited in a constant manner 
by questioning the becoming of the object, and can only be relinquished, 
in principle, at the end of the movement.
Correlatively, whereas consciousness, during the observation of the 
static object, is master of itself, of the points of view that it takes towards 
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the object under consideration, and of the manner in which it decides to 
deepen a consideration of the qualities of the object, in the attention given 
to the dynamic object, consciousness is not in possession of itself to the 
same extent. It awaits the structure that is progressively discovered and 
that it therefore does not yet entirely possess. It is only when the movement 
is completed that it can recover itself and perhaps return to the attitude 
of voluntary observation of the perceived form that it then possesses in its 
totality, and that it can then represent to itself as a static ensemble: the 
trajectory or the totality of the path taken.
We can thus say that the perception of movement, or rather, the awareness 
of a form in becoming, is, owing to the fact that it is in the course of being 
realized and that it situates itself before its total completion, a pure expecta-
tion, or even an empty intention which expects to be f illed by the object on 
which it is focused. In this sense, it must alienate itself in its attention to the 
various successive positions of the moving object, as the only traces of the 
global form that it contemplates. Such an attitude rules out taking any distance 
from the object. Our attention must coincide with each present position of the 
object insofar as this position is given as the culmination of the immediate 
past that it must retain, and as the starting point for the immediate future 
that it is projected to follow up to the conclusion of the spatio-temporal 
form in progress. We have thus been able to speak of a genuine ‘attraction’ 
of movement, a formula that is a little incorrect but highly suggestive.
Wallon has similarly spoken of a certain ‘power of life’ associated with 
movement. This second great characteristic of movement flows, according 
to Wallon, directly from the f irst characteristic, namely, the attraction 
exercised by movement. The two phenomena are doubtless correlative, 
but, in our opinion, what confers this power of life is the real or apparent 
autonomy of the moving object.
We should also note that when any moving object immediately appears 
not to be the cause of its own movement – for example, an object that I move 
about with my hands – it does not possess this power of life, and continues 
to appear to me as an inert object.
On the contrary, when an object moves inside my visual f ield, without 
an extrinsic cause for its mobility also appearing, this object appears to me 
as autonomous and draws from this autonomy its quality of a living being.
Let us return, for example, to the case of the luminous point moving on 
a screen. As long as this f igure is immobile, it remains integrated with the 
background surrounding it as an inert object. But once the point moves, 
there is a segregation between the point and the background, and since 
nothing seems to give rise to this segregation, the point appears to us as 
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being granted an autonomous being, and thus with life, because what we 
usually understand by the word ‘life’ is none other than this quality of being 
able to autonomously generate one’s own movements.
There are plenty of other things to say on movement in general, and on 
its particular characteristics, but such a project would distance us too much 
from the subject at hand. We have, we believe, the essentials of the matter, 
and we can now focus on a study of movement in the cinema.
2. Movement in the Cinema
What we have just said about movement in general can also be applied 
directly to the cinema.
A f ilm is, in fact, an extremely complex spatio-temporal structure, which 
presents us with action and behavior in becoming. Each shot is presented 
as a spatio-temporal structure integrated in broader structures, which we 
call sequences, and these sequences are integrated in turn into the whole 
spatio-temporal form constituted by the f ilm.
On all levels (shot, sequence, f ilm), the f ilmic consciousness awaits a 
becoming-in-progress, a total action that it considers in its entirety, and 
that it will only possess once the f ilm is over. This is an empty intention 
which expects to be f illed, and which must therefore adhere (and alienate 
itself in its attention) to the various successive moments of the f ilm, in the 
sense that it must cling onto each one of these particular moments of the 
action, as the only visible points of the whole, and on the basis of which it 
can make its way towards the past or the future.
It is only when the f ilm is over that consciousness can be distanced from 
it. At this point, it possesses the structure in its entirety, and can take a 
point of view on this structure. In fact, it can then be given or represented 
as a static form, because it is now conclusively f inished.
To adopt a more f igurative way of putting it, we could almost say that 
the f ilmic consciousness, during the screening, must coincide with or 
plunge itself into each present moment, as the only location from which it 
can perceive the moments that pass by and those that will follow. On the 
contrary, when the f ilm is over, and consciousness possesses the whole, this 
whole can be given or represented ‘from a distance,’ as an object that it can 
handle, and on which it can take any point of view that it likes.
What we have just said about movement in the cinema is particularly 
applicable to f iction f ilms, and we will later have the opportunity to return 
to this matter. First, however, it would be beneficial to quickly examine the 
role of movement in the other cases previously studied – namely, the home 
ParT T wo: THE FilM ExPEriEncE 107
movie and the biographical or documentary f ilm. This quick examination 
will not be useless: not only will it permit us to deepen the attitudes of our 
own consciousness in these two particular cases, but also, furthermore, it 
will allow us to better understand and explain the role of movement in the 
case of the f iction f ilm.
a) Movement in the Home Movie
Here, as also, but to a lesser degree, in the documentary f ilm, we will see that 
movement, by being subordinated to a specif ic attitude of consciousness, 
takes on a rather different signification from that which we have recognized 
on a general level.
Let us quickly recall what we said about what we can now call the ‘home-
movie attitude’ [attitude-souvenir].
In this attitude, the intention is to render present a person who is not there, 
but who we posit as existing or having existed elsewhere. Since the goal is to 
rediscover the person-in-general, there is a generalization of the matter, in 
the sense that each gesture seen is not apprehended in its individuality, but 
as a representative of multiple gestures perceived countless times in reality. 
Moreover, our attention goes well beyond the image, extending to the real 
person we are focusing on, and, f inally, there is a constitutive activity on 
the part of consciousness. In short, consciousness constantly exceeds the 
image, which serves precisely as a medium between the reality perceived 
in the past and my present consciousness of this reality.
In this perspective, therefore, the role of movement is largely reduced 
to being a factor of the liveliness of the represented reality. Indeed, the 
progressive becoming of the f ilmed action, or, more generally, the spatio-
temporal form constituted by the entirety of the home movie, is of barely 
any interest to the spectator.
Hence, for example, if, in order to summon the memory of one of my 
friends, I screen a home movie representing various actions carried out by 
this person, the endpoint of these actions is of no interest to me. My intention 
is not to be given all of these actions in their entirety, but only to rediscover, 
in each shot, or in the various moments of the action in progress, familiar 
attitudes or gestures, specif ic to the person-in-general I am thinking of, 
and which have been perceived in reality on several occasions. In other 
words, each particular moment of the f ilm is in some way isolated from the 
whole. The preceding moments do not interest me and I do not anticipate 
the following moments. Rather, each moment serves as the basis for the 
constitutive activity of consciousness to seek and f ind, beyond each specif ic 
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image, the typical allures of a certain person-in-general who truly exists in 
reality. Unconcerned with the result of the actions it observes, consciousness 
is not an empty vessel waiting for reality to materialize. On the contrary, at 
every moment it is full of the object that it considers by means of the image, 
an object which appears to it in different aspects (my friend is walking, he 
is reading, etc.), but wherein each of these aspects contains the whole of the 
person (my friend has a certain way of walking, or reading, etc.).
We could almost say, in f igurative terms, that the home movie gives 
rise to a longitudinal consciousness, which makes its way, via each present 
moment of the f ilm, towards the real and distant object that it has in mind. 
On the contrary, when our mind focuses on a spatio-temporal structure in 
progress, consciousness is, in a way, ‘lateral,’ in the sense that it makes its 
way, via each present moment, towards both the past and the future. This is 
indeed what takes place in the f iction – but we will return to this point later.
Hence, in the home movie, movement is subordinated to the primary 
intention, which is to call to mind a real person existing elsewhere. Then, the 
total action that it sketches out is not (or almost not) taken into consideration, 
but, on the contrary, each present moment is forcefully detached to serve 
at each moment as a point of application for consciousness, which does not 
cease to regard a general, existing, and known object.
Our analysis, such as it has been expressed, is in all likelihood not entirely 
correct. Indeed, if we pushed our reasoning right to the end, we would end up 
claiming that our attention focuses on each specif ic moment, which would 
end up being isolated content pure and simple (that is, mere photographs).
And yet, in movement no present moment is ever given as an isolated 
content. It always appears as the succession of that which preceded it, 
and the starting point for what will follow it. In other words, each visual 
impression is always given as the basis of a retention and protention, which 
determine its place in the continuity of movement.
However, and this is important to note for the case that we are presently 
concerned with, retention and protention appear here as subordinated to 
the present moment, to the concrete, current impression on the basis of 
which I consider a general object.
Let us illustrate this last aff irmation by returning to our example. In 
order to evoke the presence of one of my friends, I can try to imagine the 
person, but I will only end up with a very imperfect image. I can also take 
a photograph, and now the representation will be more convincing. If this 
photograph represents the person undertaking a certain action (for example, 
walking in the street), then I can seek and find, via this f ixed representation, 
my friend’s general mode of comportment. But this representation lacks 
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life. So let us suppose that I possess a home movie representing this same 
person undertaking this same action. By following this action, which now 
unfolds in time and space, there are, of course, retentions and protentions 
that, at every point in time, give me the place of each present impression 
in the continuity of movement, but my attention, far from making its way 
towards the becoming of the observed act, or towards the past, as that which 
can illuminate the whole of the acts, is instead centered at every moment 
as the continually visible incarnation of a certain mode of comportment 
that I constantly call to mind in its generality.
We can see the difference between the photograph and the home movie: 
both restitute the specif ic mode of existing of the person considered, but, in 
addition to what the photograph provides, the home movie restitutes this 
mode of existing in action. The home movie shows us life, and we should 
also note that this characteristic has affective repercussions that are often 
more perceptible than those that are engendered by the f ixed form of the 
photograph. To a far greater extent than the photo, the home movie, by 
means of the life that movement confers on it, is conducive to inducing a 
high degree of nostalgia, regret, or other sentiments in us.
We can also get a glimpse, here, of the difference between the home 
movie and the f iction f ilm. In the latter, retention and protention, instead of 
accumulating in each present moment, project beyond the present moment, 
both towards the past and the future, in order for consciousness to take in 
the action in its entirety.
But, before elucidating this last point, it is apt to study in greater detail 
the intermediate case between the home movie and the f iction film, namely, 
the documentary f ilm.
b) Movement in the Documentary Film
In the ‘documentary attitude,’ as we saw earlier, there is, as is the case with 
the home-movie attitude, a positing of existence, a generalizing of the 
matter of the image, a constituting activity, and a f ixing of the attention 
on the image as a starting point for the sketch of a generalized knowledge.
When passing from the home movie to the documentary f ilm, the 
cinematic image gains in autonomy as far as the level of real perception is 
concerned. It further centralizes our attention, but nonetheless remains 
situated (as an intermediate case) with respect to an unknown reality.
To say that the image further centralizes our attention already implies 
that movement takes on a different meaning from that which it assumes 
in the home movie.
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In the documentary f ilm or the biographical f ilm, all we know about 
the object under consideration is that it exists elsewhere, and nothing else.
Our intention is precisely to know more about it. Consequently, our 
attention is not focused only on each present moment, but on the ensemble 
of actions that are proposed to us. There is a knowledge that is formed by the 
projection, and that requires us to provide ourselves with a set of successively 
presented events. However, despite the fact that it comes very close to the 
signif ication that it takes in the f iction f ilm, movement in the documentary 
f ilm is distinct from it in several respects. These differences reside, we think, 
in the relationship that exists between retention and protention.
Let us take a concrete example.
Say I am watching a documentary f ilm about a foreign country, and I am 
shown a group of indigenous people engaged in a typical activity, which, most 
of the time, has a symbolic, representative, and generalizing signif ication. 
Hence, if I am shown the indigenous people in question hunting or farming 
the land, I immediately know that I am seeing a people who are hunters 
or farmers.
Incidentally, the voice-over commentary is often there to confirm this 
generalizing opinion.
By means of each of these particular activities presented to me, I am 
always focused on a general style of existence. What is more, each particular 
activity brought to the screen gives me, in some sense, the totality of the 
object under consideration.
If I am shown the indigenous people hunting, farming, or devoting 
themselves to some other activity, it is always a general style of comporting 
themselves that I aim for, and that I attain through the multiple aspects 
given to me.
In short, in the documentary f ilm, there is a knowledge that is formed 
on the occasion of each particular event, a knowledge that is constantly 
generalized and related to the reality that is aimed for.
Each particular shot appears as a particular perspective on a general 
comportment. That is to say that, in the documentary, movement does not 
engender this expectation of the future that we see in the f iction f ilm. In 
general, we can cut the f ilm after any sequence, or even right in the middle 
of a sequence, without the spectator being truly frustrated by it. This is 
because, at every moment, it possesses a general reality that presents itself 
on each occasion as a whole by means of the multiple, particular points of 
view given about it. No moment really summons any other moment. It is 
integrated with the preceding moments for the formation of an accumulating 
knowledge, but does not create any expectation of a future, because this 
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future never appears as being truly necessary – at least before it appears – in 
order to illuminate the preceding moments.
Of course, one could reply to this that there exist all sorts of documen-
taries, and that certain among them come close to the f iction f ilm, such 
that the attitude that we have just described f inds itself modif ied to a great 
extent. Nanook of the North by Robert Flaherty (1922) is a good example of 
this.
Nanook, a real character chosen to illustrate the life of the inhabitants of 
the Arctic Circle, is indeed ‘personalized’ to the extent that we follow him 
more as an ‘individual’ than as a representative of a category of people, and 
that the ‘becoming’ of his actions has as much importance as those that 
precede them. When watching Nanook of the North, the attitude we take is 
almost the same as in the f iction f ilm. But this is a particular case. On the 
other hand, since our project no longer involves describing the multiple 
variations and compromises within attitudes, but tries to describe rather 
pure types of these attitudes such as they are solicited by equally pure 
types of f ilms, we will not dwell on marginal or ambiguous cases. These 
cases could, in any case, easily be understood on the basis of the major 
characteristics that the description of pure cases will have delivered us.
To conclude: in the case of the documentary or biographical f ilm, there 
is f irstly retention, in the sense that each present moment is integrated 
with past moments, while the whole constitutes itself into an additional 
knowledge on the object under consideration, and a generalization in the 
sense that, at any moment, the perceived object f inds itself related to a 
general object that exists elsewhere.
In f igurative terms, once more, we can see that the documentary gives 
rise to a consciousness that is both lateral – in the sense that, on the basis 
of each present moment, it makes its way towards the past in order to retain 
it and integrate it with the present – and longitudinal, in the sense that, on 
the basis of each present moment, it makes its way towards a general object 
that exists elsewhere.
In the documentary f ilm, movement is what allows for a progressive, 
cumulative knowledge of an existing object. In this case, protention, or 
rather anticipation, is reduced.
c) Movement in the Fiction Film
Here, as we have seen earlier, there is no positing of existence. In a way, the 
imaginary is closed in on itself, in the sense that the f ilmic reality does not 
refer to any other existing reality.
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The f ilmic world is erected as an autonomous reality: there is no gener-
alization of the matter of the image, which is apprehended in its singularity. 
Hence, our attention remains centered on the screen.
All this is to say that, in the case of the f iction f ilm, movement ceases 
to subordinate itself to an intention that remains connected with existing 
reality.
On the contrary, it possesses the function that we recognized it had on a 
more general level. The f ilm is presented as an autonomous spatio-temporal 
structure with respect to the reality of perception, and the intention is 
evidently to give oneself this structure in its totality.
The f iction f ilm, therefore, creates an expectation, an empty intention 
that waits to be f illed by the totality it takes into consideration.
The successive events are no longer a sum of independent points of view on 
an existing general object. Rather, they are linked in the whole structure that 
consciousness considers. Detached from existing reality, the only meaning 
they have is in relation to all the events that precede and follow them.
Consequently, retention and protention constitute the essence of con-
sciousness’s activity, which projects, beyond each present moment, towards 
the whole that is under consideration.
In other words, consciousness must dive into every present moment, as 
the only place from which it can perceive the past and project the future. In 
the f igurative language we used earlier, we could say that the consciousness 
of the f iction f ilm is a ‘lateral’ consciousness.
There follows a certain number of consequences, some of which will 
allow us to better understand the meaning of certain expressions currently 
utilized in f ilmological literature, which all underscore the hold exerted 
over us by the f iction f ilm.
Thus, it now appears that the f iction f ilm excludes almost any attitude 
of detachment.
In fact, in the other cases examined (the home movie, the biographical 
f ilm, the documentary f ilm), there remains a form of constituting activity 
on the part of consciousness which means that it remains the master of its 
object, from which it nonetheless keeps a certain distance. In other words, 
it is consciousness, in this case, which holds, ‘at arm’s length,’ the general 
object that it projects at every moment on the basis of the individual events 
and characteristics that are given for it to see.
In the f iction f ilm, by contrast, consciousness is constantly in an attitude 
of empty expectation that leads it to totally coincide with each present 
moment in order to lose nothing of the past or the future. Its project is, 
indeed, to possess the object it considers (the f ilm in its entirety) and it 
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can consequently take a step back once the action is over, that is, when it 
possesses, and can represent to itself at a distance and in its entirety, the 
total series of events represented on the screen.
This is doubtless one of the reasons for the ‘fascinating’ nature of the 
f iction f ilm that has been so often noted by f ilm specialists.
Let us note here that we prefer, instead of the term ‘fascinating,’ which 
we have reserved for the description of the phenomenon of belief, the term 
‘captivating,’ which is more descriptive as it underscores the retention or 
‘capturing’ of our attention by f ictional events in their becoming.
If, to the preceding remarks, we can add the fact that the material condi-
tions essentially aim to abolish the ambient reality in favor of the f ilmic 
reality alone (the darkened room, the comfort of the spectator, the big screen, 
the luminosity of the screen), then we have the essence of f ictional f ilmic 
reality: an imaginary world (that is to say posited as non-present), which is 
autonomous, which imposes itself on consciousness by substituting itself for 
the real world, and which, thanks to its movement, solicits consciousness 
to coincide with it with barely any possibility of distanciation.
It is important to note here that, owing to the resources at its disposal, the 
cinema can on occasion provoke in the spectator a certain ‘distanciation’ with 
respect to f ilmic reality. The likes of Godard and Varda have honed a certain 
number of procedures aiming to break the spectator’s enchantment, and to 
invite them to take their distances. But these are, when it comes down to it, 
rather artif icial and rarely used procedures. The phenomena they provoke 
doubtless warrant a deeper description, but do not form part of our project, 
which, let us recall, is above all to highlight certain general types of attitudes.
We should also note that this ‘captivating’ character we have spoken 
about above is not found to the same degree in any other genre of f ictional 
expression, such as the novel or, to take an example even closer to the f iction 
f ilm, the photo-novel. We will now examine this latter case.
In the photo-novel, as in the cinema, a f ictional story can very well 
engender in the reader a strong attitude of expectation for the becoming-
in-progress such as it unfolds by means of successive photographs. We will 
then see the reader excitedly leaf through the volume in a single sitting, even 
though the photo-novel is no more than an attempt to represent a story in 
motion that is artif icially broken down into static fragments.
Contrary to what we can observe in the case of the f ilm, however, there 
remain sequences of voluntary movements in the photo-novel, which prevent 
our total adherence to the story, or rather, a perfect coincidence with it. 
We must indeed pass from one image to another, turn the pages, etc., and 
what is more, we have, at every moment, the possibility of stopping and 
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distancing ourselves from the passing sequences in order to envisage them 
in their entirety, while in no way losing anything of the future sequences.
In the cinema, by contrast, the spectators not only can but must submit 
to the unfolding of the story. They can never relieve themselves from their 
attention and can therefore only distance themselves from their object with 
much greater diff iculty.
It follows that movement reinforces the autonomous nature of the f iction 
f ilm we recognized earlier. Not allowing any withdrawal or relaxation of 
our attention, which must be focused on the succession of events, it impels 
a belief in the events and characters on-screen, even if this belief is brought 
into question once the f ilm is over. Any relationship with reality is generally 
only considered afterwards. During the f ilm, a belief in the specif ic reality 
of the f ilm is customary, at least as far as the f iction f ilm is concerned.
This last consideration leads us to formulate a very short and final remark 
on the differences between the f ilmic and theatrical situations. Although 
somewhat digressive, this remark will perhaps furnish us with a supple-
mentary element for understanding the ‘hold’ a cinematic f ilm has on us.
In the cinema, we said, belief is customary, a belief not in the authenticity 
or inauthenticity, or the existence or non-existence, of the object represented 
on-screen, but simply a belief in a quasi-world populated by quasi-presences 
which impose themselves on consciousness, and to which consciousness 
adheres without any detachment.
Theatrical scenes, by contrast, present events played by people present in 
their bodily physicality, but acting as analogical representatives of absent 
characters, who are posited as existing or having existed elsewhere (or even as 
not existing at all). In any case, we have in the theater the paradoxical situation 
wherein a physically present being stands in for a non-present character.
There ensues a certain segregation between a world of presences (the 
real people) and an absent but represented world.
Let us suppose, for example, a staging of Le Cid by Corneille. Rodrigue and 
the other characters are indeed attained via the actors, but we never lose 
sight of the fact that these characters are merely being played by actors. In 
fact, we are aware of an actor playing the role of Rodrigue. In other words, 
there is a certain constituting activity on the part of consciousness, which 
posits the f ictional characters represented via the actors.
In the cinema, there is no segregation between the people who represent 
and the represented characters. There is not a world of f ictional characters 
considered via a cast of present people. As a general rule, the f ictional 
characters initially appear as f ictional people in a f ictional world. Hence, 
in Laurence Olivier’s Hamlet [1948], Hamlet and the other characters are 
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immediately registered as being f ictional characters, posited as being non-
present and evolving in a world equally non-present. Of course, we know 
the names of the actors, and certain acting personalities are sometimes so 
powerful that we cannot forget them (such as Orson Welles).
But it remains no less true that, in the majority of cases, f ilmic reality 
invites us to believe in the characters of the f ilm without any distance, 
while in the theater a certain complaisance or disposition on the part of 
the spectator is necessary. We must ‘play the game’ and posit the f ictional 
characters via the physically present actors.
In the theater, there is a constituting activity and the belief in the 
character is in some way feigned. The spectator remains in control, and is 
responsible for the belief in the characters, a belief that they ‘play’ under 
the effect of a sort of ‘good will.’
In the theater, the spectator posits the fictional reality under consideration.
In the cinema, this reality directly imposes itself.
We can see that this direct, submissive adherence to the f ilmic reality 
has no equivalent in any other mode of expression. This is undoubtedly one 
of the most essential traits of the f ilm experience.
VII. Conclusion
To conclude this section is not merely, we should think, to summarize what 
has been said, but rather to take some distance, and cast a critical eye on 
the text and its contents. Any theory necessarily contains lacunae and 
imperfections which it is good to examine with an overriding concern for 
being constructive. This is what we wish to do here.
Let us f irst note that we are far from having exhausted the problem. This 
banal remark, which can be found at the end of every study as a necessary 
precaution, nonetheless here keeps its full meaning.
The attitudes that the f ilmic consciousness can take when faced with 
its object are indeed rather more diverse and complex than it seems upon 
reading our all-too-short analysis. We have indeed tried to specify three 
major types of attitude corresponding to three major categories of f ilm, but it 
must be said that we have taken these attitudes in a pure state, such as they 
are solicited by equally pure cases of the home movie, the documentary f ilm, 
or the f iction film. What is more, through a concern for the specification and 
the differentiation of attitudes, a concern that often thwarts the possibility of 
an exhaustive description of the multiple nuances which every phenomenon 
contains, we have doubtless framed or abusively crystallized each of these 
attitudes, thereby neglecting the subtle relations that they can have with 
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the others, and the multiple intermediate modalities that scale from the 
pure ‘home-movie attitude’ to the pure ‘f iction attitude.’
And yet, when looking closer, we can see that the attitudes described can 
succeed each other or intertwine with each other during the viewing of a 
single f ilm, that a f iction f ilm of a certain genre can solicit a home-movie 
attitude, or that a documentary f ilm can be presented as f ictional and 
engender a corresponding attitude.
Incidentally, it is important to note that the three attitudes described 
correspond to three possible positions that consciousness can take, and 
not necessarily to three objective categories of f ilm. If it is true that the 
objective category of the ‘f iction f ilm’ normally solicits a ‘f iction attitude,’ 
this in no way precludes the possibility of the ‘home-movie attitude’ or the 
‘documentary attitude’ from appearing.
Whatever the case may be, by specifying three modalities of the ‘f ilmic 
attitude,’ we hope to have been able to furnish an adequate frame of refer-
ence, and, consequently, a verbal tool useful for the explanation of the 
nuances evoked above.
Finally, a second remark: we have also neglected those cases in which a 
voluntary, premeditated attitude gives a very special allure to the spectator’s 
attitude. This is above all true for the f iction f ilm. For example, it goes 
without saying that the critical attitude brings about a type of perception that 
is quite different to that of the naïve spectator. For the latter, we can observe 
this adherence without any distance, which we have spoken about at length. 
In the f irst case, a willed distanciation and a taking into consideration of 
the f ilm as an aesthetic object thwarts this coincidence with the perceived 
object that the f iction film solicits, and brings about a more complex attitude 
whose description warrants its own chapter.
Finally, it goes without saying that the personality of the spectator and 
their particular interests can have a major influence, not on the type, but on 
the quality of the attitude taken. A film that is boring for one person because 
they see no interest in it will evidently not induce this intense expectation for 
the future that we have described as constituting the pure ‘f iction attitude.’
In the same mode of thinking, certain technical procedures (or, more 
generally, the aesthetic aspect of the f ilm) influence in their own way the 
type and the quality of the attitude taken. For example, we can think of 
certain successful suspense films whose technical qualities are all mobilized 
to engender, to a high degree, an expectation of the future and a passive 
and intense adherence to the perceived object.
In short, there exists a complex web of factors whose impact on the 
attitudes that the f ilmic consciousness can take is certainly not negligible, 
ParT T wo: THE FilM ExPEriEncE 117
but whose detailed analysis would require at least one if not several volumes. 
Such a detailed analysis could not f ind any place in our own study, but it 
is necessary to signal its possibility, as well as the principal elements that 
it ought to envisage.
This said, it seems useful to summarize in a short synthesis the various 
aspects of the f ilm experience that we have been able to unearth.
The f ilmic consciousness, we have seen, consists of a certain manner 
of referring to an object, a manner that is different from that which we 
encounter in real perception, and also different from that which def ines 
the pure imaginary, but which nevertheless comes close to this last, in the 
sense that it targets an object not physically present, or, to adopt Sartre’s 
language, an object that we posit as a nothingness [néant d’être].
The f ilmic consciousness is thus a relation to the world, but to a world 
posited as non-present.
Now, we have seen that the object of the f ilmic consciousness, an object 
always posited as non-present, can refer either to an existing and known 
object or an existing but unknown object, or indeed to nothing existing at 
all. In both of these different cases, the attitude of the f ilmic consciousness 
varies considerably. Correlatively, movement, an essential element of the 
f ilmic datum, has a diverse array of functions.
When the object is posited as existing or having existed elsewhere (which 
is generally the case for the home movie), there is a constituting activity on 
the part of consciousness, in the sense that, via the individual matter of the 
f ilm, it seeks and f inds the object-in-general which it knew, which exists 
elsewhere, and on which all its attention is focused.
Movement, in this case, has the essential function of giving life to the 
perceived object. Retention and protention appear as subordinated to the 
present impression, an impression which constantly serves as the basis for 
consciousness to seek out the general object known from elsewhere.
When the object is posited as existing but was not known in real percep-
tion (which is generally the case for documentary and biographical f ilms), 
there is also a constituting activity on the part of consciousness, which 
constitutes a general object on the basis of the individual matter of the f ilm. 
But since our knowledge of the object is contemporary with the screening 
of the f ilm, our attention must be more attached to the image as a starting 
point for the sketch of a general knowledge.
Movement here has as its principal function the progressive unveiling of 
certain aspects of the object, necessary to the formation of an additional, 
generalizing knowledge. The activity of retention thus appears more im-
portant than the activity of protention.
118 JEan-PiErrE MEuniEr 
In one word, the activity of consciousness consists above all of retention 
– which makes it submit more to the f ilmic datum than it does in the home 
movie – and generalization, and it remains a constituting activity which 
keeps it distant from the f ilmic reality as such.
When there is no longer any positing of existence on the part of conscious-
ness (this is generally the case for the f iction f ilm), or, in other words, when 
the f ilmic reality no longer refers to anything existing in the real, and 
f inds itself bestowed with a ‘believed’ existence correlative with an act of 
belief on the part of the subject spectator, there is of course no longer any 
generalizing activity. Our attention remains f ixed on the perceived object 
in its individuality and must submit to it. The activity of consciousness is 
exclusively realized in retention and protention, which, this time, have the 
goal of integrating at every present moment the ensemble of past events, 
and projecting future events on the basis of these same moments.
Here, there is no longer any possibility of a detachment or a distanciation 
with respect to the f ilmic reality. The coincidence with the perceived object 
is customary, and this reinforces the autonomous character specif ic to the 
f iction f ilm.
At the end of the day, it appears that our attitude towards the f ilmic 
reality is not only radically different from our attitude towards real (present) 
objects, but that it can also adopt very different forms according to the 
modalities of existence of the object under consideration.
By describing these variations in our attitude, we hope to have been able 
to explain some aspects of the f ilm experience, but also, we believe that we 
have sketched out a useful framework for the study of our behavior when 
encountering a f ilm.
To def ine certain types of attitudes according to their structure and 
their specif ic particularities was indeed necessary for the comprehension 
of f ilmic behavior, which necessarily draws its form from the attitudes that 
underpin it.
It is this behavior that we will now discuss.
Chapter II: Filmic Behavior, Identification
At the beginning of this study, we def ined identif ication as a behavior of 
private intersubjectivity, understanding by this that it is a question of the 
comportment rooted in the terrain of anonymous intersubjectivity – a sort 
of generic coexistence of subjectivities – but subsequently structuring itself 
in a personal relationship, that is, in the behavior of private intersubjectivity.
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The analysis we have carried out on identif ication related principally to 
real situations in which the members of the relationship are both present to 
each other. Now, it is a question of examining how identif ication in a f ilmic 
situation is realized, that is, when one of the members of the relationship 
is presented as not being present.
There is no doubting that the essential structures of identif ication are 
not modif ied – in both f ilmic situations and real situations, we f ind the 
same postural apprehension of other people, as described earlier – and it 
would be wrong to make f ilmic identif ication a privileged form of behavior 
without any equivalent in real situations. Too many writers have begun 
with this false premise in order to then make our identif ication with a 
character (which also goes by the name of ‘participation’ or ‘empathy’) a 
unique mechanism, one that is comparable, as much on the level of its form 
as on the level of its possible influence, with an identif ication with certain 
particularly structuring forms of behavior such as parental identif ication 
or the phenomenon of identif ication in a psychoanalytic situation.
For us, there is no question of positing f ilmic identif ication from the start 
as a privileged form of behavior.
Following the principles that we have detailed at the beginning of this 
work, identif ication is a general mode of behavior that is traced out in 
every encounter, and that is structured according to different modalities 
depending on the type of relationship at issue.
In this conceptual framework, f ilmic identif ication is a variation of 
identif ication as a general mode of behavior, a particular type of identif ica-
tion corresponding to a particular type of relationship, one in which the 
object, although presenting almost all the characteristics that it possesses 
in perception, is presented as absent in its bodily physicality.
Provisionally leaving to one side the question of the choice of characters 
with whom the viewer identif ies, and what determines this choice, we 
will now try to specify the major characteristics of this particular type of 
identif ication, f ilmic identif ication, while taking into account, of course, 
the internal modif ications that it can undergo in line with the types of 
attitude that we were able to distinguish earlier.
I. The Types of Filmic Identification
a) Identification in the ‘Home-Movie Attitude’
We know that, in the home-movie attitude, the image functions as a rep-
resentative of a known but absent person, that the matter of the image is 
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generalized, that there is a constituting activity on the part of consciousness 
and that, in the end, since our attention remains centered on the object 
existing elsewhere and known in real perception, it is not the series of events 
presented that is targeted but only each present moment.
All this leads us to presume a particular form of identif ication, a very 
special manner of entering into intersubjective relations with other people. 
In order to explicate this, we will once again refer to lived experience, and 
imagine a concrete example.
Say I project a home movie showing people I know in various activities.
At one point in the film, one of them appears to me in a close-up, smiling. I 
then happen to smile with him, or rather, like him – that is to say, I reproduce 
the smile that I apprehended in another person. We can recognize here the 
postural aspect of identif ication Hesnard spoke about, which, although it is 
manifest in our example, is customarily more silent and almost undetectable 
from the outside.
But we must note that here it is not the specif ic smile shown by the f ilm 
that is the object of identif ication.
We know, in fact, that in the home-movie attitude, the acts perceived are 
not focused on for themselves, in their individuality, but as a representative 
of a certain general manner of acting such as it has been experienced through 
multiple real perceptions.
In the same manner, the acts ‘reproduced’ or ‘mimed’ by identif ication 
are not reproduced or mimed on an individual basis, but on a general level.
Thus, in the smile that I mimed upon seeing my friend smiling in the 
f ilm, there was more than a simple reproduction of the individual act that 
has been perceived.
It did indeed involve miming a certain general manner of smiling ap-
prehended through the specif ic smile shown in the f ilm. In other words, 
the smile reproduced by identif ication constitutes a kind of synthesis of 
all the smiles apprehended on the occasion of numerous identif ications 
in real situations.
There is an entire knowledge that is incorporated with the postural 
attitude of reproduction, a knowledge which bears on a behavior-in-general 
and which largely exceeds the individual act reproduced on the screen. These 
individual acts are, incidentally, only a means for the actualization of this 
knowledge. Hence, the smile that I saw on the screen was only, for me, the 
opportunity to remake the experience of a smile known for having been 
perceived and apprehended over the course of numerous circumstances.
We can already glimpse the meaning or the role of identif ication when 
it is developed within the home-movie attitude.
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But beforehand, let us look at the role it does not play.
Such an identif ication, it can be seen, is not a participation in the acts 
perceived on the screen. In order for this to be the case, these acts would 
have to be considered on an individual basis and thus perceived ‘in situation.’
Let us explain this point further. If, for example, in a home movie, I 
perceive a friend running, it is not, of course, the act of running itself that 
I apprehend – the meaning, that is to say the origin and the goal of this act 
does not, in fact, interest me in the slightest – but rather, as we have seen, 
a certain general manner of running which itself reflects a general manner 
of acting which is that of my friend. It would be another thing entirely to 
see a character from a f iction f ilm running. In this case, identif ication 
would indeed have the act itself as its object, in its individuality and with 
its meaning. This identif ication would then often assume the guise of a 
participation. If, for example, the running of the character in question has 
the meaning of an escape, then it is the comportment of escaping which we 
apprehend, and with which we identify, with all that this implies.
But this presents the opportunity of deepening the genre of identif ication 
when we study the f iction f ilm more precisely.
The identif ication in the home-movie attitude is not a participatory 
behavior. Nor is it, however, understanding in the general sense of the 
term. There is, in fact, nothing to understand in the observed acts. In other 
terms, the identif icatory behavior as applied to the home movie teaches us 
absolutely nothing about the person under consideration. On the contrary, 
as we clarif ied above, it is the actualization of a certain intuitive knowledge 
bearing on a general behavior which is formed on the terrain of real percep-
tion on the occasion of previous contacts.
But why is this actualization realized? What is its meaning?
In our opinion, it essentially involves a kind of ‘incantatory’ behavior 
intended to ‘presentify’ the person under consideration, and evoke their 
presence.
Let us explain this further. In the example given above, there was on the 
one hand my intention to render a friend present to myself, and on the other 
hand, a f ilm sequence showing me this friend smiling. Since my attention 
does not focus on the individual smile on-screen, but on a certain mode 
of smiling specif ic to my friend who I know exists elsewhere, my postural 
attitude was fashioned as a function of what I know about the mode of 
smiling possessed by my friend-in-general who exists elsewhere.
It is therefore a matter of identifying with an absent person who is real-
ized through the intermediary of the image, a vicarious identif ication. My 
goal was therefore to enter into intersubjective relations with an absent 
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person through his image. Thus, the smile of the screen was given as the 
‘phantom’ of my friend’s real smile such as I have seen it in perception, 
such as it is presently realized elsewhere, and which I regard in its most 
essential aspects.
But to state that, in the case of the home movie, identif ication is a form 
of vicarious identif ication says much about the meaning of this behavior. 
This amounts to saying that we are dealing with an empty identif ication, a 
behavior that is realized as if the person under consideration were present 
in flesh and blood, and which even incorporates everything that it knows 
about the absent person, who is not directly perceptible on the image. This 
is a behavior that ‘plays’ the presence of the object. In short, it is an effort 
to apprehend a real but absent comportment which remains out of range. 
This is why we say that it is a kind of ‘incantatory’ behavior.
Incidentally, it may be apt to remark that the feelings accompanying this 
behavior are also sentiments that are ‘played,’ simulacra of feelings that 
could inspire in us the effective presence of the person under consideration. 
Hence, the sympathy felt for a ‘presentif ied’ friend in the home movie is 
evidently not inspired by what the screen shows us. It draws its origin from 
the real contacts that we have seen with the friend sought after. What is 
more, it is linked to the presence of this friend and, even when it functions 
for no purpose, as is the case with the image of my friend, it must also be 
interpreted as an attempt at ‘presentif ication.’ In fact, in order for these 
sentiments of sympathy that I feel for a determinate person to be produced, 
we must have the presence of this person or, absent this, a substitute for 
this presence. The cinematic image offers us this substitute and allows us 
to feel this sympathy linked to presence. At no moment do we lose sight of 
the fact that the image is only a substitute, a simulacrum of presence. And 
yet we continue to feel sympathy, even when it functions for no purpose. 
More precisely, we realize this sympathy within us in an effort to join the 
real person from whom we remain irremediably cut off. As we can see, the 
affective aspect and the postural aspect are merged in a single, unif ied 
behavior which is essentially def ined as an effort to evoke the presence 
of the object under consideration. But we must also say that this behavior 
always fails. We ‘play’ at believing in this presence, but we never get there 
since we are always aware of the absence of the object.
We might even add that the more the characteristics of the substitute are 
close to the real characteristics of the object such as it can be perceived, the 
more the failure of our behavior is felt. We can, in fact, try to render a person 
present by different means. For example, we can produce a mental image, 
or utilize a photograph or home movie. In all three cases, the behavior has 
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the same meaning. In all three cases, too, this behavior is doomed to failure, 
but we can observe that this failure is generally felt with more violence for 
the home movie than for the photograph, and with more violence for the 
photograph than for the mental image.
The fact is that, from the mental image to the f ilm, the image gains in 
precision and vivacity. It thus becomes more apt to evoke the presence, 
and more apt to render the object such as it can be seen in perception. At 
the same time, and paradoxically, it expresses absence with much more 
clarity, quite simply because, by further resembling the real object, it lets 
us better take stock of what the effective presence of this real object would 
be. Consequently, this ‘absenteeism’ is all the more clearly felt, and the 
resulting disappointment is all the greater.
In the home-movie attitude, our behavior consists of a vain effort to 
‘presentify’ the object, an attempt to enter into intersubjective relations 
with other people, which necessarily leads to disappointment.
All this leads us to make a f inal observation. At the same time as the 
absence of the object is felt, and correlatively with this fact, the presence of 
the spectator is experienced as useless, without any meaning. This is because, 
by wishing to render a person present, it is often our presence to the person 
that we try to evoke. In sum, we seek a relationship of real intersubjectivity. 
But, once the object is irremediably revealed to be out of our grasp, this will 
for a personal engagement in the relationship is experienced as being absurd.
It is confronted with the void, and remains suspended, without any 
possible outlet or any real signif ication.
To conclude: in the home-movie attitude, our own presence is constantly 
felt insofar as it is one of the poles of the relationship that we would like to 
see realized, and it is felt all the more for the fact that, since it is incapable 
of being engaged, it remains entirely preoccupied with itself.
This situation is comparable to the situation in which we have attempted 
to take hold of an object that is out of our grasp. Insofar as the object can 
be grasped, we simply have the awareness of an object to be held, and the 
gesture to take hold of it barely attracts our attention. By contrast, when 
it is out of our grasp, our attention focuses on these gestures. We are then 
aware of carrying out useless, symbolic gestures which embarrass us in 
their absurdity.
We could speak at much greater length on the behavior we have just 
studied. There would be a great deal of nuance to add, and numerous specific 
cases to examine. In any case, we believe we have touched on the essence 
of the structure and meaning of this behavior, an essence that we can 
summarize in the following terms.
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In its structure, identif ication in the home-movie attitude essentially 
consists of the actualization of an intuitive and synthetic knowledge of 
the object under consideration, an actualization which is realized thanks 
to the perception on the screen of behavior that is objectively individual 
but generalized by the spectator. In its meaning, this type of identif ication 
consists of a vain effort to evoke a presence that remains irremediably out 
of our grasp.
b) Identification in the ‘Documentary Attitude’
In the documentary attitude there is, as we clarif ied in the preceding chap-
ters, a positing of existence, a generalization of the matter of the image, a 
constituting activity and a f ixing of the attention on the image as a starting 
point for the sketching of a general knowledge. In the end, the essential 
function of movement is to permit the formation of a progressive, cumulative 
knowledge in the object presented by the f ilm. In this sense, the activity 
of consciousness consists, above all, of a retention and a generalization of 
the perceived object.
Within this attitude, how is identif icatory behavior structured, and what 
is its meaning?
Let us f irst of all note that here the quality of identif icatory behavior 
depends to a large extent on the interest felt by the spectator for the subject 
of the documentary. This remark is, incidentally, very general, and applies 
just as much to identif ication in the home-movie attitude as it does to 
identif ication in the f iction f ilm. However, it is appropriate to formulate it 
in specif ic relation to the documentary f ilm, since, in this case more than in 
the other two cases, our attention risks being distracted. This is because the 
documentary aims to procure a certain knowledge about a certain object, 
and if this object does not interest us, we will experience the f ilm in a very 
distracted manner instead of following it attentively.
But since our project is to explain certain characteristic attitudes and 
forms of behavior, we envisage the case wherein the spectator is interested 
and follows the f ilm attentively.
In order to orient our analysis, we will once again refer to a concrete 
example. Take one of the numerous documentaries about medicine. For 
example, take a documentary whose goal is to teach the spectator about 
the lifestyle of country doctors, and the diff iculties they face. The f ilm 
shows one of these medical practitioners in some of his most representative 
activities: talking with patients, taking their pulse, diff iculties in moving 
around, emergency cases, etc.
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If I am interested, I will apply myself to the task of grasping the sense of 
this doctor’s behavior by identifying with him. But here, as with that form of 
identification that develops within the home-movie attitude, his behavior is 
not apprehended on a strictly individual level. We know, in fact, that, in the 
documentary attitude, the perceived object is generalized, in the sense that it 
refers to a more general reality existing elsewhere. Thus, the particular manner 
that our country doctor has of conducting himself with a patient at a given 
moment in the film, presented as a general style of his comportment with his 
patients, proper to the real-life doctor and, through him, to country doctors 
in general. Consequently, what we try to apprehend through the individual 
behavior with which we identify is a general style of comportment, such as 
can be observed in numerous country doctors. We can see the difference 
with f iction. In a f iction f ilm, the comportment of a doctor does not refer to 
anything existing. It would have no meaning with respect to existing general 
reality. Its only meaning relates to the story told by the f ilm, an individual 
story made up of individual forms of behavior interacting with one another. 
This comportment would then be apprehended in its singularity.
Within the documentary attitude, identif ication therefore has a general-
izing nature. It involves apprehending, on the basis of particular behavioral 
acts, typical or general modes of comportment.
But if this behavior is generalizing, it is not generalizing in the same 
manner as that which is developed in the home-movie attitude. In this 
case, there is a whole knowledge that incorporates the postural attitude of 
reproduction, a knowledge which is naturally intuitive and formed in the 
course of earlier perceptual acts.
Here, by contrast, knowledge is contemporaneous with viewing the f ilm, 
and is formed precisely during the f ilm screening.
Briefly put, in the documentary attitude, identif ication teaches. This is 
its precise meaning and function. It targets the formation of an intuitive 
knowledge about an existing and general reality considered through the 
intermediary of the image. The postural attitude is here one of ‘comprehen-
sion.’ It is, therefore, radically different from the behavior of evocation 
specif ic to the home-movie attitude, and also different, in many aspects, 
from the behavior of ‘participation’ that we will have the opportunity to 
study with respect to the f iction f ilm.
Identif ication in the documentary attitude thus constitutes a kind of 
apprenticeship. We grasp and understand a certain number of typical 
behavioral forms with the explicit or implicit goal of knowing the ‘how’ and 
the ‘why’ of these representative modes of behavior belonging to a certain 
category of comportment.
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The individuals represented on the screen thus have little value as individu-
als, unless of course they are ‘personalized’ as in certain documentaries that 
have fictionalized elements or that relate to a specific person (such as Nanook). 
But, as a general rule, the individuals of the documentary film are anonymous 
beings who are seen as representing broader categories of individuals. Thus, 
in our example, the country doctor is not taken as a singular person but 
as one doctor among many, chosen from the group of country doctors as a 
representative sample of this group. It is therefore an anonymous being whose 
anonymous behavior we grasp, and who we relate to a set of individuals.
That is to say that, in this case, identif icatory behavior does not imply any 
‘ego transference.’ The ‘ego’ of the spectator and the f ilm character remain in 
a relation of pure exteriority. In other words, we identify with the character 
to understand their behavior, but in no way do we try to be this character, 
who has no, or almost no, ‘personality’ for us. We remain ourselves in the 
process of grasping the modes of comportment illustrated by one or more 
anonymous, merely representative individuals. There is nothing similar, in 
this type of identif ication, to that by which we try to substitute ourselves 
for the other person, to become united with the other person, because it 
is another character, a hero, whom we have strongly ‘valorized.’ We will 
encounter this type of identif ication when we have to envisage a certain 
genre of f iction f ilmmaking.
Here it is only a question of apprehending impersonal behavior merely 
illustrated by an anonymous individual.
This is why we said that the spectator and the character remain in a 
relation of pure exteriority.
We have the structure and the meaning of identif ication in the docu-
mentary attitude. We also know that this identif ication does not imply an 
engagement of personal ‘ego’ in the character of the f ilm. But above all, we 
know that, in the case that occupies us, it is a form of apprenticeship. We 
must now ask ourselves about the particularities of this form of apprentice-
ship, taking into account the non-presence of the object. In other words, 
what differentiates the formation of knowledge in a f ilmic situation from the 
formation of knowledge in real situations? Here, we can only give a tentative 
response to this rather marginal question, but it may nonetheless be suitable 
to address it, given the importance that it can take in the framework of the 
problems that audiovisual pedagogy poses to us.
Two elements retain our attention.
Firstly, let us note that, in a real situation, in contrast to what takes place 
in the f ilmic situation, our presence alongside the people with whom we 
identify implies a certain reciprocity in relations.
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We are always situated in a relationship with other people, and, at the 
same time that there is our view on another person, there is also the view 
of another person on us. Our presence alongside the other person is felt, 
and hones our attention as well as that of the other person. In short, we 
are in the midst of a real situation, and are concerned by other objects 
and people.
In a f ilmic situation, there is nothing of the sort. We apprehend reality 
‘from a distance’ and our presence is absolutely not under question. It fol-
lows that we can develop a purer behavior of comprehension, because it is 
extracted and centered exclusively on the object.
On the other hand, however, we must also consider that, since we are not 
in a concrete, real situation – or rather, since we are not physically engaged 
in this situation, and since we are therefore not physically concerned by it, 
the reality considered through the intervention of the image does not have 
the density for us that its actual presence would, with all that this implies 
(particularly on the level of affectivity). We all know through experience 
that following dramatic events on the screen makes less of an ‘impression’ 
on us than seeing them in reality. This is because, in the cinema, we see 
things and events ‘from a distance,’ without truly being concerned by them. 
The reality targeted remains distant, and becomes ‘disaffectivized.’
Thus, in our example, we can well understand the diff iculties faced by 
the country doctor, we can even see them, but in a manner abstracted from 
reality. Consequently, we imagine what they are more than we really feel 
them. By ‘imagine’ we do not mean an intellectual operation, by which we 
represent to ourselves what these diff iculties are. Rather, since we are not 
in a real situation, we can only ‘play’ what we would feel more deeply if we 
were present at the events and directly concerned by them.
It follows that this modality of apprenticeship that is identif ication in 
the documentary attitude offers the advantage of a comprehension that 
is more ‘objective,’ because it is extracted from the situation. Moreover, it 
remains impotent to render in all their density the affective resonances 
that are engendered by real contact with these events.
c) Identification in the ‘Fiction Attitude’
We here reach the most important point of our analysis, since it is quite 
evident that the behavior that will be under discussion is by far the most 
characteristic of the f ilmic fact.
Along with identif ication in the home-movie attitude and identif ication 
in the documentary attitude, we have studied the forms of comportment 
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corresponding to cinematic functions that are, when it comes down to it, 
rather secondary, if not de jure, then at least de facto.
Through the importance of its on-screen representation, as well as through 
its consumption by the broader public, f iction evidently constitutes the 
principal sector of f ilm production. This is why we will accord special at-
tention to the behavior solicited by f iction f ilms.
Let us briefly recall the essence of what we have said with respect to the 
attitude taken when faced with a f iction f ilm.
We know that, in the f iction f ilm, the f ilmic datum does not refer to any-
thing that exists. The f ilmic world, we said, closes in on itself in order to 
constitute itself as an autonomous reality. It is a quasi-world populated 
by quasi-presences, which we believe in without positing its existence. 
Our attention focuses on the image in its individuality. Correlatively, the 
activity of consciousness almost exclusively consists of acts of retention 
and protention, whose goal is to integrate at every present moment the set 
of passing events, and to project, on the basis of these present moments, 
future events. Thus, as we have seen, there is no longer any possibility of a 
detachment or a distanciation from the f ilmic reality. Consciousness is led 
to follow the story and cannot be detached from it.
How is the apprehension of perceived behavior realized within this 
particular attitude?
In other words, what is the meaning and the function of identif ication 
with the characters of a f iction f ilm?
We know that, here, the perceived behavior is almost entirely cut off 
from existing reality. It only has meaning inside the f ilm, within the ac-
tion in the course of being shown. Thus, for example, when we follow the 
behavior of the hero in a Western, we obviously do not seek to represent 
what heroes in general do. Their existence is not even presumed. Simply, 
we wish to follow a story concerning a certain number of characters who 
interest us to the extent that they are signif icant to the imaginary story 
we wish to follow.
It is thus above all a matter of understanding the behavior perceived, not 
for what it is conducive to teaching us (as is the case in the documentary) but 
because it has a meaning within the story being told. This is the first function 
of identif ication. It exerts itself on all the characters, but is almost exclusive 
when it comes to secondary characters or, more precisely, characters who 
remain little ‘affectivized.’
Let us explain this. We know that, in the beginning, identif ication is 
affectively ambivalent but that it is then oriented either towards sympathy 
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or towards antipathy. The same, by the way, goes for the valorization or 
devalorization of characters.
And yet, in the cinema, there are characters who are strongly ‘affec-
tivized’ – generally, they are the main characters – and others who are 
barely ‘affectivized’ at all (who are generally secondary characters). We 
will later discuss the manner in which this ‘affectivization’ is structured. 
For the moment, we will limit ourselves to describing the meaning of this 
identif icatory behavior according to whether it is attached to characters 
who are ‘affectivized’ to a greater or a lesser degree.
When it comes to less ‘affectivized’ characters, identif ication is, as we 
said, exclusively a behavior of ‘comprehension.’ The behavior of these 
characters is simply apprehended for its signif ication in the action taking 
place. This is the case, for example, in the behavior of the German sentinel 
when the prisoners try to escape. This comportment is grasped insofar as 
it has a meaning in the unfolding of events, but we in no way ‘participate’ 
in it. On the contrary, this type of comportment remains ‘external’ in the 
sense that it is situated with respect to a character who we follow more 
particularly.
Thus, when we are dealing with secondary characters affectivized to a 
lesser degree, identif ication simply grasps the individual behavior on the 
basis of its meaning in the context of the f ilm, and the relationship of the 
spectator to these characters is a relationship of pure exteriority.
The same, obviously, does not apply when we are dealing with more 
strongly ‘affectivized’ characters. In this case, identif icatory behavior takes 
on more of an allure of ‘participation.’ But it will be useful to distinguish 
several levels of participation.
To schematize somewhat, we can distinguish participation in the modality 
of ‘being-with’ from participation in the modality of ‘being-like.’ It is hardly 
possible to differentiate the objective f ilmic content susceptible to inducing 
one or the other of these modalities. The personality of the spectator remains 
the principal determinant of the type of participation. Nonetheless, without 
any presumption of reality, it seems to us that certain categories of f ilm, 
such as so-called ‘psychological’ f ilms, do more to solicit our participation in 
the mode of ‘being-with,’ whereas the heroic genre and so-called ‘adventure’ 
f ilms appear to induce a greater degree of participation in the mode of 
‘being-like.’ We will refer to concrete examples.
Thérèse Desqueyroux by George Franju (1962, adapted from a novel by 
François Mauriac) offers us a typical example of the psychological f ilm. 
Thérèse Desqueyroux, the title character, does not have the typical qualities 
of the hero of an adventure f ilm. She is a character the likes of whom we 
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often meet in daily reality, someone who f inds herself confronted with real 
psychological and moral problems, such as they occur in real life.
In the course of the f ilm, a certain sympathy is formed for the character 
of Thérèse Desqueyroux, a sympathy which derives from an understanding 
of her behavior, and which in turn solicits this understanding even more. 
This sympathy for Thérèse Desqueyroux results in our participation in her 
problems, her state of mind, and her behavior. In other words, identif ication 
here takes the allure of participation. I am ‘with’ Thérèse Desqueyroux 
in the sense that I share her life and her psychological troubles. But what 
is important to underscore is that, while participating in her existence, I 
remain situated with respect to her. In other words, I do not engage my 
personal ‘ego’ in the character. Thérèse Desqueyroux remains before me, 
in a relationship of exteriority. I live in connivance with her, in a sort of 
sympathetic complicity, but I remain a center of reference. As such, the 
story of Thérèse Desqueyroux does not become my story, since I do not 
have a tendency to fuse with her, to be ‘like her.’
Rather, I am in solidarity with her behavior and her state of mind. I am 
with her, while remaining myself. This is what we f ittingly call participation 
in the mode of ‘being-with.’
In f ilms presenting a ‘hero,’ or, in a more general manner, characters 
who are highly idealized or magnif ied – the hero of a Western, James Bond, 
etc. – participation can sometimes take on an entirely different allure.
Think, for example, of certain Western heroes, super-men who triumph 
over all obstacles and succeed in all their endeavors, both on the level of 
action and on a romantic level. This type of character offers to the audience 
the spectacle of a comportment, or rather, a highly idealized manner of being.
Not only do these characters provoke our sympathy, but, more than this, 
they are valorized to a very high degree.
We should clarify that valorization should not be understood as pro-
ceeding from a moral judgment, but rather as f lowing from an intuitive 
apprehension of privileged comportment on the level of relations with 
another person. We have here the affective valorization of a comportment 
that appears as an ideal form of behavior.
It follows that participation in such comportment is often much more 
than mere solidarity. This is because participation takes on the allure of an 
attempt to ‘be like’ the hero. Here, there is identif ication in the narrow sense 
of the term. In other words, there is an attempted fusion with the highly 
valorized character. The ego tends to establish with the personality of the 
hero a relation not of exteriority but of belonging. The center of reference 
is no longer the ego of the spectator but the personality of the hero, and 
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participatory behavior consists of an effort to be this personality. This is, 
therefore, participation in the mode of ‘being-like.’
But we must maintain that this genre of participation brings with it 
certain limits that it is important to specify if we wish to avoid wasting our 
breath by producing a caricature of reality. This attempt to incorporate the 
hero leads, in effect, to an extremely complex state in which the spectator has 
a tendency to become another person while nonetheless remaining himself.
Let us try to elucidate this ambiguity and begin by further clarifying the 
link established through participation.
We said above that participation in the mode of being-like tends to 
establish a relation of belonging. But what, precisely, does this relation 
consist of? Here, we must be wary of abuses of language, because certain 
expressions – which we ourselves have utilized – such as ‘fusion with the 
character,’ ‘transference of the ego into the character’ or even ‘forgetting 
oneself to live inside the character,’ expressions which are frequently used 
in the literature dedicated to cinema, are only a very imperfect reflection 
of reality, exaggerating it or deforming it due to the words used to describe 
it. It thus appears necessary, lest we lapse into committing certain errors, 
to nuance the global meaning that these expressions contain. The problem 
is thus to specify the exact nature of the relations between the self (the 
spectator) and the other person (the character) which are established 
through participation.
First of all, what do we mean when we speak of ‘forgetting oneself’ with 
respect to the spectator?
This question requires us to clarify what we mean by the ‘self.’ We know 
that subjectivity is not closed in on itself, but is a relationship with the world 
and other people, that it is constitutionally intersubjective.
We also know that, in such conditions, it is in and through intersubjective 
relations that the ‘self ’ and the other person reciprocally constitute each 
other through the interplay of identif ication and opposition. But this means, 
among other things, that, what I am for myself is, at the same time, neces-
sarily what I am for other people, that the ‘for-me’ is indissolubly linked with 
the ‘for-another.’ When it comes down to it, this means that, in the process 
by which I constitute myself as a personal ego, I must constantly take into 
account what I signify for other people, through ‘appearance’ or exteriority, 
as well as through my position within a sociocultural milieu, which confers 
on me a signif ication in the eyes of other people that I have not chosen but 
that I must accept, and either take responsibility for or overcome.
These remarks will allow us to better understand what is meant by 
‘forgetting oneself.’
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Although constituted interiority must also accommodate exteriority 
(or being-for-another) within itself, because they are indissolubly linked 
with one another, this does not prevent it from sometimes escaping itself, 
at least on the imaginary level, and taking refuge in another exteriority, 
another being-for-another.
It is in the imaginary realm, indeed, that we can, for a certain length of 
time, abstract ourselves from the concrete conditions of our existence, and 
free ourselves from this signif ication for the other which we must always 
assume in real life, and it is in the imaginary realm that we can consequently 
try to install in our interiority another being-for-another linked to another 
apparition and other conditions of existence. The expression ‘forgetting 
oneself’ means nothing other than the bracketing of one’s social being. We 
are now in a position to further clarify this ‘relation of belonging’ which 
we evoked earlier, and which we admitted was specif ic to participatory 
identif ication. This relationship is established between the interiority of 
the spectator and the exteriority of the character, between the for-oneself 
of the spectator and the being-for-another of the character.
The attempt to be ‘like another person’ is, in the end, an attempt to let 
dwell in one’s interiority another apparition, another signif ication for 
another person. Correlatively, what the spectator targets in participatory 
identif ication is not the other person as a being endowed with an interiority, 
but as an exteriority, a being incarnated in a certain body realizing certain 
possibilities within a certain historical and social milieu. In a word, it is a 
special manner of being-in-the-world-and-with-other-people that the specta-
tor seeks to integrate. In this behavior, the essential function of mimicry 
(posture) is precisely to make the external behavior of the character dwell 
in the interiority of the spectator, thereby constituting a link of belonging 
between the being-for-another of the latter and the being-for-oneself of 
the former.
It may be useful to illustrate all this with a concrete example.
On the screen, the standard Western hero – we are referring here to 
classical Westerns with a simple structure, and not to certain f ilms of 
the same genre which have ambitions that more evidently reside on the 
psychological or social level – imposes his law on the evildoers, his strong 
personality on his posse, and his seductive powers on the heroines. Each of 
his actions reflects a privileged mode of being, a kind of mythical style of 
existence, which is consequently enviable in many aspects. As such, if the 
character seduces me, the intersubjective relation that makes me coexist 
with him is structured in the direction of a belonging of his conditions 
of existence to my interiority. I try to appropriate to myself his behavior 
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and his manner of being. By mimetically imitating him, I try to feel the 
exteriority of the hero in my own interiority. If he vanquishes an enemy, I 
act as if I have overcome the bad guy. It can even happen that I anticipate 
his behavior, reacting to events before he does or correcting his actions.
In short, I participate in a privileged manner of being-in-the-world by 
making it my own.
We can now see what distinguishes this mode of participation from 
that which we have defined as a “participation in the mode of being-with.” 
In this latter category, we do not only aim for an exteriority. Through the 
exteriority, we try to feel the interiority of the character, even while we 
maintain a distance from it in order to comprehend it. Simply put, there is 
a co-existence with the other person, who remains other in terms of their 
personal consciousness. By contrast, with participation in the mode of 
being-like, there is no co-existence with another person, but an attempt 
to make another behavior exist for us. We should also note in passing that 
heroic characters, those who encourage participation in the mode of being-
like, do not impose themselves as individuals, that is, as personal beings 
possessing their own interiority, but rather as pure behavior or, if you like, 
as pure exteriority. They provide us with ideal schemas of comportment 
more than inviting us to consider them as personal consciousnesses. Think 
of Tarzan or Zorro, to take the simplest cases, or even James Bond or Matt 
Helm. On the other end of the spectrum, those characters who do more to 
solicit our complicity, connivance, or comprehension (participation in the 
mode of being-with) impose themselves as individuals, and invite us to enter 
deeper into the mysteries of their interiority, rather than live vicariously 
through their actions. These characters include Thérèse Desqueyroux, Cleo 
(from Cléo de 5 à 7 [Cléo from 5 to 7, Agnès Varda, 1962]), the hero from Bicycle 
Thieves, or St. Vincent de Paul from Monsieur Vincent (Maurice Cloche, 1947).
All these considerations put us in a good position to elucidate the limited 
and ambiguous aspects of the relationship established by participation in 
the mode of ‘being-like.’
If, as we believe, this participation is an adherence of the personal ego to 
the exteriority of another person, we can understand that the link thereby 
established cannot be totally realized.
If he f inds himself favored by the f ilmic situation – a situation which is, 
we must clarify, advantageous for the bracketing of my own conditions of 
existence – it remains the case that the character under consideration is 
still before me.
An insurmountable distance remains between him and me. Funda-
mentally, for participation to take place, I must be able to transport myself 
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into the f ilmic world. But I cannot do so, and so I remain condemned to 
mime from my seat the role that I try to occupy in the universe of the 
f ilm. This means that, no matter how much I may realize the belonging 
of my interiority to the exteriority of another person, I can only make it 
act from afar. I must act ‘as if ’ I were in the place of the characters, ‘as if ’ I 
possessed their bodies and possibilities. And yet, this ‘as if,’ imposed by the 
insurmountable distance between that behavior which remains inexorably 
before my own self, remains implicit for consciousness and renders the 
realization of the relationship impossible. This is because ‘acting’ at being 
like another person implies that, at the same time, I deny that I simply 
am this other person. In other words, this means that the ‘participating’ 
ego who can only ‘pretend’ remains implicitly conscious of its exteriority, 
since ‘pretending’ implies that we cannot forget but only feign to ignore 
our proper conditions of existence, and that feigning to ignore implicitly 
means recognizing.
Thus, escaping from the self is never total. It is only ever a game requiring 
a share of bad faith, an attempt to deceive oneself about one’s own reality 
and make oneself believe something else.
In what we have called participation in the modality of ‘being-with,’ there 
is nothing of the sort, since this behavior is a form of co-existence – that 
is, the simple coming together of the self and the other person as different 
beings.
Hence, the difference between the two types of participation appears 
still more clearly, and this difference, we believe, deserves to be elucidated, 
since it indicates to us that the experience of the f ilm is neither simple nor 
singular, that it moves, at times, in the direction of the understanding of 
the other person, and at other times in the direction of an escape into the 
other person, and that any psychological or sociological study of the function 
of f ilm in the life of individuals and societies must necessarily take into 
account this diversif ication of experience.
II. The Differentiation of Identification According to Different 
Characters
Until now, we have spoken of f ilmic identif ication in general, without wor-
rying too much about the manner in which it is differentiated according to 
the different characters of a f ilm. And yet, we all know from experience that 
our identif ication with a character varies greatly depending on whether the 
character is central or secondary, strong or weak, moral or immoral, etc. 
How is this differentiation brought about?
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In other words, what is it that makes our relation to certain characters, in 
the course of a f ilm, take on the allure of an intense participation, whereas 
for others, it is reduced to mere understanding?
We already partially responded to this question when we envisaged the 
problem of the different modalities of f ilmic identification, but it is doubtless 
apt now to return to this issue, by further systematizing the elements of 
an answer.
We have sometimes posed the problem of the structuring of identification 
according to different characters in terms of a choice, by the spectator, of 
a privileged individual who is identif ied with in an almost total manner. 
Subsequently, to justify this choice, it suff iced to appeal to one or another 
objective characteristic, discernible in the personality (or the character) 
and conducive to inviting the spectators to ‘escape’ or ‘project’ themselves 
into this character. Thus, we have invoked the physical beauty of the on-
screen f igure as an invitation to live for a time with the ideal appearance 
that we do not possess. Sometimes, too, we attributed the role of enabling 
intense participation to certain traits held in common by the actors and the 
spectators. If they f ind themselves faced with the physical or moral image 
that actors present to them, spectators have the opportunity to ‘project’ 
themselves into a cinematic ‘alter ego.’ Of course, the objective elements 
which, like physical beauty, arouse our escape into an ideal personality, or 
which, like the resemblance between the spectator and the actor, invite 
our participation through connivance or complicity, intervene, to a certain 
extent, in the choice that the spectators make.
On this matter, we should signal that, during a study aiming to clarify 
the impact on the audience of the f ilm La Vie conjugale by André Cayatte 
(Anatomy of a Marriage, 1964), we were able to observe that certain specta-
tors, having gone through problems similar to those encountered by the 
characters, took the side of one or the other of the characters, and stood 
up for them. Thus, everything leads us to believe that during the course of 
the f ilm, these same spectators had ‘projected’ themselves, more than is 
normally the case, in what appeared to them as their own image.
We do not deny the importance of the objective elements which have here 
been in question, but, what seems erroneous to us, or in any case abusive, is 
the idea that we turn these elements into ‘factors of identif ication,’ that we 
establish a direct link between these elements and the choices of spectators.
First of all, this would considerably reduce the act of identif ication. As we 
have seen, it is not only a behavior of intense participation, but intervenes 
on every level of relational behavior. We therefore need to describe the 
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modalities of identif ication, more than defining privileged cases where it 
is realized to a high degree.
Subsequently, if there was a direct link, if physical perfection or resem-
blance automatically induces participation, it is hard to see why these ele-
ments do not function in an equal manner for characters who are apparently 
equal on the level of beauty, or on the level of possible similitudes with the 
spectators. For example, among the secondary characters gravitating around 
the main characters, there are often those whose physique or conduct might 
inspire the spectator. In the same manner, it is also hard to see why, in the 
hypothesis of a direct link between physical perfection and participation, 
certain stars do not exert the same hold from one f ilm to the next. The cases 
are numerous wherein a star, who is generally adulated by the public in the 
majority of his f ilms, loses, as a result of playing a new role in a situation that 
is unusual for him, his power of fascination. Thus, in Lost Command (Mark 
Robson, 1966), Maurice Ronet plays, alongside Alain Delon and Anthony 
Quinn, and in opposition to these two actors, a particularly antipathetic 
character, barely conducive to soliciting the participation of the spectator.
The manner in which we here discuss the attractive value of the ‘objective’ 
elements under consideration, can appear a little simplistic, but nonetheless 
shows that it is vain to try to establish direct links between participation and 
a visible trait of the characters independent of the context in which they are 
perceived. If the traits of the characters have any influence on identif ication, 
this cannot be in the absolute, but in relation to a certain context. This is 
why we f ind it illegitimate to pose the problem of the differentiation of 
identif ication in terms of the choices motivated by certain characteristics 
of the characters envisaged as isolated beings.
Fig. 6: Françoise (Marie-José nat) and Jean-Marc (Jacques charrier) in andré cayatte’s Anatomy of 
a Marriage.
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In reality, if we attentively examine the f ilm experience, we will see that 
the characters of a f ilm are always perceived in relation to one another. 
They are characters-in-relation-to-other-characters. As we expressed at 
the beginning of this work, we do not perceive isolated subjectivities, but 
social beings perpetually in relation to one another and drawing their very 
definition from these relations. Likewise, characters perceived in the cinema 
are perceived as relational nodal points. They define themselves with respect 
to other characters and the objective elements (or rather ‘objectif iable’ 
elements) which characterize them, only have meaning in the social context 
specif ic to the f ilm.
In fact, one of the reasons why we have sometimes sought the direct 
causes of intense participation in the objective traits of characters was very 
probably the constancy with which certain actors garnered the admiration 
of spectators. It was consequently tempting to attribute only to the elements 
that are apparently invariant from one film to another – the physique and the 
temperament taken by themselves – the direct reasons for the constancy of 
the fascination they exert on the crowd. But, when looking more closely, we 
can see that, what principally remains invariant, from one f ilm to another, 
is the character played by these actors, a character who is always ratif ied 
by the social context of each of their f ilms. Thus, in almost all f ilms, Jean 
Gabin presents the image of a strong, slightly gruff personality, admitted 
as such and confirmed by his entourage.
Likewise, Brigitte Bardot, who has never ceased, since the beginning of 
her career, to play beautiful, erotic, and amoral young women, has always 
found herself in f ilmic situations from which she has drawn this signification 
of amoral and erotic beauty.
We can also say that her physique and temperament predispose her to 
this signif ication, but this is possibly because she plays the same role in life 
as she does on the screen, or, in other words, that, taking into account her 
innate physical attributes, the human relations of her real existence have 
been structured in a certain manner, and that it is this manner that has 
been reproduced on the screen in situations that confirm it.
In any case, we are still dealing with roles and situations, and with 
characters drawing a certain signif ication from a certain context, and not 
isolated personalities drawing from themselves, like a secretion, a certain 
power of attraction or repulsion.
Moreover, in contrast to actors restricted to a single persona, there are 
many others whose various appearances on the screen are so many composi-
tions of characters having little or no relationship between them, and they 
acquire from this fact very different signif ications.
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In short, as we have said, f ilm characters are always characters-in-relation-
to-other-characters who receive their signification from the social situations 
in which they are involved. It seems that it is on this basis that we must 
envisage the problem of the differentiation of identif ication according to 
different characters.
We must consider that, at the beginning of the f ilm, all characters are 
simply apprehended by the spectator in roughly the same manner. We 
grasp this behavior and understand its meaning, but nothing is as yet well 
structured, since the relations between characters are still too imprecise. 
If, at this point, certain characters already appear as more sympathetic 
than others, we are still only dealing with a barely sketched out sentiment. 
This sentiment is doubtless predicated on a style of behavior that makes 
us presume an appearance that has either been glimpsed or, in the case of 
a well-known actor, valorized in other f ilms, and that we are prepared to 
once again f ind a familiar role for them. But, up to this point, differentiation 
has only just been initiated. It is only later, in the course of the f ilm, that 
identif ication is structured and differentiated into an intense participation, 
in the case of certain characters, or a simple comprehension, in the case 
of others.
The fact is that, during the unfolding of a f ilm, that is, as the interactions 
between characters are intensif ied and specif ied, each one of them reveals 
their signif ication within the pattern that the ensemble of these characters 
constitutes.
Let us clarify things a little. As we have underscored, the spectator does 
not perceive isolated characters, but beings in relation with one another, 
characters-for-other-characters, or, alternatively, the manners that these 
different characters have of structuring their relations with other people.
In the course of the action they undertake, these manners of comportment 
are specif ied, and each one of them takes on a signif ication in relation to 
the others.
As this apprehension of signif ications is realized, the intersubjective 
relations between the spectator and the character are modif ied and con-
comitantly diversif ied.
In fact, the affectivity which, as we have seen, plays an essential role 
in identif icatory behavior, invests the characters in a very different man-
ner according to the signif ications that they reveal. Certain behavioral 
styles appear sympathetic, while others are apprehended as indifferent or 
antipathetic. Certain of them are valorized, while others are devalorized.
And yet, this affectivization and valorization of the characters will 
orient the form and intensity of identif ications. We espouse the cause of 
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sympathetic, valorized characters. Identif ication is crystallized around 
them, it is intensif ied and takes the allure of participation. As for the other 
characters, they are soon only apprehended through the main characters, 
to which we adhere almost exclusively. We grasp their behavior as having 
a meaning with respect to the chosen characters, and we often feel for 
them the same sentiments as those that they inspire in these same chosen 
characters.
At the risk of gross schematizing, we could summarize the complex 
process that we have just described in three successive phases, which can 
be delineated as follows:
1. Understanding of different characters.
 Here, identif icatory behavior merely grasps the meaning of on-screen 
behavior. Following this comprehension, each character takes on a 
certain signif ication with respect to the others.
2. Affectivization and valorization of the characters.
 Certain modes of behavior are affectivized in the direction of sympathy 
and others in the direction of antipathy and indifference. Likewise, the 
same behavior is valorized or devalorized and remains indifferent on 
the level of its value.
3. Identif ication f ixates on the sympathetic, valorized characters.
 It becomes participation.
The other characters are now only grasped through the main characters.
Let us try to illustrate this process by means of a concrete example chosen 
from a genre that is rather simple as far as the signif ication of characters is 
concerned: the Western. High Noon by Fred Zinnemann (1952), a Western 
that has become a classic, tells us the story of an aging sheriff at the end of his 
career, who f inds himself suddenly constrained to carry out an imperative 
but dangerous task.
The drama begins at 10 o’clock in the morning. Will Kane, the sheriff, has 
just married, and is ready to once and for all leave the town in which he has 
conscientiously carried out his duties for many years. However, at this very 
moment, Kane learns that the train from the south will bring a dangerous 
outlaw (Frank Miller) to the township, whom Kane had earlier condemned 
to death. Already, three accomplices wait for Miller at the station. Up to this 
moment, and although the ensemble of characters has already begun to 
organize itself around Kane, the spectators limit themselves to understanding 
the situation and grasping the meaning of behavior specif ic to the different 
characters, who still have barely any signif ication on the affective level.
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But the rest of the action will increasingly orient our attention and af-
fectivity on Kane: the sheriff, in the absence of a successor who will only 
assume his functions the following day, vainly tries to rustle up a posse of 
men to welcome the four ‘desperados.’ One by one, and for various reasons, 
his friends desert him. Even his wife abandons him. Everything is against 
him, and he will have to f ight alone.
We can see how the identif icatory behavior of the spectator is differenti-
ated. Through the situation and the interaction between the characters, 
Kane’s behavior is bestowed with a signification that induces affectivization 
and valorization, which results in identif ication being transformed into 
participation. On an affective level, we take his side, stand up for him. Our 
state of mind coincides with his own, and we ‘experience’ his behavior.
As for the other characters, they are primarily apprehended through Kane. 
Many of them (the townsfolk) are felt to be mediocre or cowardly, and Miller 
is seen as a mortal danger. Of course, even for these other characters, identi-
f ication can move in the direction of a deeper comprehension. Kane’s wife, 
for example, can certainly be the object of identif ication-comprehension. 
For proof, take this extract from a newspaper review, which can only be 
the result of enhanced identif ication:
Kane’s wife. Her character is like that of the pastor. She belongs to the 
Quaker religion which forbids violence of any kind. She pushes her 
religious convictions to the extreme and coldly imagines leaving her 
husband, resorting to threats in order to put pressure on him. We should 
adopt a very nuanced judgement in the analysis of her behavior if we take 
into account, on the one hand, the depth of her religious convictions, 
and on the other hand the obligation she has, owing to her marriage, 
to understand and admit the point of view of her husband, who values 
doing one’s duties.
We should also underscore that she was not born a Quaker, but had em-
braced the pacif ist religion following a murder in her family, committed 
right before her eyes. This atrocious vision provoked a psychological 
shock in her. She sees nothing strange in the fact that a new shock (seeing 
her husband on the verge of being killed) should provoke a profound, 
instantaneous change in her feelings, and lead her to use violence in her 
turn in order to defend the man she never stopped loving…
Evidently, this type of analysis can only come from identif icatory behavior 
which is based on comprehension, and which has been developed during 
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a viewing of the f ilm. But it is still the case that, for the vast majority of 
spectators, Kane’s wife remains a ‘peripheral’ character understood through 
her relationship with Kane, the central character who not only solicits our 
understanding but also our participation.
Let us note that this participation will attain its culmination when Kane 
heads off in search of his enemies in order to do battle with them, a battle 
which he miraculously wins despite being greatly outnumbered.
We can now see more clearly how identif ication is structurally and 
functionally differentiated according to the various signif ications with 
which the different characters are endowed within the situation in which 
they are inserted.
We can also see the precise importance that we must attribute to the 
objective, isolable elements in the physical and moral personality of the 
actor. It is only in a situation or a social context in which physical beauty is 
valorizable that this beauty can intensify identif ication or orient it towards 
participation.
In the same manner, a possible resemblance between actor and spectator 
only acquires importance in and through its context. If we are dealing with 
a moral resemblance – that is, a resemblance that is translated through a 
similarity in comportment – this is evident. If we are dealing with a purely 
physical resemblance, everything depends, in our opinion, on the signif ica-
tion that the character in question takes in the context of the f ilm. If the 
character is favorably situated, that is, if they are valorizable and conducive 
to inspiring sympathy, there is every reason to believe that this element 
of resemblance will orient our identif ication towards more intensity or 
participation. If, on the contrary, this same character is disadvantageously 
situated, it is rather certain that the element of resemblance will not in any 
fashion influence identif icatory behavior.
In a word, the primordial element on the basis of which we must under-
stand the type of identif ication that a character solicits is the signif ica-
tion that this character draws from their position in relation to the other 
characters.
Now, to avoid any confusion, it is essential to note that the process by 
which each of the characters draws their signif ication from the context 
is not something objective that would be uniquely situated within the 
f ilm, and to which the spectator is simply subjected. In fact, in the f inal 
analysis, it is the spectator who attributes signif ications, and who projects 
these signif ications onto the different characters in order to subsequently 
affectivize them and valorize them in one sense or another. But what we have 
simply wanted to show is that this bestowal of signif ication is realized not 
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through a direct effect of some kind of characteristic objectively readable 
in the personality of the actor or, more generally, the character taken in 
isolation, but rather through the apprehension by the spectator of a series 
of interactions between the characters, interactions that permit him to 
situate the characters with respect to one another and thus to attribute 
signif ications to them.
To put it differently, it is the spectator who, entering into intersubjectivity 
with each of the characters during the initial emergence of identification, and 
thus perceiving in each of them a certain mode of comporting themselves 
in relation to other people, or a mode of being for the other characters, will 
give a certain signif ication to this manner of being for other people.
This last remark elicits another question that will make us pose the 
problem of an objective approach to audience reactions. If it is true that it 
is def initively the spectator who is alone responsible for the signif ications 
accorded to the characters, do we not fall into a pure subjectivism, and are 
the reactions of the spectators not too individual, and thus too diverse, for 
the possibility of synthesizing them ever to be glimpsed?
We do not think so, since subjectivism does not necessarily signify a 
heterogeneity of perceptions and a dispersion of behavioral forms.
In fact, if the perception, identif ication, and attribution of signif ications 
essentially belongs to the subjective activity of the spectator, we must say 
that this subjective activity is largely guided by the author of the f ilm.
In other terms, it is the director who solicits, to a large degree, the manner 
in which spectators structure their behavior.
When he makes a f ilm, a director incarnates in behavior signif ications 
that he wants the spectators to recognize. He structures the relations 
between characters in such a way that each one of them is grasped by 
the spectators. He composes each behavioral act in such a way that it is 
perceived and felt by the spectators, just as he desires it to be. What is more, 
he disposes of numerous technical procedures conducive to highlighting the 
signif ications that he translates to the level of comportment (the scale of 
shots, rhythm, the soundtrack, etc.), so much so that, at the end of the day, 
he is the one who solicits and orients the manner in which the spectators 
must apprehend the characters and structure their behavior. Moreover, 
we should also remark that this solicitation of the author is exerted not 
through a critical consciousness, but, as we have seen earlier, through a 
‘captivated’ consciousness, led to coincide with the f ilmic reality and thus 
without any distance from it.
It follows that the solicitation of the author takes the allure of a real shap-
ing of the spectator’s behavior and manner of perceiving. The psychological 
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conditions of f ilmic perception are such that, in the course of viewing the 
f ilm, a narrow relationship is established between the subjectivity of the 
director and the subjectivity of the spectator, with the latter being led to f ind 
the signif ications incarnated by the former, by means of the f ilmic content.
This is why subjectivism does not signify a dispersion of reactions. On the 
contrary, we now understand that, between the spectators of one and the 
same f ilm, there exists a community of comportment and, extending our 
reasoning further, we can ask whether this behavioral community reinforces 
each individual’s behavior through what they have in common. Indeed, 
everyone knows that the reactions of the isolated spectator seem rather dif-
ferent, and in any case timider, with respect to those of the spectator within 
a group, and it is easy to understand this. In the midst of other spectators 
whose reactions are perceptibly similar, every individual is confirmed in 
their own reactions, and gives free rein to them. Thus, within the group 
of spectators, there is a mutual reinforcement of reactions through what 
they have in common. We can say that, in addition to the intersubjective 
link tying each spectator to the author, and thanks to this link, there forms 
among the spectators in a single theater an anonymous intersubjective link, 
drawn from a contagion of reactions, and through which each individual 
has a vague feeling of solidarity with the crowd.
It is now important to note that the solicitation of the author can be 
exerted to different degrees. While particularly powerful in the majority 
of action f ilms, it is often less spellbinding when it comes to f ilms inspired 
directly by daily reality, ‘psychological’ f ilms, or social-issues f ilms.
Action f ilms (the Western, the cloak-and-dagger f ilm, the spy f ilm, the 
adventure f ilm, etc.) often only recount a story involving characters with 
a simple and clearly differentiated psychology (there are ‘good guys’ and 
‘bad guys,’ brave men and cowards, etc.). Such f ilms generally arouse in 
the spectator simple reactions, which are exactly those anticipated by 
the author, all the more so given that these f ilms address a well-disposed 
audience, who only wish to be distracted by the antics of purely f ictional 
heroes. But for other f ilms, those in which characters with more complex 
psychologies bring with them a measure of ambiguity, it is obvious that the 
relationship between the spectator and the character, although it is broadly 
oriented by the author, is also nuanced according to the personality and 
the history of each party. We can think, for example, of the characters in 
f ilms such as Hiroshima mon amour by Alain Resnais (1959), Jules et Jim by 
François Truffaut (1962), Thérèse Desqueyroux by Georges Franju, 8½ by 
Federico Fellini (1963), Moderato Cantabile by Peter Brook (1960), and many 
others. The equivocal nature of these characters, with their complicated 
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psychology rich in contradictions, leaves greater room for the initiative of 
the spectator, above all when the ambiguity is willfully maintained by the 
author (e.g. Anatomy of a Marriage by Cayatte).
In the end, we can see that the behavior of the spectator is organized 
in a very complex manner. We could now begin an analysis of the way in 
which, within a single subjectivity, the personal urges and the solicitations 
of the director are articulated. This analysis would doubtless require an 
elaboration that would be too long to be included in the present study.
Our project was to describe the broad outlines of spectatorial behavior, 
and to thereby furnish a useful canvas for a global comprehension of 
phenomena.
This said, we believe it is useful, as much to clarify our ideas as to 
form a conclusion, for us to brief ly summarize the ideas developed in 
this chapter.
Identif icatory behavior is structured in different ways according to the 
different characters of a f ilm, and this is a function of the different significa-
tions that the spectator attributes to these characters. The attribution of 
signif ication is a subjective matter, but it f inds itself broadly solicited by 
the author. Finally, this solicitation of the author can exert itself to varying 
degrees, depending on the type of f ilm or, more generally, the will of the 
director.
Chapter III: Towards Post-Filmic Behavior
After studying the structures of the f ilm experience, we would like to hazard 
a few hypotheses relating to the influence of f ilmic identif ication.
Here, of course, we can only summarily paint the broad brushstrokes of 
a tableau showing the principal repercussions of a f ilm on the mental life 
and personality of the spectator. To put it simply, as much to manifest the 
possible utility of the preceding discussion as to initiate further study of the 
problem, we would like to open up certain perspectives to the analysis of the 
influence of the cinema. More precisely, based on what we have said of the 
f ilm experience, we will try to explain the manner in which this experience 
can be prolonged in psychic life and, on this basis, formulate hypotheses 
about what it would be f itting to call post-f ilmic behavior.
We have seen that, in the case of f iction f ilms, identif ication can take, 
at least when it is focused on the central characters, two rather different 
forms: participation in the mode of ‘being-like’ and participation in the 
mode of ‘being-with.’
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We can take this observation as a starting point and formulate the 
hypothesis, which is a certitude for us, that the f ilm will produce differ-
ent effects according to whether one or the other of these modalities is 
realized.
Let us f irst envisage the case wherein the f ilm has solicited participation 
in the mode of ‘being-with.’
Let us recall that this modality of identif ication is not presented as a 
form of escape into the other person, but as a complicity, a connivance with 
the other person. In this specif ic case, the self and the other remain in a 
relationship of exteriority, in the sense that the spectator participates in the 
other person while still remaining the same self, and that they ‘experience’ 
the other person as different to their own self.
We could also say that the spectator takes possession of the other person 
in order to assimilate them, to live inside them even while their self remains 
the center of reference. What would remain of this participation?
It goes without saying that if the effects of this behavior are prolonged, 
then this will take place on the same level as participation itself, that is 
to say, on the level of the being-with-other-people, or, more generally, the 
comprehension of other people as others.
Can we see how?
If we interrogate the spectators upon exiting a movie theater, we can 
observe that, in general, they are incapable of saying much of any interest 
about the f ilms and the characters they have just been following. At the 
very most, they can express a few vague impressions or sentiments, but 
they cannot clearly explain the f ilm experience through which they have 
just lived.
We could thus say that, with respect to the characters and, on this basis, 
the f ilm, they possess an intuitive knowledge, and this can be understood 
if we recall the specif ic nature of identif ication.
In its participatory form, as in all its other forms, identif ication is in fact 
motoric and mimetic in nature.
And yet, mimicry, we can recall, consists of a postural or psycho-muscular 
attitude that aims to reproduce the behavior of the other person in order 
to understand it.
What the spectator possesses at the end of the f ilm is, therefore, not 
a conceptual knowledge situated on the level of rational thought, but a 
knowledge that is somehow ‘bodily’ in nature. In f igurative terms, we can 
say that the spectator remains impregnated by the other person – possessing, 
that is, in the form of motoric or bodily traces, the behavior of the other 
person.
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If we add to this the fact that this behavior is now presented to the specta-
tor as a complete whole, then we have the essence of the intuitive knowledge 
we spoke about earlier: a bodily knowledge relating to the global behavior 
of the other person understood as another person. Of course, we are here 
leaving to one side the possibility of a conceptual knowledge resulting from 
a possible reflection that takes place while the f ilm is being screened. It 
is not very often that this type of reflection is realized and it is not, in any 
case, the habitual function of the f ilm to induce it.
It now remains for us to examine how this intuitive knowledge will be 
resolved. In our opinion, it can follow two different evolutionary paths 
(not counting intermediary cases). In the f irst case, it can remain in a 
vague, intuitive state. In this case, although it is not reproduced at the 
level of conceptual thought, this knowledge can constitute an enrichment 
in the general framework of our real relations with other people. It can 
always re-emerge and serve as a point of reference in the understanding 
and appreciation of the other person. This intuitive knowledge, therefore, 
would be in addition to the traces left by the multiple identif ications (in 
real or cinematic situations) taking place in the existence of subjectivity in 
order to constitute the complex interplay of intuitive references. Seeing the 
exact role and the relative importance of f ilmic references is, we believe, a 
fundamental problem of interest for reflection and research. This intuitive 
knowledge stemming from filmic identif ication can equally be the object of 
a more or less elaborated explanation. This happens when the spectator, for 
one reason or another, is led to conceptualize (that is, explain using verbal 
categories) the identif icatory experience of another person.
The manner in which this conceptualization is realized posits numerous 
problems that are diff icult to resolve.
How can a global knowledge of an intuitive nature flow into concepts? 
What is the role of the imagination and its power to refer to the scenes of the 
f ilm in this passage from the intuitive to the verbal? What are the relations 
between the mimetic traces and the imagination within the process that 
leads to conceptualization? And what is the role of intelligence?
The solution to these problems would necessitate long analyses that are 
impossible to realize in the framework of this study.
Nonetheless, as nothing more than a pure suggestion, we can propose this: 
there is, initially, an intention to conceptualize, to translate into words the 
behavior about which we possess all the necessary data, but in an intuitive 
and thus globally undifferentiated state.
This intention produces an activity of conceptualization. In order to 
understand this activity, it is essential to note that the concept only ever 
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teaches us about one aspect of the comportment to be explained. If we say, 
for example, that a given character is ‘courageous’ we only f ind one aspect 
of the behavior of the character in question, and we discard the rest of his 
personality. Moreover, the term ‘courageous’ is still very general and very 
vague. We would need other concepts to specify what type of courage we 
are dealing with. And others would be needed to explain other behavioral 
aspects. The conceptualization of behavior is thus progressively achieved 
by reviewing its different aspects, that is to say, by taking a wide range of 
perspectives on it – right until, if this is even possible, the globally intuitive 
knowledge we possessed in the beginning is exhausted.
We now have a better understanding of how the activity of conceptualiza-
tion should be realized: it must proceed by stages, and successively envisage 
different levels of judgment (the moral level, the psychological level, the 
social level, etc.). That is, it must take different points of view towards the 
intuitive knowledge that it possesses.
But, having chosen the level on which they will pass judgment, the 
spectator must also be able to relate, in their imagination, to the behavior of 
the most signif icant characters, with respect to the point of view they have 
chosen, and they must relate this behavior to all kinds of other behavior 
which they have experienced, and which they will use as reference points, 
since, in fact, behavior only has meaning in relation to the behavior of 
others, to which it is opposed or with which it is identif ied. The mean-
ing derived from these relations will then be explained with the use of a 
concept.
If we add to this the fact that speech is not a pure translation of what it 
signif ies, but that it has a constitutive character, then we have an idea of 
the complexity of the problems that the conceptualization or, if you like, 
the accession to the explicit meaning of intuitive knowledge has. These 
problems – which, it must be said, we have only been able to briefly skim 
through from a distance – belong to general psychology rather than f ilm 
psychology. If we have devoted a few words to general psychology, it is 
because we think that certain more specif ically f ilmic questions closely 
relate to it, and that possible research into these questions should take it 
into account. This is the case, for example, with the problem of the specif ic 
qualities – if there are any – of the conceptualization of a datum of cinematic 
origin. On this matter, there are those who have expressed the opinion that 
f ilm was conducive to revitalizing the conceptual apparatus, and to giving 
birth to more flexible verbal categories. Without fully subscribing to this 
hypothesis, we think that it would still be useful for research to focus on 
this question.
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In any case, whether it leads to conceptualization or not, it is in the domain 
of comprehending other people, or more generally on the level of being-with-
other-people that participation in the mode of being-with can prolong its 
effects. In all instances, this participation constitutes an enrichment, an 
experiential surplus. Defining the exact role and the manifestations of this 
experiential surplus is, in our opinion, a research perspective that could 
be of great interest.
We must now consider those cases in which the f ilm has solicited par-
ticipation in the mode of ‘being-like.’ Let us f irst recall that this modality 
of participation consists of an attempted escape into the highly idealized 
personality of the character. Between the self and the other person, there 
is no longer a relationship of exteriority, connivance, or complicity, but 
one of belonging. The other person (the character) is presented as an ideal 
behavioral schema, and the ego installs itself into this ideal schema. In short, 
the ego tends to escape into a highly valorized behavioral mode.
What might be the extensions of this escapist behavior in psychic life?
Here, as is the case when participation is realized in the mode of 
‘being-with,’ it seems evident that post-f ilmic behavior will have the same 
signif ication as participation itself. In other words, it is the attempt to be 
like the idealized other person that the spectator prolongs beyond the limits 
of the f ilm. We must now look at the manner and degree of this behavior. 
Lessons learnt from lived experience on the one hand, and some conclusions 
drawn from simple observation on the other hand incline us to distinguish, 
rather schematically, three major modalities of post-f ilmic comportment 
corresponding to three levels of behavior: oneiric behavior, ludic behavior 
and imitative behavior.
Let us consider the case wherein post-f ilmic behavior is situated on the 
oneiric level. We know from experience that a major part of the life of the 
imagination consists of dreaming, wherein the dreamer identif ies with an 
unrealized self whose very unreality allows for the accomplishment of ideal 
actions usually made impossible by the contingencies of real life.
In other words, the imagination is often the favored site for the behavior 
of escaping the self.
What, therefore, should be so astonishing about the fact that f ilmic iden-
tif ication prolongs its effects in the imagination? It is indeed normal that the 
spectator who, for more than an hour, has vicariously experienced an ideal 
comportment, contrives to reproduce it in their dreams or fantasies. This is 
all the more true given that escapist f ilm characters have something unreal 
or mythical about them, in perfect accord with the world of daydreaming. It is 
also all the more true given that the dream offers the dreamer the possibility 
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of experiencing idealized f ilmic comportment with their own physical 
traits. The dreamer, in fact, places their own self in their daydreams, but in 
an unreal form. We can thus say that the cinema constitutes an aliment for 
oneiric activity. It is also a powerful stimulant, since the identif ication that 
is repeated for the multiple heroes who populate the cinematic universe 
constitutes a powerful inducement to daydreaming.
Filmic behavior can thus be continued and completed in oneiric behavior. 
But this is not its only extension. Participation in the modality of being-like 
can sometimes engender more active forms of behavior, even if they are still 
bracketed off from reality. This is true for ludic forms of behavior, which are 
a compromise form between pure oneiric comportment and comportment in 
reality. Such behavior can be primarily observed in children. It is expressed 
in child play, and can be interpreted as an attempt to incarnate, to play 
in real life, that which has a purely imaginary character. Like dreamers, 
‘players’ project themselves into an unreal, often idealized ‘ego,’ with the 
difference, however, that they realize their unreal ‘ego’ in manifest and 
apparently real comportment. In a word, they act ‘as if ’ their ‘dreamed ego’ 
was a ‘real ego.’ To the same extent and in the same manner as the dream, 
the cinema constitutes a kind of aliment for ludic activity. We only need to 
consider the enthusiasm with which children contrive to reproduce in their 
games all kinds of situations illustrated by f iction f ilms. Childhood games 
are replete with cowboys and Indians, cops and robbers, heroic soldiers, 
and numerous other characters born from the mythology created, at least 
in part, by f iction f ilms.
As active and manifest as it may be, ludic behavior nonetheless remains 
without any great relationship with real life. Play rests on a convention, and 
the player who acts ‘as if ’ they were a hero, even if they are fascinated by 
this character, never forgets that it is simply an enjoyable diversion. In other 
words, players never confuse themselves with the characters they play. Once 
the game is over, they come back to their own selves without any diff iculty.
This amounts to saying that, as in oneiric behavior, ludic behavior in no 
way participates in reality. It is a pure escape from reality.
The same goes for the behavior of imitation, whose most perceptible 
manifestations can be observed in fashion styles. The ‘Brigitte Bardot look’ 
was often spoken about during the time when her popularity was such 
that, among the female public, many believed they could gain the same 
powers of seduction by donning the same long, unkempt hair as the star. 
Likewise, the myth of James Dean resulted in a wider uptake of wearing 
blue jeans. More recently, we have been able to note in men’s clothing all 
kinds of details borrowed from James Bond. The examples of this kind are 
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numerous. In fact, throughout the history of f iction f ilmmaking, there is 
practically nothing in fashion that has not felt the influence, in one way or 
another, of the major stars, who are both loved and envied by the public.
Fashions borrowed from f ilm stars incontestably attest to the existence 
of imitative behavior, but they are only a socialized and, all in all, a rather 
superf icial manifestation of this phenomenon.
If we question the meaning of imitative behavior on the purely indi-
vidual level, we can propose this: imitation consists of behavior aiming to 
reproduce the idealized behavior of others, with the goal of appropriating 
the signif ication attached to this behavior. Thus def ined, imitation is not 
fundamentally different from oneiric behavior and ludic behavior. In all 
cases, we still f ind the same desire to be like the idealized other. However, 
whereas dreams and play realize this desire in an imaginary manner, within 
the sectors of activity operative in real life, imitative behavior, for its part, 
attempts to realize it in reality.
In other words, imitation tends to realize the dreamed ego in the real 
ego. The dreamer or the player still kept in mind the distinction between 
the imaginary ego and the real ego. Or rather, their activity was based on 
this distinction. The imitator, by contrast, contrives to fuse the two.
The problem is thus to know whether this fusion is capable of being 
realized, whether it is structuring or destructuring.
This is not the place to treat this problem, which requires a discussion 
that would be too long for this study. Nonetheless, out of a concern for 
being even a little bit complete, we can, as a pure hypothesis, try to sketch 
out an answer.
If it is true, as we have maintained throughout this book, that man is a 
being who is relational right from the start, and that it is in and through 
intersubjective relations that the personal ego is constituted, if, in other 
words, we are nothing other than what we are for other people, then we 
can say that imitation can be structuring, insofar as the modif ications of 
behavior that it engenders are conducive to being ratif ied by the gaze of 
the other. Conversely, it would be destructuring if the signif ication that the 
imitator tries to incarnate does violence to the signif ication constituted by 
other people.
In the latter case, imitation can doubtless have dangerous consequences 
for the mental equilibrium of the individual. In fact, it is constantly expe-
rienced as a vain endeavor unavoidably doomed to failure. Taking refuge 
in a character is a form of alienation that cannot be approved by other 
people. It can consequently result in aggression towards other people, or a 
detachment from reality, a withdrawal into the self and an escape into the 
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imaginary. In short, it is divorced from real intersubjective relations. We 
can glimpse the consequences of this, but this is not the place to talk about 
them. In any case, if there is a place to elaborate a pathology of post-f ilmic 
behavior, it seems that we should look in this direction.
By relying on what we have been able to discern of the f ilm experience, 
we have tried to highlight certain interesting perspectives for the study of 
post-f ilmic comportment.
In doing so, we have occasionally indicated certain problems that should, 
in our opinion, arouse the attention of the researcher. But we are also aware 
that the number of these problems undoubtedly exceeds what we have been 
able to discuss. The forms and consequences of these manifestations will 
doubtless be more clearly elucidated with the aid of multiple, painstaking 
observations.
Whatever the case may be, we think that it is on the basis of a reading 
or suff iciently elaborated description of the f ilm experience as such that 
research in the field of cinema should formulate its hypotheses and construct 
its methods of observation. In the end, this is what we have wished to show 
in this last chapter.
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 General Conclusion
When beginning this work, we announced that it would include a number 
of gaps and imperfections, and now that we are concluding this study, we 
can see how necessary this precaution was.
When making our way through the different parts of this book, we would 
doubtless have taken note of the fact that there are aspects of the problem 
that have escaped our attention, or that have not been given the space they 
warrant.
This is why, having come to the end of this study, we believe it is useful, 
and even necessary, to take another quick look at the path we have taken. 
This will permit us to measure the limits of our analysis, but also to become 
aware of the place that it occupies in the general framework of f ilmology.
We had proposed to reveal certain important aspects of the process of 
f ilmic identif ication, but it has appeared to us that, for this goal to be 
realized, our project must be based on a rather detailed description of 
the fundamental structures of the f ilm experience. We have thus applied 
ourselves to the task of explaining this experience, and what we have been 
able to conclude from this can be summarized in the following terms: the 
f ilm experience is a perceptual experience that underpins the imaginary 
attitude of consciousness.
This imaginary attitude is not univocal. We have seen that it can be dif-
ferentiated by assuming several different possible forms, of which the three 
main ones seemed to us to be the ‘home-movie attitude,’ which considers 
its object to be known and existing elsewhere, the ‘documentary attitude,’ 
which considers its object as existing but not known, and f inally the ‘f iction 
attitude,’ by means of which we let ourselves become fascinated by an object 
that we know does not exist.
Depending on which one of these three forms the imaginary attitude 
takes, the manner in which subjectivity is constituted in its own turn as 
an interpersonal relationship can also be differentiated. From this point 
derives the problem of identif ication, and the structure and particular 
meaning that it assumes when it is held up by the different forms of the 
imaginary attitude.
When it is realized within the home-movie attitude, identif ication is 
the actualization of an intuitive knowledge relating to the person under 
consideration, and can be interpreted as an attempted ‘presentif ication,’ 
or evocation of the person known elsewhere.
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When it is developed based on the documentary attitude, identif ica-
tion has a didactic effect. It is the behavior of understanding, aimed at the 
formation of knowledge relating to an existing and general reality illustrated 
on-screen by anonymous forms of behavior that are representative of a 
general type of behavior.
Finally, when it takes shape within the f iction attitude, identif ication 
often becomes a participation in the behavior of other people, a participation 
that can be realized according to two modalities, that of ‘being-with’ when 
the character is followed in the mode of solidarity or connivance, and that 
of ‘being-like’ when there is an attempted escape into this character.
In short, the imaginary attitude specif ic to the f ilm experience dif-
ferentiates itself in various different forms, and each one of these forms 
underpins a particular modality of identif ication. This is what we hope to 
be the principal lesson taken from this study.
Having said that, we must now more explicitly come to terms with the 
limits of this analysis. These limits are of two kinds. The first are of an internal 
nature and concern the imperfections and the incompleteness that we have 
been able to discern in our own descriptions. The others are of an external 
nature, and result directly from the fact that we have had to make a meth-
odological choice. We will have to explain this choice later. In the meantime, 
let us try to shed a little light on what remains incomplete in our analysis.
Every theoretical exposition requires that we retain from reality only the 
most pertinent aspects, that we simplify them and exaggerate them. Owing 
to a concern for introducing clarity to the topic, this results in the neglect 
of details and the lack of nuance that was bound to have marked our study.
We have signaled these imperfections on several occasions. Broadly 
speaking, they can be boiled down to the following remark: while abstract-
ing some well-characterized attitudes from the f ilm experience, we have 
neglected, alongside the modifications capable of supervening within these 
attitudes, their possible interaction. Additionally, we have left to one side 
the detailed analysis of the relations between the attitudes and objec-
tive elements of the f ilm or, if you will, the particulars of f ilmic language. 
Finally, while considering the f ilm experience as an isolated experience, 
the aspects that we have been able to elucidate have not been envisaged in 
their integration within the general experience of the subject, an experience 
that is intellectual, perceptual, and affective, etc.
We have said all this over and over again. In fact, these limitations have 
been dictated to us by our intention to draw out only the most fundamental 
structures of the f ilm experience.
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What we desire is that these overly clear and precise descriptions nonethe-
less contain enough truth to inspire the wish to complete them.
The external limits of our study essentially derive from the choice that we 
have made in terms of our methodology. In the vast spectrum of methods recom-
mended by the various disciplines of the human sciences, we have resolutely 
opted for the one that has permitted us to read the meaning of these phenomena, 
such as they are immediately experienced. From the very start, we have tried 
to justify this choice. A reading of the lived meaning of the phenomena to be 
studied indeed appeared to be the natural starting point for filmology, just as 
it is for any of the other human sciences. We have thus provisionally put aside 
the more properly scientific methods in order to consider the film experience 
such as it is proffered to the subject in a f ilmic situation. We have tried to 
understand this experience ‘from within’ in order to describe and explain it.
Of course, f ilmological research should not remain at this point. By 
uncovering some aspects of the f ilm experience, we have simply surveyed 
the terrain for other disciplines and other methodological approaches.
Hence, the conclusions that we have reached should serve to nourish 
thinking inspired by other methodological approaches (scientific psychology, 
sociology, linguistics, etc.).
All that remains, then, is to wish that this should take place, since, in that 
case, our modest reflection will not have been useless. It will have shown its 
fecundity and contributed to creating unity within the science of f ilmology.
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I: Placing Meunier in the 
History of Film Theory




Meunier wrote his major work in 1969 as phenomenology slipped under 
the sway of structuralism. His next book followed Edgar Morin from a 
phenomenology of identif ication with images to an anthropology of mass 
culture. But in 1969, Meunier ignored Morin and other contemporary 
theorists. He relied instead on Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and the f ilmologists. 
His three-stage approach to experience derives from Husserl and echoes 
Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. This kept him at a remove from French f ilm 
studies, though he gained some notice in the USA, especially after the 
return of phenomenology in the late 1980s. This English translation lets 
us rethink issues that f ilm theory has engaged with for a century, and 
that came to a head in 1969.
Keywords: Filmology; phenomenology; structuralism; Edgar Morin; Paul 
Ricoeur; Jean-Pierre Meunier
I ran into Jean-Pierre Meunier through his book The Structures of the Film 
Experience in the autumn of 1973. It was at La Minotaure, the mythical 
bookstore at 2 rue des Beaux-Arts in Paris, where I loved to go as it was just 
across from where André Bazin and Chris Marker had worked for years 
after the war in the off ices of Travail et Culture, a communist outreach 
organization where cinema played a leading role among all the arts. Like all 
genuine encounters, I engaged The Structures of the Film Experience in three 
stages. The f irst stage found me instantly disposed to the book, wanting to 
understand its possibilities. It was very different from the semiotic studies 
that were then so fashionable. I was in Christian Metz’s seminar that year 
along with ten others. Among these was Geneviève Sellier who, when I 
mentioned this book, told me, “Ah phenomenology: Merleau-Ponty. This is 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
doi 10.5117/9789462986565_andrew
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what my parents used to read.” Evidently, I had picked up Meunier when 
his way of thinking was on the outs.
A few years later, stage two set in, when I pulled away for a more ana-
lytical view, carefully examining the book’s elements and composition. In 
completing The Major Film Theories, I determined to add a f inal section 
on the remnants of phenomenology in which Meunier is mentioned.1 No 
one who reviewed that book cared to talk about this chapter; so, in 1977, 
I wrote an article entitled “The Neglected Tradition of Phenomenology 
in Film Theory,”2 in which I located Meunier’s approach, lamenting that 
it had been ignored, a casualty of the era of ‘Grand Theory.’ Even if the 
word ‘structures’ appeared in his title, Meunier was obviously closer to 
Merleau-Ponty and phenomenology than to Lévi-Strauss and structuralism. 
My encounter now enters stage three with the appearance of this English 
translation. Re-approaching the book, I now aim, in Paul Ricoeur’s schema, 
to ‘comprehend’ it, that is, to apply it as a map to clarify, and perhaps to 
re-view and re-traverse, the overgrown f ield of f ilm theory.
Tripartite Structures in Phenomenology
Phenomenology and hermeneutics operate via stages like this, generally in 
threes. Merleau-Ponty overcame impasses in Sartre’s thought by adding a 
third term to Sartre’s binary categories. Where Sartre cleaved experience 
into being and nothingness, presence and absence, language system and 
personal style, Merleau-Ponty interjected an intermediary term. For instance, 
perception involves three stages that ramp up virtually together thanks to 
our body’s rapport with nature: sensation, then recognition, and f inally 
interpretation.3 First come light and shadow, colors and movement, forms 
and blurs; then bodies, objects, backgrounds, and a scene come into view; 
f inally, in stage three, interpretation resolves a perception by inserting it 
in a larger sphere of orientation or action.
Each perception, retained at the ready, sets the stage for a subsequent 
triad. Retention of the immediate past is part of the current moment of 
perception, which involves protention of what likely comes next; hence, 
each instance (or instant) of perception chains the past to the future.4 
Thanks to protention, the imagination enters perception. Sartre notoriously 
divided mental states into either imagination or perception; in the latter, 
consciousness is absorbed in what is present, whereas imagination consists of 
immaterial states of remembering, wishing, dreaming, or the like. Merleau-
Ponty, following Husserl more closely than did Sartre, assumes that past 
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perceptions, colored by their affect – including the experiences they were 
part of and the reflexes they triggered – constitute predispositions for new, 
current perceptions, which project themselves toward future perceptions. 
Retention and protention make room for temporal slippage in the same way 
that, in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (Phénoménologie de 
la perception), slippage between background and foreground makes space 
both continuous and dynamic.
Inheriting phenomenology’s description of (three-stage) processes, rather 
than binary states of being, Paul Ricoeur fought the structuralism of Saussure 
and Lévi-Strauss. The title of his brilliant 1964 riposte, “Structure-Word-
Event,” inserts a term between system and contingency.5 In Saussure, the 
a-historical permanence of language’s rules grounds an indefinite number 
of everyday speech events; whereas, in Ricoeur, speech events occur within 
history. A third term is required for the vital dimension of meaning in history. 
This third term, ‘Word,’ does not have the logical necessity of grammatical 
‘Structure’ but is more permanent than any ‘Event’ of speech. Its etymology 
points to the historical birth of each word, while examples (including their 
dates, in the OED) attest to the accretion of its meanings over time. Words 
have histories and provoke habits of speech, since prior speech events are 
drawn upon by every speaker who projects language for a purpose into 
a future. This schema lines up with Merleau-Ponty’s view of history: the 
sedimentation of successive interpretations of events upon which new 
events play themselves out.6 Words, institutions, and ideologies exist as 
accretions of sedimented meanings.
When Meunier wrote this book on filmic identification, he thought to break 
it down in the mode of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur, whom he does not 
mention but who, more than the others, conceived of experience in explicit 
stages. Meunier planned to approach identif ication as a three-step process: 
description, analysis, speculation. But the richest sources he draws on in his 
account of f ilmic perception turn out to be taken less from phenomenology 
than from the f ilmology of the 1940s and early 1950s. The last sentence of 
his book prays that he has “contributed to creating unity within the science 
of f ilmology” (p. 154). The lure of scientif ic objectivity led him to structural 
descriptions seemingly at odds with ‘process-oriented’ phenomenology.
The Structures of the Film Experience could appear to be a prelude to the 
topic Metz would soon take up on the psychoanalysis of identif ication. As 
Martin Lefebvre has thoroughly documented, Metz’s starting point is also 
f ilmology.7 His f irst essays, written prior to, though not cited in, Meunier’s 
book, including the important “On the Impression of Reality in Cinema” (“Sur 
l’impression de realité au cinéma”), revolve within the orbit of f ilmology. 
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Though this postwar institute had been forced to leave Paris for Milan in 
1959, something of its scent emanates from the journal Communications, 
volume one of which dates from 1960.8 Filmology was sedimented at the École 
pratique des hautes études in the 1960s under the administrative umbrella 
of Edgar Morin (a founder of Communications), whose two most illustrious 
f igures were Algirdas Greimas (Metz’s director of studies) and Roland 
Barthes, author of The Fashion System (Systèmes de la mode), “An Introduction 
to the Structural Analysis of Narrative” (“Introduction à l’analyse structurale 
des récits”), and Elements of Semiology (Éléments de sémiologie).
By 1969, structuralism had indisputably prevailed in the battle for intel-
lectual hegemony in the Francophone world (indeed post-structuralism was 
well underway). In Anglophone f ilm studies things were more in flux. When 
Meunier’s book f irst met the world, I was at the University of Iowa arguing 
structuralism in my seminars on literary theory with Gayatri Spivak, Angelo 
Bertocci, and Robert Scholes. Disciplined f ilm studies matured in the US 
at this time in a handful of institutions: Iowa, Northwestern, Wisconsin, 
NYU, UCLA. Peter Wollen’s Signs and Meaning in the Cinema arrived in 
1969, affecting the way we discussed auteurs, and initiating debates about 
the status of the image as ‘sign.’ In Paris, 1969 was when Jean-Louis Comolli 
and Jean Narboni delivered their manifesto classifying f ilms according to 
ideological valence.9 This overriding political-ideological dimension was 
understood by Cahiers du cinéma, which I followed, to operate via forms of 
f ilmic identif ication that exerted inescapable force via distinct processes 
like those of suture. Jean-Pierre Oudart’s essays on this most treasured 
concept appeared in this crucial year.10
Structuralists approach texts from systems external to them (linguistic, 
anthropological, psychoanalytic, ideological), whereas phenomenology, ever 
since Husserl, starts its inquiries from the natural attitude by describing 
interior processes. Meunier’s starting point is mixed; he appears to work 
like a social scientist aiming to clarify and map the inner life of cinema, the 
transactions of a text with the spectator’s capacities to see and to imagine. 
Predecessors such as Henri Wallon, and Albert Michotte van den Berck, 
whom Meunier cites (pp. 101-102 and 71-76), and especially Edgar Morin 
(whom he does not cite) shared this double heritage.
Meunier, Morin, and the Filmology Movement
Evidently, Meunier soon recognized that his ideas were part of an ongoing 
debate, for, right at the outset of his second book, Essai sur l’image et la 
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communication, he does cite Morin’s The Cinema, or The Imaginary Man 
(Cinéma ou L’homme imaginaire, 1956), alongside Metz’s essays on the impres-
sion of reality and on the phenomenology of narrative. He also recapitulates 
Mitry’s objections to Cohen-Séat’s f ilmological notion of identif ication. 
These references support the book’s f irst longer section, which he tells us 
was written as his 1972 habilitation and closely resembles The Structures 
of the Film Experience. The shorter part two, devoted to the image in mass 
communication, brings up Morin’s later writings alongside references to 
Baudrillard, Deleuze, Foucault, Clastres, and Debord, all of whom forecast 
a new image society.11
Meunier’s mix of interests, evident in the second book, closely resembles 
Morin’s. Both men move from the phenomenology of imagination to the 
social anthropology of images. The early Morin was specif ically interested 
in the state of ‘fascination’ that a spectator enters when dealing with the 
magic of ‘the double’ on the screen. Often deploying the language of phe-
nomenology, The Cinema, or The Imaginary Man is an anthropological 
study of humans haunted by their shadows. In the protected space of the 
movie theater, associational dream logic is unleashed by what Morin calls 
the spectator’s “projection-identif ication loop,” in which shadows thrown 
on a screen return to the spectator through his identif ication with their 
quasi-objectivity. Morin’s more openly sociological study, The Stars (Les Stars, 
1957), examines not the fictional worlds of f ilms so much as the post-fictional 
behavior of fans who imitate stars.
Meunier takes up both these directions of inquiry, concluding the f irst 
part of his second book with a chapter titled “Participation et Identif ication” 
that explicitly addresses the notion of fascination, and then embarking 
on part two, “Communications et Société.” Even in The Structures of the 
Filmic Experience, this dual approach is present in the idea of imitative 
behavior, though Morin’s name is absent. Both men are rooted in f ilmology. 
Morin published in their flagship journal, Revue internationale de filmologie, 
and, like Meunier, he cites Michotte van den Berck. He would adopt much 
of f ilmology’s mission in Communication, a journal that would become 
an abundant source for cine-structuralism in the UK and the US, where 
journals like Screen, Diacritics, and New Literary History echoed its topics 
and approaches. Barthes, Greimas, Todorov, Bremond, and Metz became 
well-known to us f ilm scholars; whereas the couple of Italian semioticians 
who had any impact (Emilio Garroni, Giancarlo Bettetini) were associated 
neither with f ilmology nor with its Italian journal IKON; instead, they were 
linguists. Pasolini was a case apart; an important one for American f ilm 
studies after his essay “Cinema of Poetry,” (“Cinema di poesia”) delivered 
164 DuDlEy anDrEw 
in Pesaro in 1965, passed through Cahiers du cinéma and became available 
to the rest of the world. Meunier does not cite the Communications group 
(Metz, Barthes) until his 1980 publication; perhaps he felt closer to early 
f ilmology because some of the most signif icant f igures were Belgian (such 
as Albert Michotte van den Berck and Alphonse de Waelhens), and their 
ideas were alive in the Université Catholique de Louvain, where Meunier 
studied, taught, and published his books.
Throughout the 1950s in Paris, f ilmology appealed to philosophers, 
sociologists, and perceptual psychologists so as to be recognized as 
a legitimate university discourse.12 However, it never welcomed f ilm 
historians, critics, or ‘f ilm theorists,’ as they were already being called. 
And neither does Meunier, who turns his back on the French cinephilic 
discourse, never looking to Epstein, Bazin, or even Mitry. It is especially 
surprising that his book excludes Mitry (he rectif ies this in the 1980 book), 
since Mitry, the co-founder of the Cinémathèque francaise and author of 
a f ive-volume history of cinema, was far more than a cinephile. He had 
been appointed a university professor and his formidable Aesthetics and 
Psychology of the Cinema (Esthétique et psychologie du cinéma) appeared in 
two large volumes from the Presses Univérsitaires de France (1963-1965). 
With minute analyses of such traits as cinematic rhythm, subjective 
camera, and reflexive montage, and with copious references to philosophies 
of perception and cognition, Mitry produced an informal encyclopedia 
of f ilm theory. His eight pages on the question of identif ication directly 
respond to the work of certain f ilmologists. His is an effort to account for 
the f ilm experience in a systematic, phenomenological manner. What does 
Meunier think of his insistence on the ‘solidity of absence’ established by 
the real movement of the shadows on the screen, against the immobility of 
the spectator enframed before it? Even Christian Metz, often considered 
a harsh opponent of phenomenology, embarked on his career with es-
says responding directly to Mitry’s views of narrative and identif ication. 
Meunier does not acknowledge this tradition until 1980. The Structures of 
the Film Experience even ignores Albert Laffay’s Logique du cinéma (The 
Logic of Cinema), a 1964 treatise that built on that author’s impressive 
postwar essays published in a Sartrean vein in Les Temps modernes and 
La Revue du cinéma. Metz saluted Laffay in a 1965 review, published in 
the same issue of Communications, wherein he famously locked horns 
with volume one of The Aesthetics and Psychology of the Cinema. Metz 
pinpoints the concept of ‘quasi-reality’ as Laffay’s most signal contribution, 
though he shows it to be insuff iciently developed.13 But any rendezvous 
one ought to have predicted between these French theorists and Meunier 
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was missed, the fault lying on both sides. For Metz never said what he 
thought of Meunier’s ideas about cinematic ontology and spectatorial 
identif ication, or about the experience of the image and of f iction – issues 
both men shared with Laffay at exactly the same moment, as they slipped 
from phenomenology toward structuralism. Later on, Meunier would 
acknowledge this moment.14
Echoes of Sartre
Given its title, Meunier’s book could have served as jumping-off place for 
Metz’s famous chapter on identif ication in the 1975 work The Imaginary 
Signifier (Le Signifiant imaginaire).15 Perhaps he wanted to avoid association 
with Merleau-Ponty through Meunier’s reliance on this philosopher. Oddly, 
shortly after Metz wrote his psychoanalytic book, his friend Roland Barthes 
published Camera Lucida (La Chambre claire), which he dedicated to Sartre’s 
The Imaginary (L’Imaginaire), the very book that is the explicit source for 
Meunier’s ref lections. You can feel how important The Imaginary is for 
Meunier when he accounts for the peculiar fascination and momentum 
belonging to the three distinct types of f ilm he identif ies: home movies, 
documentaries, and narrative f ictions. Identif ication is the key with which 
he unlocks the inner dynamics of one mode after the next, by meditating 
on the viewer’s shifting states of consciousness in digesting various types 
and organizations of images.
Bazin also drew heavily on The Imaginary. As I have previously detailed, 
a copy of the 1940 f irst edition of Sartre’s book was on the shelf above Bazin’s 
deathbed.16 When Janine Bazin let me select a book as a souvenir, this is 
the one I chose. It sat throughout 1973 and 1974 right next to my heavily 
marked-up copy of Meunier’s volume. But I did not open Bazin’s copy of 
Sartre for three decades. If I had done so right away, I would have seen 
that Bazin had underlined some of the same passages that appealed to 
Meunier. Furthermore, Bazin typed out a page of responses to Sartre that 
he left folded in the book, and which have guided my understanding of his 
difference from Sartre. He distinguishes three types of images (three again): 
photographic, f ilmic, televisual – all of them seen in relation to ‘presence,’ 
and thus to our way of absorbing them.
Leaning almost exclusively on early Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and sup-
plemented by f ilmological articles dating to 1953, Meunier, as we have seen, 
skips over f ilm theory and criticism. Taking his cue from Husserl (or even 
Descartes), he effectively starts from scratch on a diff icult problem: how 
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do spectators relate to f ilms and the characters within them? Although 
he does not cite him, Meunier’s position sometimes comes close to what 
Bazin (and Deleuze) would propose when, for example, he posits f iction 
f ilms as quasi-real:
We can now see more precisely what belief is. It implies that we depart 
from the category of the real, in order to be fascinated by an unreal world, 
a world that we posit neither as existent nor non-existent, that we never 
cease to regard as imaginary, but to which we consent, or rather, which 
we let ourselves believe in. Belief, in the cinema, is rather comparable to 
belief when playing (p. 95).
Meunier’s table of contents, as if modeled on that of a philosophical treatise, 
is leaner and more abstract than the one Morin constructed for The Cinema, 
or the Imaginary Man and Mitry for his two volumes. Those more verbose 
theorists try to corral their overbrimming thoughts and examples by organ-
izing them post-facto. Meunier, however, began with a clean outline. In part 
one, he treats the general experience of perception and identif ication; then, 
in part two he narrows the target to the experience of f ilmic identif ication. 
Each of these parts is given in two large chapters with numerous subsections. 
Throughout, the symmetries and oppositions are easy to keep track of; 
indeed, they provide much of the book’s pleasure, while making it easy to 
see where the argument is headed.
This table of contents echoes that of Sartre’s The Imaginary, the explicit 
source for Meunier’s chief premise: every f ilmic consciousness is a relation 
to a world, but a world that is posited as not there. This constitutive absence 
that operates in all f ilms differs according to mode, of which there are three: 
home movies (le film-souvenir), documentaries, and f ictions. Thanks to this 
absence, all f ilms require an investment by the spectator, although the 
type and quality of that investment varies. Phenomenological description 
distinguishes each from the others.
Laffay and others may have addressed our investment in f iction f ilms 
before Meunier, but the types of investment required by home movies and 
documentaries is original to this book. Meunier would not accept for home 
movies what Mitry wrote about f ictional works: “the f ilm image purports to 
be the same as the mental image […] f ixed inside our memories […] with the 
one difference that memory in this case is a strip of celluloid.”17 When Mitry 
then goes on to detach the image from the viewer since it is the product 
of someone else’s memory bank, he ignores the case of home movies that 
individuals record and return to. The use of cinema to recall something of 
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one’s own familiar world (often one’s family world) would not be studied 
comprehensively until the semiologist Roger Odin in the 1980s.18
As for documentary, Mitry has little to say. Although this mode had 
long been on the agenda in f ilm studies, its distinct phenomenology had 
best been seized by Bazin in his reviews of f ilms of exploration. Meunier’s 
plan to examine the viewer’s manner of processing documentary f ilm 
was therefore novel; it would have been more revolutionary but for the 
paucity of his pool of examples. His documentary category comprises only 
f ilms with a pedagogical function, ignoring essay f ilms and experiential 
explorations. While most documentaries in the 1960s were indeed produced 
by institutions rather than personally authored (as f iction f ilms often are) 
or made as diaries (in the manner of home movies), many subcategories 
of documentary would seem to demand a different interior description. 
Meunier does use the example of Lonely Boy (Wolf Koenig and Roman 
Kroitor, 1963), a rather ambiguous portrait of pop singer Paul Anka, but 
overall he considers documentaries to be films made to instruct the spectator 
in the workings of a world beyond the spectator’s knowledge. This is how 
the documentary f ilm differs from the home movie, which presents the 
spectator with a world he already knows.
In restricting documentary primarily to a mode of instruction, Meunier 
misses the entire function of what I call “cinema of discovery.”19 This tradition 
began with Flaherty, whose Nanook of the North (Robert Flaherty, 1922) 
Meunier does in fact cite. In my view, Flaherty spent years with his subjects 
so as to discover what the untrained eye, or even the human eye in general, 
could not see. The camera does better than the eye. And the f ilm does 
more than instruct; it discovers and delivers an abundance of audiovisual 
information otherwise unavailable, challenging the viewer to adopt a differ-
ent temporality. Such ‘artistic documentaries’ can be unpredictable, unlike 
most f iction f ilms and unlike most pedagogical documentaries. Even the 
length of artistic documentaries is uncertain, whereas f iction f ilms and 
commissioned documentaries come in at standard lengths. The shape of 
a f ilm, like Chris Marker’s Koumiko Mystery (Le mystère Koumiko, 1967) or 
Johan van der Keuken’s Blind Child (1965), is impossible to predict, and this 
surely affects the spectator’s attention, perception, and identification. Recent 
bold experiments in documentary – from Harun Farocki’s work to that of 
Harvard’s Sensory Ethnography Lab – comprise a rich repertoire and could 
include hybrid cases of f iction-documentary like The Act of Killing (Joshua 
Oppenheimer, 2012), which challenge Meunier’s clean categories; but Meu-
nier’s methodology, especially had he applied it to complex documentaries 
available in 1969, could clarify the spectator’s experience of such cases. With 
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experimentation in mind, what about experimental or avant-garde cinema, 
a distinct mode Meunier does not address at all? Often without characters, 
such f ilms explore not the world so much as perception, including cinematic 
perception. Do Stan Brakhage’s f ilms, like Dog Star Man (1964) or Scenes 
from Under Childhood (1967), invite identif ication with the f ilmmaker’s eye, 
with the camera, or with some putative subjective center as in the romantic 
tradition of poetry?
At the conclusion of Concepts in Film Theory (1984), using the same notion 
of stages that Meunier draws, I suggest that the modes of f ilm are tied 
to the level at which they “do their principle work.”20 Experimental f ilm 
operates at the level of sensation as it congeals into perception; documentary 
operates more at the level of perceived or recognized objects as these begin 
to constitute a complex world; and f iction f ilms, which seldom challenge 
viewers at the level of perception or recognition, instead operate at the 
level of the values of the world once it has been recognized and put in 
dramatic motion. My aim was to take Meunier’s structures and turn them 
into processes. One must work toward perception, in other words, and then, 
literally come to terms with what is perceived as a recognized situation, 
before one can proceed with higher-order processes of interpretation.
My ideas were informed at the time by a new stage in the phenomenology 
of the f ilm experience that came into its own around 1980 in France. Mitry 
at this time was aggressively attacking semiotics in an effort to keep alive his 
1960s aesthetics based on perception and style.21 He felt he had established 
what might be called the terms of perceptual constraint operating in all 
theories (thus, both in Meunier’s typology of identif ication and in Metz’s 
structural psychoanalysis). Mitry had declared:
One thing is certain: the brilliance of the screen against almost totally 
black surroundings produces a sort of preoccupying fascination which 
confines the impressions of consciousness within a frame which is clearly 
circumscribed. During the projection of a f ilm, nothing is (or can be) 
perceived except what is presented on the screen […] we only appreciate 
the image content relative to what it presents to our eyes, though we never 
lose self-consciousness.22
In 1980, perhaps as a revolt against such constraints, yet still in a quite 
phenomenological tone, Roland Barthes insisted on decentering the viewing 
situation in the presence of the punctum.23 Whereas the studium controls 
the spectator’s relation to the image, the punctum returns the image to the 
spectator’s wayward and private memories, attachments, and instincts. 
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Notably, Barthes felt this delicious possibility to belong to still images 
only. He needed to stop the f ilm, so he could control the temporality of the 
experience of viewing, something he did in “The Third Meaning” as well, 
and something that Laura Mulvey does in Death 24x a Second, too.24
But on the heels of Barthes came an even more radically phenomenologi-
cal approach, one that does not arrest the f ilm, but relishes its ceaseless 
movement as liberating an uncontrollable gush of images, some of which 
are interior and personal, others cultural, and all of which take place in 
a temporal vacuum, without duration. Jean Louis Schefer’s The Ordinary 
Man of Cinema (L’Homme ordinaire du cinéma), a nearly impossible book 
to assimilate into the system of cinema studies when it appeared, changed 
the stakes of f ilm phenomenology. I pointed to it in 1984 in Concepts in Film 
Theory; about the same time, Wide Angle published a section of it in English 
alongside an excellent introduction situating its importance by Paul Smith.25 
Championed by many theorists on both sides of the Atlantic (Deleuze, 
Raymond Bellour, Jacques Aumont, Tom Conley), it was only in 2016 that it 
was translated in full.26 However, uncomfortably suited to the digital age 
that perhaps it anticipated too well, this book may have missed its moment. 
Whereas when it was published in 1980 (just when Meunier’s second book 
appeared), it had the force of a completely new perspective, a description 
of ‘the f ilmic experience’ but without any structures holding it in place.
The 1980s, it should be recalled, found Betamax and VHS machines 
promising a new manner of watching film. No longer Mitry’s “brilliant screen 
surrounded by black”; no longer Bellour’s ineluctable, implacable unrolling 
of images beyond the viewer’s control.27 Suddenly the spectator has come 
to be in control, to change speeds, change f ilms, become a DJ of his own 
experience. We can now own films (purchase them like books) and own our 
own spectatorship. Cinema studies has yet to fully accommodate itself to this 
shift, though Vivian Sobchack’s 1992 Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of 
Film Experience and especially her 1999 article “Toward a Phenomenology 
of Nonf ictional Film Experience” go a long way toward that goal, using 
Meunier’s book more thoroughly and valuably than anyone before or since.28 
And Schefer’s ordinary man is now everyman at the cinema, awash in a sea 
of screens where identif ication operates so differently it must surely mean 
something quite distinct from what it did in 1980, let alone in 1969.
It may be claimed that Jean-Pierre Meunier’s book applies to a situation 
that no longer governs our relation to moving pictures; even if this is so, 
however, he has provided a model by which to clarify our situation, and he 
supplies the basic modes of experience from which our relation to newer 
forms of moving images derive. For, despite the mutations and explosion of 
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spectating situations, f ilm spectators still behave much in the manner he so 
clearly laid out. We still return to our personal worlds; we still come to terms 
with a world beyond ourselves that we believe is out there and must learn 
to meet; and we still involve ourselves in f ictions, which belong neither to 
us, nor to the actual world but in the midst of which, through identif ication, 
we play out other possibilities in other circumstances.
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 Between Phenomenology and 
Psychoanalysis : Jean-Pierre Meunier’s 
Theory of Identification in the Cinema
Daniel Fairfax
Abstract
This paper aims to situate Meunier’s The Structures of the Film Experi-
ence within the constellation of f ilm theory at the time of its writing in 
1969. More specif ically, it argues that Meunier’s text can, in retrospect, 
be seen as a ‘missing link’ in f ilm theory, bridging the divide between 
phenomenological and psychoanalytic approaches to the study of cinema, 
which can be more prof itably seen as complementing each other rather 
than existing in a state of mutual enmity. However, whereas apparatus 
theorists, such as Jean-Louis Baudry and Christian Metz, drew primarily 
on Lacan for the contribution of psychoanalysis to an understanding of 
f ilmic identif ication, Meunier is distinct in turning instead to the Freudian 
Angelo Hesnard for his take on the phenomenon.
Keywords: Angelo Hesnard; apparatus theory; Jean-Louis Baudry; Chris-
tian Metz; home movie
For historians of f ilm theory, one of the most intriguing aspects of Jean-Pierre 
Meunier’s The Structures of the Film Experience is the year of its publication: 
1969. The last year of the 1960s was one of the banner years in the history 
of f ilm theory, on a par with 1925 (the year of Eisenstein’s Strike and his 
f irst texts on montage), and 1945 (Bazin’s “Ontology of the Photographic 
Image” and the dawn of the neorealist movement in Italy). Above all, 1969 
has gone down as the birth-moment of the ‘Marxo-Freudian’ strand of f ilm 
theory. This moment saw an abrupt shift in editorial policies on flagship 
f ilm journals on both sides of the English channel – Cahiers du cinéma and 
Screen – as well as the founding of the explicitly radical journal Cinéthique. 
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In France, landmark articles such as Jean-Louis Comolli and Jean Narboni’s 
“Cinema/Ideology/Criticism” (“Cinéma/idéologie/critique”) and Jean-Pierre 
Oudart’s “Cinema and Suture” (“La Suture”) appeared in 1969, and were 
quickly followed by Jean-Louis Baudry’s “Ideological Effects of the Basic 
Cinematographic Apparatus” (“Cinéma: effets idéologiques produits par 
l’appareil de base”) in 1970, while in the UK the f irst edition of Peter Wol-
len’s Signs and Meaning in the Cinema was published, and Screen’s turn to 
political modernism ensued shortly afterwards.1 Debates swirled around 
contemporary politicized f ilms such as Jean-Luc Godard/Jean-Pierre Gorin’s 
Wind from the East (Vent d’est, 1969), Jean-Marie Straub/Danièle Huillet’s 
Othon (1969), Costa-Gavras’s Z (1969), and Fernando Solanas/Octavio Getino’s 
Hour of the Furnaces (La Hora de los hornos, 1968).
From these tempestuous discussions, out of whose cauldron the academic 
discipline of f ilm studies as we know it today was born, Meunier’s book 
seems singularly remote, whether geographically, institutionally, ideologi-
cally, or theoretically. Geographically, because he was based in the Belgian 
town of Leuven rather than in Paris or London, the 300-odd kilometers 
of distance keeping him safely ensconced from the critical combat of the 
larger metropolises. Institutionally, because, rather than the world of f ilm 
criticism, he was operating in a university environment, with its more 
sedate pace of work and markedly different standards for the presentation 
of ideas.2 Ideologically, because, whereas the French and British critics 
saw the development of a theory of the cinema as an inherently political 
project, closely tied with a prospective revolutionary overturning of the 
capitalist system, Meunier’s work is deliberately detached from political 
questions, preferring instead to probe deeper, more unvarying aspects of 
human experience and the cinema. And f inally, theoretically, because the 
conceptual apparatus dominating the Cahiers-Cinéthique-Screen variant of 
f ilm theory, with its combination of the structuralist semiotics of Saussure 
and Barthes, the historical materialism of Marx and Althusser, and the 
psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Lacan, was not one shared by Meunier, 
who predominantly drew, for his study on ‘the f ilm experience,’ on the 
theoretical corpus of the filmologie movement and, more fundamentally, 
on the phenomenology of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Husserl.
We could thus be tempted to f irmly place Meunier’s work on one side of 
a theoretical divide that has characterized f ilm theory – particularly in the 
French-speaking world – since the 1940s: that between a phenomenologi-
cal and psychoanalytic approach to f ilm spectatorship. If the former was 
prominent in the postwar period, with the work of Amédée Ayfre, Henri 
Agel, and, above all, André Bazin, by the late 1960s, the latter was in the 
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ascendancy, and came to overwhelmingly dominate the f ield in the 1970s 
and 1980s.3 Often, proponents of the ‘psychoanalytic’ paradigm of f ilm 
studies subjected earlier phenomenological accounts of spectatorship 
to ridicule – infused, in their view, with the musty stench of antiquated 
ideas (although, in reality, not much more than a decade separated their 
respective heydays), and prone to the twin (and contradictory) offences of 
metaphysical idealism and mechanistic scientism. Film phenomenology 
became, as Dudley Andrew termed it in his 1978 article, little more than a 
“neglected tradition” in f ilm studies.4
By the end of the 1980s, however, the hegemonic position of the structural-
ist/psychoanalytic paradigm had been decisively overturned. Importantly, 
however, it was not supplanted by a new dominant theoretical trend, but 
by scholarly dispersion, a fragmenting of the f ield into multiple, jostling 
academic endeavors. Given that this dissipation coincided with a massive 
institutional inflation – both in the university system more generally, and in 
the discipline of f ilm studies more specif ically – a suitable allegory for this 
moment may be the Big Bang: from a dense, compact f ield of energy feeding 
in on itself, the study of cinema exploded, becoming an ever-expanding 
universe whose component parts have been rapidly moving away from 
one another, in a centrifugal process which, to this day, shows no signs 
of being reversed. Indeed, in retrospect, the period when this theoretical 
prism exerted a near-totalizing sway over the concerns and activities of 
the f ield can be seen as a fundamentally unique, never-to-be-repeated 
moment in the history of the discipline: f ilm studies today is too vast, too 
polycentric, and too atomized to ever come under the dominance of a single 
set of ideas again. Among the constellation of theoretical schools to emerge 
in the wake of the structuralist/psychoanalytic moment, we can f ind the 
post-theory of David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, the ‘new film history’ of Tom 
Gunning, Charles Musser, André Gaudreault et al., cultural studies, media 
theory, and approaches inspired by Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Derrida and others. We can also, thanks to a large degree to the efforts of 
Vivian Sobchack from the early 1990s onwards, observe a resurgence of the 
phenomenological investigation of f ilm.5
It is thus that phenomenology-inspired and psychoanalytic approaches 
to the study of cinema, and more particularly the experience of the f ilm 
spectator, have predominantly been contrasted with one another, and held 
to be in an antagonistic relationship, vying for conceptual supremacy within 
the institutional framework of academic f ilm studies. This, certainly, is the 
textbook account of how these two theoretical tendencies relate to each 
other, and such a viewpoint can be evinced in certain passages from the 
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proponents of these theories themselves. In The Imaginary Signifier (Le 
Signifiant imaginaire), for instance (one of the tutor-texts of psychoanalytic 
f ilm theory), Christian Metz caustically refers to phenomenological f ilm 
theory as “the main form of idealism in cinematic theory” and characterizes 
it as a “cosmophanic conception” of cinema that registers “the ‘feeling’ of 
the deluded ego of the spectator.” At best, phenomenology can shed light 
on the functioning of the cinema in a symptomatic manner, because its 
“conceptual apparatus” is analogous to the “topographical apparatus” of 
f ilm projection. But it suffers from a blind spot towards the “lure of the ego,” 
and is only of interest if its theoretical premises are inverted.6 Conversely, 
Sobchack defends the phenomenological model of cinematic identif ication 
she develops (partly on the basis of Meunier’s ideas) as an explicit alterna-
tive to the psychoanalytic model, and superior by dint of the fact that it 
“does not posit a single and totalizing structure of identif ication with the 
cinematic image, but rather differentiates among a variety of subjective 
spectatorial modes that co-constitute the cinematic object as the kind of 
cinematic object it is.” It thereby offers “a more dynamic, fluid and concrete 
description of f ilm viewing than does its psychoanalytic counterpart” and 
“discloses rather than discounts” the “charge of the real” in cinema (and 
more particularly, documentary cinema).7 Elsewhere, the antipathy between 
these two tendencies manifests itself in the form of stony silence: scour the 
pages of Cahiers du cinéma in its Marxist phase for discussions of the ideas 
of Husserl, Sartre, or Merleau-Ponty, even in the form of polemics against 
them – you will not f ind any.8
I would nonetheless like to push back against this idea of an irremediable 
state of enmity, or irreconcilable discord, between phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis in f ilm theory. For a start, as two ‘schools’ of thought, their 
philosophical heritage is, to a large degree, shared – we are not talking 
about the kind of epistemological chasm that has separated continental and 
analytic philosophy for more than a century. Indeed, there is much evidence 
of a state of mutual influence between these two theoretical branches. The 
harsh words of The Imaginary Signifier notwithstanding, Martin Lefebvre 
and Dominique Chateau have demonstrated the importance of Metz’s early 
phenomenological period for his later work, a debt that Metz himself readily 
recognized in interviews.9
That phenomenology and psychoanalysis are more intertwined than is 
commonly assumed is also evident in the work of another seminal f igure. 
With its emphasis on the role of the gaze in the formation of the subject 
and its discussion of visual systems of representation such as painting, 
the signif icance of Lacan’s Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
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Psychoanalysis (Le Séminaire XI: Les quatres concepts fondamentaux de la psy-
chanalyse, 1973) for f ilm theory can hardly be overstated. Often overlooked, 
however, is the fact that, in this discussion, Lacan makes frequent reference 
to phenomenological thinkers. Sartre’s notion in Being and Nothingness 
(L’Être et le Néant, 1943), for instance, of the bidirectional nature of the gaze, 
and the element of surprise involved in the production of the gaze, are 
glowingly reiterated by Lacan, who states: “The gaze I encounter – you can 
f ind this in Sartre’s own writing – is, not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by 
me in the f ield of the Other.”10 Similarly, Merleau-Ponty is a recurrent point 
of reference for the psychoanalyst: his understanding of the function of the 
gaze in works such as Phenomenology of Perception (Phénoménologie de la 
perception, 1945) and the posthumous The Visible and the Invisible (Le Visible 
et l’invisible, 1964) strains against the very limits of the phenomenological 
method, in Lacan’s view, by insisting that the subject is circumscribed by 
a gaze emanating from “the spectacle of the world.”11
All this serves as contextual material for my main claim in this essay: 
that, in developing the notion of f ilmic identif ication by drawing on phe-
nomenological and psychoanalytic theoretical foundations, Meunier’s The 
Structures of the Film Experience represents a missing link in the ‘family tree’ 
of f ilm theory, bridging the gap between two theoretical tendencies that, 
rather than being counter-posed to each other, should most prof itably be 
related to one another in a complementary, compatible fashion.
Identification in Film Theory
Ironically, it was at the same time as Meunier published his account that the 
notion of ‘identif ication’ in the psychoanalytic sense made a spectacular 
entry into the working lexicon of f ilm theorists. In 1970, Tel Quel writer and 
novelist Jean-Louis Baudry – whose work was not, it must be said, particu-
larly focused on questions of f ilm theory prior to this point – published his 
“Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus” article in issue 
no. 7-8 of Cinéthique, thereby effectively launching apparatus theory in 
f ilm studies. There is much that we can f ind wanting in this brief yet dense 
article – most notably its reductive vision of the spectator’s relationship 
with the f ilmic image, and its terminological slippage between ‘ideology’ 
and ‘idealism’ – but there is no denying its enormous influence (an outsized 
influence, perhaps, when compared with the conf idential reception of 
Meunier’s text), and the theoretical advances produced by the debates it 
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incited. Few, today, would sign up wholeheartedly to the propositions Baudry 
articulates, but his text remains a vital point of discussion in the f ield.
Central to this article is a grand analogy between the cinema spectator 
and the infant, aged 6-18 months, in the midst of Lacan’s ‘mirror stage,’ 
owing to the common presence of two physiological conditions: restricted 
mobility and heightened visual awareness. As with the child who, faced 
with their own mirror image, constructs a sense of a unif ied ego upon this 
basis, the f ilm spectator develops a relationship of identif ication with the 
images projected onto the screen. But Baudry also distinguishes two levels of 
identif ication in this process, derived from the fact that, in the cinema “the 
reflected image is not that of the body itself but that of a world already given 
as meaning.”12 It is only on a secondary level that the spectator ‘identif ies’ 
with the characters portrayed in the f ilm; the primary identif ication in 
cinema-viewing is with the machinery of image-production, the camera. 
By standing in for what Baudry, following Husserl (in another point of 
convergence between phenomenology and psychoanalytic f ilm theory) calls 
the “transcendental subject,” the camera fulf ils the function of creating a 
unifying, centralizing meaning out of the perceptual shards of audiovisual 
imagery thrown onto the screen.
This gloss of identification in the cinema is widely known today. Its renown 
is partly due to Baudry’s ideas being taken up by Metz in The Imaginary Signi-
fier, who reiterated the distinction between a primary level of identif ication 
(with the camera/projector, the cinematic apparatus), and a secondary level 
of identif ication with the various characters of a narrative-representative 
film. Like Baudry, Metz highlighted the fundamental difference between the 
cinema screen and the mirror, and thus pinpointed the limit-point where the 
analogy with the mirror-stage breaks down: as opposed to the mirror, the 
cinema screen “returns us everything but ourselves, because we are wholly 
outside it.”13 In Lacanian terms, whereas the mirror unambiguously exists 
within the order of the Imaginary, the cinema screen skirts the threshold 
between the Imaginary and the Symbolic.
This, then, is the model of identif ication that dominated considerations 
of f ilm spectatorship in the 1970s and 1980s, and which continues to be 
one of the principal frameworks when questions of identif ication in the 
cinema are considered. In The Structures of the Film Experience, Meunier 
offers a markedly different theoretical model of f ilmic identif ication to that 
developed by Baudry and Metz. This is not to say, however, that there are 
not areas where the two overlap. Like Baudry and Metz, Meunier comes 
out against an overly positivistic account of f ilm spectatorship, a shortcom-
ing he ascribes to his predecessors in the filmologie movement, who were 
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excessively preoccupied with submitting the phenomena of f ilm-viewing to 
supposedly empirical observation and quantif ication. In doing so, they earn 
the same reproach that phenomenologists have addressed to the scientif ic 
method in general. Phenomena such as f ilm-viewing can only be adequately 
analyzed if the immediate lived experience of the subject is considered, 
rather than being subject to a pre-established objective schema, and this 
was, in Meunier’s view, the primary cause for the limitations of the research 
experiments carried out by f ilmologists such as Albert Michotte van den 
Berck, Jean-Jacques Rinieri, and François Ricci.
Although phenomenology is the main guiding light of Meunier’s study, he 
is not reticent to acknowledge that his notion of identif ication is ultimately 
drawn from Freud. This he has in common with Baudry and Metz. But, 
whereas the proponents of apparatus theory adopted a Lacanian outlook in 
their account of f ilmic identif ication (most notably through Lacan’s essay on 
the mirror stage), Meunier turned to another follower of Freud, one whose 
influence on f ilm theory has been far less prominent: Angelo Hesnard, and 
more particularly his 1957 book Psychanalyse du lien interhumain [Psychoa-
nalysis of the Interhuman Link].14 Although they engaged in polemics with 
one another, Lacan and Hesnard were not personally hostile, and Hesnard, 
who was a co-founder of the Société psychanalytique de Paris in 1926, joined 
Lacan’s École freudienne de Paris when the psychoanalytic movement in 
France split in 1964.15 But Hesnard’s theoretical positions were still quite 
distinct from that of Lacan.
If we wish to map out schematically the conceptual lineages of the respec-
tive models of f ilmic identif ication offered by Meunier and Baudry/Metz, 
then we could give the following diagram:
  Lacan   Baudry/Metz
Freud
  Hesnard  Meunier
Meunier draws on Hesnard for rectifying what he sees as some of the 
limitations of Freud’s own conception of identif ication, chiefly through, in 
Meunier’s words “rethinking the concept in the framework of a psychology 
enriched by the gains of phenomenological thinking” (p. 48). Whereas 
Freud still held to a model of self-contained, atomized egos, which can 
only relate to each other through the perception of common traits found 
in their (equally self-contained and atomized) fellow subjects, Hesnard, 
by contrast, develops a model of identif ication fundamentally based on a 
“primordial intersubjectivity” (p. 48). This emphasis on intersubjectivity 
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forms a signif icant demarcation point between Meunier’s account of f ilmic 
identif ication and that espoused by the apparatus theorists, whose topo-
logical models of f ilm-viewing invariably posit a lone, isolated spectator 
subjected to cinematic imagery, the affective content of which is essentially 
indifferent.16
Following Hesnard, Meunier highlights three aspects of identif ication: 
its motoric or postural aspect (our tendency to reproduce mimetically the 
movements or gestures of the person identif ied with), its affective aspect 
(eliciting either sympathy or antipathy in the subject), and its dramatic aspect 
(the fact that relations of identif ication are not stable and unchanging, but 
are subject to changes and events, which are frequently capable of altering 
the very nature of the relationship). Together, these three aspects contribute 
to the respective valorization or devalorization of the individuals identi-
f ied with, thereby transforming anonymous intersubjectivity (the generic 
co-existence of subjects) into private intersubjectivity (the development of 
personal relationships founded on affective bonds).
Meunier’s original move, then, is to apply a Hesnardian framework of 
identif ication, steeped in a phenomenological understanding of intersub-
jectivity, to the experience of f ilm spectatorship, a step which distinguishes 
his project both from earlier studies of spectatorial empathy or emotional 
participation carried out by the f ilmologists, and from the contemporaneous 
Lacan-influenced view of identification developed by Baudry and others. For 
Meunier, identification in the filmic situation (the situation of the moviegoer) 
is a variant of the general mode of behavior that is identif ication. It does 
have one primary point of distinction from identif ication in day-to-day life, 
however: whereas, in ‘real’ situations, the parties of a reciprocal intersubjec-
tive relationship of identif ication are both present to each other, in f ilmic 
identif ication, one of the parties in this relationship does not assume the 
form of a f lesh-and-blood human being, but is a spectral image projected 
onto a two-dimensional screen. They are, in Meunier’s words, “presented 
as not being present” (p. 119). Moreover, unlike Baudry and Metz, Meunier’s 
discussion of identif ication largely remains at the level of f ilmic diegesis – he 
opts not to take the step of locating an identif ication of the spectator with 
the mechanism of f ilm projection itself.
Meunier’s Three Modes of Identification
It is at this point in his discussion that Meunier makes what is perhaps his 
most theoretically stimulating move, and the one which seems to have 
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elicited the most interest among followers of his such as Sobchack, as well 
as many other contributors to the present volume. Rather than consider 
the cinema as a unitary phenomenon, in which identif ication would play 
the same role regardless of the type of f ilm under consideration, or tacitly 
take the traditional f iction f ilm to stand in for all forms of cinema (a sin 
that can, not unjustif iably, be imputed to Baudry, Metz, and many others 
who have discussed f ilmic identif ication), Meunier proceeds to a tripartite 
typology of the different modalities of f ilmic identif ication, on the basis of 
the three overarching categories of f ilm: the home movie, the documentary, 
and the f iction f ilm.
In each of these three categories, the phenomenon of identif ication has 
markedly different effects on the f ilm spectator. In the home movie, it serves 
primarily to evoke (or ‘presentify’) a person known to the viewer, enabling 
the viewer to recall past events or typical forms of behavior shown by the 
on-screen figure. In the documentary, identif ication has a didactic function: 
although we do not know the individuals shown in the f ilm personally, they 
draw our interest by exemplifying a more general reality that is of concern 
to us, allowing us to deepen our knowledge of the world. Finally, in the 
f iction f ilm, due to the fact that the f ilmic datum does not make reference 
to an existing reality, identif ication acts as a more individualized, affective 
relationship with the characters presented to us, which itself can take two 
forms: being-with (wherein we sympathize with the character but do not 
exhibit any tendency to transpose our own personality onto them) and 
being-like (in which a highly valorized, heroic character elicits a much more 
participatory mode of identif ication, beckoning us to ‘step into their shoes’). 
The French New Wave, indeed, gives us an excellent example of an obsessive 
form of ‘being-like’: in Jean-Luc Godard’s À bout de souffle (Breathless, 1960), 
Michel Poiccard, played by Jean-Paul Belmondo, happens upon a poster 
advertising the f ilm The Harder They Fall (Mark Robson, 1956). Staring at 
the image of Humphrey Bogart emblazoned on the poster, Belmondo is 
transf ixed by the image of a cinema icon on whose intra-f ilmic persona 
he has modeled his own behavior. Murmuring the name ‘Bogie,’ Belmondo 
motorically imitates the actor’s signature tic of tracing his thumb over his 
lips, in an overt act of identif ication with Bogart’s on-screen persona.
While the divide between f iction and documentary cinema is a mainstay 
of f ilm theory, bringing in the home movie as a third category is a far more 
unusual move, and its inclusion is a major factor in the unique nature of 
Meunier’s study. Here, it should be recalled that Meunier does not use 
the regular French word for home movie ( film amateur or film de famille) 
but a different term, film-souvenir, which more directly evokes the role of 
182 DaniEl FairFax 
memory in home movies. If we were looking for a more exact equivalent, we 
could perhaps proffer the term “keepsake-f ilm” (or even the direct cognate: 
‘souvenir-f ilm’). A large part of the motivation for people to record, preserve, 
and watch home movies is precisely to retain a memento of key – or even 
mundane – moments in their lives. As such, the film-souvenir essentially 
functions as a fetish-object for the viewer. The f ilm itself ends up standing in 
for a memory that – inherently unstable, unreliable, and ephemeral – resides 
just outside of our grasp. And yet, in attempting to capture a moment forever 
by recording it on f ilm (or, more preponderantly today, digitally), we are 
always frustrated by its status as a pale substitute for the experience of the 
moment itself. This understanding of the film-souvenir as a fetish-object 
remains implicit in Meunier’s text, and is not directly broached by the 
author himself, but, given the importance of the notion of the fetish in both 
Marx (the discussion of ‘commodity fetishism’ in Volume 1 of Capital) and 
Freud (his essay on the fetish), it suggests another point of potential contact 
between f ilm phenomenology and Marxist/psychoanalytic accounts of the 
cinema.17
Although Meunier could be criticized for implicitly retaining a certain 
hierarchy of image forms, ascending from the ‘base’ form of home movies, 
Fig. 7: Jean-Paul Belmondo admires Humphrey Bogart on a film poster promoting The Harder They 
Fall (Mark robson), in Jean-luc Godard’s Breathless.
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through the intermediary of documentary cinema, to the more ‘noble’ art 
of f iction f ilm, recognition should be given to the very gesture of including 
home movies as an independent category, and dedicating a signif icant 
portion of his study to the format. That he did this in 1969 is particularly 
precocious: although 8mm cameras had been available for some time, it 
was only in the late 1960s that the Sony Portapak, the f irst video-camera 
intended for the consumer market, became commercially available. From a 
relatively niche pastime only accessible to middle-class families in Western 
countries, the ‘home movie’ has become a globalized cultural practice, with 
the ability to produce and disseminate moving images of reasonably high 
quality available to anyone with a smartphone in their pocket.18
In fact, if in 1969 Meunier could state that “through the importance 
of its on-screen representation, as well as through its consumption by 
the broader public, f iction evidently constitutes the principal sector of 
f ilm production” (p. 128), we could well ask if, in 2019, this pecking order 
has been reversed. When compared with the sheer mass of audiovisual 
material available online, the vast majority of which is essentially ‘home 
movies,’ and the amount of time that individuals in contemporary societies 
spend producing and consuming this material, is it not the commercial 
f iction f ilm that has become a minor, secondary variant of the cinematic 
image, and the home movie that has become its primary, even hegemonic 
manifestation?
Meunier in/and Film Theory: Further Questions
This is only one of the many questions that Meunier’s work inspires in 
the contemporary scholar of cinema. To end this essay, I want to raise a 
few scattered enquiries of my own, which were provoked as I consulted 
his book, and which I present now somewhat at random. The present 
preponderance of the home movie has, of course, been enabled by digital 
technology. While the technological conditions of image production are lit-
tle discussed in The Structures of the Film Experience, we may well wonder 
if the transition from analogue home movies (whether Super-8 or VHS) to 
digital has had a signif icant effect on the function of identif ication for the 
viewer of such works. This can particularly come into play when watching 
home movies recorded many years earlier, in which their relationship 
to memory plays a particularly important role. I often tell my current 
crop of undergraduate students that they are the last generation who 
will know what it means to have a faded photograph of their childhood. 
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An uncanny cognate of the ‘fading’ of our own memories, the way our 
mental images become progressively blurred and indistinct over time, 
the patina of the past produced by the drained colors or sepia tones of 
old home movies and photographs is lost with the rise of eternally crisp, 
eternally ‘now’ digital imagery. Does the advent of the digital home movie, 
then, change anything in what Meunier has to say about identif ication 
with the film-souvenir?
On an unrelated note, Meunier’s discussion of identif ication often seems 
to evoke its f lipside, denial (or Verleugnung in Freud’s terminology). It is 
curious, however, that the only time he explicitly raises the question of 
denial, he refuses its pertinence. Belief in the cinema, as Meunier recognizes, 
is not a totalizing phenomenon. A f ilm is not a hallucination; no matter 
how immersed we may be in the on-screen events, we never entirely lose 
sight of their status as images projected on a screen. As Meunier notes, 
we frequently provoke ruptures in our belief in the f ilm, often when the 
situation presented becomes emotionally unbearable (he mentions the 
dramatic intensity of Boris’s death in Mikhail Kalatozov’s The Cranes Are 
Flying [Letyat zhuravi, 1957] by way of example). As a form of consolation, 
the viewers tear away from their fascination with the f ilm and say to 
themselves: “It’s just a movie.” As Meunier notes, however, this moment 
of spectatorial rupture is not an act of denial: we are not denying a real 
event, but are instead withdrawing from the imaginary world of the f ilm, 
in order to return to our real existence as a viewer sitting before a screen. 
On a broader level, however, I still wonder whether a phenomenon of denial 
is taking place in this process of spectatorial vacillation between a ‘belief’ 
in the on-screen world and a detachment from the f ilm’s diegesis. Again, 
a text contemporaneous with Meunier’s seems to be of striking relevance 
here: in 1969, the Lacan disciple Octave Mannoni, in Clefs pours l’imaginaire 
ou L’Autre Scène, discussed Freudian Verleugnung in terms of a process 
whereby the patient under analysis says to themselves: “I know very well…, 
but all the same…” (Je sais bien…, mais quand même…).19 As Pascal Bonitzer 
and Serge Daney were quick to recognize, this formulation has particular 
pertinence for the mode of existence of the f ilm-viewer, constantly prone 
to thinking, in essence, “I know very well that it’s just a f ilm, but all the 
same, it seems so real.”20
At many moments in Meunier’s text, this oscillatory mode of spectatorial 
behavior seems germane to his discussion. Indeed, it is notable that he rejects 
an equivalence between the f ilm and the dream in favor of an analogy 
between cinema and child ś play. Unlike the f ilm, the dream exerts a total 
hold over the dreamer – we almost never tell ourselves during the dream 
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that “it’s all a dream”, or when this does happen, it usually provokes us to 
wake up. By contrast, belief in cinema is rather akin to the ‘belief’ of the 
child during role-playing games such as ‘cowboys and Indians’ or ‘cops and 
robbers.’ As Meunier puts it:
The child who plays ‘cowboys and Indians’ never ceases to regard his 
behavior as imaginary, but this does not negate the fact that during the 
game – that is, until the moment when he decides to stop playing – the 
child ‘believes’ that he is a ‘cowboy,’ and ‘believes’ that his fellow players 
are ‘Indians.’ He is fascinated by the unreal world created by the game, 
just as the spectator is fascinated by the unreal world of the screen. Both 
act ‘as if ’ the unreal were real. In other terms, they confer a ‘believed’ 
existence on objects that they never cease to regard as imaginary (p. 95).
I f ind this analogy to be a seductive one. Compared with the model of the 
cinema-viewer as equivalent to an infant in the mirror-stage, it at least has 
the merit of raising us from the level of a one-year-old baby to that of a six- or 
seven-year-old child! The flipside, of course, is that, unlike the child playing 
cowboys and Indians, who has no restrictions on their mobility during the 
game, the f ilm-viewer pinned to their seat is still, as Baudry reminds us, 
motorically immature, and during the projection we are severely limited 
in the movements we can make in our mimetic identif ication with the 
on-screen f igures.
Finally, while for the purposes of conceptual clarity Meunier presents 
his three “orders” of f ilmic identif ication as schematically divorced from 
one another, it is hard to dispute that it is the mixed cases, in which the 
documentary, f iction, and home-movie modes of identif ication interfere 
with and “contaminate” each other, that are of most theoretical interest for 
scholars today. Sobchack has already written at length on the experience 
of actress Cindy Williams when confronted with images of herself in the 
series Laverne & Shirley – effectively responding to a f ictional TV show 
as a film-souvenir, a “diary of her life,” as the actress herself termed it.21 
Sobchack’s example also evokes a more canonical moment in f ilm history, 
which would have been fresh in the mind when Meunier was writing The 
Structures of the Film Experience.
In the 1966 f ilm Persona, Ingmar Bergman made the striking formal 
innovation of including a close-up in the f ilm which merged the faces of 
its two main actresses (Liv Ullmann and Bibi Andersson), highlighting the 
(supposedly) more unflattering side of each of their faces. In Bergman’s 
own telling, he showed this mongrel image to the actresses during the 
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editing of the f ilm, and both of them thought the image was that of the 
other actress:
We set the machine running, and Liv said, “Oh look, what a horrible 
picture of Bibi!” And Bibi said, “No, it’s not me, it’s you!” Then the picture 
stopped. Everyone’s face has a better and a worse side, and the picture is 
a combination of Bibi’s and Liv’s less attractive sides. At f irst they were so 
scared they didn’t even recognize their own faces. What they should have 
said was: “What the hell have you done with my face?” But they didn’t! 
They didn’t recognize their own faces. I f ind that rather an odd reaction.22
In this anecdote – and there is no way of verifying whether such an exchange 
actually took place, but se non é vero, é ben trovato – the oscillation between 
identification and denial, or what Hesnard calls the “dialectic of the alter and 
the ego” plays out in the most fascinating of ways.23 In forming a ‘missing 
link’ between the psychoanalytic and phenomenological paradigms of f ilm 
theory, the value today of Meunier’s book, I would contend, lies precisely in 
providing us with a set of theoretical tools for grappling with such moments 
of sublime uncanniness in the cinema.
Fig. 8: The faces of liv ullmann and Bibi andersson in a merged close-up from Persona (ingmar 
Bergman).
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 The Missing Link: Meunier on 




In this chapter, I consider the originality and applicability of Jean-Pierre 
Meunier’s phenomenological account of cinematic identif ication. I focus 
in particular on the key role assigned to imagination in his account of 
spectator identif ication, and describe some suggestive parallels with 
contemporary theorists’ accounts of imagination (as perceptual engage-
ment, mental simulation, or make-believe, and Murray Smith’s threefold 
“structure of sympathy”). Finally, I consider some diff iculties in Meunier’s 
model – his overly clustered concept of ‘identif ication’; a tension between 
formal-phenomenological analysis and background cultural-historical pre-
understanding; and his focus on character identif ication at the expense 
of background ‘world’ apprehension – that could be modif ied in order to 
enhance his original contribution to philosophical f ilm theory.
Keywords: Emotion; f ilm-philosophy; identif ication; phenomenology; 
Jean-Paul Sartre
The f ilm experience is a perceptual experience that 
underpins the imaginary attitude of consciousness.
‒ Jean-Pierre Meunier, The Structures of the Film Experience (p. 152)
Anyone approaching the topic of imagination in f ilm could be forgiven for 
thinking of Augustine’s famous quip concerning time: “What then is time? If 
no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do 
not know.” Many theorists have said as much of the imagination. As Tamar 
Gendler observes, attempts at taxonomizing imagination have not fared very 
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Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
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well, mainly because there are so many distinct forms of imagining that are 
often bundled together and so many diverse research f ields and subjective 
processes in which imagination comes into play.1 Kendall Walton, whose 
work on mimesis as make-believe has had a profound impact in aesthetics, 
confesses that, despite writing a book on the topic, he simply cannot spell 
out what the various conceptions of imagining have in common.2 Leslie 
Stevenson explores no less than “Twelve Conceptions of Imagination,” 
ranging from “the ability to think of something not presently perceived, 
but spatio-temporally real” to “the ability to create works of art that express 
something deep about the meaning of life.”3 With such a bewildering array 
or meanings, functions, and purposes, the concept of imagination risks 
becoming theoretically intractable. Many theorists have therefore been 
at pains to distinguish psychological or cognitive aspects of imagination 
from the creative sense of imagination, even though these are clearly linked 
(in our experience of art, for example, or in practices of artistic creativity).
A glance at the history of aesthetics confirms this view. In the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft), Kant famously identif ies 
the faculty of imagination as the power of presenting an object in intuition 
that is not present to our senses. Kant further divided this capacity into 
the productive imagination (presenting an object that is independent of 
or ‘precedes’ experience) and the reproductive imagination (presenting 
an object through intuitions that have been experienced previously).4 
Following Kant, the imagination (the ‘poetic imagination’) played a key 
role in the aesthetic philosophy of Schelling and the German Romantics, 
for whom art and poetry, as expressions of the poetic imagination, were 
central to the romantic critique of Enlightenment rationalism. In The 
Imaginary (L’Imaginaire), Jean-Paul Sartre argues on phenomenological 
grounds that imagination is distinct from perception; we can either perceive 
things or imagine them but not both at once. Images, moreover, are forms of 
intentional consciousness directed at the world, albeit as objects that have 
been “de-realized” and thereby posited as “present-absent” (the presentation 
of something absent).5 Indeed, for Sartre, the material aspect of an image 
(the analogon or analogical representation of something) serves as a visual 
prop for an intended object posited by the imagination. Looking at an image 
construed as an analogon (a painting, drawing, or photographic/film image, 
for example) enables us to freely posit the intended object as “irreal” – absent, 
non-existent, yet singular and definite – and thus as a noematic expression 
of the imaginary. One of Sartre’s key concerns was to articulate the role of 
imagination in relation to visual images, a problem that remains of great 
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interest to Anglophone aestheticians drawing on cognitivism rather than 
phenomenology.6
Given Sartre’s suggestive phenomenological account of the imagination, 
one might have expected that f ilm theorists, certainly those within the 
so-called ‘Continental’ philosophical tradition, might have been eager to 
explore Sartre’s analyses for the purposes of theorizing cinema. Yet Sartre’s 
influence on f ilm theory (despite his work on imagination and images) 
remains negligible.7 While it is customary to mention Merleau-Ponty’s “Film 
and the New Psychology,” the most influential source of phenomenological 
theory remains Vivian Sobchack’s Merleau-Pontian approach (drawing on 
elements of Husserl’s phenomenology), which has generated a rich stream 
of phenomenologically-oriented theorization emphasizing the notion of 
the ‘f ilm body’ and the haptic-synaesthetic dimensions of f ilm experience.8 
Nonetheless, it is true that, despite the recent proliferation of work in f ilm 
theory describing itself as ‘phenomenological,’ there has been as yet little 
engagement within phenomenological f ilm theory with the role of imagina-
tion in cinematic spectatorship.9 This is unfortunate, for it is diff icult to 
explore the phenomenon of emotional engagement, and especially the 
role of empathic and sympathetic responsiveness, without examining the 
ways in which imagination is at play in cinematic experience. Cinema, 
after all, is precisely an art of presenting, via audiovisual images, what is 
absent as though it were present; it is one that depends, moreover, on what is 
implied off-screen, or audio-visually suggested, rather than directly shown 
or depicted. Indeed, imagination is central, as I shall discuss, to one key ele-
ment of such engagement, namely evaluative judgment or moral ‘allegiance’ 
with characters in narrative f ilm, which means that imagination – or the 
cinematic moral imagination – will play a key role in understanding and 
articulating theoretically the ethical potential of cinema.
It is for these reasons that the English translation of Jean-Pierre Meunier’s 
Les Structures de l’expérience filmique: l’identification filmique from 1969 
represents an important theoretical intervention in the field of contemporary 
f ilm theory. Indeed, this text represents something of a ‘missing link’ in the 
historical narrative spanning the development of filmologie as a diverse 
interdisciplinary research program during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s and 
its marginalization by the rise of structuralist, semiotic, psychoanalytic, 
and Marxist-Althusserian f ilm theories during the 1970s. Bringing together 
philosophical, aesthetic, psychological, historical, sociological, and anthropo-
logical approaches, filmologie now presents itself belatedly as a timely model 
of interdisciplinary inquiry, showing us how humanistic, hermeneutic and 
empirically grounded scientif ic approaches can work together in exploring 
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key problems in f ilm theory. Meunier’s phenomenological study of the 
modalities of identif ication in cinematic experience remains a landmark 
contribution to this movement, one with many theoretical resonances and 
unexplored potentials waiting to be explored today.
Meunier is also a missing link in a more theoretical sense, for he is one of 
the few f ilm theorists to focus on the role of imagination in understanding 
audio-visual images. More specif ically, he examines varieties of imagining 
(perceptual, affective-emotional, and cognitive) involved in processes of 
empathic/sympathetic responsiveness, emotional engagement, including 
moral-ethical evaluation of characters. Meunier’s contribution thus offers 
a rich phenomenology of cinematic experience that seeks to do justice to 
the complex processes of identif ication. He analyzes the different modes 
of engagement with audio-visual images that contribute to our experience 
of perceptual and emotional responsiveness to moving images, and offers 
a timely defense of the concept of identif ication that emphasizes both its 
intersubjective and imaginative characteristics.
In what follows, I shall focus on imagination and its role in Meunier’s 
phenomenological account of cinematic identif ication and explore some 
suggestive parallels with contemporary theorists’ accounts of imagination 
(as perceptual engagement, mental simulation, or make-believe, as well as 
the threefold “structure of sympathy” that Murray Smith proposes as an 
alternative way of conceptualizing cinematic identif ication).10 Finally, I 
consider some diff iculties in Meunier’s model – his overly clustered concept 
of ‘identif ication’; a tension between formal-phenomenological analysis 
and background cultural-historical pre-understanding; and his focus on 
character identif ication at the expense of background ‘world’ apprehension 
– that could be modif ied in order to enhance his original contribution to 
philosophical f ilm theory.
Meunier on Film Experience
Meunier commences with the phenomenological insight that, before 
embarking on any empirical or scientif ic inquiry, we need to describe and 
analyze the basic structures of lived experience. Reflecting the influence of 
Merleau-Ponty, Meunier explores the “primacy of perception” in our experi-
ence of cinema: he rejects dualistic epistemological accounts that presuppose 
a disengaged subject confronting an external world of objects, and insists 
rather on the originary or ‘primordial’ relationship of perceptual openness 
towards the world – a relationship of practically engaged comportment, 
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rather than of disengaged knowing. Our pre-theoretical relationship with 
the world, moreover, is defined as holistic, relational, and intersubjective: a 
primordial intersubjectivity or anonymous ‘being-with’ others in a shared 
world that is constitutive of human experience. This phenomenological 
account of intersubjective Mitsein (being-with) provides the basis for his 
theorization of cinematic experience, and in particular, of the complex 
phenomenon of identif ication.11
As has become apparent in the history of f ilm theory, the concept of 
‘identif ication’ – from psychoanalytical accounts of spectatorial ‘suture’ to 
recent cognitivist accounts of emotional engagement and moral sympathy – is 
at once influential and opaque.12 While acknowledging the contribution 
of Freudian accounts of identif ication in the development of psychic life, 
Meunier criticizes the ‘empiricist’ and ‘intellectualist’ assumptions that 
render the psychic life of others as impenetrable or obscure to the isolated self 
or ego. Instead, Meunier’s phenomenological account of identification begins 
with an anonymous “primordial intersubjectivity”; understood as “a kind of 
generic co-existence of multiple consciousnesses” that remains “open to the 
world and to other people” (p. 48). It is against this generic intersubjectivity 
that singular relations between individuated subjects or individuals can 
emerge, transforming “primordial intersubjectivity” into “private inter-
subjectivity” within a shared social world (p. 48). Such relations of private 
intersubjectivity, moreover, involve reciprocal recognition – the recognition of 
others as subjects coupled with their recognition of me as a subject – which 
is the fundamental feature of what Meunier understands by ‘identif ication’: 
a relationship or practical intersubjectivity or relational comportment that 
has perceptual, affective-emotional, as well as cognitive-practical aspects. 
In this respect, Meunier’s account of identif ication re-situates the concept 
within the phenomenological domain of lived experience. Identif ication, 
understood as practical intersubjectivity, involves somatic and affective, as 
well as emotional and practical, comportment with and towards others. It 
provides the basis for the emotional-evaluative attitudes of sympathy and 
antipathy, which are themselves nothing other than “the affective dimen-
sion of the comprehension of other people” (p. 50) expressed in a variety of 
behaviors or relations of practical comportment within social reality.
Three Attitudes of Spectatorial Identification
Such an account of identif ication as intersubjective comportment offers a 
rich basis for describing the structures of spectatorial identif ication within 
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cinematic experience. Following Merleau-Ponty, Meunier defines this as an 
experience constituted through perceptual gestalts or the configuration 
of visual elements; but cinematic spectatorship solicits quite distinctive 
attitudes of consciousness compared with ordinary perceptual experience. 
As Meunier points out, this has led a number of theorists to posit cinematic 
experience as situated “midway between the real and the unreal” (p. 69). 
He develops this claim into the thesis that “f ilmic consciousness” can be 
understood as “a variation of the major category of consciousness that 
constitutes the imaginary consciousness” (p. 69). Filmic identif ication, as 
a form of spectatorial comportment, is thus presented as an “imaginary 
attitude” with distinctive modalities depending on the particular kind of 
cinematic image to which the spectator attends. This is Meunier’s most 
original contribution to f ilm theory, which has, for the most part, ignored 
the role of imagination: an analysis of the three principal modalities of 
imaginary engagement with cinema pertaining to the film-souvenir (home 
movie), documentary, and f ictional f ilm formats.
Meunier’s analysis of cinematic perceptual engagement is indebted not 
only to Merleau-Ponty but also to a number of lesser-known filmologie 
theorists (Francois Ricci, Jean-Jacques Rinieri, and Albert Michotte van 
den Berck). These theorists examined the status of cinematic perception as 
intermingling the registers of the real and the unreal, where this intermin-
gling solicits different spectatorial attitudes depending on the character of 
the image being perceived. Their common phenomenological starting point 
is the widely shared observation that cinematic perception involves a vivid 
impression of reality coupled with an awareness of ‘unreality,’ that is, of the 
imagistic or representational quality of the moving image. For Meunier, 
this points to the important distinction between real perception, which 
posits its object as present and as existent, and cinematic perception, which 
does not posit its object as present but as “absent, or existing elsewhere, 
or not existing at all” (p. 77). Cinematic perception is directed towards a 
reality that, although it appears as “real,” is not physically present: cinematic 
consciousness expresses “a relationship with the world, but a world that is not 
present” (p. 77).13 This apprehension of a perceived world that is presented 
as absent means that cinematic experience corresponds to key elements of 
the “imaging consciousness” that Sartre describes in The Imaginary (p. 77). 
Cinematic perception involves the “imaging function of consciousness” – in 
the phenomenological, rather than psychoanalytic, sense – that “renders 
present an object that we know is not there” (p. 78).
Meunier’s analysis, distinguishing between different spectatorial at-
titudes (presentif ication, instruction, and participation) towards different 
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modes of cinematic presentation (home movie, documentary, and f iction 
f ilm), is original and impressive. Despite Sobchack’s well-known criticism, 
namely that these three attitudes of consciousness and their corresponding 
forms of cinematic presentation are subjectively variable (“one person’s 
f iction might be another person’s documentary”), Meunier acknowledges 
that his schematic categorization of spectatorial attitudes should be taken 
as an analytic or theoretical artefact.14 In reality, spectators can move 
between all three modes of engagement (presentif ication, instruction, and 
participation) within the course of a single f ilm-viewing; and there is also 
no f irm “objective” distinction between the three “categories of f ilm” he 
describes (p. 115) (home movie, documentary, and f iction), which can be 
combined in various ways in different kinds of cinematic works.15 Rather 
than focusing on putative properties of the cinematic work, his analysis 
emphasizes, rather, the solicitation of different “existential attitudes” 
(whether objects or subjects are posited as existing or not), which are not 
necessarily tethered to objective features of particular cinematic genres 
or styles.
There are a number of striking parallels, I suggest, between Meunier’s 
phenomenological account of spectatorial attitudes, comprising the phe-
nomenon of identif ication (different modalities of cinematic experience), 
and more recent analyses of emotional engagement and cinematic im-
agination. His model anticipates and reflects, for example, Murray Smith’s 
influential threefold model of the “structure of sympathy” def ining emo-
tional engagement (‘identif ication’): recognition, or what Meunier calls the 
“understanding” of individuated characters (p. 128); alignment, or what 
Meunier calls “affectivization and valorization” (p. 138) with regard to the 
experiential perspectives of characters; and allegiance with characters 
involving moral-ethical or aesthetic evaluation, which Meunier describes as 
imaginative “participation” focused on “sympathetic, valorized characters” 
(p. 139). Although these three aspects of identif ication are not as clearly or 
precisely marked out as in Smith’s account of the structure of sympathy 
(there is some slippage between alignment and allegiance, for example), 
Meunier nonetheless anticipates Smith’s important distinction between 
alignment with a character’s subjective perspective or point of view, and 
moral-aesthetic allegiance involving a sense of imagined ‘participation’ 
with sympathetically portrayed or morally valorized characters. What 
could have been made clearer in Meunier’s account is the possibility of 
alignment with a character’s perspective occurring without necessarily 
being linked with the ‘valorization’ of that character, and that imaginative 
participation with valorized characters nonetheless typically depends upon 
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effective perspectival alignment coupled with sympathetic depiction and 
moral evaluation of their specif ic traits, views, or actions.
Meunier’s model of identif ication, moreover, not only resonates with 
Sartre’s theory of imagination, but also with more recent cognitivist ac-
counts of cinematic imagination as a form of perceptual imagining that uses 
moving images as audiovisual props for emotional and cognitive forms of 
‘simulation.’16 Like Sartre, the audiovisual image serves as an analogon that 
enables varieties of perceptual imagining as well as emotional involvement 
in a f ictional world. Like cognitivist theorists, such audiovisual images 
function as complex ‘props’ for imaginative forms of ‘make-believe’ that 
involve entertaining in imagination f ictional characters, scenarios, and 
worlds in ways that do not entail corresponding attitudes of belief that would 
guide or solicit practical forms of action. The most signif icant difference 
with both Sartrean and cognitivist accounts, however, is that Meunier’s 
phenomenological approach insists on a relational intersubjectivist model of 
perceptual and practical engagement with others within a shared ‘being-in-
the-world.’ His model thus shifts from the solitary consciousness intending 
imaginary objects or the ‘worldless’ cognitive subject engaging in subjective 
forms of imaginative simulation to an intersubjectivist model of recognition 
that grounds our capacity for imaginative involvement within an originary 
intersubjectivity and shared sense of being-in-the-world.
This relational account of the phenomenon of imagination, moreover, 
encompasses individuated forms of intersubjectivity, which encompasses 
such recent theoretical insights and topics as affective mimicry, emotional 
contagion, as well as ‘higher’ cognitive forms of imagining (as in mental 
simulation or moral-normative evaluations).17 Here again Meunier’s account 
provides a prescient ‘missing link’ between contemporary phenomenological 
and cognitivist accounts of imagining, emotional engagement, and the 
ethical evaluation of f ilm.
Three Problems with Meunier’s Filmic Identification
There are three problems, however, arising from Meunier’s model of identif i-
cation that I wish to consider further, suggesting that these could be theoreti-
cally revised drawing on contemporary phenomenological and cognitivist 
approaches. The f irst is to clarify the distinct senses of ‘identif ication’ at play 
here: Meunier’s use of the term encompasses the phenomenological sense 
of primordial and private intersubjectivity providing the experiential basis 
for the development of personal identity through social interaction; the 
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aesthetic sense of imaginative involvement and emotional engagement with 
individuals or characters within different modes of cinematic presentation 
(home movie, documentary, f iction f ilm); and the psychoanalytic sense of 
introjection and projection as well as ego idealization and psychological 
modeling played out in imaginative and intersubjective registers. It would 
be desirable to distinguish more clearly between these three distinct senses 
of ‘identif ication’ (phenomenological, aesthetic, and psychoanalytical) and 
to articulate more precisely the conceptual relations between them. The 
phenomenological sense of identif ication, for example, occurs at an implicit, 
perceptually engaged but not explicitly conscious or ‘thematized’ level, 
which is quite different from what one would describe as ‘unconscious’ in 
a psychoanalytic sense. The explicit forms of ‘identif ication’ pertaining to 
emotional engagement with characters, in contrast, occur at a different level 
from either originary intersubjectivity or the psychologically gratifying, 
culturally-mediated emulation of movie stars (Meunier cites the popular 
cultural example of female fans going for the “Brigitte Bardot look” [p.  149]). 
Using the same term to cover all three processes obscures rather than 
clarif ies the conceptual distinctions and relations between them.
At the same time, there remains an important potential in the concept of 
identif ication that is worth retrieving and revising. Berys Gaut, for example, 
argues that the concept of f ilmic identification, despite its phenomenological 
and cognitivist critics, should not be rejected but revised.18 He advocates a 
pluralist conception of identif ication that distinguishes between different 
aspects of the phenomenon, arguing that only some, rather than all, of 
these aspects can come into play in processes of identif ication. Indeed, if we 
construe the process of identification as involving a plurality of aspects (per-
ceptual identif ication, affective identif ication, epistemic identif ication, and 
so on), which need not be activated all at once, we may rehabilitate the term 
theoretically in a way that accords with the folk sense of ‘identifying’ with 
characters in film, while at the same time maintaining important distinctions 
such as sympathizing with a character in moral terms.19 Nonetheless, it is 
clear that there are many aspects involved in such processes of identification 
that require more specif ication than the concept of identif ication generally 
affords. Meunier’s model could therefore be adapted here, along the lines 
that Gaut suggests, in order to specify more precisely the pluralistic forms of 
identif ication at play in the three modalities of home movie, documentary, 
and fiction film, and to distinguish more explicitly between phenomenologi-
cal, aesthetic, and psychoanalytical senses of identif ication.
The second problem is a tension arising between the formal-phenomeno-
logical analysis of spectator consciousness in respect to the three modes of 
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intentional imagining, and the background cultural awareness of cinematic 
genres and conventions that operate in any ‘immediate’ subjective apprehen-
sion of audiovisual images (home movie, documentary, and f ictional f ilm). 
Meunier’s analyses focus on the distinctive attitudes of existential positing 
in respect to the three modalities of moving image, but then treat these 
forms of subjective ‘taking’ as occurring independently of the hermeneutic 
‘background’ or ‘pre-judgements’ inevitably shaping our engagement with 
(culturally and historically embedded) intentional objects such as f ilmic 
works, whether f ictional, non-fictional, or reconstructive/memorial. This is 
not to deny the value and signif icance of undertaking the kind of subjective 
phenomenological descriptive analyses that Meunier offers. Rather, it is 
to suggest that these analyses could be more concretely situated within a 
hermeneutic ‘horizon’ of implicitly shared cultural-historical meaning that 
any contextually situated spectator would bring to such images and that 
would orient the manner in which spectators posit them as particular kinds 
of image. It is not immediately apparent on the face of the image whether 
it is personal/memorial, documentary, or f ictional but soon becomes so 
once the contextual situation and background understanding of the viewer 
is taken into account. Adding this hermeneutic dimension to Meunier’s 
phenomenological analyses would add the relevant contextual understand-
ing and implicit situated knowledge that helps orient us affectively and 
cognitively in response to the contextually-defined varieties of audiovisual 
images we encounter.
The third problem is ‘forgetting of world’ characteristic of most psy-
chological accounts of identif ication or spectatorial engagement. Despite 
drawing on phenomenological analysis of the primacy of perception and 
openness to the world, Meunier passes over the ‘background’ intelligibility 
or shared ‘being-in-the-world’ that make possible the identif ication with 
individuated characters that forms the focus of his phenomenological 
analysis. Since perception is attuned to an originary intersubjectivity within 
a relationally def ined meaningful whole (a phenomenologically disclosed 
world), this suggests that f ilmic experience too, as perceptual and imagina-
tive, is shaped via our affective-emotional and cognitive engagement with 
distinctive cinematic worlds. We do not simply encounter human f igures, 
whether real individuals or f ictional characters, in isolated abstraction 
from relational contexts or horizons of meaning; rather, it is against such 
background intelligibility or ‘worldliness’ that individuals or characters 
can show up as individuated personages that are perceptually recognizable 
or cognitively signif icant. It is these shared ‘background’ forms of mean-
ing – or what we could call patterns of world-disclosure through ‘mood’ or 
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affective attunement – that open up or reveal the ‘foreground’ phenomena of 
individuated characters appearing within a meaningful context of action.20 
A phenomenological account attuned to specif ic cinematic world-contexts 
would shift the theoretical focus from individual perception to forms of 
intersubjective understanding, or enable us to move from a more narrowly 
author-based account to one that regards cinematic worlds as disclosing 
shared forms of meaning relating to extra-cinematic realities beyond that 
of the (narrative) f ilm itself.
These three issues – refining and specifying the concept of identif ication; 
clarifying the relationship between phenomenological analysis of specta-
tor experience and the background contextual knowledge that informs 
this experience; and contextualizing character engagement within the 
immersive experience of a cinematic world – could be elaborated further 
in order to revise Meunier’s phenomenological account of imaginative 
identif ication in regard to different modes of cinematic presentation. This 
would provide a basis for developing Meunier’s descriptive framework 
and integrating it with more recent work on the phenomenological and 
cognitive dimensions of affective and emotional engagement with both 
f ictional and non-f ictional f ilm.21 In this way, the productive potential of 
Meunier’s long-neglected work could be realized in a context that opens 
up an interdisciplinary inquiry into cinematic imagination inspired by 
the pioneers of the filmologie movement and would thereby contribute 
to contemporary f ilm-philosophical approaches to theorizing cinematic 
experience and renewing the concept of identif ication. These comments 
are offered in recognition of Meunier’s remarkable achievement: a rich 
phenomenological account of the basic structures of cinematic experience 
that shows how imagination, emotion, and cognition work together in our 
complex lived experience of moving images.
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II: On the Home-movie attitude




The home-movie ‘attitude’ is one of Jean-Pierre Meunier’s three modalities 
of ‘f ilmic identif ication’ in The Structure of the Film Experience. This essay 
both challenges and pays homage to Meunier’s heuristic phenomenol-
ogy. Accepting his invitation to elaborate upon it with specif ic cases, I 
thus focus on those instances when the home-movie viewer’s off-screen 
self-image suddenly encounters its on-screen image-self in a structure of 
identif ication quite different from identif ication with on-screen others. 
Often experienced as ‘uncanny,’ this confrontation with one’s ‘self ’ not 
only adds nuance to, but also ruptures and/or transforms what Meunier 
considers the ‘essential’ characteristics and overall phenomenological 
function of the home-movie experience.
Keywords: Existential phenomenology; Meunier; f ilmic identif ication; 
self-preoccupation; self-image/image-self
I.
In a powerful summary of the essential phenomenological structure and 
meaning of viewer identif ication in the ‘home-movie attitude,’ Jean-Pierre 
Meunier considers the futility of its impossible intentional project. This is 
to somehow ‘evoke’ and ‘render present’ to ourselves those family members 
and friends who once existed for the off-screen camera – and more fully 
than they do in the f ilm or the space-time in which we presently view them 
as ‘keepsake’ images. Indeed, our existential knowledge of their physical 
absence and temporal distance there and then is outweighed by our desire 
to be with them here and now as they were. Rather than looking at the f ilm’s 
specif ic images in the home-movie attitude, we see through them in an 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
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attempt to evoke these individuals more generally, and to ‘re-presence’ them 
in a present, yet paradoxically past, reunion of which we, ourselves, are an 
integral part. As “one of the poles” of this desire to “render a person present,” 
Meunier emphasizes that “it is often our presence to the person that we try 
to evoke” (p. 123). Indeed, “seeking a relationship of real intersubjectivity,” 
it is “our own presence [that ] is constantly felt” (p. 123).
This realization of intersubjectivity in the home-movie attitude is, of 
course, impossible. The viewer’s failed attempt at evocation and reunion 
leads not only to disappointment and compensatory nostalgia, but also to 
a sense of the existential absurdity of such an identif icatory project. Our 
“will for a personal engagement,” Meunier concludes, “is confronted with 
the void and remains suspended, without any possible outlet or any real 
signification” (p. 123). Given we are “incapable of being engaged,” our sense of 
self-presence becomes explicit, “felt all the more [and] entirely preoccupied 
with itself” (p. 123). In sum, as viewers trying to connect with familiar others 
as they were ‘elsewhen’ and ‘elsewhere’ (even while some of them might now 
be ‘as they are’ in the room), we are always already bereft – irremediably, 
and absurdly, alone with ourselves on our side of the screen.1
Nonetheless, there is more to be said about “self-preoccupation” in the 
home-movie attitude. Meunier acknowledges that “there would be a great 
deal of nuance to add, and numerous specif ic cases to examine” (p. 123). In 
what follows, I examine one such specific case of the home-movie experience 
that adds nuance to, but also challenges, the particular phenomenological 
structure that Meunier describes as essential to it. This is the not uncommon 
instance in which a significant number of viewers come ‘face to face’ with their 
on-screen ‘self’ in an identif icatory experience that is sensed as ‘uncanny.’ 
However, before elaborating, insofar as I am in sympathetic dialogue with, 
and also adopt, Meunier’s phenomenological schema and f ilmic corpus, I 
need to address two related methodological issues that inform my discussion.
The first concerns the nature and scope of the film objects that, in concert 
with the viewer, Meunier considers co-constitutive of the home-movie at-
titude. These are “f ilms made for private purposes, with the goal of acting 
as a keepsake or record of an event in the individual’s life, such as weddings, 
vacations, family gatherings, etc.” (Fairfax, fn. p. 155/156). Adopting this corpus 
allows me to ground my phenomenological variation both within and against 
Meunier’s descriptions, and also limits what would, if expanded, add yet 
another highly significant – and unwieldy – variable. Most important, how-
ever, is that, although films made only for ‘private purposes’ may now seem a 
somewhat dated circumscription, Meunier’s corpus is still culturally relevant 
today. Certainly, when The Structure of the Film Experience (Les Structures de 
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l’expérience filmique: L’identification filmique) was published in 1969, ordinary 
people did not go about their world as we do now, constantly recording and 
screening everything in sight – including themselves – for public as well as 
private consumption. Indeed, Super-8mm film cameras appeared on the mass 
market only four years before Meunier’s phenomenology. (Videotape and then 
digital camcorders were mass-marketed, respectively, in the mid-1980s and 
mid-1990s, and smartphones in the early 2000s.) His corpus thus includes the 
kinds of films made by most non-professionals at the time. These kinds of films 
are also commonplace today, if within a technologically expanded audiovisual 
context in which they – and their makers – have become increasingly available 
for public view. Thus, in certain circumstances discussed below, constant 
personal recording and ‘familiarized’ on-screen visibility may forestall the 
uncanny home-movie experiences I foreground here.
The second methodological issue involves both translation and terminology. 
Instead of using the common, and more inclusive, le film amateur, Meunier 
generically names his corpus le film-souvenir (a term I have found in no French 
dictionary). Apparently a neologism, the term foregrounds f ilmic objects 
whose primary solicitation is mnemonic, hyphenation both connecting and 
separating them from subjective acts of personal remembrance.2 Although le 
film-souvenir has preeminence in a previous essay I have written on Meunier’s 
work, here I privilege its English equivalent, ‘home movie.’3 Connotations of 
personal remembrance may be lost, but those of ‘home’ are gained: in particu-
lar, the sense of familiarity, intimacy, and comfort that the uncanny subverts. 
In this context, ‘home’ also calls up the uncanny through its subversive Ger-
man opposite ‘unheimlich,’ translated literally as ‘unhomely.’ Designating an 
experience in which what is familiar is suddenly turned disturbingly strange 
and secretive, the term is closely tied to key psychological and philosophical 
studies of the phenomenon (three later referenced here.) However, what 
follows is an existential phenomenology rather than a psychological etiology, 
psychoanalytic explanation, or philosophical extrapolation, and thus I have 
chosen to use the less aff iliated, more generalized, and English ‘uncanny.’ 
It is also, dare I say, more ‘familiar’ to those who existentially experience its 
estrangement in the American cultural context this phenomenology describes.
II.
So now to those instances, in which we view ourselves in a home movie; 
when, in the existential gap between what I will call our objective ‘image-self’ 
and our subjective ‘self-image,’ ‘I’ comes suddenly face-to-face with ‘me.’ 
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This is an identif icatory encounter that a significant number of viewers f ind 
uncanny in its disconcertingly asynchronous reversibility and destabiliz-
ing reflections. Certainly, although common enough to generate public 
discourse, this experience is not inevitable. In particular, it seems less 
likely when the viewer’s own agency brings their ‘self-representation’ into 
existence, whether before a bathroom mirror or, increasingly, in Skype video 
calls, YouTube videos, and ‘self ies.’4 In such instances, the viewer tends to 
retain a relatively comfortable sense of ‘self-possession.’ This is not the 
case, however, for those who come upon themselves in home movies and 
experience not ‘self-representation’ but a disconcerting ‘representation of 
one’s self,’ the latter f ilmed – and f iltered – through someone else’s agency 
and cinematographic perception (even if of a close friend or family member).
This encounter with ‘one’s self ’ on-screen suddenly disarticulates our 
usually transparent sense of ‘one self’ into two: a perceiving ‘I’ and a visible 
‘me.’ In this regard, and given that his phenomenology greatly influences 
Meunier’s own, here I turn to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who elaborates: “[A] 
sort of dehiscence opens my body in two, and […] between my body looked 
at and my body looking, […] there is overlapping or encroachment.”5 Thus, an 
estranged self-consciousness arises at this intimate f ilmic reunion in disun-
ion (and vice versa). The overlapping and encroachment of my image-self and 
self-image in their asynchronous difference and non-coincident reversibility 
not only preoccupies me (or is it ‘I’?), but also displaces and destabilizes me 
(or is it ‘us’?). For many viewers, this is an uncanny experience.
Certainly, this self-preoccupation aff irms a phenomenological element 
Meunier considers essential to the home-movie attitude. Nonetheless, 
looking at one’s image-self rather than the image of someone else negates 
what, for Meunier, is the essential phenomenological function of the home 
movie: its service as a medium through which we constitutively generalize 
and transcend the specif icity of those on-screen, who are personally, and 
more expansively, known to us. Indeed, even when experienced as pleasing 
or funny rather than uncanny, one’s own image on-screen tends to produce 
self-preoccupation, its ontic ‘thereness’ resistant to generalization and 
transcendence. When experienced as uncanny, however, this ‘thereness’ and 
its obdurate opacity intensif ies and provokes three possible modalities of 
the uncanny, each of which is differently structured and thus experienced 
and responded to in different ways.
The f irst modality is what I call the ‘axiological uncanny.’ It arises as 
a crisis of self-perception in relation to the representation of one’s self 
rather than the home movie’s crisis of the unrealizable ‘presentif ication’ 
of others. The second, or ‘epistemological uncanny,’ is a cognitive crisis 
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of self-knowledge. The third, or ‘ontological uncanny,’ is an existential 
crisis of self-identity. Progressive movement is thus from a sudden and 
disturbing sense that one is only partially known to one’s self to the sudden 
re-cognition that one is always partially unknown to one’s self, and then to 
the transformative revelation that one is ultimately unknowable to one’s self. 
Throughout, just as with on-screen others, one’s own existence is posited 
as ‘real.’ However, given that we each live our self both inside and out, it is 
presumed more intimately and fully known than the existence of even the 
most familiar others.
This presumption is put into question by the centrality of asynchronous 
time in the home-movie experience. That is, when off-screen ‘I’ encounters 
on-screen ‘me,’ time is spatialized in my past image-self’s visibly different 
appearance and comportment from that envisioned as my present self-image. 
While this asynchronous disparity may generate a sense of nostalgia, it 
also may generate an uncanny experience in which the viewer’s general 
sense of self-knowledge and self-possession is suddenly destabilized. We 
might suspect that the wider the temporal gap between the image-self and 
self-image, the greater their estrangement and the more intense the ‘sense’ 
of uncanniness. Nonetheless, it is when the image-self and self-image are 
most temporally proximate to each other that the ‘sensation’ of uncanniness 
is most perceptibly felt. Here, sense and sensation do not have the same 
temporal structure – duration tends to mark the one while immediacy marks 
the other. Time thus modif ies the quality of the uncanny, which moves 
from a perceptible sensation of sudden perturbation to a more reflective 
(if still unsettling) re-cognition of self-estrangement to an encompassing 
existential apprehension that this estrangement and lack of self-possession 
is the grounding condition of one’s very being. (This progression bears some 
relation to, respectively, the psychological senses of the uncanny associated 
with Sigmund Freud and the earlier Ernst Jentsch, and its philosophical 
sense for Martin Heidegger, each referenced below in the description of a 
specif ic mode of uncanny experience.6)
III.
The ‘axiological uncanny’ is so-called because its experience is dominated by 
aesthetic judgments and questions of self-value. It emerges in the unexpected 
gap between the viewer’s internalized and taken-for-granted self-image 
and the exteriorized, ‘in your face’ image-self, and occurs most often when 
both are temporally proximate. (There is often a similar gap between the 
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sound of the image-self’s externally represented voice and the self-image’s 
internally heard one.) However, what is most uncanny and destabilizing is 
the sudden awareness of the disparity between subjective self-perception 
and objective representation. The emergence of the axiological uncanny thus 
not only undermines the viewer’s security in their self-knowledge, but also 
raises doubts about intersubjectivity, belying the belief in it which otherwise 
grounds the home-movie attitude. Articulated silently, the viewer asks, “Is 
that really me?” and “Do other people really see me this way?”
In this regard, the axiological uncanny is the most literally superf icial 
of modalities, and the viewer’s self-preoccupation most apparent. The 
predominant response to its emergence is intensif ied attention to and 
excessive scrutiny of the image-self in all its specif icity. Thus, opposite to 
the basic identif icatory structure of the home-movie attitude, the viewer’s 
activity is neither highly constitutive nor more expansive than what 
the screen provides. Instead, it is completely screen-dependent. Indeed, 
the constitutive activity of generalization is replaced by the activity of 
comparison, this between the image-self ’s external characteristics and 
those internally perceived – but now questioned – as constituting the self-
image. Correspondingly, this activity of comparison also entails ongoing 
aesthetic and personal valuation aimed at some form of reconciliation or 
self-recuperation.
Although f ixated on the screen, the viewer still retains the longitudinal 
intentionality central to Meunier’s home-movie attitude. This is a primary 
investment in the present moment of viewing, in which retention and 
protention play little part. Nonetheless, the viewer’s malaise modif ies the 
quality of this investment. It is greatly intensif ied by the viewer’s close 
scrutiny, and (usually) negative judgment of what seems every specific detail 
and aspect of their on-screen image-self. Indeed, in an online forum titled 
“Do you feel uncomfortable watching yourself on video?,” many posters 
write that they ‘hate’ watching themselves because, as the initial poster 
puts it, “I just don’t look as I THINK I look […] I literally squirm when I 
see myself […] I look like someone I hardly recognize […] I also pull very 
strange expressions and move my head more than necessary.” Almost all 
the respondents agree, one of them writing, “I hate my voice and my nose 
always overtakes my face,” and another, “I can’t bear watching or hearing 
myself on video […] I tend to think ‘God, do I really look that bad?’” Only 
a very few posters do not have the same experience. However, as I have 
suggested earlier, all recorded themselves and, through this activity of 
‘self-possession,’ feel sufficient familiarity to ‘own’ their on-screen image-self. 
One is an “actor/f ilmmaker”; another “recorded EVERYTHING” and put it 
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on YouTube, and so “got pretty used to the way I looked and sounded”; and 
the last, who otherwise f inds his image-self “awful,” adds, “However, I think 
I look f ine if I take it myself.”7
In this regard, the experience of the axiological uncanny’s particular form 
of self-preoccupation signif icantly changes the viewer’s overall intentional 
project or objective by reversing its direction. For Meunier, even if doomed 
to failure, what is essential to home-movie identif ication is the viewer’s 
attempts to achieve ‘real intersubjectivity’ with on-screen others. Instead, 
here the viewer’s intentional objective is ‘real intrasubjectivity’ with ‘one’s 
self’ – that is, rather than overlapping or encroachment, the intimate integra-
tion of the estranged image-self with the presently familiar self-image. The 
achievement of this integration is also doomed to failure, for the desire that 
drives it is the fantasy of a fully-possessed and ‘unif ied’ self – a fantasy 
that the other two modalities of the uncanny progressively re-cognize and 
dis-solve. At best, then, viewers may achieve a reconciliatory, but less than 
equivalent, adequation of their self-image and image-self by re-solving the 
disparity between them.
Most often, this reconciliatory attempt at adequation is focused on 
superf icial differences, such as hairstyle or weight, that are tied to and 
thus putatively ‘caused’ by the temporal gap between the image-self and 
self-image. These are differences that do not make much of an existential 
difference and so are used to ‘explain away’ the uncanny rather than linger-
ing on its challenges to self-perception and self-knowledge. However, many 
viewers also appease the uncanny and repress their failure at fully integrating 
their off- and on-screen selves by adopting – as Meunier says of late French 
f ilmology – a “certain scientif ic attitude […] consisting of […] externalizing, 
in the domain of objective realities observable from the outside, phenomena 
whose reality is to be found internally, in the experience of the subject” 
(p. 33). Adopting such a “scientif ic attitude,” the viewer becomes actively 
engaged not in the evocation of known others but, rather, in the invocation of 
impersonal experts whose explanations of the viewer’s experience are objec-
tive. These are likely to reference the ‘uncanny valley’ hypothesis (influenced 
by Jentsch and Freud) that names the region of negative emotional response 
generated by humanoid robots very close to appearing human and yet not 
close enough, and/or the ‘mere-exposure effect’ hypothesis, which posits 
that one’s repeated exposure to one’s mirror image makes one’s screen image 
uncanny because the latter is reversed from the intimately familiar one 
seen every day.8 These objective explanations of the phenomenon do not 
‘explain away’ the experience of the uncanny; rather, their rational surety 
is palliative and comforting. Nonetheless, for many viewers, the experience 
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of the axiological uncanny is recurrent and so repeatedly disturbing that 
they avoid home-movie screenings altogether. As one of the aforementioned 
posters writes, “I won’t even watch my wedding video.”9
Avoidance, however, is def initely not a response to the ‘epistemological 
uncanny’ – indeed, quite the opposite. Although the viewer feels an initial 
frisson of estrangement from their home-movie image-self, this modality 
of the uncanny is dominated by a desire not to f lee the image-self but to 
re-cognize it – that is, to learn and ‘comprehend’ it so as to regain the sense 
of self-possession. Moreover, given that the epistemological uncanny tends 
to emerge when the image-self is at a signif icant distance in time from the 
viewer’s present self-image, the viewer’s engagement is less screen-dependent 
than in the axiological uncanny, and feels less temporally urgent. This 
temporal distance also becomes spatial distance. That is, the viewer’s atten-
tion literally expands from judgmental scrutiny of the smallest details and 
perceived aesthetic defects of the image-self to its comportment, gestures, 
and overall behavior in a broader context. As well, there is no comparative 
activity, nor is the primary intentional objective either an impossible inter-
subjectivity with on-screen others, or an impossible intrasubjectivity that 
fully integrates image-self and self-image. Indeed, this spatialized temporal 
distance transforms the viewer’s home-movie attitude into one very much 
like – but not exactly like – what Meunier describes as the “documentary 
attitude”, in which the intentional objective is new knowledge of, among 
other things, someone posited as existentially ‘real’ who is not oneself (p. 124).
Given this transformation of attitude and intentional objective, the home 
movie is no longer temporally perceived only longitudinally, retention and 
protention subordinated to each present moment of viewing as irrelevant to 
evoking those absent others of whom we have more knowledge than their 
screen images give us. Rather, faced with our uncanny image-self which, 
though clearly familiar, seems suddenly distant and unknown to us, the home 
movie is now temporally perceived not only longitudinally but also, to use 
Meunier’s term, “laterally” (p. 108). As in the documentary attitude, the viewer 
is still intent on the screen in the present moment, but also actively engaged 
in the retention of past screen information – albeit still not concerned with 
some projected future. Thus, learning more about the self one thought one 
already knew becomes a cumulative process that has no necessary teleology.
Responding to the epistemological uncanny, we could say the viewer becomes 
‘apprenticed’ to their image-self, not to focus on how it looks or sounds, but 
rather to learn more about how it behaves in the world and with others.
In this regard, the viewer’s intentional objective in the epistemologi-
cal uncanny is comprehension of the past image-self rather than its full 
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integration with the present self-image. The existential distance between 
the two is respected, and a spatial as well as temporal ‘long view’ becomes 
the favored way to observe and add specif icity to the general knowledge 
of one’s comportment and behavior in a given context. Describing such 
identif icatory engagement with documentary, Meunier uses the example of 
watching a f ilm that focuses on a single doctor whom we see in the general 
and cumulative activities and contexts of ‘doctoring.’ In the documentary 
attitude, despite this doctor’s singularity and specif icity, we tend to see him 
as representative of other doctors who comport themselves and behave in 
a generally similar way; he is thus engaged as what, in logic, is sometimes 
called a ‘typical particular.’10 However, in the context of the home movie, 
such epistemological engagement with our own image-self takes a different 
turn (even if we also happen to be doctors). Qualif ied by the uncanny, 
our identif ication operates in a reverse direction from that in Meunier’s 
example. Here, then, I offer an example of my own: a home movie in which, 
in a distant past, I am playing with my then two-year old son. Given that, 
at the time, my focus was on him and not self-consciously on myself, I 
remember the experience only generally, if at all. Watching this long past 
maternal scene, my desire now is to ‘learn’ more of myself as a ‘mother’ 
through observation and comprehension of my image-self ’s particular 
motor/postural comportment and affective behavior as I interact with my 
child. Quite unlike identif icatory engagement with Meunier’s documentary 
doctor, whom I engage as ‘representative’ of many doctors, my identifactory 
intention in this home movie is to specif ically ‘differentiate’ myself from 
other mothers within what I know as the activity and context of ‘mothering.’ 
Thus, in this mode of the uncanny, although my focus on my image-self’s 
specif icity is less intense and narrow in scope than in the experience of 
the axiological uncanny, it tends to be more so than it would be in the 
documentary attitude, in which I watch and learn ‘real’ but personally 
unknown ‘others’ rather than ‘my self.’ Here, again, the experience of the 
uncanny modif ies the characteristics of Meunier’s phenomenology.
In sum, this shift to a less urgent and affectively ‘cooler’ documentary 
attitude occurs within the home-movie attitude and is not a complete 
move from one to the other. Instead, it is a compensatory response to the 
uncanny that entails an epistemological re-cognition or taking up of one’s 
past image-self in a more impersonal than personal mode of identif ication. 
Thus, the crisis generated by the epistemological uncanny is not, as in the 
axiological uncanny, a present and urgent crisis of self-perception but a 
more broadly temporalized crisis that provokes disturbing awareness of our 
always incomplete self-knowledge. Here, Freud’s influential predecessor, 
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Ernst Jentsch, is apposite. For him, the uncanny emerges from “intellectual 
uncertainty, so that the uncanny would always, as it were, be something 
someone does not know one’s way about in.”11 In the experience of the 
epistemological uncanny, this intellectual uncertainty is articulated not in 
the sudden question “Is that really me?” but in an intentionally extended 
quest to acquire more ‘objective’ knowledge of ‘myself ’ – even as it will 
never be enough.
This brings us to the ‘ontological uncanny,’ in which the existential ques-
tion is “What really am I?” This is the most overwhelming and reflexive 
modality of the uncanny, although it need not be felt as a sudden physical 
sensation or as intellectual uncertainty. Rather, and recalling Meunier’s 
summation of our heightened self-preoccupation in the home-movie attitude, 
the ontological uncanny is experienced as a “suspended” confrontation not 
only with one’s “self” but also “with the void” (p. 123). This third uncanny 
modality of the home-movie experience, in which the self-image as ‘I’ comes 
face-to-face with the image-self as ‘me’, is the least screen-dependent and 
the most actively constitutive. Thus, of all the modalities, it would seem to 
best conform to the phenomenological characteristics that, for Meunier, 
distinguish the home-movie attitude from those associated with documen-
tary and f iction. This, however, is not the case. With the emergence of the 
ontological uncanny, although the viewer transcends the screen’s specificity 
and engages in highly constitutive activity, these operate in a radically 
opposite intentional direction from that of the home-movie attitude. Rather 
than looking outward and through the screen in the highly constitutive but 
vain effort to evoke the presence of familiar past others, the viewer’s look 
rebounds from the opacity of the on-screen image-self and is directed back 
and inward. This sudden reflexive look away from the screen and into the 
depths of one’s own ‘being’ is, in effect, the uncanny and invisible revelation 
of a ‘voided’ self. On-screen image-self, off-screen self-image, and the ‘I’ that 
purportedly subtends them all become “irremediably out of our grasp” (p. 124).
In the experience of the ontologically uncanny, the home movie’s tem-
porality is again altered – indeed, in this instance, radically transformed. 
Although it seems longitudinal, the presentness of the viewing experience 
provoked by the encounter with our on-screen image-self is not only intensi-
f ied; it also becomes temporally extensive. That is, rather than excluding 
the temporal laterality of retention and protention, the present includes 
and condenses them. Thus, in Meunier’s terms, we could say that, in the 
ontological uncanny, the viewer’s constitutive activity lies not in generalizing 
the specif icity of screen images but, rather, in generalizing the discrete seg-
mentations of time itself. Suspended in this temporally dense and extensible 
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present, and with screen images now only the pretext to internal revelation, 
the viewer apprehends the import of the ontologically uncanny. This is the 
awareness that one can never catch up with one’s ‘self,’ for ‘it’ – whatever ‘it’ 
is – is always both temporally behind and ahead not only our, but also its 
own being. ‘It’ is always becoming other than what it (never) was, is, or will 
be. Confronting Meunier’s ‘void,’ it is the viewer’s ‘self,’ wherever it seems 
located, that is voided. Bereft of security not only in self-knowledge but 
also in ‘self,’ the viewer now f inds ‘themself’ (a particularly charged plural 
pronoun here) in a spatio-temporal chasm. This is also an asynchronous yet 
reversible ‘chiasm’ between one’s visible image-self, imagined self-image, 
and invisible ‘I,’ in which their relative discretion and relational differences 
fall away and the ungrounded viewer falls with them.
In this regard, the ontological uncanny is more related to Heideggerian 
description than those of Jentsch or Freud. What Heidegger terms Unheim-
lichkeit (or uncanniness) is not a physical sensation, intellectual doubt, or 
psychological quality. These, for him, are derivative rather than ontological 
experiences of the uncanny. Indeed, uncanniness is originary for Heidegger; 
he regards it as the ‘ungrounding’ that is, if paradoxically, the grounding 
structure of human existence. For him, human being is fundamentally 
uncanny, strange, and unknown to itself as what it is: “an unstable blend 
of presence and absence, concealment and unconcealment, hiddenness 
and appearance, which constitutes man’s having to be at home precisely 
in his not being at home in the world.”12 Certainly any f ilm (or video) – by 
virtue of its function as medium – offers us an experience of precisely this 
unstable reversibility and oscillation of presence and absence, concealment 
and unconcealment, hiddenness and appearance. However, the home movie 
makes this instability not only its form but also its content. It thus progres-
sively provokes, for many of us who suddenly encounter our ‘self’ on-screen, 
the uncanny fundament not only of home movies, but also of human being.
In closing, it need be said again that my exploration of this ‘specif ic case’ 
of engagement with the home movie is meant as an homage to Meunier’s 
phenomenology of f ilmic identif ication. Despite his schematic brevity (or, 
perhaps, because of it), he grounds and describes the characteristics and 
‘coordinates’ of our active engagements with the screen in clearly articulated 
intentional modalities of subjective knowledge, attitude, temporality, and 
affect. Meunier thus provides us a meaningful existential vocabulary that 
enables an illuminating comparative method of how the f ilm experience is 
‘lived’ and differentiated. Moreover, he has given us a powerful heuristic, and 
explicitly invited us to continue exploring this ‘lived,’ but always ‘mediated,’ 
experience in all its myriad historical, cultural, and aesthetic variations.
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Notes
1. Even if some on-screen people are physically present, they are not now as 
they were then; hence, their present presence is subordinate to the memori-
alized space-time that absorbs us (and likely them as well).
2. In this volume, see Marie-Aude Baronian’s, “Remembering Cinema: On the 
film-souvenir,” which specifically foregrounds this neologism’s emphasis on 
memory.
3. See Vivian Sobchack, “Toward a Phenomenology of Non-Fictional Film 
Experience,” in Collecting Visible Evidence, ed. by Michael Renov and Jane 
Gaines (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 241-254.
4. In this volume, for a different approach to recording oneself, see Christian 
Ferencz-Flatz’s “You Talkin’ to Me? On Filmic Identification in Video-Self-
ies.”
5. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 123. Merleau-Ponty is 
making the larger point that the world is not a discrete ‘object’ nor are we, 
as embodied, discretely ‘subjects.’
6. For differently inflected elaborations of the term unheimlich, see Sigmund 
Freud, “The Uncanny”[1919], in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psy-
chological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVII (1917-1919): An Infantile Neurosis 
and Other Works, trans. and ed. by James Strachey in collaboration with 
Anna Freud et. al. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), pp. 217-256; Ernst 
Jentsch, “On the Psychology of the Uncanny” [1906], trans. Roy Sellars, An-
gelaki 2:1 (1997): pp. 7-16; and, for Martin Heidegger’s term Unheimlichkeit, 
see Katherine Withy, Heidegger on Being Uncanny (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2015).
7. “Do you feel uncomfortable watching yourself on video?” [Quoted respec-
tively, Pinko, Pet1986, Suzywong63, HungerCult, Shadow2009, KidRacchyy], 
Digital Spy, https://forums.digitalspy.com (Last accessed on 10 Novem-
ber 2017).
8. See “The Uncanny Valley: The Original Essay by Masahiro Mori” [1970], 
trans. Karl F. MacDormand and Norri Kageki, Spectrum.IEEE.org (Last ac-
cessed on 1 February 2018); and Theodore H. Mita, Marshall Dermer, and 
Jeffrey Knight, “Reversed Facial Images and the Mere-Exposure Hypothesis,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35:8 (1977), pp. 597-601.
9. “Do you feel uncomfortable?” Fluffymingo, Digital Spy.
10. Meunier does not use the term ‘typical particular,’ but his discussion of 
documentary ‘representativeness’ certainly merits it. On this mode of 
generalization, see Hubert Alexander, The Language and Logic of Philosophy 
(Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1967), p. 232.
11. Quoted in Freud, “The Uncanny,” p. 221.
12. Taylor Carman, rev. of Heidegger on Being Uncanny [Withy, 2015], European 
Journal of Philosophy 25:3 (2017), p. 901.
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This paper reflects upon Jean-Pierre Meunier’s term film-souvenir and how 
it enables us to conceive of different possible alliances between f ilmic 
practices and memory. Drawing from audiovisual testimonies and the 
work of contemporary f ilmmaker and media artist Atom Egoyan, the essay 
suggests that film-souvenir goes beyond Meunier’s designation of the term 
as a specif ic f ilmic consciousness and even beyond its commonly accepted 
translation of ‘home movie.’ The French term opens up our understanding 
of f ilm as always already related to memory, continually emphasizing the 
persistent nature of cinematic practices as not only driven by a desire to 
reproduce and learn or to immerse and phantasm, but also to remember.
Keywords: Memory; home movie; audiovisual testimony; Atom Egoyan; 
Jean-Pierre Meunier
Introduction
It all started with a book: a medium-sized paperback that had for years been 
standing on a shelf of a bookcase in the hall of my parents’ apartment in 
Brussels. The book was part of my father’s extended collection of essays on 
cinema, philosophy, and other related topics that inhabited the domestic 
décor of my childhood home. I had passed by the book every day for so 
many years without even touching it… until one day: a seemingly regular 
day that resulted in a paradigmatic and disciplinary epiphany that I only 
understood years later when pursuing academia. In the early and mid-1990s, 
my interest for both philosophy and cinema was already clearly marked, as 
I had studied and graduated in both disciplines. At that time, however, my 
research was still a timid juxtaposition of cinema and philosophy and did 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
doi 10.5117/ 9789462986565_baronian
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not consider the more dynamic notion of the two fields ‘with(in)’ each other. 
Jean-Pierre Meunier’s The Structure of the Film Experience (Les Structures 
de l’expérience filmique, 1969) was my f irst real encounter with the alliance 
of philosophy and cinema, and it proved to be a formative one. When I f irst 
read it, it influenced my perception not only of what philosophy (particularly 
phenomenology) is but, more signif icantly, what philosophy can do beyond 
itself. Now, Meunier’s eye-opening text, as a long-time companion, continues 
to fuel my f ilmic sensibility and thought processes.
This anecdote, as personal and true as it is, is not actually that far 
removed from one of the main elements Meunier discusses in his book: 
the experiencing and encountering of an objet-souvenir. This (or my) 
‘souvenir-book’ takes Meunier’s film-souvenir as a pivotal entry point for 
understanding how the home movie (which might be associated with 
the family f ilm, amateur f ilm, etc.) engages with and provokes a specif ic 
f ilmic experience. It is from this notion of film-souvenir that I would like 
to draw a few thoughts.
Film Practices, Memory Practices
My interest in Meunier’s book derived not solely from its phenomenological 
approach to f ilm, which admittedly felt extremely refreshing when I was 
conducting my studies in philosophy, but was mainly guided by its peculiar 
attention to memory thanks to the term film-souvenir.
Notably, the book took on a special relevance when I became closely 
interested in the work of Canadian-Armenian contemporary f ilmmaker 
and media artist Atom Egoyan (on whom I have also been working for a 
long time now), whose work served as a perfect vis-à-vis for illuminating 
Meunier’s thoughts. In his feature f ilms, as well as in his shorts and video 
installations, Egoyan discusses the relationship between memory and 
(domestic) audiovisual technology, as well as how recording and f ilming 
devices stand as existential objects that influence how we perceive the world, 
ourselves, and others. Audiovisual technology pervades the integrality of 
Egoyan’s work, either by being inserted prominently in the narrative or by 
exploring its modalities of presentation and preservation through lens-media 
installations, for example.1
Meunier defines the film-souvenir as a f ilm that addresses an object that 
is existent and known; in other words, the opposite of a f iction f ilm, whose 
object is unknown and non-existent. Further, “the home movie appears as 
a constitutive activity: it looks beyond the image, to the person-in-general 
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that it depicts, in order to produce and maintain his existence even during 
the screening”2 (p. 88). In the home movie, the viewer is less apprehended by 
each detail that constitutes the image but, as Sobchack notes, is in a process 
of “recovery of the memory of the whole person or event.”3 Thus, Meunier 
conceives of the film-souvenir through evocation and as a mnemonic tool 
through which the viewer relates to, or rather identif ies with, an absent 
person or a past event.4
According to Roger Odin, the family f ilm is “made by a family member 
about characters, events or objects that are, in one way or another, linked 
to this family’s history and to the privileged use of those family members.”5 
There is thus a correspondence between the one who makes and produces 
the image and the one who potentially watches it.6 This explains why it is 
not always captivating or engaging to watch another family’s home videos. 
Nevertheless, when we watch somebody else’s ‘foreign’ home movie, we also 
land in the familiar, not just because your family could be my family, but 
also because, from a more formal point of view, the often grainy, shaking, 
unpolished images recall a specific f ilmic and aesthetic mode.7 The acquaint-
ance is thus not so much solicited by the person or event on-screen (some 
‘generic’ f igures) as by its recognizable, ‘familiar’ aesthetics. Odin reminds 
us that the family f ilm is usually characterized and perceived as animated 
photography.8 On that note, Meunier writes that photography
functions as an analogical representation of the absent person. But it 
lacks life. […] If I desire to rediscover [retrouver] these known gestures, 
I can then, if I am an amateur f ilmmaker, project a f ilm that represents 
the person in question, if they have been f ilmed on a certain occasion. 
The cinematic image, more than the portrait or the photograph, restores 
life and this time, I really do f ind the person (p. 87/88).9
Incidentally, in Egoyan’s feature f ilms, thanks to the inclusion of the 
videographic medium into the narrative, we often see characters who are 
precisely caught in such situations as watching, often obsessively, domes-
tic videographic images, which they rely on to conf irm or restore their 
existential being. Thus, Egoyan borrows the practice and the aesthetics of 
home movies in order to point to the question and complexity of cinema as 
a process of authorship and spectatorship. Here I can think, for example, 
of the short f ilm A Portrait of Arshile (1995), but also the three features 
Egoyan made in the 1980s (which historically coincide with the rise of 
domestic audiovisual technologies), as well as most of his lens-based media 
installations since the 1990s.
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The film-souvenir plays with the evocation and recollection of a moment 
in time and space and is comparable to a photo album or an archive box that 
contains material traces charged with emotional values. Yet, the significance 
of what is portrayed in home movies is not solely to be found in its visual or 
topical arrangement, but mostly in the narrative around the time and space 
that belong to the ‘imaginary’ of the family life. As Sobchack puts it, “the 
film-souvenir tends to be a chronicle of temporal fragments that exists for 
us as a marker of experience and has little to do with causality.”10
The constitutive engagement characteristic of the film-souvenir is stronger 
than the image itself simply because, beyond the screen, the f ilmed person 
means ‘more.’ The film-souvenir is therefore inevitably partial and ‘unfin-
ished’ but is nevertheless perceived, during the viewing, as generalized 
(a “person-in-general” says Meunier [p. 86]). Though, as Egoyan often ad-
dresses in his f ilms and videos, the image can become all that we know of a 
person we are supposed to know personally. In that sense, the film-souvenir 
complicates the idea of ‘more’ and ‘less:’ the portrayed person or matter is 
less than what he/she/it means, but often more by its very audiovisual and 
material existence, because, in the film-souvenir, it is the existential charge 
that is stronger and more salient than the epistemological one.
But the ‘more’ and the ‘less’ also have to do with a sense of failure. As 
Meunier writes: “We ‘play’ at believing in this presence, but we never get 
there since we are always aware of the absence of the object” (p. 122). And 
he adds: “In the home-movie attitude, our behavior consists of a vain effort 
to ‘presentify’ the object, an attempt to enter into intersubjective relations 
with other people, which necessarily leads to disappointment” (p. 123). This 
type of identif ication entails a vain effort to induce a presence that “remains 
irremediably out of our grasp” (p. 124).
Here, I should mention another type of media object related to memory 
on which I have been working closely: audiovisual testimonies in the context 
of traumatic mass violence (such as the Armenian genocide). These f ilmic 
testimonies, I argue, somehow ‘test’ the notion of the film-souvenir. The 
lack and discomfort associated with audiovisual testimonies are not only 
ontological in the sense of ‘uncanny’ or of what is no more, but in the histori-
cal, social, and political circumstances that render the video testimonies 
even more relevant (and that also complicate the tension between the private 
and the public). In my own research for instance, I watched people who were 
watching, even discovering, testimonial videos of their close relatives who 
survived the genocide. Heirs and family members literally discovering, for 
the first time, that their parents or grandparents had not only been recorded 
or were taping themselves, but that such home video tapes exist in the f irst 
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place. This forces us to redefine, more cautiously, what is really ‘known’ and 
how visual and cinematic media might play a signif icant and vital role. It 
is not just a matter of ‘presentifying’ a known person or event, but – in the 
context of mass violence – of asking the question: how does the ‘known’ 
interact with the ‘unknowable’ in terms of traumatic memory?
Signif icantly, I noticed that, most of the time, the private and intimate 
setting of the home video is the only space or territory where trauma can 
be told (or not) and transmitted to family members and how, often because 
of the lack of something else (such as a safe and shared repository for such 
stories to be heard), it could move from there (or not) to a more open and 
public space. This means that, despite their restricted visibility, these home 
videos allow for diff icult stories to be inscribed (even if the telling of them is 
inherently complicated) and testify to an enduring historical and sociopoliti-
cal invisibility. At the same time, these audiovisual testimonies are not to 
be labeled as ‘orphan f ilms’ in the sense of being abandoned, because they 
are somehow preserved but not exposed or circulated.11
To ‘recover,’ following the terminology of Meunier’s film-souvenir, can 
almost be conceived in psychoanalytical terms here: something is saved, 
materially and psychically. This being said, family members do not auto-
matically watch the f ilms meticulously, also because there is an inevitable 
impossibility to watch those often painful and unbearable audiovisual 
testimonies.12 Pertinently, in many of Egoyan’s f ilms (which often deal with 
trauma, including the inherited traces of the Armenian genocide), we see 
characters who have a very fetishistic relationship with their home movies. In 
Egoyan’s feature f ilm Family Viewing (1987), for instance, the main character 
(a young man named Van) discovers the existence of videocassettes from 
his Armenian childhood that he did not know about (or remember?). It is, in 
that case, a (re-)discovery of something that has not been unveiled before. It 
literally creates a sense of newness of something that, materially speaking, 
was previously thought to be non-existent.13 This set-up slightly complicates 
the fact that, as Sobchack writes, “In the home-movie experience, I don’t 
have to learn anything about my son from the images. Indeed, I know more 
of him than the images show me. I don’t have to work at comprehending 
him (although I do have to work at evoking him).”14 So if Meunier argues that 
the film-souvenir does not teach us anything about the person represented, 
the question of learning about the material existence of the f ilm and how 
it generates a specif ic f ilmic consciousness still remains. This is precisely 
why audiovisual family testimonies, often equated to home movies, are 
signif icant. Incidentally, in the short f ilm A Portrait of Arshile that Egoyan 
made in the mid-1990s, the f ilmmaker combines the intimacy of the familial 
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home video and the testimonial legacy of the Armenian genocide; thereby 
not solely interrogating and blurring the difference between the private 
and the public, but insisting on the home recording as the only means to 
access family history and history in the broader sense.
In Egoyan’s f iction f ilm Family Viewing, Van accesses his Armenian 
childhood with his lost mother (an origin that was denied to him) through 
videocassettes.15 The videographic image is at once familiar and strange/
other; it is also at once recuperative and informative. More importantly, how-
ever, is the fact that the audiovisual testimonies exist: his being Armenian 
is possible and accessible through the home video. What Van experiences 
when he watches the cassettes is the comfort of existing ‘again’ together 
with the discomfort of having disappeared. The feeling of deceiving is, 
linked to the politics of denial, heavily connoted.
Thanks to the home videos, there is a rediscovery of something that 
has not been disclosed before. It creates a sense of newness in something 
that, materially speaking, was previously thought to be non-existent. This, 
once again, proves that, with the film-souvenir, it is often not only about the 
retrieving of a “person-in-general,” as Meunier puts it, but, I would suggest, 
the retrieving of the object itself: the cassette, the medium as a recording 
and viewing machine and the imaginary that surrounds it; what we could 
term an ‘audiovisual object-in-general.’
With the film-souvenir, the knowing usually precedes the viewing, and 
the viewing itself confirms or emotionally charges the knowing. But when a 
viewer watches a home movie of a person with whom he or she is intimately 
bound, without the knowledge that that moment was f ilmed or recorded 
(like in audiovisual testimonies or in Family Viewing), the viewing après-
coup turns into an event in itself. Again, this is not due to what is precisely 
depicted and told in the moving image, but because of the very existence of 
the recording trace. It is not about learning in terms of content information, 
it is about learning of the material existence of the recording. The viewing 
consists in the presence of another self on-screen which is equated with 
another self as screen: a sort of double strangeness and sameness, or an 
unreachable (known) someone through the reachable screen. To put it 
differently, the film-souvenir could be designated as a f ilm that aims to create 
another self at home in movies, one that stipulates a form of identif ication 
moved by a sense of familiarity and strangeness. In viewing and discovering 
such f ilm-souvenirs, there is at once a feeling of sameness and otherness, 
that is activated through the medium, almost in the double sense of the 
word medium.
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What Is Lost, What Is Preserved
Let me now point to the translation of the term film-souvenir in Meunier’s 
book. Departing from the assumption that any act of translation is marked by 
loss (due to the challenge of preserving the original meaning), a translation 
is in itself a mourning gesture, comparable to a souvenir of what is no more.16 
Yet, a translation does not always only constitute a loss or even betrayal to 
the original text, as it can sometimes add something more to it.
Sobchack confesses (between brackets!) that the original French word 
film-souvenir is much more precise than its English counterpart and that 
the English translation might have certain limitations.17 Let me therefore 
draw from and stress the translator’s 34th footnote which explains that 
Meunier’s term “refers to f ilms made for private purposes, with the goal 
of acting as a keepsake or record of an event in the individual’s life, such 
as weddings, vacations, family gatherings, etc.” The translator’s note also 
clearly indicates that even if “the English term ‘home movie’ comes close 
to this meaning,” the question and role of memory is not apparent in this 
notion (p. 156).
If ‘home movie’ is the most appropriate translation, the French expression 
film-souvenir might address something beyond the distinctive forms of 
consciousness that Meunier designates. The hyphen indicates the closeness 
and dynamic relationship between souvenir and f ilm and, in doing so, 
accentuates the value and motif of f ilm as a mnemonic medium.18 If ‘home 
movie’ indicates ‘home’ and the type of private and ‘familiar’ family events 
that are recorded there, it also acknowledges something inherently related 
to memory. Thus, if I maintain the French term it is not for the sake of 
safeguarding Meunier’s original language, but to highlight the interplay 
between film and memory that, in turn, welcomes a plurality of remembering 
f ilmic practices and variations without sticking to one category or corpus in 
particular. Moreover, there is not one film-souvenir attitude but a plurality 
of attitudes wherein, obviously, each context plays its role.
The notion of film-souvenir also surpasses its formal and cultural dimen-
sion to become, as it were, the consciousness of cinema itself. Here, cinema 
is to be understood as a web of various practices, of making and responding 
to moving images. It is as though, in the work of Egoyan, the French word 
and its English translation come together. That is, by using the aesthetics 
of the home video in his f ilms, Egoyan not only touches upon the familial 
and intimate elements characteristic of this cinematic form, but also on 
the consciousness of cinema. By creating mise en abymes, such as the f ilm-
within-a-f ilm trope, it is not only the technological and aesthetic process 
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of cinema that is reduplicated, but the process of cinema as a remembering 
machine.19 What is more, Egoyan’s f ilmic practices mirror, at various levels 
and from several viewpoints (e.g. narrative, personages), the notion that 
retrouver is both an illusion and the attracting force of cinema – what is 
no more (or even perhaps what has never been).
My proposition not only draws from the admitted fact that, as Meunier 
writes about these modalities, “we should not expect def initive conclu-
sions” (p. 36), but that the film-souvenir enables us to think more broadly 
and purposefully of the f ilmic attitude (or a subjective relationship to the 
souvenir-object) as an ‘impulse,’ of f ilm originating from an archival gesture 
and attitude (or even an ‘archive fever’ in a Derridean sense).20
In other words, not translating film-souvenir does not imply that the 
proposed translation of ‘home movies’ should be refuted, but that it could 
be valuable, beyond Meunier’s own intentions, to think of the particularity 
of the film-souvenir as a form together with the particularity of f ilm as 
souvenir (and vice versa). This also provides the opportunity to question 
the epistemic and imaginary knowledge vis-à-vis the people captured in 
the film-souvenir videos who are no longer there.
Further, as a more marginalized cinematic form (in comparison to 
documentaries and f iction f ilms) and as somehow ‘openly’ def ined and 
thus not strictly specif ied, the film-souvenir object acquires an added value 
in its capacity to be thought of beyond its textual and formal features. It 
forces us to ponder what makes it f ilmic in the f irst place.
Beyond the fact that Meunier’s modalities are flexible (as he has admitted 
and Sobchack has insisted on), I wonder if the film-souvenir is not solely in the 
attitude of the spectator, but, as it were, in the attitude of cinema tout court.21 
It is as though the film-souvenir epitomizes, in a sort of media-archeological 
fashion, the emergence of f ilmic practices (including proto-cinematic ones) 
and the numerous practices that pervade the digital age. In that case, could 
the film-souvenir not be the zero degree of cinematic practice; one that 
reminds us that, beyond the desire to comprehend (documentary) and to 
participate (f iction), f ilm is an ongoing search for something or someone 
that is no more or, at the very least, ‘out of focus’? In other words, the 
attitude-souvenir is an inherent recording and viewing attitude (memory 
as mediated). And if, as Meunier puts it, “the cinematic image truly plays the 
role of medium. It serves as an intermediary between the reality perceived 
and my current consciousness of this reality” (p. 88), I would add, the medium 
is not just a liaison provider, but also (despite its content) an end in itself.
Signif icantly, the film-souvenir is the only category for which Meunier 
does not really give an explicit or detailed example, reminding us quite 
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evidently that those f ilms are, and very often remain, untitled. Evidently, 
such family f ilms do not have a theatrical life, and when they are viewed, 
they are seen in the context of private archives or collections. This is yet 
more proof of the film-souvenir’s significance as a recording trace more than 
what it depicts or represents. Paradoxically, perhaps, in the film-souvenir, the 
viewer – because he or she views him or herself (or another ‘alter ego’ such 
as a family member) in those moving images – does not get pulled into the 
image, but rather it is the image (as mediating object) that pulls him or her 
in an affective mode of comfort and discomfort – the comfort of existing 
‘again’ together with the discomfort of having disappeared. Indeed, as 
Sobchack summarizes, the images of the film-souvenir “are not apprehended 
for themselves, but rather as the catalyst to a primarily constitutive and 
generalizing activity that transcends their specif icity in an attempt to 
call up and reactivate the ‘real’ and ‘whole’ person or event that is (or was) 
elsewhere and at some other time.”22
In the film-souvenir, the image fulf ills what it was intended to do in the 
f irst place: trace, track, and bring life to the life-world of the person f ilmed 
for the benefit of the viewer within his or her own life-world. The image is 
the intermediary through which the viewer can enter into a relation with and 
reach that someone or that something. Nevertheless, Meunier specif ies that 
the image is a substitute or a simulacrum of a presence; this idea is also at the 
heart of Egoyan’s practices and preoccupations. But if Meunier indicates that 
at no moment do we lose sight of this fact, it is, interestingly, rarely the case 
for many of the characters in Egoyan’s f ilms, who are viscerally depending 
on (and often addicted to) domestic audiovisual images and technologies.
The reason why Egoyan is constantly exploring the home movie is, as 
I have mentioned, to underpin and complicate the notion of cinematic 
practices as memory. For instance, what Meunier describes in the following 
quote is to be found everywhere in the work of Egoyan: “To a far greater 
extent than the photo, the home movie, by means of the life that movement 
confers on it, is conducive to inducing a high degree of nostalgia, regret, or 
other sentiments in us” (p. 109). In all his f ilms and media projects, audio-
visual and recording technology reflects the longing for what is no more, 
and because it is no more, it accentuates the longing, often articulated in 
a very obsessive and repetitive way.
Importantly, I do not wish to incite an all-encompassing conception of the 
viewing experience as one that is indifferent to the modalities or types of 
image that are viewed; rather, I suggest that the film-souvenir attitude is both 
particular to certain types of f ilm and, ontologically speaking, of cinema. 
In other words, the spectatorial mode of the film-souvenir corresponds to 
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specif ic objects (materially and immaterially) and, as it were, to the ‘Object 
of cinema.’ Therefore, I would imply that despite the fact that such f ilms 
have often been perceived as marginal (academically and professionally), 
the unfinished character of the film-souvenir actually indicates that cinema 
itself remains unfinished; it is ongoing, inf inite, and escapes all forms of 
strict delineation regarding how it manifests itself.
Also, the film-souvenir stresses the paradox inherent in all visual represen-
tation since it is an image of the world (a representation) but made within the 
lived world – a familiar and affective one in this case. It is a representation of 
something/someone that, while existing out of that image, can somehow be 
recuperated or, better, preserved, in that image. The film-souvenir therefore 
situates itself between the excess, the surplus, and the lack, the loss. It also, 
as noted above, lays itself between comfort and discomfort.
Remembering Cinema
Ultimately, maintaining the original term film-souvenir is a question not so 
much of being faithful to the original word, as reinforcing the possibility 
of focusing on attitudes rather than genres, on experiences rather than 
layouts, on existential engagements rather than f ilmic textual features. 
In doing so, it further concedes that Meunier’s concepts themselves are 
forceful and dynamic, and, more generically, that cinema (f ilming and 
viewing) is somehow epitomized through the ‘natural’ gesture of recording 
and preserving the ephemerality of life (and of f ilm).23
If, with the film-souvenir, Meunier paves the way for a largely neglected 
f ilmic practice that had long escaped any canonical place in academic 
studies and f ilmic institutions, it also condenses, with its apparent minimal 
means, what is at the core of the f ilming gesture. That is, the film-souvenir 
offers new directions to think of the large panel of non-theatrical practices, 
but it also ad minima translates the scopic and archival regime into which 
we are culturally and affectively immersed. It also implies a sense of being 
unfinished: because the concept itself is mobile and elastic and because the 
home movie relies on an unpolished format (even if nowadays there are 
plenty of apps that enable family images to become ‘perfect,’ leaving us with 
the question of what is ‘unfinished’ in the digital age)24. More importantly, 
however, it is unf inished because cinema (in all its multiple practices) is 
constantly reinventing itself.
In the same way that Meunier’s book opens up ways to (re-)think many 
concepts and categories central to f ilm-philosophy and f ilm theories, I 
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would venture that the concept of film-souvenir is, similarly, a notion that 
enables us to ponder the tenacious and persistent being of cinema (and its 
‘others’) and the multiple ways cinema involves a desire not just to reproduce 
and learn or to immerse and phantasm, but to remember. With the film-
souvenir it is cinema that – despite its inherent and possible failures, illusions, 
incompleteness – remembers (and, accordingly, forgets) itself.
Notes
1. To be sure, Egoyan’s work is not a mere illustration of Meunier’s ideas on 
the film-souvenir, but the artist’s entire work is an ongoing exploration of it: 
not only from a narrative and character point of view, but also in terms of 
aesthetics and visual strategies and, even more significantly, when Egoyan 
pays particular attention to the presentation and viewing context (e.g., his 
video- and lens-based media installations that contribute to the ‘Black Box, 
White Cube’ discussions).
2. Meunier adds that “there is, on the part of consciousness, a positing of 
existence, a generalization of the matter of the image that refers to a 
person-in-general, who constitutes the locus of our attention, and finally, 
the creative activity” (p. 88).
3. Vivian Sobchack, “Toward a Phenomenology of Nonfictional Film Experi-
ence,” in J.M. Gaines and M. Renov (eds.), Collecting Visible Evidence (Min-
neapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1999), pp. 241-254; here p. 244.
4. As Sobchack summarizes, “these objectively specific images, however, are 
subjectively generalized by the spectator in a vain effort to evoke presence – 
that is, the whole ensemble of a well-known person’s gestures and comport-
ment or of temporal events surrounding those depicted on the screen.” 
Ibid., p. 247.
5. Roger Odin, Le Film de famille (Paris : Méridiens Klincksiek, 1995), p. 27.
6. Needless to say, in the digital age, the lines between the private/family 
sphere and the public one are constantly put into question. This tension 
between the intimate and the collective is another key concern in Egoyan’s 
work.
7. Inversely, in the digital age (and thanks to all sorts of technological devices 
and applications), the images tend to be too perfect.
8. More specifically, Odin says that this type of home video presents recurrent 
stylistic elements, such as an absence of closure, a narrative crumbling, an 
undetermined temporality, a paradoxical relation to space, a direct address 
to the camera, a rather incoherent juxtaposition of shots, and an interfer-
ence of perception. See Le Film de famille, pp. 28-31.
9. The analogy between photography and recording technology is central to 
Egoyan’s early films. That being said, one could note that Meunier falls short 
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on the difference between photography and film (life being added simply 
by the fact that images are moving)..
10. Sobchack, “Toward a Phenomenology,” p. 248.
11. Some of the family videos (containing family stories marked by such trag-
edies as genocide) have very limited exposure: some are secretly preserved 
and are not shown to anyone outside of the family circle, while others func-
tion as oral testimony and are recorded and archived in specific locations 
such as the Zoryan Institute (a documentation center in the US and Canada 
dedicated to the Armenian genocide). In all these situations, however, the 
films are rarely shown to the general public.
12. There is also the potentiality, for the survivors and their heirs, that watch-
ing such testimonial home videos leads to triggering or reliving the original 
trauma. On these types of question, see Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, 
Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History 
(New York: Taylor & Francis, 1991).
13. This is what Meunier and Sobchack suggest when they distinguish the 
specificity of the image from the whole ensemble the person, or the event 
to which it refers. We could also add that the recorded object, through its 
materiality, adds an extra layer to the understanding of a ‘positing of exist-
ence’ that is thus central here.
14. Sobchack, “Toward a Phenomenology,” p. 251.
15. Thus, the film-souvenir can also, just like the documentary, have the ability 
to teach.
16. Here I think, for example, of Paul Ricœur who, in Sur la traduction, speaks 
of “une correspondance sans adéquation” or “une équivalence sans identité” 
(Paris : Bayard, 2003), p. 40 and p. 60. Or, in a more radical way of what 
Derrida has written on this question in various essays. See, for example, Of 
Hospitality, with Anne Dufourmantelle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2000).
17. Sobchack, “Toward a Phenomenology,” p. 248.
18. Needless to say, there is an analogy at play between the working of memory 
in the psyche and the working of film. If memory also alludes to a subjec-
tive and ‘situated’ trace of time as Jenny Chamarette puts it, memory is “a 
subjective trace of the experience of time or as a trace of the encounter 
with time – always in contact with time and temporality, but never encom-
passing it.” See her essay “Memory, Representation of Time and Cinema,” 
in P. Collier, A.M. Elsner and O. Smith (eds.). Anamnesia. Private and Public 
Memory in Modern French Culture (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 243-256.
19. The mise en abyme is close to what Meunier refers to when he writes “the 
likes of Godard and Varda have honed a certain number of procedures 
aiming to break the spectator’s enchantment, and to invite them to take 
their distances. But these are, when it comes down to it, rather artificial and 
rarely used procedures” (p. 113). This last point could benefit from being 
updated and, on that note, most of Egoyan’s filmic practices could be added 
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to it. Egoyan often uses the domestic videographic medium as a metaphor 
for cinema, to create mirror effects.
20. See Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1996) and Echographies of Television: Filmed Interviews 
(with Bernard Stiegler. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002 [1996]).
21. Sobchack writes: “Perhaps the most important of Meunier’s conclusions is 
that the structural form of cinematic identification does not depend neces-
sarily (even if it does sufficiently) on the ‘type’ of film objectively unfolding 
on the screen. However each type of film may objectively and actively solicit 
our spectatorial consciousness, in the end, we will actively and subjectively 
‘take up’ the film and position its existence and status as the kind of film 
object it is, based on a personal and cultural knowledge less deliberate than 
lived.” Sobchack, “Toward a Phenomenology,” p. 246. She further adds: “If 
we understand cinematic identification as a general comportment and at-
tentive attitude toward the screen that is informed by personal and cultural 
knowledge, then one woman’s irreal situation comedy may be another’s 
home movie.” Ibid., p. 247.
22. Ibid.
23. What is more, it is also a way to question the non-theatricality of film as a 
condition of possibility of its theatricality.
24. Here, it might also be worth mentioning that there are specific apps (such 
as “Super 8 Instant Video Footage”) that simulate the worn-out Super-8 
aesthetic as a way of evoking old home movies.
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III: On Identification




The present paper revisits Jean Pierre-Meunier’s account of the social 
structure of f ilm experience by adding a further term to his comparative 
analysis of home movies, documentaries, and films of f iction: video-self ies. 
Video-self ies are understood as the perfect starting point for an interpreta-
tion of the mutual relationships between authorship, protagonists, and 
viewer, which aims to clarify Meunier’s conception of ‘f ilmic identif ica-
tion’ critically. The analysis of the video-self ies focuses on f ive aspects: 
perception, communication, affect, space, and movement. Following 
through this analysis, the paper shows that Meunier’s approach can be 
useful not only in applying a theory of intersubjectivity to various forms 
of f ilm experience, but also in drawing from the latter insights into key 
aspects of intersubjectivity.
Keywords: Phenomenology; intersubjectivity; communication; mirror 
perception
1.
Jean-Pierre Meunier’s analysis of f ilm experience is most notable, on the 
one hand, in that it regards the social, that is: the intersubjective structure 
of this experience as its most def ining aspect; on the other hand, in that it 
pursues this aspect by means of a phenomenological variation, contrasting 
three forms of f ilm experience, namely the home movie, the documentary, 
and the f iction f ilm. Arguably, the most striking feature of this endeavor is 
its attempt to translate a theoretical framework visibly drawn from Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology into the classical vocabulary of French 
f ilmology by specif ically rephrasing the phenomenological account of 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
doi 10.5117/ 9789462986565_ferencz
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‘intersubjectivity’ in terms of f ilmic ‘identif ication’ – today, one would 
certainly f ind it more appealing to proceed in the opposite direction. In 
his treatment of ‘identif ication,’ Meunier himself, in any case, rejects the 
default psychoanalytic understanding of the term as an objective psycho-
logical mechanism, which can be analyzed from without, in favor of its 
phenomenological interpretation as a subjective experience, which should be 
described from within. Accordingly, he comes to regard the subject’s bodily, 
that is, motor and postural response to his encounter of other subjects as 
the grounding phenomenon of identif ication, while also pointing out its 
emotional, dramatic, and axiological aspects.
The second and richest part of his account applies this theoretical 
framework to f ilm experience, stipulating from the onset that the latter 
can only be analyzed as such by taking into account its most signif icant 
variations. To this extent, Meunier sets out to investigate the differences 
that occur, f irstly, in the structure of perception and movement, and sec-
ondly, in that of intersubjective identif ication, between home movies, 
documentaries, and f iction f ilms. To be sure, the definitions given to these 
three categories are rather rough-hewn. Thus, according to Meunier, home 
movies are characterized primarily by the fact that their subject is known 
and real; in documentaries, the subject is unknown and real, and in f ilms of 
f iction it is flatly unreal. However, the most signif icant point here is that, in 
Meunier’s view, these differences necessarily entail a correspondingly dif-
ferent intersubjective experience and therefore also a differently structured 
experience of f ilm. Thus, the experience of home movies is, according to 
Meunier, fundamentally driven by the viewer’s effort to rememorize the 
person depicted in it – documentary f ilm-viewing engages an attempt to 
understand that person, while f iction films demand the viewer to participate 
in the unfolding of the character’s situation.
For sure, two main methodological objections can be raised against such 
an account from a phenomenological perspective. On the one hand, one may 
wonder to what extent this presentation still holds true to the promise of 
its title, namely to outline the structures of ‘the’ f ilm experience phenom-
enologically. Does this perspective still allow envisaging f ilm experience as 
such, as an overarching invariant, or are we, on the contrary, only left with 
classifying a variety of possible f ilm experiences? On the other hand, if this 
latter is the case, are Meunier’s three categories even suff icient? Is one not 
implicitly led to differentiate the structural characteristics of each of these 
categories further and further into a variety of subcategories, while also 
adding countless other similar categories, such that, in the end, the very task 
of a ‘structural’ analysis of f ilm experience seems to be thrown overboard? 
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With these two questions in mind, I will, in the following, try to point out 
an important omission in Meunier’s reflections on f ilmic intersubjectivity. 
In doing so, however, I will simultaneously acknowledge his achievement by 
making use of a similar approach in adding a new term to his comparative 
list of typical f ilm experiences: the video-self ie.
2.
In his brief analysis of home movies, Meunier makes the following descrip-
tion of their markedly evocative viewing experience:
As for each of the gestures that I see on the screen, I do not apprehend them 
in their own individuality, but as representations of multiple gestures in 
reality. It matters little whether the person represented carries out a given 
particular activity. The activity in itself is of no interest. What interests me is 
to find, through the manner in which this particular activity is accomplished, 
a more general mode of behavior, repeatedly perceived in the absent person. 
In short, what I seek to render present to myself is the person-in-general, such 
as I knew him in the multiple real perceptions that I have had of him (p. 88).
One can almost picture the scene referred to in this description: a nostalgic 
viewer endlessly re-watching the same old footage of a departed friend or 
spouse, while completely disregarding the particular content of the tape in 
his sole interest to retrieve the shard of real presence preserved on film. As 
touching and theoretically rewarding as this scene might be, it describes only a 
very particular experience of watching a home movie, as several of the papers 
in the present volume aptly point out.1 Watching a tape of my friend’s wedding, 
which I could not attend, for instance, or some forgotten recordings from 
my childhood both entail viewing experiences that are hardly captured by 
Meunier’s descriptions. One could, on the one hand, pinpoint the issue at stake 
here by simply noting that these descriptions in fact only apply to “watching 
our own home movies,” as Vivian Sobchack puts it.2 In a somewhat broader 
perspective, one could, on the other hand, stress the fact that home movies 
are as such only meant for a limited ‘intended audience,’3 while the viewing 
experience of a third party would be different not least because it would 
always also contain an element of “trespassing.”4 The fact is, in any case, that 
both formulations bring into play a further dimension in the social structure 
of the home-movie experience in addition to the viewer’s apprehension of 
the film’s protagonist, discussed by Meunier. This may concern the viewer’s 
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relationship to the author of that film (as implied when speaking of ‘our own’ 
home movies), or both the protagonist and the author’s intentionality of their 
expected viewers (as implied when speaking of an ‘intended audience’). What I 
mean to say here is that the social structure of a home movie – and, in further 
consequence, that of f ilm experience in general – involves, from the outset, a 
more complex set of intentional relationships than just the sheer ‘identification’ 
of the viewer with the character, by specifically connecting the author, the 
protagonist, and the viewer in an intricate triangle of mutual references.
3.
Of course, this observation is, to a certain degree, commonplace in f ilm 
theory. As such, it is, for instance, already implicit in Christian Metz’s attempt 
to complicate the question of f ilmic identif ication by putting it in relation 
to the so-called “identif ication with the camera.”5 Instead, the point here is 
that, when considered in the perspective of the home-movie experience, the 
entire discussion shifts focus from the mere formal determinations of the 
cinematic apparatus to the concrete social intentionalities involved – and 
this is precisely the point at which one can also fruitfully bring into play 
video-self ies. In fact, paradoxically, video-self ies are the perfect starting 
point for an analysis of the intersubjective structure of f ilm experience 
precisely because they do not necessarily involve other people. As such, 
they offer a double advantage: they allow us to pose the question of f ilmic 
intersubjectivity strictly as a matter of structural relationships, and not as 
a matter of relationships between people, while they are particularly prone 
to be tackled phenomenologically by referring solely to the experience of 
a single subject. Thus, if we regard video-self ies in their most basic form as 
f ilms whose author, protagonist, and primary viewer are virtually one and 
the same individual subject, their phenomenology – which I will now try to 
pinpoint in f ive sketchy descriptions, focused on: perception, communica-
tion, affect, space, and movement – can easily show that the structure of 
mutual relationships they involve are by no means less rich or intricate than 
in the apparently more complex case of a feature f ilm of f iction.
a. Perception
First of all, recording a video-self ie normally implies the use of a mirror 
or monitor reflection. Thus, the f irst and most elementary form of inter-
subjectivity it involves is the sheer perceptual exchange of the look into a 
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mirror. This exchange has often been described. It is based on the dialectic 
of seeing and being seen. When looking from here at my reflection in the 
mirror there, I come to see myself back here from over there in following the 
reflection. This experience therefore necessarily entails a certain reversibility 
of perspectives, a mutual exchange between seeing and being seen, which is, 
above all, the defining feature of social interaction.6 Now, when recording a 
video-self ie, this relationship obviously becomes more complex. For, here, 
the subject no longer only regards, but also f ilms him- or herself, and he 
or she is no longer only seen, but also poses for the camera, while the two 
gestures – that of f ilming and that of posing – both involve, in addition to 
their mutual reference to one another, an intentional reference to a future 
viewer. Of course, this viewer may not be considered explicitly and may not 
even be a different person at all, but the anticipation of a future viewing 
is as such nevertheless structurally implicit in the very act of recording 
something with a camera, just as it is in the act of, say, smiling for the camera. 
Moreover, the two gestures, that of f ilming and that of posing, are here not 
only themselves engaged in a dialectic of reversibility that reduplicates the 
original dialectic of the mirror reflection, but this dialectical relationship 
is as such also visibly captured on f ilm in the composite expression of the 
protagonist, who is at the same time engaged in f ilming and posing for the 
camera. This unique expression, in which the intention of f ilming struggles 
with that of posing, arguably offers the most remarkable perceptual feature 
of self ies in general and video-selfies in particular, which, above all, prevents 
their superf icial comparison to traditional self-portraits.
b. Communication
Secondly, the intersubjective intentionality of a video-self ie is recognizable 
in its specif ic form of communicative address. For sure, address can take 
various forms in a video-self ie depending on whether it is intended as a 
video message, a vlog post, a f irst-person documentary, or a live report. 
The important point here is that, regardless of such differences, the act 
of address is performed by a subject who f ilms while regarding him- or 
herself in the mirror, and this specif ic circumstance also marks the com-
municative performance through and through. To be sure, the subject of a 
video-self ie does not simply address him- or herself, just as a TV presenter 
addressing viewers does not simply address the cameraperson. But, while 
indeed primarily addressing the intended viewer via the camera, the TV 
presenter is nevertheless in an ongoing agreement, that is: in a communica-
tive or cooperative relationship with the cameraperson, which might not be 
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immediately recognizable in his or her performance for the viewer, but which 
is nevertheless a distinctive part of its intersubjective complexity. Similarly, 
the fact that the communicative gesture of a video-self ie is marked by a 
permanent ascertainment of oneself in the mirror – that is, by perceptual 
exchanges with oneself that imprint on that performance – inevitably 
makes it acquire, to a certain degree, communicative qualities specif ic 
to mirror experiences. For instance, it is certain that part of the bashful-
ness of practicing a speech in front of the mirror implicitly stems from the 
ridicule of addressing oneself in general – for one of course already knows 
in advance what one might be saying, so that the gesture of speaking is, in 
front of oneself as an audience, unneeded and tends to fall f lat. Thus, one 
might say, it is precisely due to this that a certain aspect of blankness and 
redundancy still implicitly characterizes the communicative performance 
of video-self ies in general, regardless of how well the subject has adapted 
to the medium.
c. Affect
Thirdly, the same feature also determines the affective dimension of intersub-
jectivity in video-self ies. Thus, it is well known that audiovisual recordings 
are generally better suited than sheer mirror reflections for assessing one’s 
own performances. This is the case because they allow the subject to view 
him- or herself from the outside without constantly lapsing into the cor-
responding perspective from the inside.7 On the other hand, it is presumably 
because, in contrast to mirror reflections, recordings lack the possibility 
of (literal) identif ication, that one often experiences a certain discomfort 
when watching oneself in a recording.8 This embarrassment is indisputably 
increased in an intersubjective context. For, if I as a subject may already 
feel some unease when privately regarding my own recorded image – an 
image of myself that I can no longer adjust by self-composure as in the case 
of mirror images – the embarrassment is distinctly enhanced in the presence 
of others, who witness not just my embarrassing image itself, over which I 
am now powerless, but also my own embarrassment in relation to it. One 
could certainly point to a similarly complex interweaving of self-perception 
and intersubjectivity in the embarrassment one feels when surprised by 
others while preening in the mirror. In any case, if one may concede that 
this unease is to a certain degree culturally and historically determined, it 
nevertheless constitutes the indispensable affective background for grasping 
the fact that video-self ies at core amount to sharing with others the private 
or intimate act of watching oneself in the mirror. Of course, one might 
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hardly take notice of this fact when watching a video-self ie, as one might 
easily lose track of the circumstance that one’s interlocutor in a video-call 
is – just like oneself – simultaneously regarding him- or herself in a monitor 
image. Nevertheless, these relationships fundamentally impact on the 
intersubjective affectivity of both, embroiling the viewing I, the viewed I, 
and the other in specif ic constellations of mutual reference.
d. Space
Fourthly, the aforementioned social structure of video-self ies also deter-
mines how we experience their specif ic spatial structure. Thus, one could 
go as far as saying that a f ilm recorded by its protagonist as a video-self ie 
presents an entirely different experience of its f ilm space than the exact 
same shot recorded by a different person. This is again the case, above all, 
because of the sheer fact that, in recording it, the protagonist f ilms using a 
mirror. For this of course implies from the outset that the protagonist him- or 
herself also sees what we see. That is: he or she is not only the protagonist of 
the shot, but also its author and moreover, not only its author, but also our 
fellow spectator, with whom we actually share that specif ic view. Instead, 
insofar as the f ilm essentially reflects what the protagonist him- or herself 
is seeing, the image itself can be interpreted at the same time both as an 
objective shot and as a subjective, point-of-view shot. In other words, it can 
be read both straightforwardly and in reverse, as a mirror view, even if the 
camera itself is of course not facing a mirror and even if it only f ilms what 
it would also f ilm if it were held by a different person. As a consequence of 
this ambiguity, the spatial positions of the protagonist and of the camera 
in relation to one another virtually become mutually interchangeable, such 
that, we could say, the protagonist can be apprehended at the same time 
in front and behind the camera, on and off screen, making the f ilm image 
attain a strange sense of sphericity and enclosement.
e. Movement
Finally, a similar consequence can be derived with regard to the appercep-
tion of movement – and this includes both camera movements and the 
movements of the protagonist, which are here brought to coincide. Thus, 
on the one hand, the movements of the protagonist do not normally relate 
to their surrounding environment in a direct and unmediated fashion, 
but – insofar as the protagonist is continuously paying attention to the 
camera – only in relation to its mirror ref lection, just like a car driven 
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backwards while watching the rear mirror. Thus, the vantage point of the 
camera becomes, as in a rear mirror, the reference point for the orientation 
and interaction of the protagonist with his or her environment, conferring 
them a specif ic phenomenological deflection. Alternatively, this complex 
perceptual situation also renders the apperception of camera movements 
proper particularly complex – as becomes obvious, for instance, when 
considering GoPro video-self ies. For, in such a video-self ie, the camera in 
fact expresses the view of the protagonist not as a sheer extension of his or 
her sight, that is: as a direct prolongation of his own point of view, and thus as 
a simple form of “instrument mediated perception,” but instead as a second, 
juxtaposed point of view added to his or her body, which parallels and mir-
rors the f irst, while all camera movements are kinesthetically ambiguous in 
that they can be read reversibly both in view of their anchoring in the point 
of view of the camera and in that of the opposing protagonist handling it.
4.
An in-depth phenomenological analysis would have to work out the articula-
tions of these f ive moments in more detail in order to show how video-selfies 
bring about an entirely novel entanglement between the subjects’ experience 
of themselves and their relationship to others: the equivocal experience 
of simultaneously watching oneself in showing oneself to others and of 
showing oneself to others in regarding oneself. What our brief observa-
tions have already shown, however, is that this line of inquiry obviously 
goes beyond the classical objection brought against f ilmic identif ication. 
According to this objection, the traditional treatment of identif ication 
by f ilm theory only tackles the viewer’s empathic engagement with the 
protagonist (secondary identif ication) while ignoring his or her grounding 
engagement with the camera (primary identification). In contrast to this, our 
present reflections have shown that primary and secondary identif ication 
are both insuff icient to account for the social structure of f ilm experience 
insofar as this experience is generally not reducible to the intentionalities 
of the viewer alone. In other words, it is not just the viewer who willingly 
or unwillingly ‘identif ies’ with the protagonist and with the camera, but 
it is also the latter two who ‘identify’ with each other – and this is, in fact, 
precisely the point at which one could show that primary and secondary 
identif ication are fundamentally interlinked. For as long as the viewer 
‘identif ies with the protagonist,’ the protagonist’s relationship to the camera 
in turn becomes part of how the viewer apprehends the camera, and insofar 
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as the viewer ‘identifies with the camera,’ the camera and the cameraperson’s 
relationship to the protagonist become an integral part of how the viewer 
relates to the character. In short: the social structure of the f ilm experience 
essentially depends on how these mutual intentionalities are functionally 
interwoven. But, since this web of intersubjective relationships is certainly 
quite differently woven in video-self ies than, say, documentaries or f ilms 
of f iction, the purpose of pointing this out cannot be – as already resulted 
from Meunier’s considerations – that of def ining an invariant, structural 
feature common to f ilm experience in general. Instead, this approach could 
prove useful in two regards.
On the one hand, it could offer a theoretical framework better suited 
for specif ically grasping possible variations in the social structure of f ilm 
experience. For, indeed, since the structural relations between author(s), 
protagonist(s), and viewer(s) – in other words: the grounding interconnection 
between the social experience of f ilming and that of f ilm-viewing – are by 
far not as neatly recognizable in the case of most types of documentaries 
and f ilms of f iction as in that of home movies or video-self ies, it is only in 
contrasting them to one another that those structures become visible in 
their specif icity. One could thus, for instance, take a most basic element 
of documentary f ilmmaking like the interview as a starting point for phe-
nomenologically illustrating how the viewer’s experience varies with the 
precise distribution of the interlocutors’ intentionalities in addressing each 
other, respectively the viewer via the camera between an observational style 
recording of a discussion, a TV interview, an election show, or an Interrotron-
interview by Errol Morris. The least one could observe in performing such 
a variation is that the interviewer and the interviewee generally differ in 
their relationship to the camera, insofar as the interviewer does not simply 
occupy the position of a ‘protagonist,’ as does the interviewee, but he or she 
is at the same time to some extent an agent of the ‘authorship.’ Thus, the 
mutual interrelation between viewer, author, and protagonist is obviously 
marked here by the fact that the latter two terms are more ambiguously 
structured and intertwined, while this structural complexity is undeniably 
pushed even further in the case of f iction f ilms. For, since, in a regular 
f iction f ilm, all protagonists in fact have a share in the authorship as actors, 
while being pure protagonists as characters, the viewer’s experience of the 
f ilm is simultaneously determined by the camera’s non-existence for the 
character and by the actor’s expressive and cooperative performance in 
relation to the camera, which def ines that non-existence. Therefore, the 
social structure of the f iction f ilm experience fundamentally varies not 
only with the explicit acknowledgement of the camera by the character, 
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but implicitly also with the complexities of the relationship between the 
camera’s behavior and the actor’s expressivity in relation to it.
Be this as it may, however, such an approach is – as already stated – just 
one possible way of fructifying these considerations, and not the most 
philosophically rewarding in my regard. For, in fact, studying the social 
structure of f ilm experience might prove not just a matter of applying 
prior philosophical theories on intersubjectivity to the case of f ilm, but 
instead properly speaking also a way of uncovering novel and differently 
structured forms of social experience, as I briefly began to suggest here 
with regard to video-self ies. If this is indeed the case, then decoding these 
experiences could actually become a means for enriching and challenging 
those philosophical theories themselves. Speaking about video in the early 
1990s, Vilém Flusser claims: “whenever gestures appear that have never 
been seen before, we have the key to decoding a new form of existence. 
The gesture involved in manipulating a video camera represents in part a 
change to a traditional gesture. According to the hypothesis just presented, 
then, one way of deciphering our current existential crisis is to observe this 
gesture.”9 As our reflections above have shown, the same statement could 
go for video-self ies as well, which are themselves, no doubt, “a change to 
a traditional gesture” that promises access to entirely novel experiences 
of sociality. If this is indeed the case, however, then the main question we 
should f irst and foremost pose with regard to Meunier’s book concerns the 
extent to which reflecting on its second part and further developing it could 
also prove fruitful for expanding the scope of the f irst part.
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visible expression, from a phenomenological perspective, in the dialectic 
movement by which the viewing I constantly lapses into the viewed I and 
vice versa. One can vividly experience this reversion when practicing a 
speech or an act in front of the mirror. For, in striving to dissociate oneself 
from the viewed I so as to perceive oneself as another, the viewing I cannot 
maintain this posture in front of the mirror for long without constantly 
falling into the position of the viewed I with every gesture, statement, or gri-
mace. Hence, the awkwardness that makes it, to a certain degree, easier to 
perform an act directly in front of others rather than to practice it in front 
of the mirror. This observation might shed an interesting light on Robert de 
Niro’s famous mirror monologue in Taxi Driver (1976), not because the film 
accurately illustrates the aforementioned awkwardness, but on the contrary 
because it is completely lacking in it and the character addresses himself 
as another in front of the mirror with an estrangement that can only be at-
tained by highly trained actors or madmen, while the scene can be for sure 
read as testifying to both.
8. See the essay by Vivian Sobchack in this volume.
9. Vilém Flusser, Gestures, trans. Nancy Ann Roth (Minneapolis, MN: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. 142.
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According to Jean-Pierre Meunier, identif ication is an intersubjective 
process. Yet, when it comes to theorizing the attitudes by which we identify, 
he seems to suggest that a permanent and individuated subject has been in 
operation all along. This aporia has been examined in the debate between 
Mādhyamaka (middle way) school (theory of the emptiness) and the 
Yogācāra school (theory of existence) of Buddhism, a discourse borrowed 
by Chinese f ilm theorists since the late nineteenth century to scrutinize 
cinematic identif ication. This chapter argues that this aporia underlines 
not only how identif ication operates and why it must operate, but also 
how we inevitably return to it in our theorization.
Keywords: Buddhism and f ilm theory; Chinese f ilm theory and criti-
cism; Mādhyamaka Buddhism; Yogācāra Buddhism; cinema ontology 
and identif ication; Jean-Pierre Meunier
Introduction
In the beginning of The Structures of the Film Experience, Jean-Pierre Meunier, 
based on the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Angelo Hesnard, argues 
that cinematic identification is best understood not as a relationship between 
two individuated subjects. Rather, it is an inter-psychic connection that takes 
place on a level prior to individuation and subjectivization.1 In this sense, 
identification is not a process in which a pre-constituted subject becomes one 
with a pre-constituted object. Rather, it is a process of individuation, in which 
the divides between the self and the other, the subject and the object, and the 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
doi 10.5117/ 9789462986565_fan
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spectator’s body in here and the image out there, are initiated. Then, towards 
the end of his book, drawing on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Meunier 
reminds us that, what we sense and perceive as individuals in the image is 
the presence of the absence of an individual whose image was captivated by 
the camera in the past.2 Identif ication therefore requires the spectator to: 
(1) ‘presentify’ in a home movie, i.e. to make present the absence of someone 
we have known all along; (2) ‘personalize’ in a documentary, i.e. to give 
personality to an individual who has been reduced by the documentary 
to a representation of a larger social group, and (3) ‘affectivize’ in a f iction 
f ilm, i.e. to establish affective connections with an imagined character who 
has no existential value in our lived reality.
Between these two registers of understanding, there is an aporia. The 
understanding of identif ication according to Merleau-Ponty and Hesnard 
presumes an interdependent relationship between the spectator and the 
image. The individuation of these two parties renews itself at each moment 
of identif ication and each temporal point-instant of sense-perception. In 
this light, each party does not exist in its own right. The understanding 
of identif ication according to Sartre, however, presupposes the temporal 
permanence of a sentient body, which enables each sensory-perceptual 
point-instant to take place. It is this sensory-perceptual process that makes 
present the absence of the image, thus allowing the spectator to presentify, 
personalize, and affectivize the image as a subject.
Meunier’s shift from the f irst register to the second is symptomatic of a 
philosophical struggle outlined in the beginning of Henri Bergson’s Mat-
ter and Memory (Matière et mémoire, 1896). We cannot say that there is a 
permanent world out there that constitutes the mind in here (materialism), 
or that there is a permanent mind that projects a world out there (idealism). 
It is because our ability to sense and perceive and what we sense and perceive 
are interdependently related, that is, they arise and are extinguished in 
relation to each other. Nevertheless, despite our knowledge of this, it is 
extremely hard to theorize identif ication without imagining a je ne sais quoi 
from which a temporally and existentially permanent self is constituted. Yet, 
if understood this way, identif ication is ultimately not an intersubjective 
process, but an idealistic one, that is, the image is a milieu initiated from 
this je ne sais quoi that underlines the process of sense-perception.3
This question was f irst raised by Chinese intellectuals between the 1870s 
and the 1890s, who attempted to establish a comparative space between 
modern European philosophy and classical Chinese learnings – especially 
Buddhism – in order to foster an alternative mode of modernity.4 In the 
context of f ilm criticism, since 1897, f ilm critics have borrowed concepts from 
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Buddhism to address questions of ontology, spectatorship, and aesthetics.5 
In this chapter, I argue that Buddhist philosophy can help us rethink how 
intersubjectivity is constituted in the process of identif ication. I do so by 
scrutinizing two schools of Buddhism: the Mādhyamaka (middle way) school 
(theory of the emptiness) and the Yogācāra school (theory of existence). 
Since the Second Buddhist Council (c. 334 BCE), scholars have regarded 
these two schools of philosophy as two dialectically opposed methods of 
reasoning.6 Yet, they are both based on the same underlying assumption: that 
our sensory-perceptual reality is made up of sentient beings and inanimate 
objects that exist interdependently, arise and are extinguished from one 
temporal point-instant to another, caused by a set of nidānas (interdependent 
relationships). It means that these beings and objects are merely lakṣaṇas 
(forms) that have no existential values. They are anitya (impermanent) and 
anātman (not-having any existential value, or “empty”).7
Historical Background
Since the 1960s and 1970s, Lacanian f ilm theorists have pointed out that, in 
the cinema, the sensory-perceptual subject, who seems to exercise an agency 
looking at and constituting the image, is in fact constituted intersubjectively 
with the image.8 Yet, this interdependent relationship between the viewing 
subject and the image is extremely diff icult to grasp experientially, since 
my sense-perception and my intellectual reasoning are inevitably based on 
my body. In the 1930s, Shanghai-based Taiwanese screenwriter and critic 
Liu Na’ou (1905–1940) used the theory of meditation proposed by Yogācāra 
Buddhism to examine how a spectator approaches cinematographic reality 
subjectively on the one hand, and how they become one with the image 
intersubjectively on the other. In the end, for Liu, the cinematographic 
experience is neither subjective nor intersubjective.9
In Europe and North America, Buddhism is often understood as a form 
of spiritualism. Ironically, all schools of Buddhism reject the notion of 
the spirit and Buddhism itself was developed out of a philosophical, not 
religious, discourse in ancient South Asia.10 The use of Buddhist philosophy 
as a critical vocabulary emerged in China around the Six Dynasties (220 
or 222–589 CE).11 However, academic studies of philosophical Buddhism 
declined around the late Tang (618–907 CE) period.12 In the 1860s, scholar 
Yang Wenhui (1837–1911), upon “rediscovering” Buddhist logic, established 
the Jingling kejing chu (Jingling Sūtra Publishing House) in Nanjing in 1866 
(renamed the Zhina neixueyuan or China Inner Studies College in 1911).13 
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Seminars organized at the Publishing House and the College were attended 
by key intellectuals during the Republican period (1911–1949), including 
Ouyang Jian (1871–1943), Liang Qichao (1873–1929), Wang Guowei (1877–1927), 
Feng Zikai (1898–1975), and Thomé H. Fang (1899–1977). Many of them 
wrote comparative studies between Buddhism and European philosophy 
to propose an alternative mode of intellectual modernity.14
In addition, these scholars were inspired by the Kyoto School of philoso-
phers: Suzuki Daisetsu Teitaro (1894–1966), Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), 
and Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990). These philosophers criticized European 
modernity as a system based on the binary division between the self and the 
other. For them, Zen Buddhism provided a way to rethink human relation-
ships and world politics in intersubjective terms.15 Nonetheless, the Kyoto 
School’s anti-modernity position was appropriated by the militarists during 
the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Pacif ic War (1941–1945), which 
was largely questioned by their Chinese counterparts.16
The Twelve Nidānas and Middle Way Buddhism
The basic principles common to all schools of Buddhism are the twelve 
nidānas (interdependent relationships), which constitute all phenomena. 
For Shakyamuni Buddha (c. 563 or 480 BCE–c. 483 or 400 BCE), our una-
wareness of them is called avidyā (ignorance or unenlightened). The term 
“ignorance” is not to be taken negatively. Instead, it is the fundamental 
condition of existence. For example, a table is made up of pieces of wood 
assembled by a carpenter. Once assembled, this “table” is endowed with 
a lifespan: formation, endurance, deterioration, and emptiness. Without 
the interdependent relationships between the raw materials and the act of 
assembling them, there is no table and the time in which it dwells. We can 
say the same about a human body and anything that appears to exist in 
time. Our act of misrecognizing a being or an object as something that exists 
on its own, by ignoring the interdependent relationships that constitute 
them, is “ignorance.” 17
For Shakyamuni Buddha, ignorance is interdependently related to 
saṃskara, a cause-and-effect chain from which all forms of existence come 
into being – a force of life. In Buddhism, it is also known as karma – cause-
and-effect cycle.18 The interdependent relationship between ignorance 
and force-of-life produces vijñapatis (consciousnesses): the abilities to 
differentiate, from which the abilities to sense, think, act, and become 
conscious are manifested (nāmarūpa or naming).19 Vijñapatis are sometimes 
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interchangeable with the six vijñānas (consciousnesses of the eyes, ears, nose, 
tongue, body, and mind). With these consciousnesses, the six ṣaḍāyatana 
(entrances or organs) are initiated, which enable us to sparśa (come into 
contact with) āyatana (sense data). Such contact gives rise to vedanās 
(affections: pleasure, displeasure, non-pleasure, and non-displeasure) and 
generates tṛṣṇā (desire). With desire, we develop upādāna (attachment) to 
the self and to those beings and objects desired as though they were bhava 
(those which exist). With existence, temporality arises, which is manifested 
through jāti (birth) and jarāmaraṇa (old age and death).20
The earliest pupils of Shakyamuni Buddha believed that nirvāṇa (release 
from ignorance) could be achieved by abandoning the self and sense-
perception, so that they could dwell in śūnyata (emptiness). However, in 
so doing, they effectively treat emptiness as that which exists.21 Between the 
second and f irst centuries BCE, the Mahāsāṃghika sect began to rethink 
the implications of the theory of nidānas.22 Supposed that all things sensed 
and perceived are constituted by the twelve nidānas, these beings and 
objects have no existential values, i.e. they are śūnya (empty). At f irst glance, 
existence and emptiness seem to be two dialectically opposite modes of 
reality: the former corresponds to the Kantian notion of the phenomenon, 
the latter to the noumena (things-in-themselves). Between the second and 
third centuries CE, Buddhist scholar Nāgārjuna (150–c. 250 CE) argued, 
if emptiness simply refers to the absence of any existential value in the 
phenomenon, existence is empty, and emptiness is the foundation of exist-
ence – the two concepts are not identical, but they are also not different!23
Therefore, nirvāṇa is not a release from nidānas in order to reach a state 
of śūnyata, but from our unawareness that nidānas and śūnyata are inter-
dependently related. For Nāgārjuna, tathātā (the way it is, or the ultimate 
reality) lies in the mādhyamaka (middle way), or more appropriately, what 
remains after the differences between arising and extinction (existential 
difference), permanence and impermanence (temporal difference), identity 
and difference (spatial difference), and coming and going (difference in 
movement), have been deconstructed.24
In the cinema, for instance, we sense and perceive the image on-screen 
as a reality with its own temporality. Yet, such a reality is constituted by a 
set of interdependent relationships: light particles, a projector, a f ilm crew 
that made the f ilm, actors, and us as the spectators. The reality on-screen is 
therefore empty, and such emptiness is the foundation of cinematographic 
reality. Identification is, in this sense, a process initiated from an attachment 
to existence (temporality), and the self. For example, in a home movie, I form 
an attachment with the existence of the presence of the family member I 
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seem to see on-screen, even though this human f igure is absent (empty). 
Yet, for me, this human f igure initiates affections in me. Also, its form or 
appearance (presence) suggests time: I can trace the memory of this family 
member; they appear to be here; and they should continue to exist in this 
f ilmic reality. I therefore attach my self to this f igure as that which exists: 
I presentify it.
But then, for Nāgārjuna: (1) what existed in the past no longer exists; thus, 
existence in the past does not exist; (2) what will exist in the future does 
not exist, as existence in the future has not come into being yet; (3) in what 
we call the present, existence in the past has ceased to exist and existence 
in the future is yet to arise. In this sense, the presence, in which we dwell, 
is a difference between the past and the future, which has no existential 
value – or as Meunier argues, à la Sartre, a gap between retentionality and 
protentionality (p. 108).25 Yet, if neither the past, the future, nor the present 
has existential value, identif ication is an instantiation of attachment, an 
active ignoring of an assemblage of causalities that gives rise to both the 
sensory-perceptual body and the image. To presentify, personalize, and 
affectivize is to ignore wilfully that what we sense and perceive (in this 
case, the cinematic image and my body) is initiated out of an interdependent 
relationship between nidānas and śūnyata.
Yogācāra Buddhism and the Theory of Seeds
The process of identif ication can be nuanced with the theory of seeds pro-
posed by Yogācāra Buddhism. For Yogācāra scholars, the f irst six conscious-
nesses interdependently arise with the self-consciousness (manas-vijñāna), 
sometimes called the seventh consciousness. For Mādhyamikas (scholars of 
Mādhyamaka Buddhism), the f irst six consciousnesses and the self are not 
identical concepts. However, the self is initiated when the six consciousnesses 
are initiated and what the “self” signif ies is the summation of these six 
consciousnesses. Therefore, these concepts are not different. However, as I 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, for Yogācāra scholars, there must 
be a je ne sais quoi from which this interdependent relationship is initiated.
This problem is observed in Yogācāra meditation. First, a meditator 
observes that what they sense and perceive is an image (or milieu), given 
form by their own attachment (parikalpitah-sabhāva: form arisen from 
attachment). It is either an imagination (standalone image), a misrecognition 
(substance-image), or an image that seems to be initiated out of its own 
self-nature (nature-image).26 Then, a meditator observes that this image 
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consists of forms constituted by the twelve nidānas (parataṇtra-sabhāva: 
forms arisen from interdependency). Yogācāra further divides causality into 
four categories: (1) hetu-pratyaya (immediate and circumstantial causes); 
(2) samanantara-pratyaya (chronological causes); (3) ālambana-pratyaya 
(encounter between two sense-media); and (4) adhipati-pratyaya (assisting 
causes).27 In this light, the image out there is empty and impermanent. Its 
existence and temporality are given form by the interdependent relationship 
between the six consciousnesses and the self. But if so, such an interdepend-
ent relationship seems to be existent and permanent.
To circumvent this problem, Yogācāra scholars propose the idea of the 
ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness). Within the storehouse conscious-
ness, there lies an astronomical number of bījas (seeds). Each seed is an 
instantiation of the interdependent relationship between ignorance and 
force-of-life. When a seed is actualized, the f irst six consciousnesses arise 
interdependently with the self-consciousness. Each actualization of a seed 
initiates a series of smṛtsis (awarenesses), and a sequence of awarenesses 
constitutes an image that exists in time. To complicate matters, Yogācāra 
scholars argue that seeds are not actualized sequentially, but as an oghā 
(avalanche). Hence, temporality is not made up of a sequence of awarenesses, 
but a fabric of interdependently related awarenesses, each producing its 
own cause-and-effect chain (saṃskara or force-of-life), and together with it, 
ignorance. This renewed interdependent relationship between force-of-life 
and ignorance is instantiated as a new collection of seeds.28 These seeds 
therefore carry with them memories from the past, a potentiality, which, 
once actualized, turns into consequences that will unfold in the future. In 
other words, the ālaya-consciousness is the site where existence arises out 
of emptiness. An awareness of it is called parinispanna-sabhāva (ultimate 
reality).
The Image and Identification
In terms of the theory of seeds, how does identif ication work? Here, I 
scrutinize a photograph found in the family archive of my partner John 
Christiansen, which is a sepia medium close-up of his uncle John Adams 
when he was eighteen (see Fig. 9). Adams’s picture was taken in autumn 
1944 in a drugstore in Brooklyn when he was on leave from the army, shortly 
before he was sent to occupied France, where he died saving a wounded 
comrade on the battlef ield. The portrait was taken with a low-quality 
camera and the entire image is out of focus. In this portrait, Adams wears 
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a slightly oversized leather jacket. Underneath, he wears a plaid shirt with 
the top button open, thus revealing his white undershirt. Adams’s head is 
slightly lowered, yet his eyes stare directly into the lens. Correspondingly, 
his crescent-shaped mouth is slightly open with a smile, as though the smile 
had yet to be completed or as though he were about to say something. In fact, 
his slightly lowered head seems to be arrested in the middle of an action. 
His strong nose sits in the middle of his face, his eyes are wide open and 
brightly lit, and his thick eyebrows frame the top of his eyes and give form 
to his tall forehead. His left ear (on frame right) is hidden from the camera, 
whereas his right ear (on frame left) juts out with a touch of humor. He has 
a young and handsome face with an air of def iance. He wears a smoothly 
and immaculately done quiff parted towards the left side of his skull. He 
is looking at you.
In Yogācāra Buddhism, a nature-image arises when the ability to sense, 
perceive, and (re)cognize encounters a set of sense data. In 1944, the im-
age of Adams (as a living being) arose through the sensory-perceptual 
Fig. 9: Portrait of John adams in Lower Manhattan, shortly before he was sent to Germany in 
Spring 1944 (d. amanvillers, occupied France, September 11, 1944). courtesy of John christiansen.
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mechanism of the camera and a set of interdependent relationships. The 
camera mechanically preserved some of these relationships, especially the 
way light particles were related to each other and the way Adams comported 
and looked into the camera that day. Today, the photographic image of 
Adams arises again through my own sensory-perceptual process, depend-
ent upon some of the same interdependent relationships that gave rise to 
Adams’s existence. This in fact corresponds to André Bazin’s understanding 
of photographic ontology.29 As Roland Barthes comments on Alexander 
Gardner’s photograph of Lewis Payne in 1865, shortly after he was executed 
for an attempted assassination of U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward: 
“He is dead and he is going to die….”30
When I behold the photograph, the image is initiated from the operation 
of my f irst six consciousnesses, which are in turn dependent upon my self-
consciousness. This self-consciousness gives the series of sensory-perceptual 
instants that take place in the f irst six consciousnesses an impression of 
unity and integrity. The self therefore assumes the role of an observer and 
sees the image as a phenomenon initiated out of a set of interdependent 
relationships: immediate and circumstantial causes, chronological causes, 
encounters between two sense-media, and assisting causes. I then come 
to believe that the photographic image is a nature-image because of my 
attachment to the self and to the phenomenon.
The operation of the first six consciousnesses, under the supervision of the 
self, stimulates the seeds that have laid dormant in the ālaya-consciousness 
and produces more instantiations of ignorance (seeds). Each stimulation is 
triggered by an activation of a seed, from which an awareness is initiated. 
Once the first awareness is initiated, the entire sensory-perceptual operation 
is also initiated as a fabric of complex cause-and-effect chains, experienced 
by me as a chronological sequence. In this sequence, a second awareness 
arises, during which the self-consciousness seeks the permanence of the 
f irst awareness, i.e. I want this image to persist in time and to discern what 
it really is. Then, a third awareness arises, which determines what such an 
awareness is: I can determine that this image is the image of Adams, which 
exists in time. This is followed by a fourth awareness, in which the qualita-
tive value (e.g. pleasure and displeasure) of the awareness is determined, 
which then triggers a sequence of awarenesses, which in turn constitutes 
the photographic image of Adams and the time in which it dwells. This is 
the way by which I presentify the image of Adams as Adams, a process of 
identif ication that is also a process of becoming Adams. In the cinema or 
a moving image, this process further gives form to birth and extinction, 
permanence and impermanence, similarity (continuity) and difference 
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(discontinuity), coming and going – impressions that constitute temporality 
and spatiality. In short, I identify because my ālaya-consciousness cannot 
let go of the need to identify, and I cannot let go of presentifying myself.
Conclusion
What Yogācāra scholars and practitioners identify, however, is an impasse. 
The ālaya-consciousness never stops operating. Yogācāra scholars argue 
that it is a pure potentiality from which permanence and impermanence, 
existence and non-existence are initiated. Nonetheless, scholar Yin Shun 
(1906–2005) argues that the concept of the ālaya- consciousness, understood 
this way, becomes a je ne sais quoi that closely resembles a “f irst cause.” For 
him, ālaya-consciousness is a powerful tool to explicate not only why we 
are incapable of letting go of the self and of permanence, but also why, in 
philosophy and theory, we often replicate the same impasse. For us, we can 
understand perfectly that identif ication is an intersubjective process. Yet, 
when we explain how we identify, we are always tempted to assume that 
a permanent self is in operation.31
Yin Shun therefore suggests that we revisit Mādhyamaka Buddhism 
for a possible way out of this impasse. According to the Vajracchedikā 
Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra [Diamond Sūtra]:
All phenomena are like
A dream, an illusion, a bubble and a shadow.
Like a dew drop and a f lash of lightning,
Thus should you view them.32
The cinematic image and our process of identif ication operate in a way 
similar to a dream, an illusion, a bubble, a shadow, a dew drop, and a flash 
of lightning. If we simply say that, because it is transient, that it does not 
exist, we deny the fact that it is a reality initiated out of the twelve nidānas. 
If we say that it exists, we deny the fact that its existence is empty. A f ilm 
appears to us as a reality that has its own existential value, one that is 
initiated from the existential value of the photographed being or object 
in the past. Yet, it remains a set of sense data, an assemblage of light and 
shadow that runs 24 frames per second. One reality is not more real than the 
other, and we have a penchant to attach ourselves not only to the image as 
that which exists, but also to our “selves” as those which exist. In this sense, 
the cinema is a technical milieu in which these two modes of existence 
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are neither identical nor different. In this technical milieu, identif ication 
is an intersubjective process. Yet, the intersubjectivity of such a process is 
often ignored both experientially and theoretically. It is because this entire 
process is driven, in the f irst place, by a saṃskara that carries memories 
from the past, memories from which the divide between the self and other, 
the spectator and the image, and the past and the future are all initiated.
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 Whose Identification? A Brief 
Meditation on the Relevance of Jean-
Pierre Meunier’s The Structures of 




This essay responds to Meunier’s The Structures of the Film Experience 
from the perspective of feminist phenomenological f ilm theory, whose 
development from the early 1990s onward it begins by tracing. It argues 
that Meunier’s employment of Angelo Hesnard’s phenomenological under-
standing of identif ication in Psychanalyse du lien interhumain (1957) offers 
a more promising way for historical f ilm phenomenology to engage with 
current queer and feminist work in the f ield than does the scientif ically 
skeptical response to queer and feminist f ilm phenomenologies outlined 
by Christian Ferencz-Flatz and Julian Hanich in their 2016 essay “What 
is Film Phenomenology?” It draws on feminist phenomenologist Sandra 
Bartky’s essay “Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness” 
(1975) in support of this claim.
Keywords: Feminist phenomenology; feminist consciousness; female 
viewing subject; existential ethics; Sandra Bartky; Angelo Hesnard
Introduction: Feminist Film Phenomenology in History
My primary connection to f ilm phenomenology is the work collected in 
my The Body and the Screen: Female Subjectivities in Contemporary Women’s 
Cinema.1 This book comprises a set of readings of f ilms directed by mostly 
well-known women f ilmmakers that is prefaced by a philosophical chapter 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
doi 10.5117/ 9789462986565_ince
260 K aTE incE 
on theories of female subjectivity and a historico-critical chapter that 
attempts to trace a genealogy of feminist f ilm philosophy, which (it f inds) 
overlaps to a considerable degree with recent work in f ilm phenomenology. 
I am actually more inclined to describe myself as a feminist phenomenolo-
gist than as a f ilm phenomenologist, but have accepted the invitation to 
consider how Jean-Pierre Meunier’s important volume The Structures of the 
Film Experience can inform and contribute to the feminist phenomenologi-
cal strand of f ilm theory I outline in the second chapter of The Body and 
the Screen for two reasons: f irst, I am a feminist phenomenologist who 
works particularly with French cinema and French f ilm theory, as well as 
f ilm theory and f ilm philosophy more generally, and second, two of my 
publications gain a mention in the excellent editorial introduction to the 
recent issue of Studia Phaenomenologica written by Christian Ferencz-Flatz 
and Julian Hanich, which bears the reassuringly open title “What Is Film 
Phenomenology?”2 If only on this account, I must, it seems, be some kind 
of f ilm phenomenologist.
Since the literature in which feminism and queer theory have begun to 
intersect with f ilm phenomenology is not widely discussed in this volume, I 
shall begin with a brief summary of the history of feminist phenomenology.3 
Although it may be dated to the publication of Simone de Beauvoir’s The 
Second Sex (Le Deuxième Sexe) in 1949, or even earlier to the work of Husserl’s 
doctoral student and assistant Edith Stein in the late 1910s, it did not really 
have an academic profile until 1980, when Iris Marion Young’s essay “Throw-
ing Like a Girl: a Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, 
and Spatiality” was first published, followed four years later by Judith Butler’s 
“Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description: A Feminist Critique 
of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception.”4 Then, as I chart in The 
Body and the Screen, “the f irst book on [feminist phenomenology] in English 
was Linda Fisher and Lester Embree’s co-edited Feminist Phenomenology, 
which was based on a symposium held in 1994, and the 2000s and 2010s 
have seen a steady growth of publication in the area and the formation of 
a Society for Interdisciplinary Feminist Phenomenology at the University 
of Oregon.”5 Film phenomenology, as Ferencz-Flatz and Hanich set out in 
the introduction to their recent issue of Studia Phaenomenologica, took off 
in earnest in the late 1940s when Gilbert Cohen-Séat founded the Institut 
de Filmologie at the Sorbonne: many phenomenologically oriented essays 
appeared in the Revue internationale de filmologie during the fourteen years 
that this journal was published in Paris, including those by Henri Wallon 
and Albert Michotte van den Berck referred to by Meunier in The Structures 
of the Film Experience.
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I entirely agree with Ferencz-Flatz and Hanich that there are “two decisive 
moments in f ilm phenomenology’s history: the years of 1946ff (with 1947 as 
the key moment) and 1990ff (with 1992 as the crucial date).”6 But my feminist 
phenomenological perspective on f ilm phenomenology’s history leads me to 
see the 1992 publication of Vivian Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye, which 
draws on Iris Marion Young’s take-up of Merleau-Ponty’s and Simone de 
Beauvoir’s phenomenology in the late 1970s and 1980s, and an article by 
Gaylyn Studlar in the special 1990 issue of the Quarterly Review of Film 
and Television on “Phenomenology in Film and Television,” mentioned by 
Ferencz-Flatz and Hanich as marking out not just the second key intersection 
of phenomenological philosophy with f ilm studies in the twentieth century, 
but the initial encounter of feminist f ilm studies with phenomenological 
philosophy. What I call “the feminist phenomenological strand of f ilm 
theory/philosophy” probably counts as many feminist philosophers in 
its number – de Beauvoir, Sandra Bartky, Iris Young, Luce Irigaray, Sonia 
Kruks – as it does film philosophers – Vivian Sobchack, Gaylyn Studlar, 
Laura Marks, and Jennifer Barker – but at least some of the second group 
would, I feel sure, describe themselves as feminists, despite the different 
object(s) of their philosophical attention not entailing the same degree of 
engagement with female identity and female subjectivity.
The Body and the Screen is concerned above all with the subjectivities of 
female characters, directors, and writers, but here, as part of the dialogue 
with Meunier’s The Structures of the Film Experience, I want to take up an 
issue I fairly explicitly set aside in the book – the female viewer. I term ‘her’ 
“the female viewing subject,” rather than “the female spectator” in order to 
distinguish a phenomenological approach to f ilmic identif ication (including 
Meunier’s) from the approach to spectatorship pursued during the era of 
psychoanalytic/semiotic/Marxist f ilm theory that prevailed from about 
1970 until at least the late 1980s.7
Identification in The Structures of the Film Experience
Can Meunier’s book contribute to an account of viewing au féminin? Address-
ing this question will turn around the concept of identification and the way 
it is employed by Meunier in The Structures of the Film Experience, which is 
not presented as exclusively phenomenological. Early in his book, he says 
that “depending on the subjacent theoretical conceptions or the nuanced 
considerations of the process, [identif ication] also goes by the names of 
‘emotional participation,’ ‘projection’ or ‘empathy’.” (p. 32) A little later, he states
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In their rush to apply the process of identif ication to the f ilmic situation, 
the majority of studies dedicated to the problem have, it seems, abusively 
simplif ied the data. Often, the original form of the Freudian mechanism 
has been ‘transplanted’ into the f ilmic situation without any changes. But 
this neglects the fact that the mechanism in question, in the framework 
of developments in psychoanalysis and other theoretical tendencies, had 
itself undergone various retouches, and nourished numerous controver-
sies, and that it was thus rather hasty to utilize the notion of identif ication 
without subjecting it to a prior critical examination. (p. 33)
Meunier’s mention here of “various retouches” made to the mechanism of 
identification theorized by Freud, and to the “numerous controversies” nour-
ished by it, seems to allude principally to phenomenology – Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception, certainly, but also other mid-twentieth century 
deployments of phenomenological philosophy. In effect, what Meunier does in 
this statement is steer carefully around one or more troubled chapters in the 
history of the concept of identif ication and turn a page (as it were) to a new 
chapter, in which he will deploy it in quite a singular way. This singularity, 
however, is not so much his own as Angelo Hesnard’s in Psychanalyse du 
lien interhumain (Psychoanalysis of the Interhuman Link), a source Meunier 
quotes from no fewer than nine times in the “Perception” and “Identif i-
cation” chapters of The Structures of the Film Experience.8 Meunier states 
quite unambiguously just before the start of Chapter 2 that it is Hesnard’s 
understanding of identif ication and the way he deploys it in Psychanalyse 
du lien interhumain, that he will draw on for the main part of his study in 
Part Two: “Here we return to the theories of Hesnard, who by rethinking the 
concept [of identif ication] in the framework of a psychology enriched by the 
gains of phenomenological thinking, has unveiled its true meaning.” (p. 48)
What are the key modif ications Hesnard has made to identif ication in 
his rethinking of it? Filmic identif ication, Meunier explains,
came to be considered in its objective form, that is, as a psychic mechanism 
(a mechanism of projection and introjection) or as a function (an empathic 
function) destined to comprehend or explain the functioning of the 
objective models of the personality constructed by scientif ic theory. (p. 33)
This was understandable, since
[i]t is, after all, generally admitted that the psyche can be regarded as an 
object, a slice of the perceptual world, or even an externally observable 
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apparatus. […] But in adopting this point of view, which it often did, 
f ilmology exposed itself to the same reproach that, in the last few years, 
phenomenological thinking has addressed to the scientif ic attitude in 
general, and which has done much to weaken it. By transposing psychic 
phenomena to an external objectivized form, that is, by reducing them 
to the state of simple functions or mechanisms, their very nature was 
altered, and their meaning or signif ication was thereby lost. (p. 33)
In an extrapolation of a central insight of the pioneers of phenomenology 
(Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty), Meunier insists, against “the 
scientific attitude” that “[t]his meaning or signification can only be perceived 
if we place ourselves on the terrain from which these phenomena have been 
extracted – namely, lived, f irst person experience” (p. 33/34). The meaning 
of phenomena must be discovered “as they present themselves to the subject 
who experiences them.”
Levels of Generality in Phenomenological Description
At this point in his presentation of Hesnard’s de-objectivation of the mecha-
nism of identification, Meunier touches on the issue of generality and particu-
larity in phenomenological description, also considered by Ferencz-Flatz and 
Hanich in section 4.2 of “What Is Film Phenomenology?”, entitled “Feminist 
and Queer Phenomenology.” Meunier specifies that describing lived experience
is not a matter, of course, of elucidating particular forms of behavior – for 
example, a given identif ication of a given subject with a given person 
– through the concrete modalities of their realization, but, rather, of 
unveiling the invariable aspect in these particular forms of behavior. In 
other words, we must abstract real forms of behavior and the structures 
that we can locate in all forms of the same kind of behavior, which 
themselves are their specif ic, concrete realizations. (p. 34)
This statement of Meunier’s appears to echo the preference Ferencz-Flatz 
and Hanich state for a search for invariability over particular differentiation 
when they take issue with queer and feminist critiques of a seemingly 
universal type of body experience. Such critiques of seemingly universal 
descriptions of (f ilm) experience can be located on two levels, the two 
scholars state, either as a “problem of incompleteness” (the descriptions 
are wrong in their limitedness, and must be amended and complemented 
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“by descriptions of specif ically female and/or queer experiences”), or as 
a “problem of generality” (the descriptions’ aspiration to universality is 
correct, but they are insuff iciently specif ic, and “should be amended and 
complemented by more concrete descriptions”).9 The distinction made 
here between levels of critique is, to my mind, a spurious one, introduced 
for the purposes of refuting the anti-universalist stance(s) of queer and 
feminist f ilm phenomenologists: the solution to a problem Ferencz-Flatz 
and Hanich claim to be two problems is actually the same (the descriptions 
of f ilm experience in question “must be amended and complemented” by 
the “more concrete” descriptions of “female and/or queer experiences”).
Whereas Ferencz-Flatz and Hanich employ logical argument of a Husser-
lian kind to f ind fault with the critiques of universal (f ilm) experience made 
of Merleau-Ponty by Vivan Sobchack and Judith Butler, Meunier aff irms, in 
a positive recommendation more in tune with existential phenomenology, 
that the description of the lived experience of f ilm should abstract directly 
from real forms of viewers’ behavior and seek invariable structures in those 
forms of behavior.10 (This could be effected on descriptions supplied by 
groups of viewers who share a gender or a race just as easily as on the experi-
ences of a mixed audience.) Meunier is aware that there is still abstraction 
involved in his recommended procedure for a ‘de-objectivized’ approach to 
the experiential description of f ilm, and asks whether it “slip[s] back into 
the impasses of the scientif ic attitude,” but answers his own question in 
the negative, since the abstraction at issue is, he says, a single rather than 
a double objectivation of the kind hitherto effected on analyses of f ilmic 
identif ication (p. 34). (It is the second stage of objectivation that situates the 
analysis “in an objective, externally observable model, and thus, as we said 
above [loses] its meaning for the subject and real nature” [p. 34]). Meunier’s 
conclusion to this section of The Structures of the Film Experience is: “Thus, 
the basis for research must not be any kind of conception of man as an object 
of observation, but an explanation of man as an experiential subject.” (p. 35)
In their interventions into f ilm phenomenology, queer and feminist f ilm 
scholars are also concerned with experiential subjectivity – the subjectivities 
of female and queer embodied subjects, rather than the aspirationally 
universal subjectivity of ‘man.’ The de-universalization entailed in basing 
research into f ilm-viewing on specif ied types of viewing subject arguably 
maintains a focus on subjectivity, ‘the real world’ and meaning exactly 
where it is lost by aspiring to “generalities, invariant structures of experience 
[…] with an emphasis on sameness, solidarity, empathy” that Ferencz-Flatz 
and Hanich state to be one of the diverse motives for doing phenomenology 
(the alternative motive they mention is “to describe how an experience is 
wHoSE iDEnTiFicaTion? 265
individual, unique, particular, singular,” which they suggest “is in the interest 
of a politics of recognition and emancipation”11). By outlining two levels of 
objectivation which can be effected upon the mechanism of identif ication 
(and potentially other psychic phenomena), Meunier introduces a level 
not allowed for by Ferencz-Flatz and Hanich’s binary distinction between 
generality and individuality/uniqueness, a level that corresponds neither 
to the “pipedream of pretended neutrality” in subjectivity described by 
Gaylyn Studlar, nor to a wholly unique individual subject.12 In other words, 
where Ferencz-Flatz and Hanich argue that a rejection of the sharing of 
experiences on the level of all viewers undermines claims for the sharing of 
experiences by identified sub-groups of f ilm-viewers such as female viewers, 
Meunier’s framework of two levels of objectivation makes it possible to 
argue simultaneously for difference (actual difference in embodiment or 
sexuality) and sharedness within identif ied sub-groups of f ilm-viewers. 
Arguing for sharedness “only for a more specif ic level of generality and not 
for a more general level of generality” (Ferencz-Flatz/Hanich) is, Meunier 
would appear to agree (with me), not particularly diff icult.13 Moreover, 
sharedness is not necessarily embraced “in the interest of a politics of 
recognition and emancipation.” It may indeed be appropriate to consider 
feminist f ilm phenomenology as “post-structuralist inflected” – putting it at 
the ‘individual/unique/particular/singular/different’ level of Ferencz-Flatz 
and Hanich’s binary model of levels of generality – since feminist theory has 
been significantly shaped by post-structuralist questioning and deconstruc-
tion of the understanding of the subject as unitary and ‘individual,’ and 
has been more diverse and complex – more attuned to racial, social, and 
embodied differences between women – than the suggestion that it is held 
together by a “politics of recognition and emancipation” allows for some 
considerable time.
Identifying with First-Person Experience, an Ethics of Method
It is not only through his framework of two levels of objectivation, which 
offers feminist and queer phenomenologies of f ilm a route via which to 
maintain an emphasis on their embodied difference while researching 
(quite possibly empirically) what unites them, that Meunier’s approach 
to f ilm phenomenology can act as a model for future enquiry in this f ield: 
there is an ethics to the very method he uses in The Structures of the Film 
Experience that could serve such future enquiry well. For Meunier approaches 
the sketch of the home-movie, documentary, and f iction-film modes of f ilm 
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consciousness he undertakes in Part Two of his book in the first person, 
enacting the retention of meaning and signif ication he insists on in at the 
start of his study. To quote Meunier again:
For us, it will not be a question of objectively representing to ourselves 
the experience of the spectator-subject, but, of placing ourselves within 
this experience, of attempting to describe and reveal its meaning, and 
specify its fundamental structures. (p. 35)
By doing exactly this in Part Two of The Structures of the Film Experience, 
Meunier enacts what could be called an ethics of identif ication (“placing 
ourselves within this experience”), which I would argue should be adopted 
by future f ilm-phenomenological enquiry.
Sandra Bartky’s essay “Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Conscious-
ness” – an approach to a particular type of consciousness that parallels 
Meunier’s enquiry into f ilm consciousness in The Structures of the Film 
Experience – offers some useful considerations for the path I am attempting 
to steer here. Bartky notes early in the essay that “To be a feminist, one has 
f irst to become one,” which often “involves the experience of a profound 
personal transformation, a [‘complex and multi-faceted’] experience which 
goes far beyond that sphere of human activity we regard ordinarily as ‘politi-
cal’.”14 This transformation entails altered behavior, and
These changes in behavior go hand in hand with changes in consciousness: 
to become a feminist is to develop a radically altered consciousness 
of oneself, of others and of what for lack of a better term, I shall call 
‘social reality.’ […] What is a fully developed feminist consciousness like? 
In this paper, I would like to examine not the full global experience of 
liberation, involving as it does new ways of being as well as new ways 
of perceiving but, more narrowly, those distinctive ways of perceiving 
which characterize feminist consciousness. What follows will be a highly 
tentative attempt at a morphology of feminist consciousness.15
The morphology Bartky goes on to attempt suggests that feminist con-
sciousness is ‘anguished’ in a way politicized consciousnesses typically 
are: it manifests the “inner uncertainty and confusion which characterizes 
human subjectivity in periods of social change.”16 Bartky rebukes Marx-
ist scholarship for not paying suff icient attention “to the ways in which 
the social and economic tensions they study are played out in the lives of 
concrete individuals,” conf irming (since she also states this in different 
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terms elsewhere in the essay) that this is her motivation for incorporating 
phenomenological description into Marxist analysis – in other words, for 
adding feminist consciousness to a body of scholarship that has only ever 
considered one mode of consciousness – class consciousness – at all seri-
ously.17 How, though, is the temporality of feminist consciousness to be 
understood? Bartky elucidates as follows:
This consciousness […] emerges only when there exists a genuine pos-
sibility for the partial or total liberation of women. This possibility is 
more than a mere accidental accompaniment of feminist consciousness. 
Feminist consciousness is the apprehension of that possibility. The very 
meaning of what the feminist apprehends is illuminated by the light of 
what ought to be. The given situation is f irst understood in terms of a state 
of affairs not yet actual and in this sense a possibility, a state of affairs in 
which what is not given would be negated and radically transformed.18
This project of negation and transformation constitutes transcendence as 
Sartre describes it in Being and Nothingness (L’être et le néant), but under-
standing “what we are and where we are in the light of what we are not 
yet” is a perspective Bartky considers insuff iciently rooted in the actual, 
present world for feminism, a point that leads her to admit that there will be 
instances in which the possibilities apprehended by feminist consciousness 
are not realizable, because of unfavorable material conditions.19 Feminist 
consciousness, she implies with this observation, is not a property that can 
be acquired; it is a way of conceiving of the world that may come and go. The 
phenomenology of feminist consciousness Bartky attempts (and I am sug-
gesting), which might serve feminist phenomenological explorations of f ilm 
experience, is, it must be emphasized, phenomenological and not ontological: 
ontological questioning and theorizing are not appropriate approaches to 
the phenomenon at issue. And just as importantly, it is a politicized and 
political form of consciousness – feminist consciousness – and not the 
essentialistically defined gendered entity female consciousness that Bartky 
considers it possible and worthwhile to describe and approach in her essay. 
To enter into speculation about distinct female and male consciousness(es) 
would be to re-rehearse debates about the possible usefulness of essentialist 
theorizing for feminism that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
and therefore philosophically, as well as politically, retrograde.
Further aspects of feminist consciousness explored by Bartky in “Towards 
a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness” – that it is consciousness of 
victimization, and that it entails apprehensiveness, suspicion, or ‘wariness’ 
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– are not in my view especially relevant to the pertinence the concept 
could prove to have for the specif icity of women’s experiences of viewing 
f ilm.20 Of the two quasi-def initions of the concept Bartky offers in her 
concluding paragraphs – that it “can be understood as the negating and 
transcending awareness of one’s own relationship to a society heavy with 
its own contradictions,” and that it is “the consciousness of a being radically 
alienated from her world and often divided against herself, a being who sees 
herself as victim and whose victimization determines her being in-the-world 
as resistance, wariness and suspicion,” the f irst seems a better basis on 
which to move forward to the description of women’s experiences of viewing 
f ilms.21 Probably even more noteworthy for the possible rapprochement of 
Bartky’s work with feminist phenomenological f ilm theory, however, because 
it confirms the proximity of her discussion to existential phenomenology, 
is her statement “To develop feminist consciousness is to live a part of 
one’s life in the sort of ambiguous ethical situation which existentialist 
writers have been most adept at describing.”22 This observation coincides 
with my discussion, toward the end of the f irst chapter of The Body and 
the Screen, of female subjectivity as ethical in its ambiguity (for Beauvoir) 
or two-ness (for Luce Irigaray), a coincidence to which I draw attention 
simply in order to emphasize that the question of method, with which 
Meunier is concerned in The Structures of the Film Experience (and which 
may also be seen at work in Bartky’s f irst-person approach in “Towards a 
Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness”), is itself an ethical question. In 
The Structures of the Film Experience, Meunier does not comment directly 
as he proceeds on the f irst-person form he adopts when working through 
the viewing experiences that constitute the three attitudes of imaginary 
f ilmic consciousness (toward the film-souvenir, the documentary, and the 
f iction f ilm), but he anticipates the value of this method in his introductory 
discussion of levels of objectivation, and states there: “The present study 
constitutes an attempt in this direction.” (p. 35) The method he employs in 
Part Two of his book is one that values f irst-person subjective experience 
practically and ethically, as much as it does philosophically.
To conclude by recapitulating my argument in this essay, it has been that 
the intersection and confluence of contemporary queer and feminist f ilm 
phenomenologies with historical f ilm phenomenology will benefit from 
employing the ‘ethics of method’ I claim emerges in Meunier’s The Structures 
of the Film Experience, and has previously been practiced by feminist phenom-
enologists such as Sandra Bartky. This ethics arises from Meunier’s adoption of 
the phenomenological approach to identification, set out by Angelo Hesnard 
in Psychanalyse du lien interhumain, which Meunier implicitly observes in his 
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explanation of the importance of de-objectivizing the concept of identification 
in the introduction to The Structures of the Film Experience and then practices 
in the highly original sketch of the home-movie, documentary, and fiction-film 
modes of consciousness he undertakes in Part Two of his book.
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IV: Referentiality and Mediation
 Jean-Pierre Meunier’s Modalities of the 
“Filmic Attitude” : Towards a Theory of 
Referentiality in Cinematic Discourse
Guido Kirsten
Abstract
Meunier’s ref lections upon the differences between the “home-movie 
attitude,” the “documentary attitude,” and the “f iction attitude” can help 
to develop a theory of reference in cinematic discourse. Such a theory 
needs to take into account three fundamental ideas. First, reference is 
not constituted by the f ilm alone but results from an interaction between 
f ilm and viewer. Second, there are different kinds of objects (or entities 
with different “modes of being”) that are referred to. These two ideas can 
be drawn more or less directly from Meunier’s argument. The third idea is 
less obvious but logically implied: it is based on a differentiation between 
three dimensions of meaning: intensional (with an ‘s’), extensional, and 
referential meaning, all of which co-exist phenomenologically.
Keywords: Film theory; reference; intension; extension; realism; modes 
of reading
Introduction
In a brief note published in 1963 in Raymond Bellour’s short-lived journal 
Artsept, Roland Barthes writes about Strangers of the Earth (Les inconnus 
de la terre, 1961), a cinéma-vérité documentary by Mario Ruspoli:
This f ilm is a genuine investigation; Ruspoli lets his farmers speak and 
they immediately convey, through their direct, concrete language, the 
problems of the French peasantry today: their pitiful revenues, the an-
tiquated technology, the generational antagonism between young and 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
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old, the conflict between individual and the group, the demand for better 
living conditions and more freedom. Before our eyes, class-consciousness 
awakens and speaks of its own accord.1
Ruspoli had interviewed several peasants in Lozère (a department in the 
region of Occitanie, in southern France). Sometimes they discuss among 
each other in front of the camera. Yet, for Barthes, the f ilm is not about 
these individuals, but about class-consciousness and the general “problems 
of the French peasantry today.”
In the French original, this last phrase reads “les problèmes généraux du 
paysan français d’aujourd’hui,” which reminds me of Jean-Pierre Meunier’s 
la personne-en-générale (“the person-in-general”), who we tend to see, ac-
cording to Meunier, when watching home movies.2 Meunier writes that 
“the consciousness of the home movie appears as a constitutive activity: it 
looks beyond the image, to the person-in-general that it depicts, in order 
to produce and maintain his existence even during the screening” (p. 88).
The two cases are also quite different, of course: Barthes, in his reading 
of Strangers of the Earth, merges several individuals into one collective 
singular (“the French peasant”), while Meunier claims that we look beyond 
one single person who is well known to us, to perceive her general traits, 
her gestures, her individual personality. But the cases are comparable in 
that the cinematic discourse’s referents shift from what we immediately 
perceive – individuals in specif ic situations – to more abstract entities. Both 
thus raise questions for a general theory of referentiality in f ilm.
Meunier’s Modalities
Jean-Pierre Meunier’s thoughts on the structures of f ilm experience, and 
especially his differentiation of three “modalities of the ‘f ilmic attitude’,” 
can help formulate such a theory3 (p. 116). These three modalities (or forms, 
or types) of attitude are: the “home-movie attitude,” the “documentary 
attitude,” and the “f iction attitude.”
In many aspects, these attitudes resemble three of Roger Odin’s “modes 
of producing meaning and affect” which play a central role in his semio-
pragmatic approach: the “private mode,” the “documentarist mode,” and 
the “f ictionalizing mode.”4 Both authors have developed them from what 
they consider normal or typical ways of watching and apprehending the 
corresponding kind of f ilm: home movie (the film-souvenir or the film 
de famille, respectively), documentary, and f iction f ilm.5 Both are also 
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eager to remark that f ilms can be watched against the grain: applying the 
documentary attitude to a f iction f ilm, or the f iction attitude to a home 
movie and so on. And they can be used in combination, as Meunier writes: 
“when looking closer, we can see that the attitudes described can succeed 
each other or intertwine with each other during the viewing of a single 
f ilm” (p. 116). Besides, Meunier is quite aware (as is Odin) that his categories 
are ideal types, heuristically useful but relating only to a theoretically 
abstracted reality.6
These caveats need to be taken seriously, but they should not prevent 
us from reflecting upon the construction of the three modalities of f ilmic 
attitude, nor from making use of them for a theory of reference in the 
cinema. In Meunier’s study, the f irst and fundamental distinction of the 
three different modes is based on the two factors existence and knowledge. 
The home-movie attitude “considers its object to be known and existing 
elsewhere,” the documentary attitude “considers its object as existing but 
not known” (p. 152, emphasis mine), and the f iction attitude considers it to 
be non-existing – and therefore necessarily unknown prior to the experience 
of the f iction.
In the home-movie attitude, the viewer seeks to “render present” a person 
one is well acquainted with, to recognize what she knows about the absent 
person’s physiognomy and comportment. As stated above, this implies a 
certain activity on the part of the viewer consisting of looking “beyond the 
image, to the person-in-general that it depicts” (p. 88). The image is enriched 
by the spectator’s individual memories. Identif ication in the home-movie 
attitude consists in what Meunier calls an “incantatory” behavior; it serves 
to “presentify” the absent person. It therefore necessarily involves a dimen-
sion of latent frustration, because it makes one all the more aware that 
the person is truly absent. In sum, for Meunier, the overall purpose of the 
home-movie attitude consists in the presentif ication of a well-known but 
absent person by way of extending the image’s content beyond itself and 
seeking an imaginary contact with the “person-in-general.”
Inspiring as this claim is, I think it warrants a qualif ication, because 
not all home-movie consumption seems to work along this line. Imagine 
watching a friend’s wedding video – a paradigm case of what Meunier calls 
the film-souvenir. The two brides – the year is 2019 – are standing in front of 
the celebrant, looking at her, and then at each other, as the camera zooms 
in on your friend’s face. What you are likely to see in these images is less 
the “person-in-general” (her general behavior, her typical gestures), but the 
person-in-a-very-particular-moment. You wait for her smile in this special 
moment, and try to read her feelings (is there a slight hesitation behind the 
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overall happiness?). This is not to deny that Meunier’s description is valid 
for many cases of home-movie viewing, but what he sees as the home-movie 
attitude could well be only one of its sub-modes, another of which I have 
just hinted at.
A similar qualif ication might be helpful for Meunier’s outline of the 
documentary attitude. This attitude posits, according to Meunier, its objects 
as existing, but not known to the spectator prior to the viewing. Its main 
purpose is to gain knowledge, via the f ilm, about what are considered real 
world events or states of affairs. Therefore, the images acquire a greater 
degree of “autonomy”; they are less invested with prior beliefs than in the 
home-movie attitude. However, according to Meunier, “retention” and 
“protention” (the imaginary prolongation of the present movement into 
past and future, respectively) are still less important than they are in the 
f iction attitude: “[W]e can cut the f ilm after any sequence, or even right in 
the middle of a sequence, without the spectator being truly frustrated by it,” 
he claims (p. 110). This characterization of the documentary attitude must 
seem more doubtful today, after increasing tendencies towards narrative 
documentary, than at the time of Meunier’s writing when classical docu-
mentaries and cinéma-vérité f ilms seem to have constituted the paradigms.7 
Here again, we might be tempted to regard what Meunier elaborates as the 
documentary attitude solely as one of its possible sub-modes.
The f iction attitude differs more radically from the two others as it does 
not posit the f ilmic objects, persons, and events as existing, even though 
they appear to be real. As Meunier writes: “the f ilmic world is erected as 
an autonomous reality” (p. 112) (a “diegesis,” he could have said in Souriau’s 
wording).8 As the character’s movement (when considered as such, not 
as the actor’s movement) has no existence outside the diegetic world, it 
only gains meaning in relation to his or her other movements in the same 
f ilm, whence results both the much greater importance of retention and 
protention and the “captivating” dimension of the f iction attitude (p. 113). 
With regards to identif ication, Meunier distinguishes two sub-modalities 
in the f iction attitude: a participation in the mode of “being-with” and a 
participation in the mode of “being-like” the character (p. 129).
Consequences for a Theory of Referentiality
What I f ind especially original in Meunier’s theory is his differentiation of 
referential objects according to the respective attitude the viewer applies. As 
I aim to show, Meunier’s ideas can help to sketch a theory of referentiality in 
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cinematic discourse. Three ideas are of key importance here, two of which 
are explicitly stated by Meunier. I have already mentioned them but will 
reiterate them for the sake of clarity. The third one remains implicit (but 
appears to me to be a logical consequence) and needs to be explained.
The f irst idea is that its reference is not constituted by the f ilm alone, 
but results from an interaction between f ilm and viewer: “[W]e should also 
note that the positing of existence does not essentially depend on the type 
of f ilm. […] We can indeed posit a purely f ictional character as existing, 
and we can also posit the Paul Anka of Lonely Boy as not existing” (p. 110). 
However, “each type of f ilm solicits consciousness to comprehend it” in a 
way that renders one kind of reading far more probable than others.9 By 
implication, every other attitude appears as a “deviation” (p. 100).
The second idea is that there are indeed different kinds of objects – or 
objects with different “modes of existence” – that are referred to.10 The 
home-movie attitude’s “person-in-general” is obviously a different kind 
of being than the documentary attitude’s “object-yet-unknown” or the 
f ictional attitude’s “non-existing-person.” Philosophical problems loom 
large here. And there are not only the three grand object categories 
of the three major types of attitudes, but also intermediate cases that 
pose particular complications. Within the domain of f iction, Meunier 
distinguishes two groups of f ilms: “the purely f ictional f ilm, such as 
we f ind in heroic and fantasy genres” and “this other category of f ilms 
closer to the real” (p. 97). Stories told in f ilms belonging to the second 
category appear “lifelike, or at least possible,” referring to “slices of lived 
experienced” (p. 98).
This type of f iction f ilm “is perceptibly close to the documentary genre” 
but is “distinguished by the fact that it does not convey, beyond the image, a 
specific, existent, concrete reality.” As an example, Meunier points to Bicycle 
Thieves (Ladri di biciclette) by Vittorio de Sica (1948), a f ilm, he writes, that “is 
presented almost as a social observation” and “refers to something other than 
itself, a specif ic reality existing elsewhere.” However, in contradistinction to 
what happens in the documentary, “this reality remains indistinct, vague 
and undifferentiated. Thus, the bicycle thief is not posited as existing in his 
specif ic reality, that is as a personal being, but he is valid as a representative 
of a number of anonymous beings existing in a certain period and sharing 
the same problems with him” (p. 98, emphasis mine). In this formulation, 
Meunier comes quite close to what Barthes said about Strangers of the 
Earth – only reversed: whereas Barthes had merged several real individuals 
into one abstract person, Meunier splits one f ictional character into a group 
of “anonymous beings.” Both authors, however, refer to a social reality outside 
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the f ilm.11 A little later Meunier writes: “The bicycle thief as such does not 
exist, but the existing reality that it [the f ilm] illustrates confers on it a 
power of existence that gives it a certain substance of reality” (p. 98). This 
seems to be yet another kind of mode of existence of f ilmic entities.12
Again, the positing of this particular f ilmic entity (f ictional-but-with-a-
certain-substance-of-reality) depends not only on the f ilm, but also on the 
viewer. As Meunier explains, it is always possible to deny the ascription of 
that “substance of reality” – but, and this is important, only at the cost of 
also denying the existence of the underlying social structure: “At the same 
time as I break my belief in the bicycle thief as a f ictional character, I must 
also, in order for this act to be complete, deny a certain social reality that 
this f ictional character illustrates, and whose major characteristics he 
reproduces” (p. 98/99).
A telling historical instance of such a denial is François Truffaut’s review 
of The Roof (Il Tetto, 1956), another neorealist f ilm by De Sica and Zavattini, 
in which they portray a young newlywed couple who desperately search for 
a place to stay in Rome. Truffaut, angry young man and passionate hater of 
De Sica’s cinema that he was, writes:
Concerning The Roof, I would only reproach De Sica and Zavattini for 
having radically deformed the reality they are referring to, for having 
distorted the housing problem by inventing facts that are not true, and 
for having evaded the real diff iculties of this problem, substituting them 
with inappropriate sentimental considerations.13
This accusation of having invented ‘alternative facts’ (avant la lettre!) only 
makes sense within a realist reading of the f ilm. Note that the accusation 
does not, of course, relate to the characters – that Luisa and Natale and all 
the other characters of The Roof were indeed invented, too, cannot bother 
Truffaut. What he minds is what he regards as false statements about real 
social structures such as the housing problem, thereby first assuming, then 
denying what the f ilm appears to claim, namely its “substance of reality.”14
This implies, and here I come to my third point and my more original 
contribution, that there are several layers of meaning which we need 
to differentiate. First, there are the sequences of moving images and 
sounds that have, as I have laid out elsewhere, both an intensional and an 
extensional dimension.15 The intension is what we immediately perceive 
in a scene (as soon as we read them “f iguratively”); for example, a woman 
doing the dishes, a man in his pajamas taking water from the tap, seen in 
black-and-white in a medium-long shot (see Fig. 5).16 In other words, the 
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intension is what the images and sounds represent in themselves, without 
reference to contextual knowledge except for the “tacit knowledge” of basic 
cultural “codes of iconic nomination” which allow us to identify objects 
in images at all.17
The extensional meaning refers to full-fledged entities: objects, persons, 
actions as constituent parts either of a pro-f ilmic situation or of a diegetic 
world. The intensional ‘woman doing the dishes’ can extensionally refer either 
to the f ictional character of Giovanna in her kitchen (f iction attitude), or to 
the non-professional actor Maria di Fiori during the shoot (documentary 
attitude).
The distinction between intension and extension goes back to Gottlob 
Frege’s famous distinction between Sinn (translated as ‘sense’) and Bedeutung 
(most often rendered as ‘reference,’ sometimes as ‘meaning’ or ‘denotation’ 
in English). In order to avoid confusion and because I would like to reserve 
the terms ŕeference´ and ŕeferential´ for yet another dimension, I therefore 
prefer to use Rudolf Carnap’s pair of terms intension and extension for Sinn 
and Bedeutung respectively, following their common use in analytical 
philosophy.18 One famous example which Frege used in order to introduce 
the distinction is the difference between the expressions ‘morning star’ and 
‘evening star,’ which have different intensions (one being the star seen in 
Fig. 10: Scene from The Roof by vittorio de Sica.
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the morning, the other the star in the evening) but the same extension (that 
physical object which is also called Venus).19 The very same logic applies to 
images, I would argue. Two photographic images of planet Venus can have 
different intensions (displaying different details of the surface structure, 
having been recorded from different viewpoints, one looking brighter and 
smooth and beige, the other appearing redder and hotter) but point to the 
same extensional entity.20
In his original text, Frege was skeptical about f ictional extension. For 
him, sentences such as “Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca sound asleep” 
and the name Odysseus in the same context lack Bedeutung, although 
they do have Sinn. The literary theorist Lubomír Doležel has character-
ized “Frege’s doctrine as a semantics of one world with two languages.”21 
Doležel argues that this doctrine results in a counter-intuitive treatment 
of f ictional names such as Odysseus or Hamlet as either empty or self-
referential. For him, using a possible world’s theory as framework for 
his f ictional semantics, such names “refer to an individual of a f ictional 
world.”22 This does not render Frege’s distinction obsolete for f ictional texts. 
According to Doležel, it is perfectly possible to use the “two-language” 
model to distinguish intensional and extensional structures of meaning 
for literature as well, the only difference being that in f ictional texts the 
extension does not exist a priori, but is “stipulated” through the creation 
of a possible world.23
What I suggest is thus an adaption of Doležel’s terms from the f ield of 
literary studies to that of f ilm, where, mutatis mutandis, the same logic 
applies. In every f ilm we watch – with the possible exception of purely 
abstract f ilms such as Arnulf Rainer (Peter Kubelka, 1960) or The Flicker 
(Tony Conrad, 1965) – we deal with both an intensional and an extensional 
structure. The former refers to the immediate sense in its audiovisual 
layout (including camera perspective, lighting, optical f ilters, editing, 
sound design etc.), the latter to the ensemble of denoted (pro-f ilmic or 
f ictional) entities.
According to Doležel, “intension is necessarily linked to texture, to the 
form (structuring) of its expression,” and the “crucial role of intensional 
meaning is explained by aesthetic factors;” he even claims that “extensional 
meaning is aesthetically neutral; only on the level of intension is aesthetically 
effective meaning achieved.”24 Gertrud Koch’s similar formulation – “In the 
aesthetic experience, intensional meanings prevail”25 – is more cautious, and 
more accurate. There is no need to exclude the extensional from the realm of 
aesthetics completely (the choice for a certain layout of the f ictional world 
can have aesthetic reasons and aesthetic effects), but it certainly seems right 
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to regard the intensional meaning as aesthetically dominant.26 Furthermore, 
we can determine the relation of intension and extension as follows:
Although extensions and intensions can and must be differentiated in 
semantic theory, they are by definition complementary in the production 
of literary [and f ilmic, G.K.] meaning. Extensions are available only 
through intensions and conversely, intensions are f ixed by extensions.27
We have access to the diegetic situation only through the audiovisual texture 
and its intension, but our knowledge of the diegesis also disambiguates 
elements of the intensional structure.
So far, so good. What Meunier’s categories and his discussion of the 
possible denial of the “substance of reality” of realist f ictional f ilms show, 
however, is that the conceptual couple of intension/extension does not 
suff ice. Consider the example from The Roof again. Intensionally, we 
perceive a woman doing the dishes and a man in his pajamas taking water 
from the tap in a black-and-white medium long shot. In the extensional 
dimension, we can have this intensional ensemble refer either, in the f iction 
attitude, to the f ictional characters of Natale and his sister Giovanna in 
her kitchen, or, in the home-movie or the documentary attitude, to the 
non-professional actors Maria di Fiori and Giorgio Listuzzi during the 
shoot. But in order to understand the concepts of “the person-in-general” or 
the “denied substance of reality,” it is necessary to consider at least a third 
dimension of meaning. I suggest calling this the referential meaning – a 
meaning which is determined by references to the external, non-f ilmic, 
or “af ilmic” reality.28
Imagine you are Giorgio Listuzzi’s sister and you are watching the scene 
from The Roof in Meunier’s home-movie attitude. You would not care about 
the f ictional story, but would focus on your brother’s gestures, his corporeal 
attitude, maybe on his way of talking, the timbre of his voice. The reference 
would then be Meunier’s “person-in-general.” Or, alternatively, but still 
within the home-movie attitude, you could think of your brother in that 
very specif ic situation when he f irst stood in front of a camera, and perceive 
a suppressed nervousness in his gestures other viewers remain perfectly 
unaware of, because you have talked to him shortly before or after the shoot.
A f ilm historian, on the other hand, could proceed from the identical 
extensional basis – the same profilmic situation – but refer to a different set 
of objects, e.g. Listuzzi and di Fiori as representatives of non-professional 
acting in Italy in the 1950s. Or she could analyze the cinematography and 
the mise en scène, including the lighting, the choreography of the actors, 
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and the placement of props and realistic details in the room (in implicit 
comparison with other staging practices common around that time).29
Referring to these two sets of referent objects is not the standard mode of 
viewing, however. The Roof ’s institutional purpose is rather to be watched 
in the realist sub-mode of the f iction attitude. This means, as Meunier 
explains, not only to assume Natale’s non-existence (as with every character 
in every f iction), but, paradoxically, also his existence as “a representative 
of a number of anonymous beings existing in a certain period and sharing 
the same problems with him” (p. 98). Alternatively, it is possible to deny the 
existence of these problems or to claim, like Truffaut, that the real problems 
are quite different, thus referring to an invented reality and thereby, but 
implicitly and ex negativo, to the real reality.
Intension Extension Reference
a woman doing 
the dishes (before 
putting a child 
to bed), a man 
in his pyjamas 
taking water from 





actors Maria di 
Fiori and Giorgio 




natale and his 



















b1) the problematic 
housing situation 
in rome in the 
1950s (realist fic-
tion attitude)
b2) an “invented 
reality” in distinc-
tion from the 
real reality which 
is referred to ex 
negativo (skeptic’s 
fiction attitude)
Fig. 11: intension, extension, and reference in the kitchen scene from The Roof.
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The crucial difference between extension and reference is that they imply dif-
ferent ways of looking beyond the given image. In referring to the extensional 
dimension we merely look ‘through’ the image into the diegetic world or 
back to the moment of production, treating it as quasi-transparent. But, in 
the referential dimension, we really look ‘beyond’ it, including thoughts, 
memories, beliefs, and imaginations of or about persons, things, and social 
structures that are absent in a much stronger sense.
Conclusion
What I have sketched here are merely the f irst tentative steps towards a 
theory of referentiality in cinematic discourse. I will end with two remarks. 
The f irst has to do with the relatively undetermined character of what I 
have called the referential meaning. Looking at the categories intension, 
extension, and reference in the table above (Fig. 11), we can note that their 
respective content becomes less clearly f ixed when moving from the left 
to the right column: a scene’s intension is completely determined by the 
combination of images and sounds (given our reading them ‘f iguratively,’ 
which is something we practically always and automatically do).30 The 
extension is less fully determined, because it is possible to have the material 
refer either to their prof ilmic origin or to a diegetic universe.
Compared to the referential dimension, however, the extension is still 
relatively f ixed, too. The aforementioned scene from The Roof offers several 
options for referential meaning. And even if we agree on a standard realist 
reading and agree that it is clearly about the housing problem in Rome in 
the 1950s (accurately described or not), one could also claim that the f ilm 
is more generally about poverty, or about the unjust distribution of wealth: 
the “opposition of standards of living: bricklayers, who are badly housed 
themselves, construct buildings for others,” as Raymond Borde and André 
Bouissy have put it.31 But then, why not say it is really about capitalist class 
society, or even more broadly about stratif ied forms of sociality as such? 
How wide should we draw the circle of reference?
This problem of where to set the limits of reference for a given cinematic 
discourse (ranging from a particular case to a general notion) may be less 
a theoretical then an empirical one: historical reception studies can help 
ascertain what sets of references were actualized by critics and other viewers, 
and detailed f ilm analyses (informed by the f ilm’s discursive context) may 
discover how the work’s inner organization shapes the probability of referring 
to this or that topic, of referring to a very specific case or a very general claim.
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My second concluding remark has to do with the phenomenological 
framework of Meunier’s discussion. The reason why Meunier has not spelled 
out a differentiation of dimensions of meaning similar to the one I have 
outlined here (even though it does seem to be logically implied) is possibly 
that this would be at odds with his approach of describing “lived experience” 
(p. 34). In the lived film experience, intension, extension, and reference are all 
more or less immediately given. They are not separated phenomenologically. 
Together, irreducibly intertwined, they constitute the thick and complex 
texture of meaning in f ilmic discourses. In terms of the epistemology of f ilm 
studies this indicates that what we need are fruitful articulations between 
phenomenological and other, more semiotic approaches.
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 Phenomenology, Immediacy, and 




This text explores three phenomenological approaches to immediacy from 
around 1970. At that time, phenomenological studies had to address the 
question of immediacy. Immediacy means that no mediation happens in 
a given relation, but, at the same time, it presupposes media because it 
presupposes a difference. A medium, however, cannot be immediate. If 
it were, the relational elements between which it mediates would be part 
of an unmediated relation. In this case, both separation of the elements 
and the medium’s mediation in turn would be eliminated. Each of the 
three works discussed tries to rearrange this framework: Derrida by 
deconstructing its metaphysical foundations, Meunier by introducing 
f ilmic mediation, and Landgrebe by historicizing phenomenology as a 
struggle with immediacy.
Keywords: Media theory; Jacques Derrida; Jean-Pierre Meunier; Ludwig 
Landgrebe; immediacy
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, three books were published that explored 
how phenomenology is fascinated by immediacy and challenged by media-
tion: Jacques Derrida’s Voice and Phenomenon (La Voix et le Phénomène) 
in 1967, Jean-Pierre Meunier’s The Structures of the Film Experience (Les 
Structures de l’expérience filmique) in 1969, and Ludwig Landgrebe’s not-yet 
translated Der Weg der Phänomenologie. Das Problem einer ursprünglichen 
Erfahrung [The Path of Phenomenology: The Problem of Originary Experi-
ence] in 1971. Each of these studies presents its own explanation of the 
assumed immediacy of perception, and each of them has a different, more 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
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or less explicit conception of underlying processes of mediation. In this 
regard, Meunier proposes a conception of media that introduces immediacy 
into the phenomenological discussion and includes f ilm as an example for 
the mediated immediacy of experiences.
The phenomenological tradition, to which all three books contribute, has 
from the beginning, been fascinated by immediacy. For example, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior (La Structure du comportement) 
from 1942, an important point of reference for French phenomenology, 
addresses the question of the immediate givenness of experience on almost 
every page. The question of immediacy belongs to phenomenology’s heritage 
and is part of the complex that every phenomenological study had to address 
at that time – and still has to address today, even though the technological 
conditions of our time have radically changed. The following short and 
preliminary remarks describe how the three books react to the challenge 
of immediacy. The observations converge in a conclusion that asks how 
to tackle the phantasms of immediacy today. The publication of the f irst 
translation of Meunier’s book, half a century after it was written, is an 
opportunity to ask these questions again, because this translation has a 
place both within the past and within the present.
One of the reasons for this constellation around the year 1970, for the 
historical situatedness of the articulation of phenomenology’s problem 
with immediacy, is that, around this time, the fundamental mediatedness 
of experience became obvious – a reason reflected by Meunier’s approach 
to identif ication. Film is only one entity that gained theoretical value at 
that time. Television had already started to replace (or rather reframe) f ilm 
as the dominant medium a few years beforehand. Of course, theorists like 
Walter Benjamin had articulated this approach earlier, but the institu-
tional establishment of media theory begins in this period when Marshall 
McLuhan’s theory of media was widely discussed in both North America 
and Europe. It is obvious that Derrida’s and Landgrebe’s texts demonstrate 
the unwillingness of philosophers to make sense of the media landscape of 
the time, but maybe they react to it in a deeper sense: they both explore the 
mediatedness of experience and f ind answers to the problem of immediacy. 
Meunier’s book, meanwhile, is evidently part of this constellation, though 
he restricts mediated experience to f ilm.
As a phantasm of unity and direct, continuous contact, immediacy is 
not restricted to phenomenology. Immediacy means that no mediation 
happens in a given relation, but at the same time it presupposes media, 
because it presupposes a difference that has to be bridged. Immediacy 
means the immediate relation of at least two elements. But when there 
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are two, there needs to be a mediating third element.1 A medium, however, 
cannot be immediate. If it were, the relational elements between which 
it mediates would be part of an unmediated relation. In this case, both 
separation of the elements and the medium’s mediation in turn would 
be eliminated. As relational in-betweens, media are the condition for the 
immediate connection of two elements with each other, since immediacy 
implies the collapse of the relation between two or more elements. However, 
in the immediacy of a relation, the medial connection of the elements 
and their necessary separation are at the same time erased – there must 
be two to become one and the one always stays separated. A medium, in 
this sense, can only be phantasmatically immediate. The history of media 
is accompanied by a history of phantasms of immediacy that reach from 
the unity of logos and speech contrasted with the separation of writing in 
Plato’s Phaedrus to the idea that depictions of violence im-mediately affect 
their viewers, from scenarios of immersion into atmospheric media to the 
immediacy of f ilm experience.2
The stakes of such immediacies entail historically different prospects 
of reward: they sublate the uncertainties and contingencies that lie in the 
separation between elements by promising to substitute multiplicity for 
unity; they present the prospect of an undivided community; in the form of 
a metaphysics, they hark back to an originary source (originärer Ursprung) 
from which everything else can be derived; they strive for an always already 
transmitted transmission in which delay or loss play no role; and they 
enable a primordial, uninterrupted access to the world via the senses. In the 
history of media, one can thus discern time and again an emphasis on the 
signif icance of media that is shot through with the ‘reverie’ of a media-less 
immediacy.3 The paradox of the immediacy of media that is thus generated 
consists in the negation of its own presuppositions. Immediacy displaces 
what ought to be explained to the realm of the unexplained and substitutes 
uncertainties with too-certain certainties.
This paradoxical constellation of immediacy is the starting point of all 
three books. In the context of phenomenology, the immediacy of experience 
is an important part of the epistemological framework. Each of the three 
books tries to rearrange this framework: Derrida by deconstructing its 
metaphysical foundations, Meunier by introducing f ilmic mediation, and 
Landgrebe by historicizing phenomenology as a struggle with immediacy. 
The latter two strive for an immediacy of experience, while Derrida attempts 
to dismantle these foundations. Despite the reference to an unmediated 
access to the world, the question of mediation intervenes into their self-
assuring conception of phenomenology around 1970. The three books can 
PHEnoMEnoloGy, iMMEDiacy, anD MEDiaTion 291
be read as symptoms of an uneasiness with phenomenology’s fascination 
with immediacy.
Jacques Derrida and the Mediation of Immediacy in the Soliloquy
Jacques Derrida introduces his conception of deconstruction in his publica-
tions from the late 1960s and early 1970s, in which he investigates originary 
unities, essentialisms, and binaries in the history of philosophy and argues 
against the traditional equivalence of perception and access to the world, of 
appropriation and signif ication. He grounds his project on the observation 
that the phantasmatic paradox of immediacy, as one example of the es-
sentialisms he criticizes, lies in the negation of its own presuppositions. This 
“coherence in contradiction […] expresses the force of a desire.”4 This desire, 
identif ied by Derrida as a dominant strain in the history of philosophy, aims 
at unity instead of separation, at direct contact instead of mediation. The 
deconstructive move shows that, in the binary opposition of immediacy 
and mediation, the suppressed necessarily intervenes in the ideal. As an 
instance of such unity, immediacy, Derrida explains, is a construct that 
appears to be unconstructed. “Immediacy is derived,” as he writes in Of 
Grammatology (De la Grammatologie).5 And he goes on to characterize 
such philosophies in the following terms: “As always, this archaeology is 
also a teleology and an eschatology; the dream of a full and immediate 
presence closing history, the transparence and indivision of a parousia, the 
suppression of contradiction and difference.”6
In his deconstruction of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, specif ically 
of his Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen, 1900-1901) in Voice 
and Phenomenon, Derrida explores how the personal subject of phenomenol-
ogy is based on metaphysical presuppositions and develops a critique of 
phenomenology’s foundational essentialisms.7 By taking into account “the 
instituting value of its own premises,” this approach unsettles the tradition of 
phenomenology, the dominant philosophy in France at that time.8 Though it 
took a few years for Derrida to emerge as one of the leading proponents of what 
North American scholars would later call French Theory, the basic tools of his 
thinking are already at work in Voice and Phenomenon, published alongside 
Of Grammatology and Writing and Difference (L’Écriture et la différence).
In this book, Derrida works through Husserl’s phenomenology of ex-
pression and indication as a key distinction that organizes his conception 
of language and speech. As Derrida demonstrates in a famous passage 
on Husserl’s conception of language and the voice, there are no signs in 
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soliloquies for Husserl, since the self-presence of the monologue prevents 
anything from being re-presented. Husserl writes:
Or shall we say that, even in solitary mental life, one still uses expressions 
to imitate something, though not to a second person? Shall one say that 
in soliloquy one speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs, i.e. as 
indications, of one’s own inner experiences? I cannot think such a view 
acceptable […] [In soliloquy] we are in general content with imagined 
rather than with actual words. One of course speaks, in a certain sense, 
even in soliloquy, and it is certainly possible to think of oneself as speak-
ing, and even as speaking to oneself.9
In Husserl’s view, soliloquies do not require any representational function 
of language since there is only the presence of the subject with itself. Self-
presence must not be imbued with any representation, even if the subject 
speaks with itself. In this presence, no repetition of the sign is necessary. 
Since nothing need be repeated, the soliloquy is sign-less. For Husserl, 
soliloquies invite us to search for sense beyond any materialization. In 
this perspective, the soliloquy is immediate and allows an unmediated 
relation of the self to itself because it is the self that speaks and listens at 
the same time. The self is immediately present to itself. There is no rupture 
or gap in the self in this idealizing conception. Derrida is interested in the 
extent to which Husserlian phenomenology depends on how consciousness 
does not communicate because it is present-to-itself and non-f issured. 
Nonetheless, it presupposes difference. To include this difference, Der-
rida argues, involves excluding self-identity, but also, at the same time, 
presupposes an identity that includes difference, albeit an identity that is 
fractured. Even the speaking self uses signs that differ in every repetition. 
Communication – even when curtailed in its most radical form in a soliloquy 
– presupposes a difference and thus a multiplicity: “This deconstruction of 
presence accomplishes itself through the deconstruction of consciousness, 
and therefore through the irreducible notion of the trace (Spur).”10 Presence 
cannot be thought without absence, and absence does not simply replace 
but supplements presence. As Derrida argues, immediacy is derived. In 
this sense, the phenomenological subject is torn in itself, even though it 
remains unif ied through the soliloquy – it is immediate in its mediation.
Consequently, the presence of the speaking phenomenological subject is 
overburdened by metaphysics. Media, in this regard, can appear as immedi-
ate – the voice of the phenomenological subject can appear as a harbinger of 
self-presence. In his seminal text “Signature, Event, Context,” which initiated 
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the by now famous debate with John Searle, Derrida shows that the success 
of communication can never be accomplished – communication includes 
its failure.11 Noise, parasites, and dissemination can never be excluded as 
intended by metaphysical thinking. Instead, Derrida shows that the absence 
of writing makes possible that something is written: “Spacing (notice that 
this word speaks the articulation of space and time, the becoming-space 
of time and the becoming-time of space) is always the unperceived, the 
nonpresent, and the nonconscious.”12 This temporal logic of repetition is 
characteristic for Derrida’s notion of différance. Every mediation, in this 
sense, delays something, creates a difference that cannot be substituted. 
Différance, one could say, is the differentiating origin of differences, which 
can no longer be an origin because it produces a difference that comes before 
the origin. In this sense, immediacy is derived, but when it is derived, it 
cannot be immediate. As deferral and distinction, différance is a difference 
of a medium which has never been immediate.
Jean-Pierre Meunier and the Immediacy of Film Experience
Meunier’s phenomenology of f ilm is not touched by the questions posed by 
Derrida. There is no feeling of uneasiness toward the notion of immediate 
experience in his study. The book instead develops a new perspective on 
the mediation of experience by introducing a further layer: the structure 
of f ilm as f ilm experience. First published in 1969, we learn from Meunier’s 
introduction to his book that he sees f ilm as a medium which reflects the 
cultural biases, artistic output, and cultural developments of his time. For 
Meunier, f ilm is the art form which offers the highest degree of identification 
for the viewer and is thus most relevant for an exploration of the complexities 
of human experience and its relation to the world:
In this conceptual framework, f ilmic identif ication is a variation of iden-
tif ication as a general mode of behavior, a particular type of identif ication 
corresponding to a particular type of relationship, one in which the object, 
although presenting almost all the characteristics that it possesses in 
perception, is presented as absent in its bodily physicality (p. 119).
Film, in other words, offers phenomenology a chance to test its assumptions 
with an aesthetic object: “These considerations, and others, will lead us to see 
f ilmic consciousness as a variation of the major category of consciousness 
that constitutes the imaginary consciousness” (p. 69).
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For Meunier, phenomenology means to take “phenomena such as they 
are immediately lived, and not such as they are conceived by virtue of 
some pre-established objective schema” (p. 34). Consequently, immediacy 
appears as equivalent to life and lived, i.e. embodied experience. The 
opposite of immediacy, not named as such in this context, lies in the 
schematizing process of theorizing experience as an objective entity. 
There is no access to immediacy via theory, only via phenomenology. 
This approach offers an indirect key to the primordial dimension of 
subjectivity by “unveiling the invariable aspect in […] particular forms 
of behavior” (p. 34). Drawing upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Meunier argues 
that an analytical conception of “cognitive operations” based upon an 
“adequate representation of reality” implies ignorance toward the bodily 
incorporation of perception as a “lived experience of phenomena” (p. 40) 
and the fact that the perceiving body is also the perceived body. Rather, 
perception, as a “primordial faculty that underpins our insertion in the 
world and all of our relations” (p. 38), deserves a different approach that 
is supposed to do justice to immediacy.
Perception, in the sense of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, is not simply 
the act of accumulating sensations, but rather a formed and structured 
process below the threshold of cognition. These forms and structures are 
the topic of phenomenology, which, at the time of Meunier’s writing, had 
developed an elaborate instrument to describe them. Though Meunier 
describes this formed and structured process, perception can nonetheless 
appear as immediate, because the phenomenological relation to the world 
is “more immediate and more primitive than that described by analytic 
thought, basing itself on supposedly objective elements” (p. 41/42). What 
does Meunier mean by immediacy? And what happens to this immediacy 
characterized by the movement of images and a mode of identif ication 
similar to, but productively different from real-life experience, when the 
relation to the world is mediated by a relation to a f ilm?
We can find preliminary answers to these questions in Meunier’s approach 
to the phenomena of intersubjectivity. The immediate relation to the world 
that composes our bodies and subjectivities extends, he argues, to encounters 
with other persons: “I directly grasp the signif ication of their behavior, not 
through a cognitive operation, but through an immediate apprehension 
of their comportment” (p. 44). There is nothing in between, rather, the 
difference vanishes and makes way for a union of formerly separated enti-
ties: “The perception of other people […] is an immediate given” (p. 44). It 
is impossible not to experience other people in an immediate way when 
we perceive them. “I grasp their intentions and, in a way, they become my 
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own” (p. 44). The intersubjective world perceived by this phenomenological 
subject is composed in its immediate relation to the world.
In this sense, the experience of f ilm as a medium that shows other peo-
ple’s lives on-screen is always mediated because f ilm itself is a structure 
of perceivable elements, “in which the elements draw their meaning from 
their internal organization” (p. 71). Watching a f ilm, the subject experiences 
the f ilmic world and the “world tout court” (p. 71) in an immediate and 
uninterrupted way, and it can only perceive individuals in the f ilm with 
the same immediacy as individuals in reality – even though experience is 
mediated by f ilm. The subject Meunier is interested in identif ies with f ilm 
and relates to the world through f ilm in a similar way as it relates to the 
world through others. Similar to Husserl’s subject, which perceives itself 
in the soliloquy, Meunier’s subject perceives other people, preferably in 
a f ilm. It is immediately present to them because it perceives them as it 
perceives itself.
Even if Meunier argues that f ilm, as a medium, “is only a representation 
of the world,” it nonetheless offers the world to us, “in the same manner 
as our unmediated sensations” (p. 71), although with a different attitude, 
because we know that we perceive a representation. Film, for Meunier, is a 
medium of immediacy, but he never tackles this paradoxical constellation. 
In the context of this approach to f ilm, the immediacy of perception is a 
central element, because its primordial, non-cognitive dimension enables 
a “presence alongside the objects of the world” (p. 71). In his description of 
the home movie, Meunier explicitly refers to the mediation of f ilm: “We 
can also say that in the case of the home movie, the cinematic image truly 
plays the role of medium. It serves as an intermediary between the reality 
perceived and my current consciousness of this reality.” (p. 88) The difference 
between perceiving the real world and the represented world lies in different 
approaches toward this world, in different relations to it: “In the case of visual 
representation, we know that the behavior under consideration, despite 
presenting all the characteristics of perception, is not physically present.” 
(p. 71) Even if we know that mediated f ilm experience is mediated, we still 
perceive immediately and thus gain an immediate access to the world: 
“In perception, therefore, the objects are not ‘believed’ but immediately 
apprehended as existent.” (p. 93) Even if, we could say, f ilm mediates, we 
experience the world it presents in an immediate way because perception, 
in the phenomenological sense, can only be immediate. In this process of 
identif ication and relation, immediate experience is mediated.
On the one hand, then, Meunier’s assumption of immediate experience 
is not up to date in light of Derrida’s harsh critique of metaphysics, but on 
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the other hand, it opens a new sense of the mediatedness of immediacy 
that is not present in Derrida’s work. Though Meunier never problematizes 
immediacy and takes it as a given, his introduction of f ilm as a medium 
of immediate experience complicates the question of immediacy for phe-
nomenology. A phenomenology, we could argue following Meunier, that 
does not take into account the multiplicity of technologies of mediation 
that transform experience and our ways of world-making in specif ic ways 
can neither understand its technological condition, nor the immediacy 
that it employs.
Ludwig Landgrebe and Philosophy’s Struggle with Itself
In this sense, phenomenology’s appropriation of immediacy has a history. In 
1971, the phenomenologist Ludwig Landgrebe, student of Edmund Husserl 
and teacher of Hans Blumenberg, outlines the scope of such a philosophical 
and phenomenological history of immediacy in a remarkable essay on 
the immediacy of experience. His book Der Weg der Phänomenologie: 
Das Problem einer ursprünglichen Erfahrung includes a chapter “On the 
Immediacy of Experience,” in which he describes the foundations of this 
project:
The thinking of the 19th century in all its decisive steps – not the ones 
which are usually included in the compendiums of the history of 
philosophy – can be understood, as it were, as an index of the f ight of 
reason with itself. Reason attempts to determine itself in relation to the 
immediacy of experience, and in wrestling itself from the nets in which 
reason positioned itself, it enmeshes itself even further.13
Landgrebe goes on to expand how this struggle emerged when philosophy 
encountered the problem of conceiving the world through sensibility. The 
modern turn to epistemology, beginning with English empiricism and lead-
ing to Kant, questioned this access to the outside world and the possibility 
of knowledge about it. Even though, as Landgrebe explains, for Kant the 
Ding an sich (thing-in-itself) remained beyond knowledge and experience, 
his search for a source of knowledge in sensibility set the conditions for a 
new phase of the f ight of philosophy with itself. The relation of the senses 
and the outside world subsequently became a prominent philosophical 
challenge. As Landgrebe argues, this unanswered, maybe unanswerable 
question crosses the centuries of philosophy and finally becomes the vantage 
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point of phenomenology. Reason, as the foundational logos of philosophy, 
was confronted with a relation to the world beyond reason, and philosophy 
tried to make sense of this oscillation.
Landgrebe underlines that, for Hegel, the immediate became relevant as 
mediated, because the opposition between mind and matter or experience 
and world was itself conceived of as a product of thinking – which appears, 
from Landgrebe’s point of view, as an impertinence because, for him, this 
dialectic removes the immediate from experience:
For Hegel, sensibility, which forms the material of all knowledge, cannot 
be the unique source of knowledge that it was for Kant, because this 
material cannot be understood as something in itself immediate. The 
supposed immediacy of sensibility needs to be proven as mediated.14
The importance of Kant – and the failure of Hegel – lies in the concep-
tion of the Ding an sich, which is in itself unknowable, but necessarily 
immediate. In Hegel’s tendency to declare reason as the sole criterion for 
philosophy, Landgrebe assumes a tendency to abandon the world. Kant, 
on the other hand, tried to rearrange reason and sensibility in a way that 
gives justice to both reason and immediacy. Confronted with this question 
of the immediacy of experience, philosophy since then has taken up the 
task of determining itself in relation to immediacy, and has incorporated 
this challenge. Landgrebe goes on to explain that the importance of the 
immediacy of perception has been neglected by modern science and its 
focus on rational objectivity. What Landgrebe calls “the technical means 
of mass manipulation in cold calculation”15 is a result of this enacting 
approach to the world. It leads to a withering of immediacy and affect. 
To f ind a way out of this situation, it is necessary to reclaim an immedi-
ate connection to the world and the “inextricable rest that refutes to be 
conquered by scientif ic rationality.”16 Consequently, Landgrebe def ines 
the task of phenomenology in the twentieth century as ref lecting this 
history of struggles in order to unite reason, sensibility, and immediacy. 
Husserl, in fact, describes the evidence of perception as an immediate 
opening up of reality.
In a decisive step in this history, Heidegger replaced the strict dualism of 
subject and object by the idea that the object is not given, but produced 
[hervorgebracht] and closely bound to the language that we use to explore 
the world. Thus, the relation of immediacy between subject and object is 
replaced by a more dynamic relation that allows for a different conception 
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of immediacy as something that is not objectif iable. In this direction, 
Landgrebe continues the phenomenological approach as a reaction to the 
philosophical struggle with itself:
The logos of philosophical thinking as an exegesis of the immediacy of 
experience can only be clarif ied by a meditation [Besinnung] on the 
ways in which language, even before all conceptual thinking, is always 
an interpretation of reality.17
Referring to the late Heidegger and his turn to language, and resembling 
Husserl’s conception of the soliloquy, Landgrebe looks for a new perspective 
on the immediacy of experience understood as a “hearing that does not want 
to rule [Vernehmen, das nicht herrschen will].”18 He f inds his solution in the 
fact that, though immediacy cannot be grasped by words, it also cannot be 
separated from the subject that experiences it. Phenomenology, Landgrebe 
argues, should not stop with the investigation of immediate experience, but 
instead take into account that such experience is mediated by language: 
“Every understanding of immediacy includes a self-understanding.”19 Im-
mediacy can only be articulated in language. In this sense, immediacy is 
necessarily included in the understanding of language. Immediacy hap-
pens when one understands oneself by understanding language. In the 
mediation of language, Landgrebe searches for immediacy and argues for 
a convergence of phenomenology and hermeneutics as a solution to the 
struggle of philosophy with itself.
Conclusion
Immediacy implies that the necessary separation between the two elements 
that are connected immediately is negated. As Michel Serres has stated, “A 
third exists before the second. A third exists before the others. […] I have to 
go through the middle before reaching the end. There is always a mediate, a 
middle, and intermediary.”20 Immediacy requires a medium, though it expresses 
the desire to eradicate its mediation. Rather than allowing an absorption by 
metaphysical unity, it is necessary to consider the differences that exist because 
there are media. That media operate with delays, that they isolate rather than 
unify, that they never transmit in real-time, that the gap between perception 
and world is irrefutable, and that film consists of still frames does not enter 
the picture if media are phantasmatically invested with immediacy. Media 
are always in danger of being replaced by immediacy if the very separation 
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upon which they are premised is erased in phantasms of unity, presence, and 
immediacy. Landgrebe and Meunier seem to be aware at least of the condition 
of mediation that is necessary for immediacy, even if they strive toward an 
originary, unmediated connection. With Derrida, the goal must be to preserve 
the separation and to describe the difference of mediation not in terms of 
its elimination, but rather as distance as such. This is what Landgrebe and 
Meunier – more or less involuntarily – introduce to phenomenology.
To conclude, I want to come back to the point that the three studies of 
phenomenology presented here belong to a historical moment, at which 
immediacy itself became an explicit – and no longer implicit – problem for 
philosophy. Phenomenological thinking, as Derrida and Landgrebe show, has 
always been invested in immediacy, but, in the years around 1970, it became 
possible, and perhaps necessary, to articulate this problem as def ining the 
scope of phenomenology. This is not the place to attempt to write a history 
of phenomenology’s fascination with immediacy, but perhaps Meunier’s 
book can be read as such a speculation. Of the three texts presented here, 
Meunier and Landgrebe present immediacy not only in the sense of an 
indubitable unity of self-presence, but also as a state that is dependent upon 
media that constitute the conditions of immediate experience: for Meunier, 
the possibilities of identif ication and world-making that are provided by 
film are part of its immediate experience; and for Landgrebe, the immediacy 
of understanding language depends upon the givenness of the medium of 
language. In this sense, they go one step further and incorporate mediation 
into phenomenology’s fascination with immediacy.
At this point, it makes sense to ask for the place of the translation of 
Meunier’s book in the present. If the original publication of 1969 was part 
of a historical situation, in which immediacy became a problem, then we 
should ask for the historical situatedness of the translation, and also for 
phenomenology’s relation to it. Has this mediated immediacy of experience 
any relevance today? How can we rethink phenomenology’s phantasms? 
To situate these questions, which of course cannot be answered here, it is 
necessary to understand how different today’s technological condition is 
from that of 1970. We currently witness, as, for example, Mark Hansen and 
Katherine Hayles have shown, a transition in which media no longer simply 
present or represent aesthetic material that can be perceived. Ubiquitous 
mobile technologies such as smartphones with location-based services, 
logistical media based on RFID (Radio Frequency Identification), or sensorial 
and autonomous technologies such as self-driving cars collect, Hansen 
writes, “huge amounts of data about behavior and our environment without 
our active participation, initiative or even consciousness.”21 In the face of this 
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redistribution not only of agency, but also of perceptive faculties, Hansen 
argues, we should rethink what experience, apprehension, and subjectivity 
mean. We have to “abandon our object- or body-centered models of media 
experience for a radically environmental approach.”22 Hansen describes 
the sensorial distribution of locative, mobile networks as an extension of 
sensorial faculties, in which mobile media create an ubiquitous environment 
of streams of information and energy. Humans and objects are woven into 
the fabric of this network. In a similar vein, Katherine Hayles demonstrates 
that the convergence of the most powerful locative technologies RFID and 
GPS necessitates a redefinition of the passage between human beings and 
technology, a critique of their politics, and consequently a new modification 
of the concept of mediation.23 In the environmentality of such media, agency 
no longer belongs to the presupposed status of a human subject – and this 
extends to experience. Indeed, Hansen does not call for an end of subjectivity, 
but for its redistribution, so that experience and mediation come together:
For the first time in our history and (very likely) in the history of the universe, 
we find our long-standing and up to now well-nigh unquestionable privilege 
as the world’s most complex sensing agents challenged, if not overthrown, 
by the massively replicable and ubiquitously propagating technical capacity 
for sensing introduced by our smart devices and technologies.24
In this regard, Hansen tries to establish a phenomenology adequate to the 
changing technological conditions of our time. How is perception, we should 
ask, incorporated today, when human bodies are perhaps not the prime 
indicators of perceptive faculties? How can phenomenology find an answer to 
the challenges of ubiquitous, ‘smart’ media-technologies in a way that takes 
up the pathway shown by Meunier? What is an experience of f ilm beyond 
f ilm? How can we, with Derrida, deconstruct this technological condition 
of the present?25 And how can we situate ourselves in the struggle of reason 
with itself when we no longer f ight for immediacy but for mediation?
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V: Phenomenological Expansions
 Cinema and Child’s Play
Jennifer M. Barker
Abstract
This paper takes its cue from Jean-Pierre Meunier’s brief references to 
children’s games to ask what child’s play might teach us about his model of 
f ilmic identif ication. Filmic identif ication, in Meunier’s account, emerges 
from and against the background of “syncretic sociability,” a state of 
“anonymous collectivity” that characterizes infancy and early child-
hood, but which never entirely disappears in the adult. By examining 
what Daniel Stern called “forms of vitality,” we gain a clearer sense of 
how that shift between Meunier‘s “primordial intersubjectivity” and 
“private intersubjectivity” takes place. Forms of vitality also lend support 
to Meunier’s nuanced descriptions of the affective relationship between 
spectators, characters, and f ilms by bringing into focus the aesthetic 
movements through which that relation comes into being.
Keywords: Syncretic sociability; phenomenology; intersubjectivity; Jean-
Pierre Meunier; child psychology; Daniel Stern
In The Structures of the Film Experience: Filmic Identification, Jean-Pierre 
Meunier addresses the question of the viewer’s attachment to and investment 
in cinema and identification with the people and characters it presents to us. 
He identif ies three modes of cinema – the home movie, the documentary, 
and fiction – each of which “solicits” from its viewer a particular “attitude” or 
form of engagement, including a specific way of engaging with its characters 
(whether those are f ictional or real-world people), and with the time of its 
narrative in relation to real-world time in the case of the non-fiction modes. 
Along the way, he makes a brief but intriguing aside, pointing out that “the 
consciousness of the child can teach us a lot” about the way spectators 
engage with these f ilmic modes. “But this is not our concern,” he continues, 
“We have only wanted to determine certain general attitudes of f ilmic 
consciousness, […] outside of any deviation” (p. 100).
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
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This paper takes up the “consciousness of the child,” not as a “deviation,” 
but as a meaningful prehistory. Exactly what can child consciousness teach 
us about f ilmic modes and identif ication? Meunier’s arguments rest heavily 
on the premise that f ilmic identif ication emerges from and against the 
background of what he terms “syncretic sociability,” a state of “anonymous 
collectivity” that characterizes infancy and very early childhood, but that 
some psychologists and philosophers argue never disappears entirely. If this 
is true, we stand to learn something about adult spectatorship by attending to 
the complexity of infantile relations to the world and others in it. Specifically, 
by examining what developmental psychologists have termed “forms of 
vitality” and the early childhood play, in which they are the focus, we see 
just how participatory and interactive is the relation between spectator, 
character, and f ilm in Meunier’s account of f ilmic identif ication.
Many scholars of early childhood agree that the “anonymous intersub-
jectivity” Meunier describes (p. 118) is the originary mode of engagement 
between an infant and others in the world. Drawing on phenomenology, 
cognitive psychology, and neuropsychology, contemporary scholars of early 
childhood development elaborate – in more detail than Meunier’s brief 
overview can do – just how “syncretic sociability” emerges and plays out, 
as well as how it anticipates, enables, and shifts into more ‘private’ forms of 
intersubjectivity, even as it lingers in some form. Bringing the psychology 
and phenomenology of childhood and child’s play to bear on Meunier’s 
theory of f ilmic identif ication also allows us to expand the discussion of 
f ilmic identif ication beyond narrative and character, to make room for 
formal, cinematic aspects of identif ication that are less emphasized by 
Meunier’s account.
Though Meunier calls the consciousness of a child a “deviation” from the 
“generalized” spectator he pursues through the book, there is good reason 
to turn to childhood for clues regarding f ilmic identif ication as it pertains 
to adult spectators. Of course, childhood differs from adulthood in more 
ways than we can count, but as Merleau-Ponty says, in a series of recently 
translated lectures on child psychology and pedagogy, “adult functions are 
already represented in the child, but are not present in the same sense. It 
is analogous to a game of chess; all the pieces are there at the start and yet 
the face of the game changes.”1
As Merleau-Ponty argues, children’s mindsets demand to be engaged 
on their own terms, putting aside assumptions and comparative measures 
based on adult concepts and habits. If one approaches childhood in this 
fashion, one f inds that structures inherent in early childhood are in some 
ways radically strange in comparison to those of adulthood, and yet they 
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continue to play a meaningful role long after the development of new ones. 
Syncretic sociability is one of these structures.
Syncretic Sociability
Meunier quotes Merleau-Ponty, who claims that syncretic sociability is “a 
commerce with the world and a presence to the world which is older than 
intelligence” (p. 42). In this early stage in a child’s relation to the world, the 
child has not arrived at a sense of the self, nor of others. As Merleau-Ponty 
writes, syncretic sociability (the term he adopts from Henri Wallon) is 
“the existence of a kind of precommunication, an anonymous collectivity 
with differentiation, kind of a group existence.”2 It precedes a second stage, 
which is “the objectif ication of one’s body, segregation, distinction between 
individuals. […] Individual consciousness only appears later, along with the 
objectif ication of one’s own body, establishing a dividing wall between the 
other and me and the constitution of the other and of me as ‘human beings’ 
in a reciprocal relationship.”3
Meunier describes this stage as the foundation of a sense of oneself as a 
unique entity, a subject in the world.
It is on the basis of this indistinct, intersubjective syncretism that 
self-awareness, and the awareness of others, is structured in the child. 
Moreover, it is remarkable that the recognition of other people always 
precedes the awareness of oneself as a singular being. […] The link to 
other people is provided with existence in the form of a coexistence of 
consciousnesses. As such, it precedes the formation of people as private 
subjectivities and is even the precondition for this process (p. 45/46).
Indeed, then and now, many psychologists and phenomenologists agree 
that this syncretic sociability never fully disappears. After all, writes 
Wallon, “could adult intelligence have remained rich and productive if 
it had really been forced to abandon the sources from which the child’s 
intelligence springs?”4 Summarizing Merleau-Ponty, Talia Welsh writes that 
“all experiences are constituted by original, subjectless experience and thus 
all experiences express elements of original syncretic sociability.”5 In other 
words, “this anonymous existence is not just a period of the subject’s early 
life; it is interwoven within everyday existence.”6
Meunier makes clear that “identif ication is founded on primor-
dial intersubjectivity in order for it to be structured in relation to private 
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intersubjectivity” (p. 46). For a clearer sense of how that shift between 
“primordial intersubjectivity” and “private intersubjectivity” takes place, 
we can look to Daniel Stern’s work in developmental child psychology.
Stern’s career-long investigation of interpersonal relations, including 
and especially those of infancy and early childhood, reflects an increasing 
overlap between the f ields of phenomenology, psychoanalysis, cognitive 
psychology, and neuroscience on these issues. He agrees with those of his 
contemporaries in cognitive child psychology who argue that intersub-
jectivity is an “innate, emergent human capacity,” but he parts company 
with them on the question of what precisely intersubjectivity is.7 While 
some have argued that the infant’s tendency to imitate the parents’ facial 
expressions suggests the infant does have a sense of self as separate from 
others, Stern “reserves intersubjectivity for the end of the f irst year, when 
the infant ‘discovers he has a mind, that other people have minds […] and 
that inner subjective experiences are potentially shareable.’”8
Stern does acknowledge that a certain kind of intersubjectivity exists in 
infancy, but he considers the term too broad to be useful. This prompts him to 
identify three categories, or stages, of “intersubjectivity” that develop between 
infant and parent. First, there is “interaffectivity,” in which “the infant somehow 
makes a match between the feeling state as experienced within and as seen 
‘on’ or ‘in’ another.”9 Following this, “interattentionality,” or joint attention, 
emerges: here, child and parent expressly share an object of attention, as when 
a child looks back at the parent to confirm that (in Stern’s example) it is safe to 
move forward to grasp a toy that appears beyond comfortable reach. Finally, 
with “interintentionality,” the infant attributes to the parent “the capacity to 
understand the infant’s intention,” as when (in Stern’s example) she demands 
a cookie and persists in her demand until the parent gives her the cookie or 
indicates explicitly that the demand has been refused.10
It seems clear that interaffectivity overlaps or coincides with syncretic 
sociability. In the context of f ilmic identif ication, it seems to align as well 
with the f irst and second of “the three aspects of identif ication” Meunier 
identif ies: “its motor or postural aspect, its affective aspect, and its dramatic 
aspect” (p. 52). Because Stern considers interaffectivity to be both corporeal 
and affective, he would not likely differentiate, as Meunier does, between 
the f irst and second of these. He would consider both to be precursors to 
the third, the “dramatic” aspect of identif ication, in which self and other are 
singular entities whose attention and intentionality are shareable (whether 
they actually are shared or not). Thus, what Stern discovers of the earliest 
“interaffective” stage of infantile social relations sheds light on the motoric 
and affective aspects of f ilmic identif ication in Meunier’s account.
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Interaffectivity is not a static state: it manifests in movement and time. 
A typical interpersonal encounter, he writes, is “a performance where the 
faces, bodies, tone of voice, etc. of the speaker and listener are the show for 
each other and for themselves, involving rapid shifts in arousal, interest, 
and aliveness.”11 In early developmental stages, “preverbal infants (4 and 
12 months) and mothers precisely time the starting, stopping, and paus-
ing of their vocalizations to create a rhythmic coupling and bidirectional 
coordination of their vocal dialogues. This implies that they have ‘captured’ 
not only their own timing but that of the other as well.”12
To understand precisely how human encounters unfold, Stern insists 
we must attend to the minutest f lows of energy and force. These “forms of 
vitality,” as he terms them, he considers to be the building blocks of infantile 
and, eventually, adult relations with others. Vitality forms are “the felt 
experience of force – in movement – with a temporal contour, and a sense 
of aliveness, of going somewhere. They concern the ‘How,’ the manner, and 
the style, not the ‘What’ or the ‘Why’” of interpersonal relations.13 Here, 
as in all his work, he uses quite cinematic language to underscore their 
ubiquity and signif icance:
Zoom in to describe the ‘dynamics’ of the very small events, lasting 
seconds, that make up the interpersonal, psychological moments of 
our lives: the force, speed, f low of a gesture; the timing and stress of a 
spoken phrase or even a word; the way one breaks into a smile or the 
time course of decomposing the smile; the manner of shifting position 
in a chair; the time course of lifting the eyebrows when interested and 
the duration of their lift; the shift and f light of a gaze; and the rush 
or tumble of thoughts. These are examples of the dynamic forms and 
dynamic experiences of everyday life. The scale is small, but that is 
where we live.14
To tease out the experience of vitality – not only in humans, but in the 
inanimate world and in the temporal arts of dance, music, and cinema, 
for example – requires close observation and descriptive language. “To 
understand dynamic forms of vitality more clearly,” he suggests we consider 
a lengthy list of words – among them, “exploding,” “drawn out,” “fluttering,” 
“tense,” “surging,” “languorous,” “swinging,” “loosely,” “fading,” “f leeting,” 
“halting.”15 These are neither sensations nor emotions nor acts, he points out: 
they are not modality-specif ic, like sensations, nor are they goal-oriented, 
like intentional acts. Vitality forms are cross-modal: mothers do not exactly 
mimic children’s precise sounds and movements, but transpose their vitality 
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affects into another register, perhaps responding to an excited child’s forceful 
outward thrusting of the arms with a sound, a vocalization that matches 
that movement’s enthusiastic force and intensity. Likewise, no vitality 
form belongs exclusively to any one emotion; “anger can ‘explode,’ ‘ooze 
out,’ ‘sneak up,’ or be ‘cold,’” for example, but “so could happiness and its 
smile.”16 “In short,” Stern writes, “vitality forms are different from emotions 
in their nature, feel, non-specif icity, omnipresence, and neurobiology.”17 
And yet, he insists, vitality affects are meaningful; “this is more than just 
‘embodiment.’”18
Although Meunier focuses considerable attention on character attitude, 
personality, motivation, and behavior, he de-emphasizes the ‘how’ of the 
movements and gestures that express these things, and which certainly 
contribute to a spectator’s response. After all, “without motion we cannot 
read in or imagine mental activity underneath, or thoughts, emotions, or 
‘will.’”19 In this respect, forms of vitality could be a useful tool for f leshing 
out Meunier’s analysis of f ilmic identif ication.
Vitality forms in the cinema entail not just the movements of human 
bodies, be they f ictional or documentary, but also f ilm style, in the aes-
thetic sense (an authorial style, or an acting style, for example) as well as 
in a broader, more pertinent phenomenological sense that Merleau-Ponty 
describes as a “unity,” which the world and everything in it has. Sounding 
very much like Meunier himself in his description of the way viewers of 
a home movie might identify friends or family members by their way of 
walking or smoking, Merleau-Ponty describes this “unity” as
comparable to that of an individual whom I recognize in an irrecus-
able evidentness prior to having succeeded in giving the formula of his 
character, because he conserves the same style in all that he says and 
in all of his behavior, even if he changes milieu or opinions. A style is a 
certain way of handling situations that I identify or understand in an 
individual or for a writer by taking up the style for myself through a sort 
of mimicry, even if I am incapable of def ining it; and the def inition of 
a style, as accurate as it might be, never presents the exact equivalent 
and is only of interest to those who have already experienced the style.20
Vitality forms can disclose the relation between affect, movement, and 
time in very precise ways. The speed of a human gesture or a camera move-
ment, the inflection of a voice or intensity of a sound effect – these and 
innumerable other aspects of a f ilm’s style would lend support to Meunier’s 
nuanced descriptions of the affective relationship the spectator has to a 
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f ilm’s characters, whether f ictional or belonging to a real-world context 
that may be intimately, or not at all, familiar to the spectator.
Child’s Play
“Belief, in the cinema,” writes Meunier,
is rather comparable to belief when playing. The child who plays ‘cowboys 
and Indians’ never ceases to regard his behavior as imaginary, but this 
does not negate the fact that during the game – that is, until the moment 
when he decides to stop playing – the child ‘believes’ that he is a ‘cowboy,’ 
and ‘believes’ that his fellow players are ‘Indians.’ He is fascinated by the 
unreal world created by the game, just as the spectator is fascinated by 
the unreal world of the screen. (p. 95)
Child’s play begins long before ‘cowboys and Indians’ and imaginary tea 
parties, even before patty-cake and peek-a-boo. It has its roots in the 
deceptively simple exchange of vocalizations, touches, and gazes between 
newborns and their parents or closest caretakers. In a sense, they are the 
child’s f irst playground.
The continuity between the preliminary, purely affective play that 
dominates in the f irst year of life and the symbolic play that follows in 
later years parallels the relationship between syncretic sociability and the 
‘private’ intersubjectivity that emerges later, in real-world interpersonal 
relations and in f ilmic identif ication.
In a study of child’s play that is substantially informed by Stern’s work, 
Silvia Español and her colleagues observed in the interactions between an 
adult and children, two and three years old, “a type of interactive play where 
child and adult, in a pleasant and organized fashion, actively manipulate 
the vitality forms of their own movements and sounds.”21 In this kind of 
play, dubbed forms-of-vitality-play (hereafter hyphenated for clarity) the 
researchers were struck by “two essential traits: its non-figurative character, 
and its link with temporal arts.”22
The only ‘content’ in this category of play are the vitality forms themselves; 
there is no act of representation as in games of ‘cowboys and Indians’ or 
‘house,’ for example. Instead, “the dyad [baby and parent] skillfully extracts 
some of the f ive events of forms of vitality (movement, time, force, space 
and intention/direction) and elaborates on them according to a repetition-
variation structure.”23 Forms-of-vitality-play do, however, provide “a good 
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runway for the development of symbolic play.”24 Forms-of-vitality-play 
also “prepares the child to participate in the temporal arts that belong to 
his culture,” as Stern has claimed.25 In the patterning of movements and 
sounds between child and adult, for example, the researchers identif ied 
certain patterns of repetition and variation “of small units of movements 
and sounds, resembling patterns that are present in the temporal arts.”26 
Across forms-of-vitality-play, symbolic play, and in the temporal arts, they 
f ind that “in all three, the backbone is the repetition-variation form.”27
Although Meunier likens the suspension of disbelief in the f ilm experi-
ence to a child’s game of ‘cowboys and Indians,’ his own account of f ilmic 
identification bears closer resemblance to forms-of-vitality-play. Consider the 
two possible kinds of participatory identif ication with a f ictional character 
that he sets out: “being-with” and “being-like.” Giving the example of a 
spectator who identif ies with the hero in a classic Western, he writes that, 
in this case,
participation takes on the allure of an attempt to ‘be like’ the hero. Here 
there is identif ication in the narrow sense of the term. In other words, 
there is an attempted fusion with the highly valorized character. The 
ego tends to establish with the personality of the hero a relation not of 
exteriority but of belonging. The center of reference is no longer the ego of 
the spectator but the personality of the hero, and participatory behavior 
consists of an effort to be this personality. This is, therefore, participation 
in the mode of ‘being-like’ (p. 130/131).
Against this kind of identif ication, he posits another mode he calls “being-
with.” In this case,
while participating in her [the character’s] existence, I remain situated 
with respect to her. In other terms, I do not engage my personal ‘ego’ in 
the character. [She] remains before me, in a relationship of exteriority. 
I live in connivance with her, in a sort of sympathetic complicity, but I 
remain a center of reference. As such, [her story] does not become my 
story, since I do not have a tendency to fuse with her, to be ‘like her.’ (p. 130)
Paradoxically, in this latter mode we empathize and identify more closely 
with a character by maintaining our difference and distance from her.
Likewise, in forms-of-vitality-play, difference not only exists but plays a 
crucial role, this despite the fact that the self and other, the ‘I’ and the ‘you,’ 
have not yet been fully conceptualized, much less f irmly codif ied. Español 
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and her colleagues identify this as a hallmark of forms-of-vitality-play, 
distinct from the type of mimicry that comes just before it. Whereas the adult 
is the one who determines the dynamics of very early social play through 
repetition and difference, in forms-of-vitality-play, both adults and children 
manipulate their movements and sounds, “letting novelty emerge from 
their almost symmetrical exchanges” and creating a dialogic exchange.28
Part of the pleasure and excitement in forms-of-vitality-play lies in 
contingency. “For play to appear,” Stern writes, there must be
a loose frame that permits spontaneity and unpredictability; the in-
corporation of accidents, errors, and rule violations; the momentary 
uncoupling from the other to explore and adjust inside yourself and then 
rejoin the partner; sometimes f iddling with the very timing of interactions 
and expectations so as to create variations and pleasurable violations; 
and other such nonlinear and frame-breaking features that enhance 
creativity.29
In fact, Stern points to evidence that infants develop a tolerance and even 
desire for contingency. Babies younger than three months are drawn to 
situations in which the vitality dynamics of adult behavior perfectly match 
their own. Around the age of four months, however, they begin to show a 
preference for events in which adult behavior is “highly but imperfectly 
contingent with their own.”30
If Meunier’s ‘being-with’ requires difference between self and other in 
identif ication, then, it is in forms-of-vitality-play that we see that difference 
coming into being, even though, at this stage, the self and other have not 
yet been clearly demarcated. This explains what Meunier says of children 
playing ‘cowboys and Indians,’ that they can quickly and easily shift from 
play to reality: they are cowboy and Indian, until they stop playing. This 
shift from being oneself to being another becomes easier with practice; 
perhaps forms-of-vitality-play offers precisely that.
Elsewhere in this volume, Daniel Fairfax points out how refreshing it 
is to see Meunier’s allusion to f ive- and six-year-old children, rather than 
the infant who f igures so strongly in apparatus and psychoanalytic f ilm 
theories. On the other hand, I appreciate that even the infant, who (thanks 
to Meunier’s emphasis on syncretic sociability) hovers just outside the 
frame of his discussion, is much more engaging than the one who f igures 
in later f ilm theory. That is, if we take Meunier’s cue to think of cinema in 
terms of play, but focus our attention on forms-of-vitality-play rather than 
the symbolic play of later childhood, we bring into relief the signif icant 
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difference between Meunier’s idea of the spectator and the one imagined 
by apparatus theory. Meunier’s spectator ‘plays back’ interactively with the 
f ilm, bringing his or her own vitality forms into the mix, echoing Stern’s 
argument that infants’ perceptual activities are far more active and acute 
than traditional accounts have given us to believe.
Vitality Affects and Filmic Identification
Stern consistently uses distinctly cinematic language when describing 
infantile interpersonal encounters – he refers to the parents’ vocal and 
gestural behavior as a “sound and light show” for the infant, for example – 
and his own psychotherapy practice.31 “I grew to realize how much occurs 
in a moment that lasts only seconds,” he writes. “Once I got the hang of 
these techniques (e.g., freeze frame, slow motion, segment repeats) I could 
even use them, unsystematically, in real time, for very short stretches, to 
see my psychotherapy patients differently.”32
It comes as no surprise, then, that in elaborating his concept of forms 
of vitality, Stern includes a lengthy discussion of Raymond Bellour’s 1979 
essay, “System of a Fragment (on The Birds),” one of several essays in which 
the f ilm theorist examines classical cinema’s def initive pattern of repeti-
tion and variation.33 “Bellour does a micro-analysis of f ilm, working with 
units lasting only seconds, using stop frame, replay, fast forward, and slow 
motion – all the techniques that baby watchers use to analyze the ‘ordinary 
choreography’ between mother and infant.”34 In Bellour’s close reading, 
“flesh has been put on the narrative, and it has been imbued with powerful 
vitality forms. This use of Bellour’s work is only one among multiple possible 
examples of the unique ways in which cinema can produce the dynamic 
feel of experience.”35
Stern’s admiration for Bellour’s work was mutual: the latter’s 2002 essay 
on the “unfolding of emotion” in cinematic experience draws substantially 
on Stern’s introduction of vitality affects in The Interpersonal World of the 
Infant, f irst published in 1985. In response to Stern’s argument that vitality 
affects underscore not only our earliest human social relations but also 
prepare us for the experience of the temporal arts, Bellour writes,
The cinema immediately seems to f ill the frame of such a vision. […] All 
the resources of the shot, from the frame to the movements that move 
it, either in their inner limits, or in animating them through the camera 
movements – all the resources of the shot and series of shots serve the 
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sustained deployment of vitality affects, under the pretext and according 
to the inclinations of psychological affects, supporting identif ications 
with characters, with the f iction.36
Still Life
I want to end this piece with two brief examples of the way forms-of-vitality 
research resonates with Meunier’s theory of f ilmic identif ication.
The patterns Stern and fellow researchers identify in clinical experiments 
bear some resemblance to patterns of attention and movement in the f ilmic 
experience. For example, he points out that
when a mother goes ‘still face’ while facing her infant, i.e. not moving her 
face at all, not even with slight expressions, the baby, or even a neonate, 
becomes upset within seconds. Newborns already have working peripheral 
vision that is designed to detect motion at the periphery. Accordingly, 
stillness is registered no matter where their focal vision is on the mother’s 
face.37
This experiment recalls the scene in The Birds (Alfred Hitchcock, 1963), in 
which Melanie looks on in horror as a gas station patron ignites a trail of 
spilled gasoline near the diner where she and other townspeople have taken 
refuge. The scene has prompted startled laughter in undergraduates seeing 
it for the f irst time in my classroom. Perhaps they, like the baby in Stern’s 
experimental example, are startled by the utter stillness of Tippi Hedren’s 
face. Preternaturally still, she stares in shock as the trail of f ire rapidly speeds 
out of control. The moment unfolds in nine shots, neat eye-line matches 
that intercut her still face (each time in a slightly different position, always 
motionless) with shots of the f ire racing along the ground.
Her stillness is striking precisely because it contrasts not only with the 
movement of her fellow onlookers, but even with the movement of her own 
hair, blowing slightly in the breeze through the open window. Like an infant 
looking for signs of life in the mother’s face, perhaps viewers are startled by 
the sudden absence of movement where one expects it. Interestingly, the 
shot of Mrs. Brenner’s silent scream in response to farmer Dan Fawcett’s 
ghastly corpse works in a similar fashion. There, the contrast plays out not 
so much in editing, but in sound and performance, between her paralyzed 
silence and the synchronous sound of the shot itself, including Mitch’s voice 
asking her to explain what has happened.
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“Compared to the infant’s expectations and wishes, the depressed 
mother’s face is f lat and expressionless,” writes Stern.
She breaks eye contact and does not seek to re-establish it. There is a 
disappearance of her animation, tonicity, and so on. Along with these 
invariants coming from the mother there are resonant invariants invoked 
in the infant: the f light of animation, a def lation of posture, a fall in 
positive affect and facial expressivity, a decrease in activation, etc. In 
sum, the experience is descriptively one of a micro-depression.38
Stern’s description concerns an encounter that we certainly would not 
consider play. However, one can imagine a case in which the mother goes 
still in order to surprise the baby by playfully ‘coming to life’ again, provoking 
in the child a similar pattern of suspension and sudden arousal. In such a 
case of forms-of-vitality-play, the child and mother would be responding 
to one another’s vitality forms (movements, sounds, expressions) in such a 
way as to create expectation, resonance, and surprise. Hitchcock is playing 
with us in exactly this manner, in this sequence.
By attending to vitality forms as they emerge in infancy, then, we arrive 
at a formal pattern in The Birds and an approach to it that plays nicely with 
Bellour’s own argument about the semiotic structure of the f ilm and its 
significance regarding the gendered gaze, identif ication, power, and author-
ship. This is a good example of the way psychoanalysis, phenomenology, 
Fig. 12: Scene from alfred Hitchcock’s The Birds with Tippi Hedren.
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and cognitive science might intersect productively in the f ilm theoretical 
analysis of f ilmic identif ication.
The editing-studio segment of Dziga Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera 
(1929) provides another example. As children watch a magic trick with a mix 
of joyous and befuddled amazement, the f ilm shifts to a series of successive 
freeze-frames, rendering each child’s face suddenly still. These shots are 
followed by a sequence of adult faces, also in freeze-frame, as if frozen in 
response to the children’s sudden stillness. After a short segment, in which 
we watch the f ilm’s editor (Elizaveta Svilova) constructing the sequence 
we have just watched, these same faces launch into movement again. Much 
later, the use of stop-motion animation produces a similar effect, when a 
tripod and camera assemble themselves on-screen before an audience of 
curious moviegoers. The jerky motions of machinery repeat but modulate 
the quick, small movements of the diegetic viewers who laugh, blink, lean 
forward, or raise an eyebrow in amused surprise or consternation at the 
apparatuses’ antics. The play between stillness and movement, and more 
profoundly between human vitality forms and cinematic ones, exhibits the 
“momentary uncoupling from the other” that enables the creative “variations 
and pleasurable violations” Stern points to in forms-of-vitality-play.
Tom Gunning and Vivian Sobchack have discussed, separately, the 
uniquely cinematic experience of time. Gunning argues the “astonishment” 
attributed to early cinema spectators stems from the sudden transition from 
still image to moving image.39 Sobchack takes up Gunning’s argument in an 
analysis of a trope in contemporary martial arts f ilms, in which fast-moving 
action sequences suddenly cut to extreme slow motion for a long moment, 
before cutting back to speed again.40 She argues the astonishment that 
spectators might experience in such moments stems not from the speed 
or the slowness itself, or even from their drastic difference, but from the 
transition from one to the other, which reveals the uncanny co-presence 
of identity and difference. “What ‘attracts,’ is not simply ‘still to moving’ 
or ‘moving to still’ but, rather, the movement from one terminus to the 
other – indeed, the movement of movement itself, which, made visible in 
slow motion, occupies the uncanny space ‘between’ these end points, and 
reveals them both to be merely different ‘dimensions of the same process.’”41
The psychological research that I have discussed here raises the possibil-
ity that the “aesthetic of astonishment” (to borrow Gunning’s phrase) on 
display in Vertov’s f ilm and exemplif ied by early cinema and the modern 
action f ilm’s trope of abrupt slowness, may stem from very early child’s 
play, marked by “dialogic exchange” in which both child and adult “get 
to manipulate vitality forms letting novelty emerge from their almost 
cinEMa anD cHilD’S Play 317
symmetrical exchanges.”42 This ‘play’ involves not only vitality forms of the 
human f igures on-screen, but also the f ilm’s, including not only frame rate 
but also the speed, intensity, force, and orientation of camera movements 
and bodies in motion, of sound, of light, and so forth.
Looking at adult f ilm perception through the lens of forms-of-vitality-play 
supports Meunier’s own reading of f ilmic identif ication, by casting the 
spectator as a much more active player in the experience than the apparatus 
theory that follows quickly on the heels of his 1969 text would have it. It has 
the added advantage of extending Meunier’s discussion of ‘identif ication’ 
into the realm of aesthetics, rather than solely narrative and character. 
That is, although he frames his discussion of ‘being-with’ and ‘being-like’ 
squarely in terms of identif ication with characters embedded in stories (be 
those f ictional or not, classically organized or not), using ‘forms of vitality’ 
to think through f ilmic identif ication allows us both to attend to formal 
qualities involved in any instance of f ilmic identif ication, and to consider 
f ilmic identif ication in f ilms organized around formal play, rather than 
character and story.
Bellour draws a similar conclusion regarding vitality affects and f ilm 
analysis: to see the bodies, objects, light, and camera movements as vitality 
affects, rather than as narratively motivated and meaningful characters, 
objects, and gestures
is not to say that therefore we cannot commit ourselves to aims of analysis 
that are meant to be, on one side, more f igurative or f igural in nature, 
on the other, more narrative or narratological. But the essential thing is 
that […] the two aspects are in the end forever linked just as they were 
at another level welded from their origin. And this, in such a way that 
such a link also proves to be free from all predestination, and open to 
the greatest chance, in life and in cinema.43
Forms-of-vitality-play also seems an appropriate analogue to moviegoing 
in that it emerges within the syncretic sociability that Meunier posits as 
a crucial support for the ‘private’ sort of identif ication a spectator experi-
ences with characters. In this stage of life, “it is true that children have an 
ambiguous understanding of other people as subjects,” writes Talia Welsh 
in her own take on Merleau-Ponty’s child psychology lectures
But it is not the case that other people are objects for children. […] 
Intersubjectivity is not a matter of discrete subjects. When I live in the 
world, it is not similar to watching a movie where things pass in front of 
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me and I passively receive them. Nor do I experience my body like a thing 
that processes sensations akin to how a money-counter counts bills.44
Counter to Welsh’s assumptions here, research into forms of vitality, when 
paired with Meunier’s discussion of f ilmic identif ication, reminds us just 
how active watching a movie is for its spectators, who interactively play 
with narrative, actors, and the f ilm itself.
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Combining Jean-Pierre Meunier’s notion of film-souvenir, which originally 
only referred to home movies, with Daniel Yacavone’s phenomenology of 
f ilm form, this contribution sketches the outline of a phenomenology of 
f ilm experience which covers the entirety of what Eric de Kuyper proposes 
to call the “vast-domain of cinema as non-art,” a domain that includes 
orphan f ilms, ephemeral f ilms and other forms of utility f ilms.
Keywords: Utility f ilms; home movies; ephemeral f ilms; historical experi-
ence; Jean-Pierre Meunier
The relation between f ilm and the end of bourgeois culture is not so much 
captured in the term distraction [Zerstreuung] in which, after all, capitalism 
protects itself from its loss of metaphysical elevation. It is captured rather in 
what are interruptions in the production process: in a boredom that protects 
itself against organization, in a form of leisure in waiting.
‒ Heide Schlüpmann
I sincerely hope we can avoid the trap of auteurism this time around.
‒ Rick Prelinger
I.
In a recent essay, Daniel Yacavone notes that thanks to the works of Dudley 
Andrew, Vivian Sobchack, Jennifer Barker, and others, phenomenology 
has once again moved to the center of the debate in f ilm theory, which it 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
doi 10.5117/ 9789462986565_hediger
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occupied before the advent of semiotics and post-structuralism. Yacavaone 
then takes Vivan Sobchack to task for focusing her phenomenology of f ilm 
experience on the medium rather than the form of f ilm. Sobchack, according 
to Yacavone, “advocates replacing a conception of cinematic experience 
rooted in the idea of f ilmmaker(s) as expressing subject(s) with that of a f ilm 
itself as an ‘expressing subject and object.’”1 By contrast, Yacavone highlights 
the distinction between medium and form to argue for a phenomenology 
of f ilm form that reinstates artistic expression, and with it an auteurist 
approach to f ilm, as a primary concern.
While I am profoundly sympathetic with Yacavone’s focus on form, what 
I want to propose here are the outlines for a phenomenology of f ilm form for 
which artistic expression is, at best, a secondary concern. My interest is in 
what Eric de Kuyper, in a lucid critique of a conventional f ilm historiography 
driven by categories like ‘auteur,’ ‘nation,’ and ‘style’ inherited from art 
history and literary studies, has called the “vast domain of cinema as non-
art,”; in other words, the type of f ilm that has variously been described as 
“ephemeral f ilm” (by Rick Prelinger), “useful cinema” (by Haidee Wasson and 
Charles Acland), and “utility f ilm” (by Yvonne Zimmermann and myself), 
which includes corporate f ilms, science and research f ilms, educational 
f ilms, and home movies.2 Precisely because these f ilms constitute such a 
“vast domain”, such an important part of f ilm history, we need an “aesthetic 
of f ilm history,” one that gives its “due to f ilm as an aesthetic, and not just 
an art phenomenon,” as De Kuyper wrote almost a quarter of a century ago.3 
The wide availability of utility f ilms in digital repositories today lends De 
Kuyper’s call for an aesthetic of f ilm history with renewed urgency.
Jean-Pierre Meunier’s The Structures of the Film Experience (Les Structures 
de l’expérience filmique: L’identification filmique) can contribute to such an 
aesthetic. Meunier’s book was one of the f irst treatises on f ilm aesthetics, 
if not the f irst, to include home movies under the rubric of ‘f ilm.’ While 
Meunier’s choice of examples suggests that he was neither a cinéphile in the 
classical sense – his corpus includes f ilms by non-canonical genre directors 
like Philippe Broca and James Bond movies – nor very concerned with the 
problem of artistic expression, his principal interest is in f iction f ilms. 
Borrowing a triad of concepts from Sartre’s The Imaginary (L’Imaginaire) to 
distinguish between three major attitudes of f ilm-viewing and three modes 
of f ilm experience – the f iction attitude, the documentary attitude, and the 
home-movie, or film-souvenir, attitude – he considers home movies almost 
by accident. But that accident has consequences: Meunier extends the f ield 
of f ilm aesthetics to include the entire domain of cinema as non-art.
EnGinES oF THE HiSTorical iMaGinaTion 323
Incidentally, in 1968, as Meunier was readying his book for print, the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) net, the US military’s predeces-
sor of the internet, took shape and Sol Worth developed the project of a 
democratized ethnography, at the heart of which he envisioned a video-
sharing platform creating a “world where symbolic forms created by one 
inhabitant are instantaneously available to all other inhabitants.”4 Just as 
Meunier set out to expand the horizon of f ilm theory, the outlines of the 
contemporary digital ecology emerged.
In this contribution, I want to argue that we can develop the outlines of 
a phenomenology of cinema as non-art by combining Meunier’s concept of 
film-souvenir with Yacavone’s phenomenology of f ilm form. In a f irst step, 
I want to restate the challenge such a phenomenology poses, particularly 
to Yacavone’s notion of form. In a second step, I discuss the experience of 
cinema as non-art and argue that, because of their lack of inherent interest, 
utility f ilms refer viewers to their ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit), or, in less 
Heideggerian terms, to the limits of their personal and situated knowledge. 
Utility f ilms thus work as virtual film-souvenirs and engines of the historical 
imagination. In a third step, I return to the problem of form and argue 
that disunity of form is what def ines utility f ilms as aesthetic devices. 
Incidentally, this also makes them a paradigm for an aesthetic of f ilm history.
II.
Based on a rereading of Merleau-Ponty’s seminal 1945 essay “Film and 
the New Psychology” and the passages dedicated to cinema in “Art and 
the World of Perception” from 1961, Daniel Yacavone argues that cinema’s 
aesthetic potential lies in creating a “reflexive, knowledgeable, and sensitive 
consciousness” of the fundamental process of lived perception. In that 
sense, “narrative cinema made and experienced as art largely shares in 
[the] same dynamics as modern painting.”5 For narrative cinema to be art 
and for the fundamental process of lived perception to become the object 
of a reflexive, knowledgeable consciousness, the presence of an auteur is 
required. Yacavone speaks of a “three-term, lived relation” between “two (or 
more) actual human subjects – the viewer and the f ilmmaker(s) – and one 
symbolic and communicative, as well as highly expressive object, i.e. the 
cinematic work of art as and when experienced.”6 For this three-term, lived 
relation to result in the experience of art, the expressive object of f ilm has 
to conform to certain standards. “The primary criterion for cinematic art,” 
Yacavone writes, paraphrasing Merleau-Ponty, “consists in the successful 
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creation of a distinctly aesthetic cohesiveness and expressive holism of 
formal and temporal (rhythmic) structure.” The auteur is the guarantor of 
“expressive holism”; expressive holism enables cinema as art, which in turn 
is the focus of a phenomenological aesthetics of f ilm.
The medium-form distinction thus aligns with the distinction between art 
and non-art. This considerably enlarges the already vast domain of cinema as 
non-art. Stanley Cavell once wrote that the question was not whether cinema 
could be art, but why it was spared the fate of becoming one for so long.7 Only 
with the advent of the nouvelle vague, Cavell argues, did cinema acquire a 
consciousness of its own history and thus become an art in the modern sense. 
Like Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson, and like Bazin, who attributed the 
greatness of classical Hollywood cinema to the “genius of the system” rather 
than individual auteurs, Cavell understood Hollywood cinema as a system of 
conventions comparable to Greek temple architecture, i.e. as an authorless art.8
We can argue that Hollywood cinema achieves ‘expressive holism’ even 
without an auteur f igure protruding into the viewer’s consciousness at every 
turn. But there can be no doubt that the films at the center of Eric de Kuyper’s 
thinking about an aesthetic of f ilm history do not satisfy Yacavone’s criterion 
of formal unity. Film archives typically include numerous unidentif ied or 
unidentifiable fragments. As deputy director of the Nederlands Filmmuseum 
in the 1990s, De Kuyper worked with Peter Delpeut and Mark-Paul Meyer 
to compile these “ruins of f inished works,” as he called them, into so-called 
“Bits and Pieces” reels.9 A continuing series, “Bits and Pieces” now consists 
of 623 fragments on 56 reels of 300 meters.10 They are screened in the f ilm 
museum cinema and at festivals, as well as lent and sold to other archives 
and institutions.
The legal term for these “Bits and Pieces” is ‘orphan f ilm.’ It classif ies 
f ilms as ‘abandonware,’ i.e. as material that has been abandoned by its 
owners and/or copyright holders or that is of unknown or unlocatable 
ownership.11 Timothy Corrigan and Patricia White describe orphan f ilms 
as “any sort of f ilms that have survived but have no commercial interests 
to pay the costs of their preservation.”12 This description also covers the 
majority of utility f ilms, i.e. f ilms made for specif ic occasions such as fairs 
or shareholder meetings. Now collected in dedicated archives such as the 
Italian Archivio Nazionale del Cinema d’Impresa in Ivrea near Turin or 
the Prelinger collection (most of which is available online at www.archive.
org), such f ilms lost their value even in the eyes of the corporations and 
institutions which commissioned them once their mission was complete. 
Home movies, which can also be classif ied as utility f ilms in that they were 
made to record specif ic occasions for a limited audience, turn into orphan 
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f ilms if and when they are abandoned by the people who made them and 
sold on flea markets or on eBay.
Scholars like Florian Hoof have studied the role of utility f ilms in the 
emergence and consolidation of industrial organizations in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.13 Others, like Alexandra Schneider, have provided 
the outlines of a theory of practice of home-movie f ilmmaking by looking 
for stylistic patterns in random film samples and reconstructing production 
histories from biographical cues.14
What is still missing is an aesthetic of utility f ilms, an aesthetic of f ilm 
history in the sense of De Kuyper. The real object of f ilm history, argues 
Pierre Sorlin, is the event of projection and the experience of the screening.15 
Projection alone does not endow the “Bits and Pieces” with the ‘expressive 
holism’ that would turn them into works of art according to Yacavone’s 
criterion. Rather, it highlights the character of many of these f ilms as 
fragments and ‘ruins of works.’ Fragments and ruins have, of course, long 
been a concern of aesthetics. Commenting on Stendahl’s observation that 
the Colosseum in decay is more beautiful than it was in its original glory, 
Hartmut Böhme writes: “Ruins show a precarious balance of preserved form 
and decay, nature and history, violence and peace, memory and present, 
mourning and longing for redemption, which no intact edif ice or object of 
art achieves.”16 In that spirit, we can argue that a phenomenology of f ilm 
form will only be complete if and when it accounts not just for expressive 
holism of complete works, but for the aesthetic specif icity of bits, pieces, 
errant home movies, and other ‘abandonware.’
III.
Fiction and documentary f ilms are crafted to capture the attention of as 
large an audience as possible, unbound by limits of a specif ic time and 
place of viewing. Film canons imply the existence of works of inherent, 
universal, and enduring value. And while it took Hollywood until the 1950s 
to comprehend the longevity of f ilm, it has been focused on the long-term 
exploitation of copyrights ever since. By contrast, unless we watch them 
with a “documentary attitude” in the sense of Meunier, i.e. with an eye to 
historical detail such as clothing and design, home movies appear to interest 
only those who made them or appeared in them, while passion for ephemeral 
f ilms fades with the occasion for which they were made.
To say that other people’s home movies and most ephemeral f ilms lack 
interest is another way of saying that they are boring. As Patrice Petro and 
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others have argued, boredom, def ined as lack of interest, is a genuinely 
modern state of mind.17 The modern subject emerges in sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century philosophy as the bearer of a reflexive consciousness, 
and of passions and interests.18 Only a subject capable of passions and 
interests can experience boredom as the absence of interest. If distrac-
tion, as Heide Schlüpmann argues, obfuscates the bourgeois world’s loss of 
metaphysical elevation, boredom, defined as the absence of interest, points 
to that loss. Boredom undermines a state of affairs in which the passions 
and the interests are constantly activated towards some specif ic goal or 
purpose. More specif ically, boredom marks the point where the production 
of subjectivity, which critics from Adorno to Lazzarato have identif ied as 
the modus operandi of the cultural industries, breaks down.19 If boredom 
can thus be read, as Schlüpmann suggests, as a critique of the production 
logic of modern bourgeois society, watching other people’s home movies and 
other f ilms devoid of interest becomes a critical, and even political, act.20 
As Patrice Petro writes, “Hidden in the innovation of distraction and shock 
is the despair that nothing further will happen. Hidden in the negativity 
of waiting, however, is the anticipation that something (different) might 
happen.”21 Perhaps paradoxically, Petro claims, boredom “habitualizes 
renewed perception.” Renewing perception, of course, is the signature trait 
of art as understood by the Russian formalists. An aesthetic of cinema as 
non-art, then, has to account for this paradox: it is precisely by virtue of the 
fact that it is devoid of interest, i.e. inherently boring, that cinema as non-art 
behaves like art, and can perform the function of an artwork.
To understand this paradox better, we need to look at situations in which 
ephemeral f ilms behave unexpectedly, (re-)awaken interest, and replace 
boredom with excitement: situations in which something indeed happens. 
One such instance occurred in the fall of 2004, when the Bergbaumuseum, 
the German National Museum of Mining in Bochum at the heart of the Ruhr 
Valley, organized a series of public screenings of mining f ilms from their 
archive. There were more than 180 mines in West Germany in the early 1950s, 
with a large concentration in the Ruhr Valley. After the coal crisis of 1957/1958, 
the coal industry went into a managed decline; the last mines, in Bottrop 
and Ibbenbüren, closed in 2018. Founded in 1930 and opened in the 1950s, the 
National Museum of Mining is the largest of its kind in the world and holds an 
important film collection. Screenings are a regular feature of Industriekultur, 
the public celebration of industrial heritage. The films screened in 2004 dated 
from the 1930s through the 1960s and covered public relations, work safety, 
recruitment, and advertising for coal. None of the f ilms was from a famous 
director or otherwise known, but all screenings were packed.
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As much as by the f ilms, I was enthralled by the spectacle of spectators 
experiencing the screenings in a palpably tactile way or, as the saying goes, 
with every f iber of their bodies. Work safety f ilms were particularly instruc-
tive. They focused on workplace hazards, always exemplif ied in a dramatic 
scene of an accident. The audience – many of them former miners, who had 
been shown some of the f ilms in their own training – tended to deride these 
scenes in the discussion after the screenings, mostly for the hammy acting. 
Rather than to the dramatization of danger, they appeared to respond to 
the evocation of their former workplace. In part, the discussions after the 
f ilms re-litigated the labor conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s. But the politics 
of past decades alone could not explain the excitement of the audience.
As Jean-Pierre Meunier points out in The Structures of the Film Experience, 
the relational, intersubjective structure of the film experience always implies 
an element of contagion between spectators. Any spectator will also act as 
a second-order observer of the other spectators. He or she will track their 
responses and, more often than not, mimetically adjust to the response of 
the others in the cinema.22 Focusing on the spectator’s relationship with 
the body on-screen, Meunier quotes the following passage from Hesnard:
My body of natural knowledge – my perceived body – f inds in the body 
of the other person a kind of extension of its own intentions: our two 
bodies are inhabited by the same anonymous existence. Furthermore, our 
two bodies realize, or at least give a hint of, expressive and signif icative 
movements, and form a single system by completing each other (p. 44/45).
Vivian Sobchack later develops this thought into the idea of the f ilm’s body, 
a basic experiential structure, which enables our engagement with a f ilm. 
Christiane Voss, in turn, speaks of the Leihkörper of the f ilm, of the spectator 
as a “surrogate body.”23 But the logic of extension also pertains to the other 
viewers: f ilm and spectators aggregate as a plurality, rather than as atomized 
individuals. At the Bochum screening, however, the contagion by aggregation 
had its limits. Partly because the response of the other audience members 
was so intense, those who did not share their background, like myself, were 
confined to the position of outsiders or second-order observers. My response 
to the f ilms was, in fact, largely predicated upon what they meant to the 
other members of the audience.
Extrapolating from self-observation and drawing on models and insights 
inherited from philosophy and psychology, theories of spectatorship usually 
assume an ideal spectator to be able to make general statements about 
viewer engagement. The feminist critique developed by Laura Mulvey and 
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others in the 1970s and 1980s introduced gender as a key marker of the 
spectator subject, while cultural studies in the 1980s added race and class 
to distinguish between modes of spectatorship. More recently, queer theory 
and intersectional analysis have contributed to differentiate current notions 
of spectatorship further.
One could, of course, describe my taking the position of second-order 
observer as a performance of class privilege. When I f irst took the job at 
Ruhr University, colleagues asked me how I was dealing with the ‘culture 
shock’ of trading Zurich, one of the richest cities in the world, with the 
post-industrial cityscape of Bochum. But I would argue that the challenge 
offered by the Bochum audience reaches beyond differences of race, class, 
gender, and sexual orientation.
One lesson that Gilles Deleuze retains from phenomenology is the heu-
ristic value of epoché, the bracketing of established beliefs and consolidated 
(if not reif ied) concepts and categories. Highlighting Deleuze’s concern 
with thinking immanence beyond the dualities of traditional metaphysics, 
Leonard Lawlor writes that the “challenge of immanence appears to be 
nothing less than the challenge with which phenomenology confronts 
traditional metaphysics.”24 As Deleuze argues himself, the concept of the 
image in his cinema books offers an underhanded critique of the unacknowl-
edged transcendentalism of the then-dominant psychoanalytic theories of 
spectatorship.25 For Deleuze, the image is not something perceived or gazed 
at by the spectator; rather, spectatorship is something folded into and out 
of the image as event.
Along similar lines, one of the lessons of the Bochum screening seems to 
be that we need to account for the specif ics of the viewing event rather than 
frame it in terms of the conceptual abstraction of a viewing subject and the 
declination of its attributes. More specifically, I would argue that the Bochum 
audience’s response points to the role of what Michael Polanyi proposes to 
call “tacit knowledge,” while my reaction to that response highlights the 
importance of what Donna Haraway calls “situated knowledge,” the specif ic 
knowledge of the researcher and its experiential limits. Tacit knowledge, 
the non-propositional knowledge acquired through personal experience, 
which Hesnard seems to refer to as “natural knowledge,” plays into every 
event of viewing a f ilm.26 At a general level, we understand the conventions 
of cinema without necessarily being able to name and describe them. At 
a more individual level, we respond to a f ilm as it relates to our personal 
experience, and we infuse the f ilm’s world with our knowledge of a given 
space, situation, or conflict. To put it in more Deleuzian terms, we affect 
the f ilm as it affects us. As we engage with a narrative f ilm, that affect 
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remains subordinate to the emotional engagement which is patterned 
into the narrative structure of the f ilm. But with f ilms like the mining 
f ilms, which elicit no strong emotional engagement based on narrative 
or visual invention, the knowledge with which we affect the f ilm takes 
center stage, and in a way overwhelms the f ilm. As Jean-Pierre Meunier 
argues, the f ilm experience is “a perceptual experience that underpins the 
imaginary attitude of consciousness” (p. 152). What Meunier writes about 
home movies also applies to utility f ilms: “There is a constitutive activity on 
the part of consciousness. In short, consciousness constantly exceeds the 
image, which serves precisely as a medium between the reality perceived 
in the past and my present consciousness of this reality” (p. 107). In her 
work on the home movie, Vivian Sobchack draws on Meunier’s typology of 
viewing attitudes to argue that we can shift from one attitude to the other 
even as we watch a f ilm. As the discussion after the screenings suggested, 
the Bochum audience explored all three attitudes. They adopted a fiction 
attitude towards the characters in the f ilms, exploring the being-with and 
being-as modes of the f iction attitude (or alignment and allegiance, to use 
the terms of Murray Smith’s model of character participation), ultimately 
finding the characterization unconvincing, as they indicated in their critique 
of the acting and the mise en scène.27 They adopted a documentary attitude, 
treating the f ilms as purveyors of knowledge about the world, which led to 
the debate about labor strife and work safety regulation. Most importantly, 
however, they treated the f ilms as film-souvenirs, even though they were 
clearly not watching a home movie of any kind. Perhaps based on an element 
of self-recognition in the being-as mode, the vicarious participation in the 
character’s experience, the reality perceived in the past through these f ilms 
was their own. In that sense, the former miners responded to the f ilms with 
an excess of consciousness, which was based in their tacit knowledge of the 
workplace, while I reflexively responded to their perception of a reality in 
the past, which I had not lived and could not access.
One could argue that this split describes the viewing situation of any 
ephemeral f ilm: there are those who have grounds to respond to the 
f ilms, and there are those who do not. In a unique way, and more than 
conventional f iction and documentary f ilms, the viewing situation of utility 
f ilms exemplif ies the situatedness of the viewer’s knowledge. Arguing for 
a feminist objectivity, Donna Haraway writes that objectivity is not about 
“transcendence and splitting of subject and object” but “about specif ic 
and particular embodiment,” and that only “partial perspective promises 
objective vision.”28 The viewing situation of ephemeral f ilms makes that 
partial perspective palpable. The experience of the f ilm fragment, of the 
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ruins of works, and of works that are in ruins because they lost their original 
mission, is itself fractured and fragmented, an experience in ruins, and we 
have to understand it as such.
If the Bochum miners overwhelmed the mining f ilms with an excess 
of consciousness fueled by their lived experience of the industrial past, 
the f ilms required a different excess of consciousness, a different feat of 
the imagination, of those who did not share that past. They had to treat 
these f ilms as virtual film-souvenirs, as f ilms that worked as film-souvenirs 
for others but could only work as such for them if they imagined having 
shared the same experience. In the case of the Bochum screening, this 
meant imagining the experience of working in a coal mine, an epitome 
of the industrial world, from the vantage point of a post-industrial lived 
world. Yet a reliving of the past as it had been, a wie es gewesen in the sense 
of nineteenth-century German historian Ranke, remained out of reach 
for such an act of imagination. Ineluctably, it remained coupled with a 
second-order observation of others experiencing their remembrance of the 
past as it had been f irst hand. A comparison to two other types of f ilm, the 
trailer and the historical drama, can help us define what such an act of the 
imagination entails. If the movie trailer presents the f ilm in the form of a 
virtual memory, i.e. as we would remember it had we already seen it, the 
utility f ilm challenges us to imagine what we would remember had we lived 
what it refers to, had we lived through its specif ic occasion.29 And where 
the historical drama produces subjectivity, addressing and interpellating 
its viewers as members of a polity and an “imagined community” whose 
history the f ilm purports to tell, the utility f ilm returns the viewer to her 
“partial perspective that promises objective vision.”
Lest we shift to what Meunier calls the “documentary attitude” and 
content ourselves with a historicist curiosity for period detail, the utility f ilm 
works as an engine of the historical imagination in a reflexive way. It is an 
aesthetic device, i.e. it has the potential to renew perception and to elicit as 
Yacavone states, a “reflexive, knowledgeable, and sensitive consciousness” of 
the fundamental process of lived perception, precisely insofar and because 
the boredom it promises clears the space for the historical imagination 
to do its work. In that sense, if the f ilm experience is indeed, as Meunier 
argues, a perceptual experience that “underpins the imaginary attitude of 
consciousness” (p. 152), it is the film-souvenir that invites the strongest effort 
of the imagination – or, more specif ically, the utility f ilm, the ephemeral 
f ilm or home movie, imagined as a virtual film-souvenir by those who do not 
share the past reality to which the f ilm refers. This might also explain why 
the home-movie fragment has become such a popular technique in narrative 
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cinema: it invites an excess of consciousness that anchors the f iction f ilm 
more deeply in the lived experience of the viewer. It has been argued that 
the industrial f ilm, a key format of the utility f ilm, is a parasite, a function 
rather than a format that can shift shapes according to the situation.30 But 
in terms of aesthetic experience, the relationship can be reversed, and it 
can be the f iction f ilm that thrives on the strength of the film-souvenir, or 
rather of the virtual film-souvenir.
IV.
But if film-souvenirs are indeed, as Meunier writes, a “medium between the 
reality perceived in the past and my present consciousness of this reality” 
(p. 107), then what about their form?
According to Yacavone, form only exists in a given medium as expressive 
holism. Whether it be a fragment, a ruin, a concoction with an ephemeral 
purpose or an aid to the memory of someone we never knew, most utility 
f ilms lack an auteur and a primary aesthetic purpose, both of which would 
be required to achieve expressive holism. In retrospect, some industrial f ilms 
from the format’s golden age, i.e. the 1950s and 1960s, can be reappraised 
Fig. 13: Program of the mining film screenings at the German Museum of Mining, Bochum, 
September-october 2004. © Deutsches Bergbaumuseum.
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as forgotten milestones of modernism. Robert Menegoz’s Only the Fogs Are 
Grey, a 1965 documentary for Thyssen steelworks photographed by Sacha 
Vierny, comes to mind, or the collaborations between industrial f ilmmak-
ers and pioneers of electronic music in 1960s Italy.31 Yet Only the Fogs Are 
Grey is a recruitment f ilm, extolling the virtues of a highly automated steel 
factory to potential hires among the moviegoing public. Such f ilms are the 
Schroedinger’s cats of cinematic art: they are art and non-art at the same time.
We could contend that the external purpose of a film like Only the Fogs are 
Grey is no longer relevant today and treat the film as a self-sufficient artwork. 
But this would obfuscate the historicity of our viewing situation, and with 
it, the aesthetic specif icity of the f ilm. Viewing, from our post-industrial 
vantage point, an industrial f ilm from the golden age requires an effort of the 
historical imagination to compensate for the limits of our situated knowledge: 
it requires, if you will, post-industrial objectivity. As a consequence, whatever 
form we can claim for a utility f ilm must be a form in a “medium between 
the reality in the past and my present consciousness of this reality” (p. 107).
Phenomenology emerged in response to an existential contradiction, 
which also posed a fundamental challenge to philosophy: the discrepancy 
between the rapidly expanding scientif ic knowledge about the world and 
the subject’s fading conceptual grasp of the unity and totality of that world. 
For philosophy to stay true to its mission, it had to f ind a way to bridge that 
gap.32 A return to ‘the things themselves’ and the study of the constitutive 
acts of consciousness of a being embedded in the lived world, rather than of 
the ontological structure of the world as a totality of being, was the answer. 
On a much smaller scale, the project of a phenomenology of f ilm form which 
includes cinema as non-art responds to a similar challenge: to provide a 
conceptual grasp for a ‘vast domain’ of f ilms without having to resort to a 
selective criterion like authorship or the primacy of aesthetic purpose to 
seize the unity and totality of its object.
In the absence of an author, the viewer has to step in and provide the 
form that distinguishes the utility f ilm as an aesthetic object. Just as the 
lack of interest was the key to understanding the structure of the utility f ilm 
experience, the lack of formal unity provides the key to its form. Utility f ilms 
are ephemeral not just because of their purpose, but because of their form: 
where art can rely on the relative solidity of ‘expressive holism,’ the form of 
the utility f ilm is ultimately the fleeting, transitory work of the historical 
imagination, which operates in the medium “between the reality perceived in 
the past and my present consciousness of that reality.” When the production 
of subjectivity breaks down and an expressive authority fails to materialize, 
the productive subject gets to play and takes responsibility for form.
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But we would be remiss if we thought that the formal disunity and ephem-
eral was a suff icient criterion to distinguish De Kuyper’s “vast domain of 
cinema as non-art” from cinema as art. In fact, one could argue that, in the 
contemporary digital ecology, the conditions of intelligibility of cinema as art 
are now aligning with those of cinema as non-art. Dominique Païni points out 
that a true film history has only become possible with the emergence of digital 
image technologies. The f ilm exhibition, which, starting in the 1990s helped 
cinémathèques redefine their mission in the face of the competition from 
high-quality home video formats like the DVD, creates historical meaning 
by juxtaposing f ilm fragments with other fragments, texts, material objects, 
and photographs.33 De Kuyper’s vision of an aesthetic of f ilm history that 
comprises fragments and ruins of works has become the default mode not 
just of the history of cinema as non-art, but of the history of cinema as art. 
Merely a stepping stone on the path towards the film forms that really matter 
in Meunier’s phenomenology of f ilm experience, the utility f ilm, by virtue 
of its formal disunity, turns out to be a paradigm of a true history of cinema.
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 When Viewers Drift Off: A Brief 




Inspired by Jean-Pierre Meunier and expanding some of his original ideas, 
this article looks at cinematic daydreaming as an act of consciousness 
viewers are sometimes engaged in over and above the perception of the 
f ilm. After def ining the term ‘cinematic daydreaming,’ I distinguish 
three relations the daydream can have to the f ilm. Subsequently, I offer a 
concrete description of the cinematic daydreaming experience by focus-
ing on f ive aspects: (1) the degrees of controllability, (2) the declining 
attentiveness to the perceptual surroundings, (3) the attenuated power 
of the f ilm, (4) the shift into a more private mode, and (5) the distinction 
between intrusive daydreams that interfere with the f ilm and extensive 
daydreams that enrich it.
Keywords: Viewing experience; Jean-Pierre Meunier; mind-wandering; 
ruminating; experimental f ilm; slow cinema
I. Introduction1
Psychologists claim that we spend up to 50% of our waking life daydreaming, 
and on average we experience 2000 daydream segments per day.2 Even 
when we are involved in maximally demanding tasks with high stakes, we 
reportedly devote a minimum rate of 10% to daydreaming.3 Although we 
should be skeptical about such exact quantif ications when it comes to our 
mental life, these astonishingly high numbers might tempt us to assume that 
daydreaming also occurs when we watch a f ilm. And why not? Imagine you 
watch Hou-Hsiao Hsien’s Goodbye, Dragon Inn (2003) or Godfrey Reggio’s 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions, Amsterdam University Press, 2019
doi 10.5117/ 9789462986565_hanich
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Koyaanisqatsi (1982) and all of a sudden you realize – and maybe feel a bit 
surprised, annoyed, guilty, or embarrassed upon discovering it – that you 
have spent a considerable amount of time in what Freud once called your 
mind’s private theater. Involuntarily, the inner magician of your mind has 
conjured up for you an effortless f low of visual memories and imaginings: 
your magnif icent trip to Taiwan or the US, the place where you want to 
spend your next holiday, the conference trip that you still need to book, the 
heated discussion you might have with your friends about the f ilm… Your 
perception of the f ilm momentarily receded to the background of attention 
while you were immersed in your own daydream.
Instances like these, which seem to me much more common than usually 
admitted or even realized, have not yet received the attention they deserve 
in f ilm studies. Inspired by Jean-Pierre Meunier’s The Structures of the 
Film Experience (Les Structures de l’expérience filmique: L’identification 
filmique), I will investigate daydreaming as an act of consciousness that 
viewers sometimes are engaged in over and above the perception of the 
f ilm. The article does not provide an exegesis of Meunier’s work or an 
excavation of the origins of his thought, but is meant to showcase how 
some of Meunier’s original ideas can be expanded. As Meunier has shown 
us, our f ilmic consciousness is neither always completely bound to the f ilm, 
nor is it a static affair. What makes his book so valuable is that it points to 
the protean character of f ilmic consciousness, where the f ilm may be the 
center of the viewer’s attention in one moment (f iction consciousness) and 
a mere instigator for memories in another (home-movie consciousness). My 
discussion of cinematic daydreaming will yield further evidence for how 
dynamic and ever-changing the viewer’s consciousness is: we do not at all 
remain locked in one mental state while watching a f ilm but often drift 
off. It speaks to the clear-sightedness of Meunier’s little book that this was 
anything but consensus when it appeared in 1969, a year that marks the 
onset of a period when the dominant strand within f ilm theory began to 
describe the f ilm spectator as a dupe essentially dominated by the medium.
Almost 50 years later, the picture has changed: Meunier and other f ilm 
phenomenologists like Vivian Sobchack have tremendously enriched our 
understanding of what goes on in our conscious, albeit often pre-reflective 
experience of a f ilm. The stream of consciousness – to use an old term by 
William James again en vogue among philosophers of mind – is in a constant 
flux and is remarkably multilayered. Fiction consciousness, documentary 
consciousness, and home-movie consciousness can f luctuate; emotions, 
moods, affects, and various bodily sensations may f low into each other; 
different forms of time, space, and image consciousness can take turns; 
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perceiving, imagining, remembering, and – yes – daydreaming might co-
occur or alternate… While f ilm phenomenologists admit that many facets of 
the f ilm experience occur at the margins of consciousness (partly because 
they are too habituated to attract meta-awareness), they insist that these 
facets are nevertheless part of our conscious experience. Not only can they 
be described – only a proper description allows us to gain a fuller picture 
of the richness of the viewing experience. Not least, a phenomenological 
description raises awareness of what we rarely reflect on. Daydreaming, I 
argue, is precisely such a hardly-ever-noticed act of consciousness.
To be sure, the daydream has been a recurring topos in the history of 
f ilm. Take the Surrealists’ ‘irrational enlargement’ of the f ilm wherein 
the viewer does not follow the ‘rational’ demands of comprehension and 
understanding, but freely follows a spontaneous chain of associations 
initiated by a seemingly irrelevant detail of a f ilm usually suppressed by 
the f ilm’s demands on sense-making.4 As Adrian Martin claims, for the 
Surrealists, the term ‘irrational enlargement’ is “really just their fancy name 
for daydreaming.”5
Theorists have also compared f ilm to daydreaming or drawn an anal-
ogy between the spectator and the daydreamer. In their influential book 
Movies: A Psychological Study from 1950, Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan 
Leites, for instance, claimed that f ilms are the common daydreams of 
a culture.6 In his Theory of Film from 1960, Siegfried Kracauer oscillates 
between the terms “dream” and “daydream”: f ilms supposedly lower the 
viewer’s consciousness and thus invite dreaming, but they also cater to the 
desires and daydreams of their audiences; they can look like dreams and 
contain dreamlike elements that send the audience dreaming, but they 
also make the viewers enter episodes of daydreaming.7 Last but not least, 
we may cite Christian Metz who, in The Imaginary Signifier (1977), claims 
that the f lux of the f iction f ilm and its diegetic character resemble our 
daydreams, and some autobiographical or narcissistic f ilms, which derive 
directly from the daydreams of their authors, are even more like reveries. 
Moreover, the daydreamer and the viewer, due to the “relative lowering of 
wakefulness,” f ind themselves in comparable psychic states. And f inally, 
Metz also diagnoses, in the “social life of our age,” there is a “functional 
competition” between the f iction f ilm and the daydream, where the f ilm 
is often victorious.8
Inversely, we also f ind psychologists who have compared daydreaming 
to watching a f ilm: the daydreamer is likened to a “devout cinemagoer” 
and a melodramatic daydream is described as “a prototypical f ilmic tear-
jerker;” the daydreamer is seen as “camera, f ilm, projector, and screen” at 
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the same time.9 Be that as it may, such comparisons and analogies will not 
occupy me in this essay: I presuppose that watching a f ilm is not identical 
to daydreaming and whether it is similar to it is a question of debate.
Instead, I will take a brief but close look at the viewer’s experience of 
cinematic daydreaming: those passive moments when, in the words of 
Daniel Yacavone, “our attention and concentration wanes, and we mentally 
‘wander away’ from a f ilm and its demands” or when we actively start to 
‘build castles in the air’ by imagining or contemplating a chain of vivid 
scenes related or unrelated to the f ilm.10 Note, however, that I do not want 
to overvalue cinematic daydreaming as a positive act of resistance along 
the lines of Benjaminian distraction or to postulate it as a preferable mode 
of f ilm-watching. My account of the cinematic daydream aims at a detailed 
description, not a normative prescription. As Meunier puts it: “phenomenology 
is above all a method aimed at a description of our immediate experience. 
Renouncing, at least provisionally, the theoretical explanations that reason 
or scientif ic intelligence have been able to construct, it represents a return 
to the lived experience of phenomena […]” (p. 40).
Naturally, we can expect considerable differences in daydreaming prone-
ness among individual viewers. For instance, age seems to be an important 
influencing factor: psychologist Eric Klinger reports f indings which show 
that both vividness and frequency reach their peak during the teens and 
early twenties and then gradually decrease.11 However, these individual 
differences are not something I pursue here. My brief phenomenology will 
focus on cases in which a cinematic daydream actually occurs.
II. Cinematic Daydreaming Defined
Before answering the question what is it like to experience a daydream 
while watching a f ilm, however, we f irst need to define the contours of the 
concept. As late as 2009, Klinger noted that “there has clearly not been a 
consensual def inition.”12 More recently, analytic philosophers like Fabian 
Dorsch, Zachary Irving, and Evan Thompson have tried to conceptualize 
daydreaming and mind-wandering more clearly.13 While I have profited from 
their conceptual rigor, I have opted for a somewhat wider usage of the term. 
In what follows, ‘cinematic daydreaming’ will serve as an umbrella term for 
a host of related phenomena that can occur while watching a f ilm such as 
mind-wandering, ruminating, fantasizing, being lost in thought, building 
castles in the air, drifting off, reverie, and absent-mindedness. The reason 
for uniting this range of different, if similar, phenomena under the umbrella 
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term ‘cinematic daydreaming’ derives from the fact that I primarily want 
to make room for the Meunier-inspired intuition that the f ilm experience 
is not f ilm-devoted pure and simple. However, it is certainly possible – at a 
later stage even desirable – that different variants or subtypes of cinematic 
daydreaming should be distinguished phenomenologically.14
As a working definition, I suggest defining cinematic daydreaming as an 
act of consciousness in which a viewer – voluntarily or involuntarily – enters 
into a chain of sensory presentifications (Vergegenwärtigungen) of something 
that is either absent or non-existent, and which partly removes attention 
from the immediate perceptual surroundings of the viewer and thus draws 
attention, however slightly, away from the f ilm: the imagination-f illed 
perception of the f ilm that philosophers in the wake of Husserl have called 
“image consciousness” is complemented or even pushed aside by other forms 
of consciousness like mind-wandering, ruminating, free-floating imagining, 
etc. Importantly, the chain of sensory presentif ications involved in these 
other acts of consciousness is unguided by the film (even if it can certainly be 
related to it) and is thus at one remove from the film’s perceptual affordances.
The cinematic daydream may be a brief burst of a few seconds, but it can 
also occur in an extended fashion. In either case, it either ends smoothly, 
when the daydream has run its course, or abruptly, when it is somehow 
interrupted. It can involve a pleasurable form of free-floating imagining, 
but it can also involve displeasure and annoyance when the daydream 
comes in the form of a worrying rumination or is considered, afterward, as 
having interrupted the f ilm experience. It can involve the past, the future, 
hypothetical things, but also the here and now of the viewing environ-
ment – for example, when the erotic atmosphere of the cinema inspires a 
viewer to fantasize.
What is more, the temporal dynamics of cinematic daydreaming implies 
a chain of imaginings, memories, or thoughts – often (but not necessarily 
always) moving from one topic to another.15 Take Eric Rohmer’s Cahiers 
du Cinéma review of Rossellini’s Voyage to Italy (1954), in which the future 
nouvelle vague director remembers how his “imagination was wandering 
about” and how he felt plunged “into very absurd reflections”:
I confess that I have, while I was watching the f ilm, made reflections 
far removed from the drama itself; in the manner of a spectator who, 
entering the cinema between two meetings, and more concerned with 
his business than the show, is surprised to try to read the time on the 
watch that an actor wears on his wrist.16
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Moving freely from f iction consciousness to documentary consciousness 
and beyond, Rohmer recognizes the patterns on George Sanders’s jacket, 
wonders about the actor’s age and how much older he has grown since 
Rebecca (1940) and All About Eve (1950), ref lects on the haircut of Ingrid 
Bergman, considers the different structures of the skulls in the catacombs, 
and ponders new methods of archeology.
Note, however, that it is not easy to draw a strict line between daydream-
ing and imagining.17 In my broad understanding, free-floating imagining 
should be considered a form of daydreaming, whereas imagining steered 
from outside is not. The latter would be the case when someone tells you 
to imagine something, when a book guides your imagination, or when a 
f ilm makes you mentally visualize something. It is easier to distinguish 
daydreaming from other mental states. Dreams, hypnagogia, fever dreams, 
hallucinations, deliberate problem-solving thoughts, and memories must 
not be confused with daydreams (even though memories, for instance, can 
certainly become part of daydreams).18
III. The Cinematic Daydream and Its Relation to the Film
The exact contents of spectators’ daydreams – what they daydream about 
while watching a f ilm – are too varied and idiosyncratic to dwell on here. 
It seems that, in principle, everything a person may daydream in everyday 
life can also become the content of a daydream during a f ilm. More relevant 
for a phenomenology of cinematic daydreaming is the daydream’s relation 
to the f ilm. Here, we can broadly distinguish three types.
First, the daydream is directly linked to the f ilm: just like Rohmer in the 
example above, the viewer daydreams about the f ilm – its narrative, its 
characters, its world, its creators, its actors, its special effects. A viewer may 
briefly stray away from narrative absorption and daydream about how Max 
Ophüls and his cameraman Christian Matras f ilmed the opening sequence 
shot of La Ronde (1950): how must the set have looked to move the camera 
so elegantly for so long and how did Ophüls and Matras interact with their 
actors and extras during the shooting of the scene?
A viewer may also engage in a reverie about what it would be like to live in 
the world depicted in Byambasuren Davaa and Luigi Falorni’s documentary 
The Story of the Weeping Camel (2003): what would he do when confronted 
with – what for him comes across as – the monotonies and hardships of 
a monadic life in the Mongolian Gobi region?19 Similarly, when I recently 
watched Koyaanisqatsi, I caught myself wondering about the people whose 
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intense, quizzical faces Ron Fricke’s camera captures in slow-motion on the 
streets of New York: what has happened to these people in the intermittent 
35 years, are they still alive, and what do they look like today? (I also came 
to realize that Roland Barthes had asked similar questions when looking 
at André Kertész’s photograph of little Ernest from 1931: “Is it possible that 
Ernest is still alive today: but where? how? What a novel!”)20 
However, as much as these instances of daydreaming are linked to the 
f ilm, it is important to distinguish them from what I have elsewhere called 
“bounded imagination” (and what Elaine Scarry dubs “imagination-under-
authorial-instruction”): moments when the f ilm seems to invite – or even 
force – us to imagine something it does not show, but strongly suggests.21 
In this case, the intertwinement of the viewer’s act of consciousness and 
the f ilm as aesthetic object are differently structured, since the viewer’s 
imagining seems necessary to concretize the f ilm fully and thus to turn 
it from a work of art into an aesthetic object (in the sense def ined by the 
phenomenological aesthetics of, for instance, Roman Ingarden).22
Second, the daydream can be indirectly linked to the f ilm: the f ilm 
somehow incites the daydream, but its narrative, characters, world, creators, 
actors, or special effects do not themselves play a role in it. Think of a viewer 
watching a sadly moving melodrama that sparks thoughts about the future 
Fig. 14: The opening scene of Max ophüls’s La Ronde with anton walbrook.
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death of the viewer’s grandmother, father, brother, or daughter: the viewer’s 
thoughts are carried away and he begins to daydream about the funeral, the 
speech of a close relative, the deep feeling of loss wearing him down and 
so on. Or think of a young viewer who watches a horror f ilm alone at home 
while his parents are out for a party: the f ilm turns the dark living room 
into an unsafe, threatening place that sparks fearful daydreams of burglars 
outside the window, a looming monster in the creaking wardrobe, and an 
ensuing f ight for survival. Not least, the politics of an engagé documentary 
such as An Inconvenient Truth (2006) or I Am Not Your Negro (2016) may all 
of a sudden remind a viewer that he always wanted to be more active in 
environmental matters or anti-racist campaigns, and he begins to think 
about what steps to take the following days.
The third type of relation comprises all those daydreams that are not at 
all linked to the f ilm, when the viewer is carried away into foreign territory 
entirely unconnected to the movie.23 Consider this: you start watching 
the f ilm after a meeting in which you made a stupid mistake, or you had a 
heated debate with your best friend in which he insulted you in an unusual 
way. You try to focus on what is happening on the screen, but your thoughts 
keep drifting off, wandering back to that mistake or insult and the way you 
should have behaved. Or, while watching Andy Warhol’s Haircut (1963) or 
Eat (1964), your mind begins to wander: from the dinner afterwards … to the 
Christmas presents you have to buy … to the tennis match that you want 
to watch on Friday to … alas … many other things. While we might claim 
that Haircut or Eat’s monotony in some sense ‘incites’ a flight from boredom 
via fancy (the f ilm would thus be indirectly related to the daydream after 
Fig. 15: Some passersby in Godfrey reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi.
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all), it may be better to speak of the f ilm as the reason for daydreaming and 
not its cause. The viewer’s daydream occurs in order to escape the f ilm’s 
monotony, but the f ilm does not set it off.
Meunier, for his part, has shown us how the viewer’s dependence on 
the f ilmic images varies between the f ilmic modes: while the home movie 
makes us look beyond the screen to existing, previously experienced reality, 
the non-existing, autonomous reality of the f iction f ilm demands that our 
attention is focused on the screen. Analogously, cinematic daydreaming 
can be linked directly or indirectly to the f ilm, or not at all.
IV. The Experience of the Cinematic Daydream
Let us now move on to a more concrete description of the experience of 
cinematic daydreaming. I will focus on five aspects: (1) the degrees of control-
lability, (2) the declining attentiveness to the perceptual surroundings, (3) 
the attenuated power of the f ilm, (4) the shift into a more private mode, and 
(5) intrusive daydreams that interfere with the f ilm vs. extensive daydreams 
that enrich it.
1. Degrees of Controllability: Active vs. Passive Daydreaming
Cinematic daydreaming can be actively and voluntarily initiated and 
pursued. Take the example from La Ronde: precisely because I am actively 
following the f ilm, I am seriously interested in f inding out how Ophüls 
and Matras have staged the opening scene. I actively, with a certain effort 
and multitaskingly, pursue these thoughts and visually presentify to me 
the potential scenarios in a comparatively vivid way. Hence, my presen-
tif ications are not ‘gray’ inferences or abstract hypotheses, but ‘colorful’ 
daydreams that accompany my perception of the f ilm. Not everyone 
would agree with such an inclusive position, though. Dieter Lohmar, 
for instance, argues that, while daydreams can be actively initiated, we 
subsequently have to give ourselves over passively to their unfolding.24 
Others, like Elaine Scarry, def ine daydreams as voluntary: “Indeed it 
would be hard to see – given its fadedness and other failings – why we 
would devote ourselves to this ghostly practice if it did not have the virtue 
of the voluntary.”25
However, Scarry’s position seems too one-sided to me: it f lies in the face 
of the worrying and ruminating daydreams that keep creeping into our 
ongoing activities involuntarily. Surely, daydreams can also passively and 
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involuntarily overcome me. In this case, the mind seems to take over from 
the self without me realizing it at f irst. Zachary Irving draws attention to 
grammatical constructions we use in which the subject is not a human 
agent: “we would say ‘my mind was wandering’ or ‘Luke’s mind wandered’ 
rather than ‘I was mind-wandering’ or ‘Luke mind-wandered.’ […] when 
our minds wander, we don’t feel responsible for our thoughts; our minds 
are what wanders, not us.”26 Here, the daydreams occur effortlessly and 
unguided, and I glide into them unknowingly: “Frequently we realize that 
we are engaging in these acts only after we have been indulging in them 
for some time. By a sort of psychic repercussion, we f ind ourselves caught 
in their midst – in medias imagines, as it were,” Edward Casey writes.27 
Frequently, such moments of ‘waking up’ from the daydream come with an 
emotional response. We may be surprised or annoyed by our own reverie 
when we realize we have missed important parts of the f ilm (as, in contrast 
to reading a book, we cannot go back, at least when we sit in a cinema 
where the movie progresses relentlessly). Alternatively, we may feel guilty 
or embarrassed, especially when a friend or neighbor nudges us, whispers 
to us, and points out something on the screen we have overlooked because 
we were too deeply sunk in our own daydreams.
2. Declining Attentiveness to the External Perceptible 
Surroundings
As Irving notes, daydreaming is a conscious experience: “This is intuitive: 
when a person’s mind wanders, the lights don’t go out. Rather, she experi-
ences a stream of memories, imaginings, inner speech etc.”28 Similarly, 
Gaston Bachelard observes that the “night dream is a dream without a 
dreamer. On the contrary, the dreamer of reverie remains conscious enough 
to say: it is I who dream the reverie, happy with this leisure in which I no 
longer have the task of thinking.”29 Since the daydream occupies conscious-
ness at least to some degree, the daydreamer becomes less aware of the 
perceptible surroundings: even though we can certainly watch a f ilm and 
concurrently fall into an episode of daydreaming, daydreaming always 
backgrounds perception, however minimally.
Here we can distinguish various degrees of visual intensity, of trans-
parency or obliqueness: from the weak and vague daydream that allows 
you to ‘see through’ it to the strong and concrete type that almost fully 
‘blocks’ your perception of the f ilm (to a lesser degree, this is also the case 
for the auditory intensity of the daydream). Hence, the more the daydream 
dominates consciousness, the more the f ilm is relegated to the fringes of 
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consciousness, even if one still ‘picks up’ visual (and auditory) information. 
With regard to f ilmic imagining, I have elsewhere spoken of episodes of 
‘mental superimposition’ or ‘mental double-exposure.’30 We can also utilize 
these metaphors for the daydream: the concurrent perception of f ilmic 
images and the daydream are, as it were, layered on top of each other. 
The more the f ilm and the daydream are part of the f ield of conscious-
ness the more we can say the viewer is engaged in a form of multitasking: 
watching the f ilm and daydreaming at the same time. What is more, while 
daydreaming, the viewer is suspended between three different worlds: (a) 
the physical world of the cinema or any other viewing surrounding, (b) the 
filmic world (which may or may not be f ictional), and (c) the mental world of 
the daydream. Depending on the strength of the daydream, the locatedness 
in these three worlds varies.
3. The Attenuated Power of the Film
Since daydreaming backgrounds perception, at least minimally, we experi-
ence the f ilm as wielding much less power over us than in moments of 
intensif ied absorption (such as deep f ictional immersion and awe-inspiring 
aesthetic enthrallment).31 In fact, cinematic daydreaming occurs in moments 
when the f ilm seems to be bereft of its ‘grip’ over us. This can be for many 
reasons. First, the f ilm unintentionally does not ‘captivate’ us any longer 
(or has not been ‘gripping’ to begin with) and our attention starts to drift 
off. Second, we can ‘wrest’ ourselves actively from the f ilm by initiating an 
episode of daydreaming when we think this is more appropriate, or we are 
‘torn away’ passively from the f ilm by penetrating thoughts that interfere 
with the f ilm experience. Third, the attenuated power of the f ilm can also 
intentionally derive from its aesthetics, an aesthetics that does not want to 
‘chain’ us to its narrative and style but grants us more freedom to drift off 
into daydreaming. Below, we will see how some experimental f ilms seem 
to invite episodes of daydreaming, but we could also think of slow cinema. 
As Eric Rohmer remarks in his review, Rossellini’s f ilm allowed him “absurd 
reflections […] of which a more sustained tempo in the plot would not have 
left me the leisure.”32
This attenuated power of the f ilm can be experienced as liberating, 
but it can also imply constraints and frustration. Not feeling guided and 
captivated by a f ilm may result in disagreeable boredom; and when we 
seem to be under the ‘spell’ of our wandering mind, which strays away 
even though we actually would like to follow the f ilm, we may regret the 
lack of power of the f ilm.
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4. A Shift into Privacy
The daydream also implies an abandonment, however minimal, of the 
outside world and a shift into a more private realm. This aspect of privacy 
has two components. First, watching a f ilm entails perceiving something 
that is outside of me. It is clearly located beyond myself, there on the screen. 
The daydream, instead, is experienced as much closer to me, almost ‘inside’ 
of me. As Bachelard puts it: “Truly inhabiting the whole volume of his space, 
the man of reverie is from anywhere in his world, in an inside which has 
no outside. It is not without reason that people commonly say that the 
dreamer is plunged in his reverie. The world no longer poses any opposition 
to him.”33 To be sure, the talk of an ‘inside’ is not without its problems. 
What Edward Casey notes about imagining also goes for daydreaming: 
“Far from inhabiting a concrete setting, imagined possibilities are typically 
projected into a spatio-temporal limbo that is felt to be neither external nor 
internal to the imaginer.”34 Still, the daydream is more private because we 
know that – unlike the perceivable images and sounds of the f ilm – it is not 
available to others. The daydream constitutes a world decidedly not shared 
by others (hence the well-known feeling of being excluded from someone 
else’s world who is ‘lost in his thoughts’). There is no shared daydreaming 
of the same content.
Second, the daydream is also private in the sense that it is a world in 
some way connected to me and my own identity: it is f illed with what I 
personally daydream about. Eric Klinger writes: “Most people view their 
daydreams as very private affairs that they feel less comfortable describing 
to other people than when they are describing their real experiences.”35 At 
the same time, this does not imply that one has fully lost contact with the 
here and now of one’s viewing surroundings. Unlike in dreaming proper, 
the f ilm is relegated to the margins of consciousness at best, but it is still 
somehow ‘gleaming’ or ‘shimmering.’
Still, even in cases of f ilm-related daydreaming, personal elements from 
outside the f ilm itself ‘adhere’ to it, ‘cluster’ around its images, ‘push’ it from 
the center of consciousness: our mundane joys, hopes, concerns, worries or 
anxieties are invited into – or force themselves upon – our f ilm experience.
5. Intrusion vs. Extension of the Film Experience
Expressions like ‘seeing through’ the daydream, the daydream ‘blocking’ 
perception, or Casey’s in medias imagines hint at the intermediary char-
acter of daydreams: their in-betweenness. The daydream can therefore be 
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experienced – in retrospect – as an intruder: It is as if the daydream has 
pushed itself ‘between’ you and the f ilm and has created a barrier for your 
smooth perception of the f ilm. Take this not-so-unusual example. While 
you would like to focus on the f ilm, your mind keeps drifting away to a 
potential revenge scenario: how can you pay back the massive annoyance of 
the person sitting behind you in the cinema, who answered your request to 
stop kicking against your chair with an extremely impertinent remark? You 
play through various possibilities to get even, from informing the cinema 
manager to throwing the content of your f ive-liter cup of popcorn at him. 
The more the daydream is experienced as intrusive, the more it will be 
considered as a form of distraction, almost like the annoying neighbor 
sitting behind you.
But there are two reasons why daydreaming may be experienced as 
quite the opposite of distraction and intrusion. First, from the viewer’s 
perspective, daydreaming may be very welcome. Think of drifting back to 
the extremely positive email you received before starting to watch the f ilm 
and the pleasurable trains of thought it initiates for you. Hence, any negative 
definition of daydreaming as “an occurrence of thoughts […] unrelated to the 
task being carried out at the moment of their occurrence,” as Stawarczyk et 
al. put it, must be rejected as too sweeping.36 Instead, with Irving/Thompson, 
we can claim that “individuals switch tasks when their minds begin to 
wander.”37 For the viewer-turned-daydreamer, the daydream thus becomes 
the main task carried out at the moment, before the film gains predominance 
again and the daydreamer transforms back into his role of focused viewer 
just an instant later. Or consider the case of an utterly boring moment 
during a f ilm – the umpteenth action sequence in a superhero movie, for 
instance – wherein daydreaming can come as a momentary exit strategy 
from boredom’s imprisonment. This is another lesson to be learned from 
Meunier’s book: Just like the home-movie consciousness that “looks beyond 
the image, to the person-in-general that it depicts, in order to produce and 
maintain his existence even during the screening” (p. 88), the daydream 
consciousness leads the viewer beyond the image into a stream of private 
thoughts and imaginings. The former evokes the act of remembering, the 
latter the act of daydreaming.
Second, daydreaming may also be considered an intentional goal of the 
f ilm – or at least one may feel legitimized and even encouraged to enter 
daydreaming episodes by the f ilm’s aesthetics. Think of Paul Sharits and 
his f licker f ilm N:O:T:H:I:N:G (1968): for Sharits, it was an explicit goal to let 
the viewer reach “totally new levels of awareness,” as he put it. He claims 
to have based the color development of the f ilm on the Tibetan Mandala of 
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the Five Dhyani Buddhas “which is used in meditation to reach the highest 
level of inner consciousness”: “I am not at all interested in the mystical 
symbolism of Buddhism, only in its strong, intuitively developed imagistic 
power.”38 While it is not clear what exactly Sharits means by “new levels of 
awareness,” “highest level of inner consciousness,” and “imagistic power” 
(the f ilm is certainly close to the drug experiments of the 1960s and the 
counter-cultural interest in Buddhist meditation), we can assume that he 
would not have been averse to a daydreaming viewer.
In fact, we can create a whole list of canonical experimental f ilms whose 
explicit purpose – or at least implicit invitation – seems to involve daydream-
ing: Empire (1964), The Flicker (1965), Wavelength (1967), RR (2007)… Some 
cases of slow cinema – for instance, f ilms by Tsai Ming-Liang, Albert Serra, 
or Apichatpong Weerasethakul – equally seem to open themselves up to 
daydreaming viewers. These f ilms ‘harness’ the viewer’s daydreams: the 
perception of the f ilm is extended and enriched by the viewer’s drifting 
mind.39 To round off this brief phenomenology of cinematic daydreaming, 
we could therefore distinguish between intrusive and extensive daydreams. 
On the one hand, there are reveries that lead us entirely away from the f ilm 
into the mundane. On the other hand, we f ind daydreams that extend the 
world of the f ilm – and thus immerse us even deeper in its world.
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